THE BATTLE OF WILSON’S CREEK—THE UNION OR FEDERAL ACCOUNT.
Gen. Lyon in Springfield—His entreaties to Gen. Fremont for
Reinforcements—Lyon Loses His Temper—Preliminaries to the Final
Conflict—Slight Skirmishes—Proposals to Retreat—Gen. Sweeney
Opposed—A False Alarm—Thursday, August 8th—Friday, August 9th—A
Messenger from Fremont—No Hope—Lyon’s Last Letter—Confederate
Military Movements—Failure to Discover or Develop the Federal
Position—McCulloch Reconnoiters in Person—Price Loses His
Patience—An Advance Ordered on Springfield—Gen. Lyon Marches Out
to Battle—Order of March, List of Regiments and Battalions,
etc.—The March Begun—Lyon’s Route—“Gay and Happy.”—Col. Sigel’s
Advance and Route—Preparations in Springfield for Retreat—Great
Excitement Among the Citizens—The Federals in Position Waiting for
the Dawn—Lyon Opens the battle—Temporary Success of the
Federals—Desperate Fighting on Both Sides—Death of Gen. Lyon—Full
Particulars—Still the Battle Goes On—Nearing the End—The Last
Grand Charge of Price’s Men—The Federals Retreat—Sigel’s Part in
the Fight—Surprise of the Confederate Camp—Moving Forward—All
Successful So Far—In Position—A Force Seen Approaching Down the
Valley—“They Are Friends”—“Ah! They Shoot Against Us; They Make a
Mistake”—“No! They Are Enemies!”—Charge of the Louisiana
Regiment—The Federals Retreat with Precipitation and in
Confusion—Destruction of Sigel’s Force—Sigel Himself Escapes,
“With Two Dutch Guards and Nary Gun”—Lieut. Farrand’s
Account—Surgeon Melcher’s Account—Sigel’s Explanation—Capt. Carr’s
Account.
GEN. LYON IN SPRINGFIELD.
When Gen. Lyon returned to Springfield after the Dug Springs expedition,
he scattered his forces upon the different roads leading into the city
at a distance of from three to five miles. Five miles from town, on the
Fayetteville road, was a force of 2,500 under command of Maj. Sturgis.
The other roads were well guarded, and all precautions were taken
against a surprise or a sudden attack. Gen. Lyon’s private room and
personal headquarters were in a house on North Jefferson street, not far
from the public square. The building, a small one, was then owned by
Mrs. Boren; it is now (1883) the property of Mrs. Timmons. His general
headquarters were on the north side of College street, a little west of
Main, in a house then owned by John S. Phelps, but which had been
recently occupied by Maj. Dorn. In this same house his body lay, after
it was borne from the battle field of Wilson’s Creek. The house was
burned by Curtis’ Federals in February, 1862, and where it once stood is
now (July, 1883) a vacant lot, on which are the remains of an old
cellar.
As soon as Lyon reached Springfield he again sent off a courier to
Fremont at St. Louis asking for reinforcements. Hon. John S. Phelps, who
had started for Washington City to attend the extra session of Congress
convened by President Lincoln, had stopped in St. Louis, called upon
Gen. Fremont, and urged him to help Lyon and the Union people of
Southwest Missouri with men and supplies, both of which were at St.
Louis in abundance.[2] But Fremont stated that he did not believe Gen.
Lyon was in anything like desperate straits; that McCulloch and Price
could have nothing but an inconsiderable force, since the country in
Southwestern Missouri was too poor to support a force of any formidable
strength; that in his opinion Lyon could take care of himself; and
finally that he had no troops to spare him anyhow, as he had received
information through Gov. Morton, of Indiana, that a large Confederate
force and flotilla of gunboats, under command of Gen. Pillow, were
coming up the Mississippi to attack Cairo, Bird’s Point, and if
successful in their destruction, would come on and destroy St. Louis,
and that he had need of every available man to guard those threatened
points.
Gen. Lyon consulted with his officers and with the prominent Union men
of Springfield very freely. He knew the situation perfectly. His scouts
came in every day from McCulloch’s army and gave him all needed
information. He was impatient to fight the force in his front, but he
anxiously desired reinforcements to enable him to have a reasonable
chance of success. Every day he visited the out-posts and nearly every
day sent off messages for help. Sometimes he would lose his temper and
curse and swear quite violently. On one occasion he received a message
from Fremont that no more troops could or would be sent for the present.
Striding back and forth in his room, with the paper in his hand, he
suddenly threw it on the table, and smiting his hands together cried
out: “_G—d d—n General Fremont_: He is a worse enemy to me and the Union
cause than Price and McCulloch and the whole d—d tribe of rebels in this
part of the State!”[3]
PRELIMINARIES OF THE FINAL STRUGGLE.
On Monday, August 5, the day of Lyon’s arrival at Springfield, as before
stated, he left a force of 2,500 strong at a point about five miles from
Springfield, on the Fayetteville road. This force (comprising fully
one-third of Lyon’s army), under Major Sturgis, was ordered by Gen. Lyon
to be ready to move at a moment’s notice, and at about 6 o’clock on the
evening of the next day the men were in ranks, the artillery horses
harnessed, and everything in readiness to march back and attack the
advancing enemy.
Shortly afterward a stream of visitors, messengers, and communications
poured in upon the general, some reporting the engagement of Capt.
Stockton, of the 1st Kansas, and two companies of Home Guards with a
party of Price’s cavalry, on the prairie west of town, in which two of
the latter were wounded; some gave other information; some were the
bearers of excellent advice(!); others came for orders; still others had
no business.
Two companies were ordered to the relief of Capt. Stockton. Eight
companies of the 1st Kansas infantry, a part of the second Kansas, and
Major Osterhaus’ battalion of the 2d Missouri were ordered to a certain
point in town to await the arrival of Gen. Lyon, who, it seems, was so
entirely occupied with other matters that instead of starting at 10
o’clock, it was midnight when he left his headquarters, and without
looking at his watch he proceeded to Camp Hunter, having already ordered
Major Sturgis to drive in the enemy’s pickets, if within two miles of
his own. A company of cavalry under Capt. Fred Steele[4] was dispatched
on his errand (to find the pickets) at half-past 12, and Gen. Lyon, with
the troops above mentioned, arrived at 3 o’clock in the morning. Here he
consulted his watch, and, finding the time more than two hours later
than he supposed, he at once called together his principal officers,
communicated to them his embarrassing position, and taking their advice,
withdrew the entire force to Springfield.
It had been Lyon’s intention, on retreating from Dug Springs to
Springfield, to wheel suddenly about on reaching the latter place and
march back upon Price and McCulloch (who, he considered, would be
following him up), fall upon them when they least expected an attack,
and defeat them if possible. On arriving at Springfield, appearances
indicated the approach of a Confederate force from the west, and this
caused him to wait a few hours. The night of the 6th, his information
was to the effect that Price and McCulloch were only seven miles away
from Sturgis’ camp, and he intended attacking them at daylight. On the
return to town the general remarked to Major Schofield, of the 1st
Missouri (Frank Blair’s regiment), that he had a premonition that a
night attack would prove disastrous, and yet he had felt impelled to try
it once, and perhaps should do so again, “for my only hope of success is
in a surprise,” he added. Before the Federals reached Springfield it was
daylight. An ambush was formed in the timber southwest of town in case
of pursuit.
During Wednesday continued alarms were circulated in Springfield, and a
real panic prevailed among many of the citizens, who packed up and left,
or prepared to leave, for supposed places of safety. The troops wore
under arms in every quarter, and several times it was reported that
fighting had actually commenced. Toward night the panic in a degree
subsided: but many of the people who remained did not retire or make any
attempt to sleep. Phelps’ regiment of Home Guards, commanded by Col.
Marcus Boyd, was on the _qui vive_ the whole night.
