Dreadnoughts that Great Britain and Germany would have in 1912
was challenged at once by the leader of the Opposition, Mr.
Balfour, who said: "On the two-years’ basis of building we
shall in December, 1910, as I calculate, have ten, and only
ten, Dreadnoughts. But the Germans at that date, as I
calculate, will have 13. That assumes, of course, that I am
right in stating, and I do not think I shall be contradicted,
that the Germans anticipated their programme by four months.
If you work that out, and assume that the German ships begun
last November, in anticipation by five months of the ordinary
date, are completed in two years, then you will find that I am
not wrong in saying that in December, 1910, we shall have only
ten Dreadnoughts and the Germans will have 13. That danger
period in which, according to my calculation, the ratio of
British to German Dreadnoughts is as ten to 13 extends, on the
basis of two years’ building, from December, 1910, to the end
of March, 1911. On April 1, 1911, the Germans, as I understand
it, will have only 13 and we shall have raised our number to
12. We should still, therefore, on April 1, 1911, according to
my calculation, have one less than the Germans, and that
period of what I might call the 12 British to 13 Germans will
last until July, 1911. Then we shall have 14; but in the
meanwhile the Germans, if they build their four ships this
year, in addition to the anticipated ships they laid down in
November, will have 17, as I understand. We should still have
14 in July, 1911, but the Germans would, as I make out, have
17."
Mr. Balfour contended that the four ships which, according to
the German programme, were to be laid down on the 1st of April
coming (1909) had been actually laid down in advance of that
time. He had information to that effect; whereas Mr. McKenna
was informed that materials for them had been collected in
advance, but that the construction was not begun. Mr. Balfour
contended stoutly for the correctness of his own information,
and argued: "If they [the four battleships supposedly waiting
to be laid down April 1, 1909] were laid down in November, as
I believe, that means that the Germans laid down eight
Dreadnoughts last year. They may lay down no Dreadnoughts this
year, and they may say, ‘We anticipated our four ships for
1909-1910; we anticipated them by laying them down in November;
we have no ships for this financial year.’ But there are two
other things to remember. Having laid down eight ships last
year, they may lay down four ships this year, or they may lay
down eight ships this year. That the capacity of their yards
and their great engineering shops renders that process
perfectly feasible no one now doubts. … If the Germans go on
at that rate, which is more than possible, the probability is
that they will have on April 1, 1912, 21 Dreadnoughts to our
20. The hypotheses, then, are these, and I want to make it
clear to the Government and to the House:—Eight Dreadnoughts
have been laid down in 1908 by Germany. If four are laid down
in 1909, there will be 17 on April 1, 1912; if eight are laid
down—as eight have been laid down last year—there will be 21
on April 1, 1912, to our 20; and if the Germans imitate the
policy of the present Government and lay down not only their
eight in the financial year, but begin a new group of four
when the Government propose their group of four, on April 1,
12 months hence, they will then have 25."
{703}
Over this difference of information as to the facts of German
Dreadnought-building, and consequent differences of
conclusion, controversy raged throughout the kingdom for
weeks. The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, tried unavailingly to
moderate the impeachment of German good faith in the matter.
"It is fair and right to the German Government that I should
say," he remarked, "that we have had a most distinct
declaration from them that it is not their intention to
accelerate their programme (cheers) and we cannot possibly, as
a Government, believing as we do most explicitly in the good
faith of those declarations (cheers), we cannot possibly put
before the House of Commons and Parliament a programme based
on the assumption that a declaration of that kind will not be
carried out. Be it observed—I want to be very careful in the
language I use about this—I am not saying that it is a pledge
in the sense of an agreement between the two countries.
Nothing of the kind. I should not accuse the German Government
of anything in the nature of bad faith if they altered their
intention. We have been told by them expressly and explicitly
that that is their intention, an intention not to accelerate,
or in other words not to do what the right honourable
gentleman contemplates, when he credits them with the
intention possibly of doing—namely, of laying down as many as
eight ships in one financial year. It is impossible in framing
these Estimates to do so while at the same time ignoring that
declaration from the German Government, and that is why I say
in taking this power to lay down if need be four ships on
April 1 next year we are making such provision as prudence
shows to be necessary for all the contingencies which we can
reasonably anticipate at the present moment."
At the same time, Mr. Asquith made a statement of importance
in reply to the question, Why should there be an increasing
competition in naval expenditure between these two countries?