A consultation of the principal Federal officers was held at Gen. Lyon’s
headquarters, which lasted till midnight. The question of evacuating
Springfield and abandoning Southwest Missouri to its fate was seriously
discussed. Looking at the matter from a military point of view, there
was no doubt of the propriety and even the necessity of such a step, and
Gen. Lyon and the majority of his officers counseled such a movement.
Some favored a retreat to Fort Scott, while others thought Rolla a point
easier reached and promising better results.
Gen. Sweeney, however, was strongly opposed to retreating without a
fight. With his naturally florid face flushed to livid red, and waving
his one arm with excitement, he exclaimed vehemently against such a
policy—pointing out the disastrous results which must ensue upon a
retreat without a battle—how the “rebels” would boast over such an easy
conquest, how they would terrorize, harass, and persecute the
unprotected Unionists if given undisputed possession of the country, how
the Unionists themselves would become discouraged, crushed, or
estranged, and declared himself in favor of holding on to the last
moment, and of giving battle to Price and McCulloch as soon as they
should offer it.[5]
Gen. Lyon and some of the other officers became converts to Gen.
Sweeney’s views, and it was decided to remain, save the reputation of
the little army, hope against hope for reinforcements, and not evacuate
Springfield and Greene county until compelled to. The next day when
Sigel’s brigade quartermaster, Major Alexis Mudd, asked Gen. Lyon when
the army would leave Springfield, the latter replied: “Not until we are
whipped out.”
A FALSE ALARM.
Thursday morning, Price and McCulloch were reported to be actually
advancing on Springfield. Lyon’s troops were quickly in line of battle,
the luggage wagons were all sent to the center of the town, and in this
position they remained during nearly the entire day. The Southern troops
_had_ advanced, but only about two miles, and had gone into camp in the
southern part of this county, nearly on the line between Greene and
Christian counties (in sections 25 and 36, tp. 28, range 23, partly in
Greene and partly in Christian county), their tents being on either side
of Wilson’s Creek, and extending a mile or so east and south of the
Fayetteville road. Thursday evening the Federals were ready for marching
orders, but a portion of the Kansas troops had been so much engaged the
night before as to be really unfit for service, and an order for all of
the soldiers, except those actually on guard, to retire and rest, was
issued, and the night attack was again deferred. The Home Guards were on
duty and in active service in the city at this time.
And so the soldiers lay down to rest and to sleep—to many of them it was
to be the last repose they should take until they should lie down to
take their last sleep. Soon the camps were wrapped in silence and
slumber and no sound was to be heard save the cry of the night birds and
the challenges of the watchful pickets as they hailed the relief guard,
or arrested the steps of some belated wanderer. There they lay, these
men from Iowa and Kansas, dreaming of the homes and loved ones they had
left behind them on the beautiful prairies of their own States, and in
vision seeing faces and forms and scenes they were destined to never see
again in reality. There they lay, these bearded Germans from St. Louis,
dreaming, perhaps, of families and kinsmen in the city by the great
river, or of their early homes in the Fatherland, far across the deep,
blue sea. There they lay, these Missouri Unionists, sleeping as
peacefully as their brethren in arms.
There they lay, too, only a few miles away, those men under the folds of
the new flag, who had come out from their homes by the bayous of
Louisiana, on the plains of Texas, amid the hills and dales and valleys
of Arkansas and Missouri, to do battle for the cause they believed to be
just and righteous, to drive out those whom they believed to be the
wrongful invaders of their country, the despoilers of their homes. And
to blue and gray alike, with an equal peace and softness, came that
balmy blessing which “knits up the raveled sleeve of care.”
Friday, the 9th, Springfield was remarkably quiet. But the calm preceded
the storm. Those timid creatures who had made it a business to repeat
exciting rumors had been frightened away with much of the material upon
which they operated. Enlistments in the Springfield regiment had been
rapid, and really among the uninitiated and uninformed a feeling of
security prevailed. During the afternoon, Capt. Wood’s company of Kansas
cavalry and Capt. Stanley’s company of regulars had a skirmish with a
scouting party of Price’s cavalry on the prairie about five miles west
of town, defeating them, wounding two and capturing six or eight
prisoners. From the prisoners, among other information, it was learned
that the Southern troops were badly off for provisions and were forced
to do some pretty liberal foraging on both friends and enemies.
A MESSENGER FROM FREMONT—NO HOPE!
About noon there arrived a messenger from St. Louis and Fremont bearing
a dispatch from the latter to Gen. Lyon. This dispatch informed Lyon
that his situation was not considered critical; that he doubtless
over-estimated the force in his front; that he ought not to fall back
without good cause, and assured him that no reinforcement would be sent,
but that he must report his future movements as soon as possible, and do
the best he could.
Like the brave, disciplined soldier that he was, Lyon accepted the
situation, and prepared to obey the orders of his superior officer. With
Fremont’s message before him, he sat quietly down at his little table in
his headquarters and wrote the following reply with his own hand—the
last letter he ever wrote:—
Springfield, Mo., Aug. 9, 1861.
General—I have just received your note of the 6th inst., by special
messenger. I retired to this place, as I have before informed you,
reaching here on the 5th. The enemy followed to within ten miles of
here. He has taken a strong position, and is recruiting his supplies
of horses, mules, and provisions by forages into the surrounding
country. His large force of mounted men enables him to do this without
much annoyance from me. I find my position extremely embarrassing, and
am at present unable to determine whether I shall be able to maintain
my ground or forced to retire. I shall hold my ground as long as
possible, though I may, without knowing how far, endanger the safety
of my entire force with its valuable material, being induced, by the
important considerations involved, to take this step. The enemy
yesterday made a show of force about five miles distant, and has
doubtless a full purpose of making an attack on me. Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
N. Lyon
Brig. Gen. Vols., Commanding.
To Major Gen. J. C. Fremont, Commanding Western Department, St. Louis,
Mo.
No word of complaint; no murmuring; but with the expressed knowledge
that he was to be attacked, when attack meant defeat, he calmly
announced his determination to hold his ground as “long as possible.”
CONFEDERATE MILITARY MOVEMENTS PRECEDING THE BATTLE.
From their camp at Moody’s Spring, where they had arrived Monday night,
Generals Price and McCulloch moved forward to the point on Wilson’s
creek, heretofore described, and went again into camp on the 6th.
Scouting parties were at once sent out, especially to discover the
Federal position, but with little success, while foraging parties
scoured the country in every direction, and were equally inefficient in
obtaining information. The combined forces were at once put in position
to advance on Springfield, and only awaited the decision of Gen.
McCulloch to begin to move. The latter was irresolute and undecided for
some days. From the information he possessed as to the strength and
character of Lyon’s forces and his knowledge of his own, he was fearful
of the result of an engagement at that time. He had but little
confidence in Price’s Missourians, who were somewhat undisciplined and
inexperienced, it is true, and at one time he characterized them as
“splendid roasting-ear foragers, but poor soldiers.”
It is an undoubted fact that at one time Gen. McCulloch had decided _to
retreat into Arkansas_. Gen. Price, however, was anxious for an
immediate advance and attack. He knew that Lyon’s force was inferior
even to his own, and that the entire Southern army had but little to
risk in offering battle. He knew furthermore, that Lyon ought to be
reinforced, and that the chances were that he could and would be, and of
course it was desirable that the enemy be attacked before this
reinforcement should be effected. The most serious feature considered by
McCulloch, that the Missourians were illy disciplined, imperfectly
organized, and poorly armed, Price thought would be overcome by their
superiority in numbers and _their pluck_ in fighting on Missouri soil
against a detested enemy—“the Yankee Dutch.”
There remains to be shown a good reason why McCulloch did not follow up
Lyon and attack him on the 6th; it is true that he gained a victory by
waiting, but that victory could have been won four days earlier and made
more complete, more decisive and more lasting in its results. And yet
McCulloch, on the 8th, seriously meditated a retreat—knowing his enemy’s
strength as well as his own, and understanding, or supposed to
understand, the situation perfectly.
In his report to the Confederate Secretary of War (see Rebellion
Records, Series I., Vol. III., p. 745), Gen. McCulloch says: “* * * I
asked of the Missourians, owing to their knowledge of the country, some
reliable information of the strength and position of the enemy. This
they repeatedly promised, but totally failed to furnish, though to urge
them to it I then and at subsequent periods _declared I would order the
whole army back to Cassville_, rather than bring on an engagement with
an unknown enemy. It had no effect, as _we remained four days within ten
miles of Springfield, and never learned whether the streets were
barricaded, or if any kind of works of defense had been erected by the
enemy_.”
Col. Snead says that McCulloch made every effort to discover the
condition of Springfield; that he (McCulloch) would frequently sling his
rifle over his shoulder, mount his horse and reconnoiter in person; but
all to no purpose. Incredible as it may seem, it could not even be
ascertained whether or not the Federals had thrown up breastworks, which
it might be supposed could be learned from inspection a mile away.
Gen. N. B. Pearce says the first information concerning Gen. Lyon’s
condition was furnished by two ladies, who, “on a pass to go out of
Lyon’s lines, came around by Pond Springs, and came to Gen. Price’s
headquarters and gave the desired information.” No corroboration of this
story has been obtained, but it is given on the high authority of such a
gallant officer and high-minded gentleman as Gen. Pearce, now of
Whitesboro, Texas.
At last, Gen. Price lost all patience, and at sunrise on the morning of
the 9th, sent Col. Snead over to McCulloch, to say to him that if he did
not give orders for an immediate advance he (Price) would resume command
of the Missouri State Guard and advance alone, be the consequences what
they might. This led to a conference of the general officers at Price’s
headquarters that afternoon, which conference resulted in orders for an
advance on Springfield that very night, the movement to begin at nine
o’clock.
GEN. LYON MARCHES OUT TO BATTLE.
Upon the receipt of Gen. Fremont’s last message, to the effect that no
help would be sent, Gen. Lyon resolved upon attacking his enemy down on
Wilson’s creek and trusting to the effect of a surprise and a fierce
fight. He was led to this course by the fact that he knew his situation
would not improve with time, and perhaps by his knowledge of the fact
that Price and McCulloch were about to attack _him_.[6] To fight on the
defensive about Springfield, with a town full of women and children
behind him and an open country adapted to the movements of cavalry, of
which he had but a handful, and of which his enemy’s force largely
consisted, could but result one way—in defeat. The Confederates were
expecting to attack, not to be attacked, and if the Federals should fall
suddenly upon them it would disconcert them very materially, to say the
least. These were the tactics adopted by Gen. Lee when Grant crossed the
Rapidan, in the spring of 1864, and by Napoleon, in the first campaign
in Italy.
Accordingly, late in the afternoon of the 9th (Friday) word was sent to
the subordinate commanders that after nightfall another movement against
the Confederates would be made. Between Gens. Lyon and Sweeney, Col.
Sigel, and Maj. Sturgis, the plan of attack was agreed upon. That part
of the plan which arranged for sending Sigel’s brigade around completely
to the south and rear of the Confederate position, was, it is said,
adopted by Gen. Lyon upon the most urgent suggestions and
representations of Col. Sigel himself. The army was to be divided into
two columns. The first column, under Lyon, was to consist of three small
brigades, the second under Sigel, was to consist of one small brigade
composed of two regiments of infantry, two companies of cavalry, and six
pieces of artillery.
The first brigade of Lyon’s column was composed of three companies of
the 1st U. S. regular infantry, as follows: Co. B, Capt. Gilbert; Co. C,
Capt. Plummer; Co. D, Capt. Huston; a company of regular rifle recruits
under Lieut. Wood,—the four companies being commanded by Capt. Plummer,
of Co. C. Then there were two companies of the 2d Missouri Volunteers,
under Maj. P. J. Osterhaus; Capt. Woods’ company (mounted) of the 2d
Kansas Volunteers; Company B, 1st U. S. regular cavalry, under Lieut.
Caulfield, and a light battery of six pieces commanded by Capt. James
Totton. The first brigade was commanded by Maj. Sturgis.
The second brigade was commanded by Lieut. Col. Geo. L. Andrews, of the
1st Missouri Volunteers (Blair’s regiment), and was composed of the 1st
Missouri infantry; Cos. B and E, 2d U. S. regular infantry, under Capt.
Fred Steele; one company of regular recruits under Lieut. Lothrop; one
company (squad) of mounted recruits under Sergeant Morine, and Lieut.
Dubois’ light battery of four pieces, one a 12-pounder.
The third brigade was commanded by Gen. Sweeney, and was composed of the
1st Iowa volunteers, under Lieut. Col. Merritt, the colonel, J. F.
Bates, being sick in Springfield; the 1st Kansas, under Col. Geo. W.
Deitzler; the 2d Kansas, under Col. Mitchell, and about 200 mounted Dade
county home guards, under Capt. Clark Wright and Capt. T. A. Switzler.
Gen. Sigel’s command consisted of eight companies of the 3d Missouri
volunteers (Sigel’s regiment), under Lieut. Col. Albert; nine companies
of the 5th Missouri, under Col. Salomon; one company, 1st regular
cavalry, under Capt. Carr; one company, C, of the 2d U. S. dragoons,
under Lieut. Farrand, and six pieces of light artillery manned by
details from the infantry recruits under Lieuts. Schaeffer and
Schuetzenbach.
THE MARCH BEGUN—ROUTE OF GEN. LYON.
At about 6 P. M. of Friday evening, the 9th, the movement of troops
began. Gen. Lyon’s column went to the westward, on the Mt. Vernon road,
Capt. Gilbert’s company of regular infantry having the advance. In a
short time it was dark, but the march was continued. Although the march
was intended to result in a surprise, and, it was expected, would be
conducted silently, yet there was a great deal of noise made. The Iowa
and Kansas volunteers were disposed to exercise their vocal organs, and
camp songs of all sorts were sung _con spirito_, along the march. The
1st Iowa had a favorite song, the burden of which ran:—
So let the wide world wag as it will,
We’ll be gay and happy still.
Gay and happy, gay and happy,
We’ll be gay and happy still.
The strains of this song were wafted out over the prairie, loud enough,
it would have seemed, to have been heard by McCulloch’s pickets, if any
were out. The Kansas men sang the “Happy Land of Canaan,” and raised the
neighborhood with their vocal efforts. Toward midnight, however, the
line became more quiet, by Gen. Lyon’s orders. The latter had remarked
during the march that the Iowa troops had too much levity in their
composition to do good fighting, but added that he would give them an
opportunity to show what they were made of. It so turned out that the
general was mistaken in his estimate of the fighting qualities of the
Hawkeyes.
Lyon marched west from Springfield on the Mt. Vernon road, about five
miles, or a little east of where the town of Brooklyn now stands, when
he turned south, and made his way over neighboring roads and across
prairies as best he could nearly six miles, when he reached a point
within striking distance of Price’s Missourians. The center of the camp
of the Southerners was about six miles west, and about seven miles south
of the public square of Springfield. Gen. Lyon had for guides Pleasant
Hart, Parker Cox, and other men. Nearly twenty men have come forward to
claim this distinction.
It was 1 o’clock in the morning when the advance discovered the
camp-fires of the Missourians. The command was then halted, and the
ground reconnoitered as well as possible until the dawn of day, when it
again moved forward and formed a battle line, moving a little southeast
so as to strike the extreme northern point of the enemy’s camp.
COL. SIGEL’S ADVANCE.
Sigel left “Camp Fremont,” on the south side of Springfield, at about
6:30, p. m., taking at first the “wire” road, or road to Cassville and
Fayetteville, along which the telegraph wire ran. About four miles
southwest of town, the command left the main Cassville road, which led
directly through McCulloch’s camp, and bore south, and then along a road
parallel with the Cassville road, and in the same general direction,
until below the Christian county line. Col. Sigel had for guides, C. B.