"The question," he said, "has been raised by us, the British
Government, more than once, with a view to ascertaining
whether any proposal for a mutual reduction of expenditure for
naval purposes would be accepted by the German Government, but
we have been assured more than once, and in the most formal
manner, that their naval expenditure is governed solely by
reference to their own needs, and that their programme does
not depend upon ours. That is the statement which has been
made to us. They tell us quite plainly that if we build 100
Dreadnoughts we must not assume that they would add to their
naval programme, and, on the other hand, if we built no
Dreadnoughts at all they would go on with their programme just
as it is. If that is so, it is perfectly clear that there is
no possibility of an arrangement for mutual reduction. I
regret it very much, but I do not complain. The Germans, like
every other nation, are the best judges of their own national
requirements and necessities."
As will have been learned from Mr. McKenna’s statement, quoted
above, the Government desired authority to begin construction
of two new Dreadnoughts in July and two in November, 1909,
with contingent authority in addition to give orders during
the year for four more, if reasons for doing so appeared. This
did not satisfy the Opposition, which insisted that not less
than eight the new type of battle-ships should be built
outright; and a veritable panic of public excitement on the
subject of German designs against England was created in the
country, by the combined agency of speech and press and the
melodramatic stage. The Government was so little shaken by the
clamor that a motion of censure on its "declared policy" in the
matter was defeated in the House of Commons by a majority of
218. Nevertheless, on the 26th of July, Mr. McKenna made the
following announcement of a modification in its naval
programme:
"After very anxious and careful examination of the condition
of shipbuilding in foreign countries the Government have come
to the conclusion that it is desirable to take all the
necessary steps to ensure that the second four ships referred
to in this year’s programme should be completed by March,
1912. They propose to take all the necessary steps in the way
of preparation of plans, getting out of specifications,
invitations to tender, and, finally, the giving of orders
which will procure the delivery of these ships at the time I
have named. As was said in the month of March, there will be
no need to lay the keels of these ships in the course of the
present financial year. It will be quite time enough if the
keels are laid in the month of April next. …
"The examination of the state of foreign shipbuilding
programmes to which I have referred is bound to lead in the
minds of most members of the Committee to the conclusion that
the Government had no other course open to them. The Committee
had stated to them last March very amply what was the
condition of foreign shipbuilding up to that date. Since then
the development of shipbuilding in foreign countries has gone
on apace. Two countries, Italy and Austria, have now declared
a definite programme of four large armoured ships of the
latest type. In Italy one of those ships is already laid down,
a second is to be laid down immediately, and the remaining two
are both to be laid down in the course of the present year.
With regard to the Austrian programme, sceptics might say they
would never believe in it until, as in the case of Italy, they
saw the keels actually laid down, but the fact is every
earnest has been given of the determination of the Austrian
Government, and two large slips have been prepared for the
construction of battleships of the largest type."
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The English Naval Programme for 1910.
"The navy estimates for 1910, which were issued by the British
Admiralty last night, provide for an expenditure of
$203,000,500, [thousands digits, "000", obscured and unknown]
an increase of $27,805,000 over 1909. The increase is almost
wholly taken up by shipbuilding armaments authorized by
Parliament before dissolution. The new programme provides for
five large armored ships, five protected cruisers, twenty
destroyers, and a considerable number of submarines. By April
1 there will be under construction seven battleships, three
armored, nine protected, and two unarmored cruisers,
thirty-seven destroyers, and nine submarines."
_New York Evening Post,
March 10, 1910._
{704}
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The French Naval Administration.
Alarming discovery of Bad Conditions.
France was greatly startled and shocked in March, 1909, by
rumored scandals in naval administration, uncovered by the
investigations of a Parliamentary Commission, but not yet
officially made known. The report of the Commission was not
published until late in June, and when it appeared it
confirmed, not the worst of the state of things which rumor
had described, but enough to show an alarming and unsuspected
weakness of the nation on that side of its armament for war.