Owen, John Steele, Andrew Adams, Sam (or Jo.) Carthal and L. A. D.
Crenshaw. Sigel’s column marched perhaps twelve or thirteen miles,
passing clear around the extreme southeastern camp of the enemy, and
arriving at daylight within a mile of the main camp. Taking forward the
two cavalry companies of Carr and Farrand, Col. Sigel contrived to cut
off about forty men of McCulloch’s troops, who had gone out early to
forage, and were engaged in digging potatoes, picking roasting ears,
gathering tomatoes and procuring other supplies for their individual
commissary departments. These captures were made in such a manner that
no news of the Federal advance from this quarter was brought into the
Confederate camp. Moving cautiously up, Sigel planted four pieces of his
artillery on a little hill, in plain view of the Confederate tents,
which spread out to his front and right. The two regiments of infantry
advanced so as to command the Fayetteville road at the point where it
crosses Wilson’s creek, while the two companies of cavalry guarded the
flanks. In this position the command rested, awaiting the sound of
Lyon’s gun as a signal to open the ball. The prisoners were left in
charge of Capt. Flagg, with his company (K) of the 5th Missouri.
In conformity to the plan agreed upon between the Federal commanders,
Sigel disposed his troops so as to command the Fayetteville road, and
prevent the Confederates from retreating by that thoroughfare. It is
claimed by officers of both armies that, had an avenue of retreat been
left open, it is highly probable that the result of the day’s battle
would have been different.
Lyon had left behind him the Greene and Christian County Home Guards to
take care of Springfield, directing the officers in command to watch the
Fayetteville road below where Sigel turned off, and send word to him
across the country, should the Confederates be found approaching from
that quarter. This is a circumstance corroborative of the theory that
Lyon knew that the Confederates meditated a night attack on him (as they
did) or believed that such was a fact. Everything in Springfield had
been gotten ready for a retreat. Wagons were loaded, and the funds of
the bank were secured for transfer, and were being guarded by the Home
Guards. The citizens were in quite a state, to be sure.
LYON OPENS THE BATTLE.
In describing the battle of Wilson’s Creek in this history, which, it is
believed, contains the only fully elaborate and accurate account ever
published, of that memorable contest, it is proper to do so in detail.
The statements herein made have been derived from the official reports
of commanders, and from the fairest accounts of actual participants.
Care has been taken to discard all reports which are highly colored,
sensational, not corroborated by undisputed facts, and savoring of the
improbable. Both Federal and Confederate accounts of this character have
been rejected. The Federal accounts believed to be the most reliable are
those furnished by Maj. (General) Sturgis, Lieut. Col. Merritt of the
1st Iowa; Lieut. Col. Blair and Maj. Cloud, of the 2d Kansas; Maj. J. M.
Schofield, then of the 1st Missouri; Capt. Totten and Lieut. Dubois of
the artillery, and Capt. Steele of the regulars; Capt. Wright of the
Home Guards, all of Lyon’s column; and Gen. Sigel, Dr. S. H. Melcher,
the guides, and Capt. Carr, of Sigel’s column. The Confederate or
Southern accounts relied upon, are the official reports of Gens. Price,
McCulloch, Pearce, Clark, Rains, McBride and Parsons; reports of Col.
John T. Hughes, of Slack’s division, and Col. John R. Graves, of Rains’
division; letters from Col. Thos. L. Snead, Asst. Adj. Gen. of Gen.
Price, and Lieut. W. P. Barlow, of Guibor’s battery; reports of and
letters from Col. T. J. Churchill, 1st Arkansas Mounted Riflemen; Col.
James McIntosh, and Lieut. Col. B. T. Embry, 2d Arkansas Mounted
Riflemen; Lieut. Col. D. McRae, of McRae’s battalion, Arkansas
Volunteers; Col. Lewis Hebert, Lieut. Col. S. M. Hyams and Maj. W. F.
Tunnard, 3d Louisiana Volunteers; Col. E. Greer, South Kansas-Texas
Regiment Cavalry; Capt. J. G. Reid, of Reid’s Arkansas Battery; Col.
John R. Gratiot, 3d Arkansas; Col. J. D. Walker, 4th Arkansas; Col. Tom
P. Dockery, 5th Arkansas Infantry; Col. De Rosey Carroll, 1st Arkansas
Cavalry, and other commissioned officers, and many private soldiers and
a few citizens.
Maj. Sturgis, who assumed command of Lyon’s column after the battle,
states that at daylight, Lyon’s battle line was formed, the infantry in
front, closely followed by Totten’s battery, which was supported by a
reserve. In this order the line advanced but a few hundred yards, when
the first outpost of Price’s men was encountered. Firing was commenced
instantly, and the outpost hurriedly retreated. This was the advance of
Rains’ division. The Federal line then halted, and Capt. Plummer’s
battalion of regulars, with the Dade County Home Guards on his left, was
sent to the east across Wilson’s creek, and ordered to move toward the
front, keeping pace with the advance on the Federal left. The main line
then swept forward, and after crossing a considerable ravine and
ascending a high ridge, a full view of a line of Rains’ skirmishers was
had. Maj. Osterhaus’ two companies of the 2d Missouri, and two companies
of the 1st Missouri, under Capts. Yates and John S. Cavender, were
deployed to the left, all as skirmishers. Firing between the two
skirmish lines now became very severe, and Totten’s battery, then in
position, opened with shell, and the boom of the cannon and the crashing
of the bombs added to the excitement.[7]
The 1st Missouri, Col. Andrews, and the 1st Kansas, Col. Dietzler, were
now hastily moved to the front, supported by Totten’s battery; the 2d
Kansas, Col. Mitchell, Steele’s battalion, and Dubois’ battery, were
held in reserve. The 1st Missouri took its position in front, upon the
crest of a small elevated plateau. The 1st Kansas went to the left of
the 1st Missouri, while Totten’s battery was placed opposite the
interval between the two regiments. Osterhaus’ two companies occupied
the extreme right, with their right resting on a ravine, which turned
abruptly to the right and rear. Dubois’ battery, supported by Steele’s
battalion, was placed seventy-five yards to the left and rear of
Totten’s guns, so as to bear upon a well-served Confederate battery
(believed to have been Capt. Woodruff’s “Pulaski Artillery,” of
Arkansas), which had come into position to the left and front on the
opposite side of Wilson’s Creek, and was sweeping with canister the
entire plateau upon which the Federals were posted.
The Missourians now rallied in considerable force under cover at the
foot of the slope and along it in front and opposite the Federal right,
toward the crest of the main ridge running parallel to the creek. During
this time Plummer’s battalion had advanced along the ridge about 500
yards to the left of the main Federal position, and had reached the
terminus of this ridge, when he found his further progress arrested by a
force of infantry (a portion of McCulloch’s division), which was
occupying a cornfield (Mr. Ray’s) in the valley. At this moment the
“bang” of a cannon was heard more than a mile to the south, at about the
point where Sigel was supposed to be. This fire was apparently answered
from the opposite side of the valley, at a still greater distance, the
line of fire of the two batteries being apparently east and west, and
nearly perpendicular to Totten’s and Dubois’ batteries. After about ten
or twelve shots this firing ceased, and nothing more was heard of Sigel
until about 8:30, when a brisk cannonading was heard for a few minutes,
about a mile to the right of that heard before, and still further to the
rear.
Early in the engagement the 1st Iowa had been brought up from the
reserve to the front, and immediately became hotly engaged, doing good
fighting and winning the praise of Gen. Lyon, who thought at one time
that men who sang rollicking songs would not fight well.
The entire Federal line was now successfully advanced with much energy,
and apparently with every prospect of success. The firing, which had
been spirited for half an hour, now increased to a continuous roar,
heard miles away—in Springfield, plainly. Capt. Totten’s battery came
into action by section and by piece, as the nature of the ground would
admit, it being wooded, with much black-jack undergrowth, and played
vigorously upon the Confederate lines with considerable effect.
More desperate fighting was not done during the civil war. The men of
the West were fighting. For fully half an hour the armies fought over
the hill before described—“Bloody Hill,” it was afterward called. The
1st Kansas gave way and went to the rear, but the 1st Iowa promptly took
its place, and the fighting went on. Back and forth over the ground they
went. Now the Union troops fell back a few yards, then advanced again
and drove the secession troops a short distance, then the latter
advanced, and so it was for half an hour. At last the Federals were left
in possession of the ground for a short time, the Confederates falling
back and reforming.
Meantime Plummer’s battalion on the Federal left had encountered
McIntosh’s regiment of Arkansas riflemen, and Hebert’s 3d Louisiana
regiment, in Ray’s cornfield and been driven back with considerable
loss. The Arkansas and Louisiana regiments both belonged to McCulloch’s
army. They would have annihilated Plummer almost, but just as they were
preparing to do so Dubois’ battery opened with shells, filling the
cornfield full of them, and making it untenable for any troops, and the
two regiments retreated in some disorder. Steele’s battalion was
supporting Dubois’ battery on this occasion. Plummer was severely
wounded.
Just now there was a momentary cessation of firing, the advantage being
with the Federals, and it became apparent that some of the Southerners
desired to retreat, but they soon learned that they were practically
surrounded, for there was no road to the east or the west, and the only
outlet from their position, the Fayetteville road, was held by Sigel.
The only way therefore to get out was to fight out. Quite a number of
the Missourians were in confusion. Their horses were frightened and
became uncontrollable, and the men galloped about aimlessly, and wildly.
Some of them got away from the battle field and rode away to Cassville
panic-stricken and reporting that Gen. Price’s army had been “all cut to
pieces” by an overwhelming force of Federals! The greater portion of
Lyon’s line was quiet for a time, and some thought the victory had been
won.
Along the right of the Federal line, however, the 1st Missouri was hotly
engaged with McBride’s division of Missourians and was about to be
overcome. Lyon hurried the 2d Kansas to its relief and saved it. During
the temporary lull in the firing the Federal line was reformed under the
direction of Lyon himself. Steele’s battalion, which had been supporting
Dubois’ guns, was brought forward to the support of Totten’s, and
preparations were made to withstand another attack, which, as could be
ascertained by the shouts of the enemy’s officers, plainly audible, was
being organized.
Scarcely had Lyon disposed his men to receive the attack when his enemy
again appeared with a very large force along his entire front and moving
toward his flanks as well. At once the firing again began and for a time
was inconceivably fierce along the entire line. The Confederates were in
three lines _in some places_ the front line lying down, the second
kneeling, the third line standing, and all the lines and every man
loading and firing as rapidly as possible. Every available Federal
battalion was now brought into action, and the battle raged with great
fury for an hour, the scales seeming all the time nearly equally
balanced, sometimes the Federal troops and then the Confederates gaining
ground and then losing it, while all of the time some of the best blood
in the land was being spilled as recklessly as if it were ditch-water.
How they did fight, these men of both armies!—fought until their
gun-barrels became so hot they could scarcely hold them—fought when
their leaders fell and without commands—fought when the blood and brains
of their comrades were spattered into their faces—fought, many of them,
until they died. By and by, as the Confederate fire never slackened, but
was constantly increased by the arrival of reinforcements, and as some
of the Federals reported that their cartridges had given out,
detachments of the latter began to give way, and Gen. Sweeney and Gen.
Lyon were engaged from time to time in bringing them back into the
fight.
DEATH OF GEN. LYON.
Early in this engagement, while Gen. Lyon was walking and leading his
horse along the line on the left of Totten’s battery, his horse, the
iron gray, was killed and he was wounded in two places, in the head and
in the leg. Captain Herron, of the 1st Iowa,[8] states that he saw the
horse fall, and that the animal sank down as if vitally struck, neither
plunging nor rearing. Lyon then walked on, waving his sword and
hallooing. He was limping for he had been wounded in the leg. He carried
his hat, a drab felt, in his hand and looked white and dazed. Suddenly
blood appeared on the side of his head and began to run down his cheek.
He stood a moment and then walked slowly to the rear. Capt. Herron
states that he was within twenty feet of Lyon when this happened, near
enough to observe that he was wearing his old uniform, that of captain
in the regular army.
When he reached a position a little in the rear Lyon sat down and an
officer bound a handkerchief about his wounded head. He remarked
despondingly to Maj. Schofield, of Blair’s regiment, one of his staff:
“It is as I expected; I am afraid the day is lost.” The Major replied:
“O, no, General; let us try once more.” Major Sturgis then dismounted
one of his own orderlies and offered the horse to Lyon, who at first
declined the animal, saying: “I do not need a horse.” He then stood up
and ordered Sturgis to rally a portion of the 1st Iowa which had broken.
Sturgis, in executing this order, went to some distance from his
general. The 1st Iowa was being ordered forward by a staff officer, when
some of the men called out, “We have no leader,” “Give us a leader,
then,” etc. Lyon immediately asked to be helped on the orderly’s horse.
As he straightened himself in the saddle the blood was dripping off his
heel from his wounded leg. Gen. Sweeney rode up and Lyon spoke quickly
to him, “Sweeney, lead those troops forward (indicating the 1st Iowa)
and we will make one more charge.”
Then, swinging his hat, Lyon called out to the 2d Kansas regiment, “Come
on, my brave boys, (or ‘my bully boys,’ as some say), I will lead you;
_forward_!” He had gone but a few yards when he was shot through the
body. One of his orderlies, a private named Ed. Lehman, of Co. B, 1st U.
S. cavalry, caught him in his arms and lowered him to the ground. With
the breath still feeling at his lips, and his great heart throbbing and
striking his own death-knell, the dying chieftain gasped, “Lehman, I’m
going,” and so passed away his spirit through the battle-clouds to the
realms where is everlasting peace. The place where Lyon fell was
afterward called “Bloody Point.” A heap of stones marks the spot to this
day. Lyon’s body was borne to the rear by Lieut. Schreyer, of Capt.
Tholen’s company of the 2d Kansas, assisted by Lehman and another
soldier.
STILL THE BATTLE GOES ON.
In the meantime the disordered Federal line was rallied and reformed.
The 1st Iowa took its place in the front, and Major Sturgis says,
“fought like old veterans.” The Kansans and the Missourians were also
doing well, and the Confederates were driven back, only to come again.
The situation of the Federals was now desperate. The commander, Gen.
Lyon, was killed; Gen. Sweeney was wounded, Col. Deitzler, of the 1st
Kansas, lay with two bullets in his body; Col. Mitchell, of the 2d
Kansas, by the same fire that killed Lyon, was severely wounded (it was
thought at first mortally) and as he was borne from the field called to
an officer of Maj. Sturgis’ staff, “For God’s sake support my regiment;”
Col. Andrews, of the 1st Missouri, and Col. Merritt, of the 1st Iowa,
were wounded; and thus it was that all of the regimental commanders of
Lyon’s column were wounded. Still the battle went on.
THE LAST GRAND CHARGE OF PRICE’S MEN.
The great questions in the minds of Sturgis and Sweeney and the other
Federal officers, who had been informed of the plan of attack agreed
upon were, “Where is Sigel? Why doesn’t he co-operate?” Although it
seemed as if there must be a retreat should the Southerners make another
vigorous charge, yet if Sigel should come up with his near 1,000 men,
and make an attack on Price’s right flank and rear, then the Federals
could go forward with strong hopes of success. If Sigel had been
whipped, however, there was nothing left but to retreat.
Maj. Schofield, Lyon’s chief of staff, rode to Sturgis and informed him
that Lyon was killed and Sigel could not be heard from, and moreover,
that the ammunition was about exhausted, some of the troops being
entirely out. Sturgis thereupon assumed command—although only a major at
the time. He at once summoned the principal officers left and consulted
with them. All agreed that unless Sigel made his appearance very soon
there was nothing left but to retreat, if indeed retreat were possible.
The consultation was brought to a close by the advance of a heavy column
of infantry from towards the hill where Sigel’s battery had been heard
at the beginning of the struggle. These troops carried flags which,
drooping about the staffs, much resembled the stars and stripes, and
Sturgis and Schofield say the troops had the appearance of Sigel’s. A
staff officer in front of where the consultation was going on rode back
and called out delightedly “_Yonder comes Sigel! Yonder comes Sigel!_”
and the officers departed, each to his command to arrange for the
expected change in the programme.
On came the moving mass in Sturgis’ front, the soldiers cool and steady
as grenadiers. Down the hill across the hollow in front they swept and
took position along the foot of the ridge on which the Federals were
posted. And now, “they are rebels!” was heard from the more advanced of
the Kansans and Iowans. Suddenly a battery (Guibor’s) which had followed
the line and had reached the hill in front of “Bloody Hill,” wheeled
about, unlimbered and the command “_Fire!_” rang out and the guns
belched forth shrapnel and canister before the trail pieces had hardly
touched the ground. The infantry at the foot of the hill, now began
firing and slowly ascending the hill, and at once commenced the fiercest
and most bloody struggle of all that bloody day.
Lieut. Dubois’ battery, on the Federal left supported by Osterhaus’ two
companies and the rallied fragments of the Missouri 1st, opened on the
new battery (Guibor’s) and soon checked it. Totten’s battery, still in
the Federal center, supported by the Iowans and regulars, seemed to be
the main point of the Confederate attack.
The Missourians frequently came up within twenty feet of the muzzles of
Totten’s guns and received their charges of canister full in their
faces, and the two clouds of battle smoke mingled until they seemed as
one.
For the first time during the day the Federal line never wavered and the
Confederate line never flinched. At one time Capt. Steele’s battalion,
which was some yards in front, together with the left flanks, was in
danger of being overwhelmed and captured, the contending lines standing
so close that the muzzles of their guns almost touched. Capt. Granger,
of Sturgis’ staff, ran to the rear and brought up the supports of
Dubois’ battery, consisting of Osterhaus’ battalion, detachment, of the
1st Missouri, 1st Kansas, and two companies of the 1st Iowa, in quick
time, and took position on the left flank, and poured in a heavy volley
upon the Confederates, which was so murderous and destructive that that
portion of the line gave way. Capts. Patrick E. Burke and Madison
Miller, and Adjutant Hiscock, of the 1st Missouri, were especially
mentioned for gallantry in this assault.
The entire Confederate line now fell back a short distance and began
again forming. Sturgis took advantage of this lull in the storm to make
good his retreat. Perceiving that Totten’s battery and Steele’s
battalion were entirely safe, for the present, and directing Capt.
Totten to replace his disabled horses as soon as possible, Sturgis sent
Dubois’ battery to the rear with its supports to take up a position on
the hill in the rear and cover the retreat. The 2d Kansas, on the
extreme right, having been nearly out of ammunition for some time, was
ordered to withdraw, which it did bringing off its wounded. This,
however, left the Federal right flank exposed, and the Missourians at
that point, to the number of 100 or more, advanced at once; they were
driven back, however, by Steele’s battalion of regulars and joined the
main force reforming in the rear.
RETREAT.
Maj. Sturgis gave the order to retreat as soon as his enemy had fallen
back and enabled him to do so. Totten’s battery, as soon as his disabled
horses could be replaced, retired with the main body of the infantry,
while Capt. Steele met the feeble demonstrations of a few plucky
Missouri skirmishers who had not fallen back with the main line and were
picking away at the Federal right flank. The whole Federal column now
moved unmolested and in tolerable order to the high open prairie east of
Ross’ spring and about two miles from the battle ground. The artillery
and the ambulances, were brought off in safety. After making a short
halt on the prairie the retreat was continued to Springfield over
substantially the same route taken to the field.
Just after the order to retire had been given, and while Sturgis was
undecided whether to retreat from the field entirely or take up another
position, one of Sigel’s non-commissioned officers (Sergt. Frœlich)
arrived on a foam-covered horse and reported that Col. Sigel’s brigade
had been totally routed, his artillery captured, and the colonel himself
either killed or taken prisoner.
On reaching the Little York road Sturgis encountered Lieut. Farrand,
with his company of dragoons, one piece of artillery and a considerable
portion of the 3d and 5th Missouri, all of Sigel’s command, which had
made their way across the country in order to unite with the main
command and be saved from entire destruction. The march was resumed, but
the command did not succeed in reaching Springfield until five o’clock
in the evening.
Lyon’s column began the attack at about 5 in the morning and it was
half-past 11 when the battle ended; the main body of the troops were
engaged about six hours.
SIGEL’S PART IN THE FIGHT.
It is proper now to consider the part taken by Col. Sigel and his
brigade in the battle of Wilson’s Creek. It has been stated that he had
moved entirely around the southern end of the Confederate line of camp,
and on a previous page we left him with his guns “in battery,” and his
infantry and cavalry in line commanding the Fayetteville road, and ready
to open fire as soon an the sound of Lyon’s guns could be heard up the
valley, nearly two miles.
At 5:30, early in the morning, the rattle of musketry was heard,
apparently nearly two miles away, to the northwest. “_Bang! Bang! Bang!
Bang!_” in rapid succession, went the four guns of Lieuts. Schaeffer and
Schuetzenbach, as they discharged their contents into and among the
tents of McCulloch’s camp. A few more rounds and the Confederates
abandoned their tents and retired in haste toward the northeast and
northwest. This fighting was done just across the line, in Christian
county, on Sharp’s farm, which runs up to the county line, on which
stands Mr. Sharp’s house.
McCulloch’s troops, infantry and cavalry, soon began to form, and Sigel
brought forward his entire line into and across the valley, the two
companies of cavalry to the right, the artillery in the center and the
infantry on the left. After a period of irregular firing for about half
an hour, the Confederates retired into the woods and up the adjoining
hills. The firing toward the northwest was now more distinct, and it was
evident that Gen. Lyon had engaged the enemy along the whole line. To
give assistance to him—to be able to co-operate with him if necessary,
and to drive the enemy in his own front, Sigel again advanced, this time
toward the northwest, intending to attack the Confederates in the rear.
Marching forward, Sigel struck the Cassville road, making his way
through a number of cattle and horses, and arriving at an eminence,
which had been used as a slaughter-yard by McCulloch’s men. This was on
Sharp’s farm and near the house. At and near Sharp’s house, on the road,
some of McCulloch’s men, who were straggling back from the fight in
front, came unawares on Sigel’s men and were taken in. Sigel, after a
brief conference with some of his officers, at once concluded that Lyon
had been successful and was driving the Confederates before him. Knowing
that this was the only avenue of retreat left open, and imagining that
here was a grand opportunity for stopping it up and bagging several
thousand “rebels,” the colonel hurriedly formed his troops across the
road, planting the artillery in the center on the plateau, and a
regiment of infantry, and a company of cavalry on either flank, and
awaited the coming of what seemed to him to be the _vanquished_
Confederates, large numbers of whom could be seen moving toward the
south along the ridge of a hill about 700 yards opposite the right of
the Federal right.
It was now about half-past eight o’clock, and the firing in the
northwest, where Lyon was supposed to be, and where he really was
fighting, had almost entirely ceased. At this instant, Dr. S. H.
Melcher, the assistant surgeon of Salomon’s regiment, and some of the
skirmishers came back from the front, where desultory firing had been
going on, and reported that Lyon’s men were coming up the road, for they
could be seen plainly, and the gray-coated Iowa regiment plainly
distinguished. At once, Lieut. Col. Albert, of the 3d Missouri, and Col.
Salomon, of the 5th, notified their regiments _not to fire_ on the
troops coming in this direction, for they were friends, and Sigel
himself gave the same caution to the artillery.
Everybody was surprised at this unexpected turn of affairs, and the
Germans of Sigel’s and Salmon’s regiments began jabbering away
delightedly, and the color-bearers were beckoning with their flags to
the advancing hosts to “come on”—when, all at once, two batteries of
artillery, one on the Fayetteville road and one on the hill where it was
supposed Lyon’s men were in pursuit of the flying Confederates, opened
with cannister, shell and shrapnel, while the gray-coated troops,
supposed to be the Iowans, advanced from the Fayetteville road and
attacked the Federal right, and a battalion of cavalry made its
appearance, apparently ready and waiting to charge!
The jabbering of the German soldiers was now something wonderful, but it
had a different tone from that of a few minutes previously! It is
impossible to describe the consternation and frightful confusion that
resulted. So surprised and frightened were the soldiers that they could
not understand these were _Confederates_ who were firing upon them and
coming rapidly forward to sweep them from the face of the earth. They
hurried and skurried about crying, some in English: “It is Totten’s
battery!” others in German: “_Sie haben gegen uns geschossen! Sie irrten
sich!_” (They are firing against us! They make a mistake!) And then
making no effort to fight worthy of the name, they began to retreat.
The artillerymen, all of whom were recruits from the infantry, who had
seen but little service of any kind, could hardly be brought forward to
serve their pieces, although directed by Sigel himself; the infantry
would not level their guns until it was too late; indeed, they could not
be made to stop running, let alone to turn and fight. Salomon cursed in
German, in English, in French. Sigel threatened and bullied and coaxed.
No use. As well try to stop a herd of stampeded buffaloes. Lieut.
Farrand, with his company of cavalry brought off one piece of artillery
which had not been unlimbered and put in position, and away it went the
wheels bouncing two feet from the ground and the postilions lashing
their horses like race riders.
On came McCulloch’s and Price’s men, the Louisiana regiment of Col.
Hebert (pronounced Hebare) which had been mistaken for the 1st Iowa
because of its pretty steel gray uniform, was in front, and following
them were the Arkansas regiments of Dockery and Gratiot, the 5th and 3d,
Greer’s regiment of Texas cavalry, Lieut. Col. Major’s Howard and
Chariton county battalion, Johnson’s battalion mounted Missourians, and
some other detachments. Up to the very muzzles of the cannons they came,
killing the artillery horses and what artillerymen were reckless enough
to remain, firing fairly into the faces of the panicky Teutons and
forcing them to throw themselves into the bushes, into by-roads,
anywhere to escape and scamper away as fast as their legs could carry
them. The color-bearer of Sigel’s own regiment was badly wounded; his
substitute was killed, and the flag itself was captured by Capt. Tom
Staples, a Missourian, of Arrow Rock, Saline county.
When the plateau was reached, the cannon captured and the field gained,
the infantry stopped and cheered, Reid’s and Bledsoe’s batteries fired
parting salutes into the flying blue-coats, and then, leaving the
cavalry to pursue, both infantry and artillery turned about and went up
to the other end of the valley to assist their brethren in that quarter,
and to participate in the final triumph of the day.
Away went the Germans, down to the south into Christian county, throwing
away guns, cartridge boxes, even canteens,—everything that hindered
rapid flight,—wandering about and hiding when they could with the Texas,
Arkansas, and Missouri cavalry leaping upon them incessantly and slaying
them wherever they made the least show of resistance. At Nowlan’s mill,
on the James, three miles from the battle-ground, it was told that four
fugitives skulked under the mill-dam and, refusing to come out, were
riddled with buckshot.
The next day men lay scattered all over the country, wounded or dead;
and yet Sigel lost but comparatively few killed. Prisoners were taken in
great numbers—run down by the Texas rangers and driven in like flocks of
sheep, as timid now and as harmless. Sigel himself got panicky after
awhile and fled for Springfield, across the country, accompanied by only
two guards, giving rise to the wicked stanza of the song sung in the
Confederate camps after the battle, concerning the battle of Wilson’s
Creek,—how,
Old Sigel fought some on that day,
But lost his army in the fray;
Then off to Springfield he did run,
With two Dutch guards, and nary gun.
At Mrs. Chambers’ house, four miles south of Springfield, Col. Sigel and
his two guards halted and procured a drink of water, and then rode away
to Springfield, as rapidly as their jaded horses could carry them. Sigel
himself arrived at Springfield with but one orderly.
Only the cavalry under Carr and Farrand, the one piece of artillery, two
caissons and about 150 infantry came off in anything like order, and
these followed down the wire road some miles to the west and then turned
off due north and united with Sturgis’ column, near the Little York
road. Only four pieces of artillery were captured at the time of the
charge on the hill, for those were all that were in position. The two
others were in the rear. In attempting to get one of them away a wheel
horse was killed, and the drivers abandoned the gun, after first spiking
it as best they could. The gun that was saved was first abandoned out on
the Fayetteville road, and hauled off at first by hand a short distance,
Capt. Flagg employing the prisoners and soldiers as artillery horses.
Concerning the retreat of that portion of Sigel’s force which went to
the westward, Lieut. Chas. E. Farrand (then of the Second Regular
Infantry) commanding the company of cavalry before mentioned, writes:—
Upon finding myself with my company alone, I retired in a southerly
direction, and accidentally meeting one of the guides (Mr. Crenshaw),
who had been employed in taking us to the enemy’s camp, I forcibly
detained him until I could collect some of the troops, whom I found
scattered and apparently lost. I halted my company and got quite a
number together, and directed the guide to proceed to Springfield, via
Little York. After proceeding a short distance, we came upon one of
the pieces which had been taken from Col. Sigel. Although the tongue
of the limber was broken, one horse gone, and one of the remaining
three badly wounded, we succeeded in moving it on. Some distance in
advance of this we found a caisson, also belonging to Col. Sigel’s
battery. I then had with me Sergt. Bradburn, of company D, 1st
cavalry, and Corporal Lewis and Private Smith, of my own company (C,
2d dragoons). My company being some distance in advance, I caused the
caisson to be opened, and on discovering that it was full of
ammunition, I determined to take it on. I and the three men with me
tried to prevail upon some of the Germans to assist us in clearing
some of the wounded horses from the harness, but they would not stop.
After considerable trouble, my small party succeeded in clearing the
wounded horses from the harness, hitching in two more and a pair of
small mules I obtained, and moved on, Corporal Lewis and Private Smith
driving, while Sergt. Bradburn and I led the horses. After reaching
the retreating troops again I put two other men on the animals, and
joined my company with my three men. Before reaching Springfield it
became necessary to abandon the caisson,[9] in order to hitch the
animals to the _piece_. This was done after destroying the ammunition
it contained. Lieut. Morris, adjutant to Col. Sigel’s command,
assisted me in procuring wagons, which we sent back on the road after
the wounded.
The route of retreat taken by Lieut. Farrand and Capt. Flagg, and the
fragments of Sigel’s command, 400 in all, was down the wire road a short
distance, and then north to the Mt. Vernon road. While marching
northward this body of disordered men was only within two or three miles
of the entire Southern army for three or four hours. Why Generals Price
and McCulloch did not send out a small force of mounted men and take
prisoner every man, which could very easily have been done, is
inexcusable, certainly.
DR. S. H. MELCHER’S ACCOUNT.
Mention has been made of Dr. Samuel H. Melcher, who as assistant surgeon
of Col. Salomon’s 5th Missouri (Dr. E. C. Franklin, being surgeon), was
present at the battle of Wilson’s Creek with Sigel’s command. To the
writer hereof Dr. Melcher, now of Chicago, sends his recollections of
the events of the memorable contest. After narrating the preliminary
movements of Sigel, substantially as heretofore given, Dr. Melcher
says:—
* * * Gen. Sigel soon gave the order to fire, which was responded to
with rapidity, but our guns being on an elevation, and the
Confederates being in a field which sloped toward the creek, the shots
passed over their heads, creating a stampede but doing little, if any,
damage to life or limb. In vain I and others urged the artillerymen to
depress the guns. Either from inability to understand English, or, in
the excitement, thinking it was only necessary to load and fire, they
kept banging away till the whole camp was deserted. * * * The command
then moved on till it reached the Fayetteville road and Sharp’s house.
While the command was taking position, I with my orderly, Frank
Ackoff, 5th Missouri, went into the abandoned Arkansas camp where I
found a good breakfast of coffee, biscuit and fried green corn. * * *
Most of the tents were open—a musket with fixed bayonet being forced
into the ground, but up, and the flap of the tent held open by being
caught in the flint lock. At that time, besides a few Confederate
sick, there were in the camp Lieut. Chas. E. Farrand, in command of
the dragoons, and his orderly. Half an hour later, some straggling
parties from the 3d and 5th Missouri, set fire to some wagons and camp
equipage.
* * * The four guns were in the front, supported by the 3d Missouri,
with the cavalry and dragoons on the left in the timber. The 5th
Missouri was in reserve, except Co. K, Capt. Sam’l A. Flagg, which was
further in the rear, guarding some thirty or forty prisoners. At this
time, scattering shots were heard at some distance in our front, but
no heavy firing. Armed men, mostly mounted, were seen moving on our
right in the edge of the timber. * * *
It was smoky, and objects at a distance could not be seen very
distinctly. Being at some distance in front of the command, I saw a
body of men moving down the valley toward us, from the direction we
last heard Gen. Lyon’s guns. I rode back, and reported to Gen. Sigel
that troops were coming, saying to him, “They look like the 1st
Missouri.” [Iowa?] They seemed moving in a column. * * * By this time,
Sigel could see them. Not seeing their colors, I suggested to Sigel
that he had better show his, so that if it _was_ our men they might
not mistake us—Sigel’s brigade not being in regulation uniform. Gen.
Sigel turned and said: “Color-bearer, advance with your colors, and
wave them—wave them three times.” As this order was being obeyed,
Lieut. Farrand, with his orderly, arrived from the Arkansas camp, each
bearing a rebel guidon, which they had found, and with which they rode
from the right of the line, near Sharp’s house, directly in front of
the color-bearer of Sigel’s regiment. Then there was music in the air.
A battery we could not see opened with grape, making a great deal of
noise as the shot struck the fence and trees, but not doing much
damage, as far as observed, except to scare the men, who hunted for
cover like a flock of young partridges, suddenly disturbed. The
confusion was very great, many of the men saying, “It is _Totten’s_
battery! It is _Totten’s_ battery!” The impression seemed to be
general that Totten was firing into us, after seeing the rebel guidons
of Farrand, as it was the common understanding that the Confederates
had no grape, and these were grape shot, certainly.[10]
Gen. Sigel _now_ evidently thought of retreat, as the only words I
heard from him were, “Where’s my guides?” [Instances of individual
cowardice among Sigel’s officers are here given.] I assisted Lieut.
Emile Thomas (now of St. Louis), the only officer of his company that
had the grit to stay, to reform the men. I do not know if we could
have succeeded, had not a Confederate cavalry battalion suddenly
appeared in our front, on the line of retreat. For a moment the two
commands gazed upon each other, and then came a terrible rattle of
musketry, and a great hubbub and confusion in the direction of Sigel’s
command, which was just around a bend in the road to our rear.
In a twinkling, men, horses, wagons, guns, all enveloped in a cloud of
dust, rushed toward us, and in spite of Lieut. Thomas’s utmost
efforts, Company F started with all speed _down_ the Fayetteville road
toward the Confederate cavalry. The latter, seeming to think that they
were being charged upon, wheeled and got out of the way very quickly!
The bulk of Gen. Sigel’s command _turned to the east_ and were
followed by a Confederate command, that captured one gun at the creek,
many prisoners, and left a considerable number of killed and wounded
along the road.
Perhaps one-third of the command went southwest, and halted at the
next house beyond Sharps’ on the Fayetteville road, and here Dr.
Smith, who was Gen. Rains’ division surgeon, came up, with a long
train of wagons and coaches, and was captured, but at once released on
my intervention. [After this, Dr. Melcher accompanied Dr. Smith to the
battle-field.] * * * The one gun that was abandoned on the
Fayetteville road was really saved by Capt. Flagg, whose men drew the
gun by hand till they found some horses, and the Confederate prisoners
carried the ammunition in their arms. * * * They came into Springfield
the same evening by way of Little York.
Sigel’s reasons for his defeat must here be given. He states that he
tried to obey his orders to attack the enemy in the rear and to cut off
his retreat. This he did, but he also cut off his own retreat very
nearly, a circumstance he had not counted upon.
The time of service of one of his two regiments of infantry, the 5th
Missouri, Salomon’s, had expired some days before the battle and they
had clamored to go home. On the first of August he had induced them to
remain with the army eight days more. This latter term had expired the
day before the battle. The men therefore were under no obligations to
fight, except that they had marched out to do so, and when the time
came, suddenly remembered that “they did not have to fight.” The 3d
regiment, Sigel’s own, was not the old 3d, that fought at Carthage; that
regiment, its time having expired, had been mustered out, and the new
regiment was composed of 400 new recruits and of but a few other men who
had seen service. The men serving the artillery were new recruits who
knew next to nothing of gunnery, and were commanded by two lieutenants
whose only experience as artillerists had been in the Prussian army in a
time of peace. Again it is stated that only about half of the companies
were officered by men with commissions, which Sigel says, was the fault
of the three months’ service.
But over all it is claimed that Sigel’s complete defeat was the result
of an attack of vastly superior forces, the flower of McCulloch’s army,
that was permitted to approach fatally near under the mistake that they
were friends instead of enemies.
As explaining and detailing something of the retreat of that wing of
Sigel’s command which turned to the east, the following statement of
Captain (now General) E. A. Carr, who, as previously stated, commanded
the advance guard of Sigel’s brigade, may be found of interest:—
“At about 9 o’clock Capt. Carr received word that Sigel’s infantry were
in full flight and that he was to retreat with all haste. After
galloping away as best he could for about a mile and a half to the rear,
Carr came upon Sigel at the spring where the army had halted the first
night when returning from Dug Spring some days before. After a brief
consultation it was decided to move south on the Fayetteville road until
there was a chance to go out and circle around the pursuing enemy and
then strike for Springfield. There were then present at the spring
Sigel, Carr, Lieut.-Col. Albert, Carr’s 56 cavalry, 200 of Sigel’s badly
demoralized infantry, one piece of artillery, and two caissons. After
“retiring” rather hastily for a mile or so a body of cavalry was
observed in front, and Sigel sent Carr up to see the condition of
affairs and report at once. Arriving at the front Carr discovered that
the Confederate cavalry were coming in from the right and forming across
the road, to stop the retreating Federals and send them back to the care
of McCulloch’s division again. Reporting at once to Sigel, that officer
directed Carr to turn off at the first right-hand road, which happened
to be near the point where he (Carr) then stood. Retreating along this
road in a brisk walk Sigel asked Carr to march slowly so that the
footmen could keep up. Carr replied that unless they hurried forward
they would be cut off at the crossing of Wilson’s Creek, and that the
infantry ought to march as fast under the circumstances as a horse could
walk. Sigel then said, “Go on, and we will keep up.” On arriving at the
creek, however, and looking back, Carr saw that the infantry had not
kept up, but that a large body of Texas and Arkansas cavalry was moving
down and would form an unpleasant junction with him in a few seconds.
“To use a Westernism,” says Gen. Carr, “there was no time for fooling
then, and as I had waited long enough on the slow-motioned infantry to
water my horses, and they were not yet in sight, I lit out for a place
of safety which I soon reached, and after waiting another while for
Sigel, I went on to Springfield. I was sorry to leave Sigel behind, in
the first place, but I supposed all the time he was close to me until I
reached the creek, and then it would have done no good for my company to
have remained and been cut to pieces also, as were Sigel and his men,
who were ambuscaded and all broken up, and Sigel himself narrowly
escaped.”