From the conclusion of the elaborate report a few translated
passages will suffice to indicate some of the conditions it
brought to light. In this final summary, the Commission states
that the testimony submitted by it establishes, among other
facts, the following:
"That during the last ten years Parliament has been asked to
authorize the construction of ships for which in most cases
the plans have not been definitely (_sérieusement_)
fixed; that months, and most generally years, elapsed between
the different contracts for the essential parts of the ships,
the hulls, the turrets, the boilers, &c., entailing
considerable loss of time and of money …; that numerous and
important changes were introduced in the course of
construction, … changes the chief inconvenience of which,
apart from the increase of expenditure and the retardation of
construction, is to impair that homogeneity which is the
supreme quality of a squadron; that most of these defects are
aggravated in the case of the six battleships of the Danton
type, the original contract for which, signed at the end of
December, 1906, has undergone hundreds of modifications which
must now be placed on a proper basis. …
"That the arsenals are not at present in a state to carry out
with the rapidity which is desirable new constructions and
repairs; that the mechanical equipment is in general
inadequate and out of date; that the abolition of piece-work,
which has coincided with a reduction of working hours and the
diminution of the powers and authority of the superintendents
in charge, has resulted in a considerable lessening of
production; and that lack of material sometimes entails a
stoppage of work. …
"That the four divisions of battleships and the cruiser
division of the Mediterranean Squadron have not the regulation
supply of steel shells, that the two divisions of armoured
cruisers of the Northern Squadron have only one-third of their
proper supply of steel shells, and that for both squadrons the
stores for renewing their supplies of steel shells are not
ready.
"That the various branches of the administration are wanting
in unity of views and purpose, in method and in defined
responsibility, and that neglect, disorder, and confusion too
frequently prevail. …
"In view of the fact that only a small part of the scheme of
1901 for modernizing ports and (lock yards in accordance with
the requirements of the construction programme of 1900 has
been executed, and in view of the total failure to provide
docking accommodation for the large battleships of the Danton
class, the Commission invites the Chamber to censure the want
of foresight and the indifference which these lamentable
discoveries disclose."
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
French Naval Programme revised in 1909.
Radical Changes in the Department of the Marine.
A despatch from Paris, June 8, 1909, announced:
"According to the _Temps_ this evening, the Navy Council
has finally decided to recommend that, in addition to 45 ships
of the line, the fleet shall consist of 12 ‘scout cruisers,’
60 large destroyers, and 64 submarines. The importance
attached to an increase in the number of capital ships, which
is the chief feature of the new proposals, is illustrated by a
comparison with the so-called ‘programmes’ of 1900 and 1907.
In 1900 it was decided on paper that the fleet should consist
of 28 battleships, 24 armoured cruisers, 52 destroyers, 263
torpedo-boats, and 38 submarines or submersibles. In 1907 the
composition of the fleet was changed to 38 battleships, 20
armoured cruisers, six scouts, 109 destroyers, 170
torpedo-boats, 82 submarines for offensive purposes, and 49
defence submarines.
"A comparison of these three ‘programmes’ shows an increase in
the number of capital ships and destroyers, the abolition of
armoured cruisers as a separate class and of torpedo-boats in
favour of destroyers, and a decrease in the number of
submarines. With regard to the existing armoured cruisers,
which the Navy Council no longer regards as efficient fighting
units, it may be noted that two out of the four 14,000-ton
Gambettas have not yet been completed. Given the age limit of
armoured ships as fixed at 20 years, only the six Danton and
the six République battleships would still figure on the
effective list by 1925. In other words, 33 armoured ships
would have to be completed during the next 16 years. In
addition, 12 scout cruisers would have to be constructed, and,
besides a number of submarines, over 100 destroyers would have
to be laid down, since the life of this class of vessel is
fixed at 17 years."
On the 29th of July the Paris correspondent of the London
_Times_ wrote: "It is semi officially announced this
evening that the Council of Ministers at its meeting to-day
approved a number of radical changes proposed by the new
Minister of Marine, among the higher ranks of the
_personnel_ of the naval administration. All the heads of
departments at the Ministry of Marine appointed under the old
regime have been removed and their places have been filled by
Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère’s own nominees. So complete a
reconstruction of a public department is without precedent in
modern French history. These changes, moreover, are
supplemented by a number of new appointments in the commands
afloat."
On the first of April, 1910, it was announced from Paris that
the Chamber of Deputies had voted to lay down two battle-ships
in the current year, designed to equal the latest type added
to the navies of Great Britain and Germany.
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
French Naval Administration.
Parliamentary Investigation.
See (in this Volume)
FRANCE: A. D. 1909 (MARCH-JUNE).
{705}
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The German Emperor’s Statement of his Peace Policy based
on Preparation for War.
In the spring of 1905, speaking at Bremen, on the unveiling of
a monument to his father, the Emperor made an impressive
statement of his motives in striving for the creation in
Germany of a great naval and military power. He said that in
boyhood he had been angered at the weakness of the German
navy, and that his policy had sprung from that feeling, not
directed toward aggression, but to the command of respect from
the rest of the world. His aim was to "do everything possible to
let bayonets and cannon rest, but to keep the bayonets sharp
and the cannon ready, so that envy and greed shall not disturb
us in tending our garden or building our beautiful house." "I
vowed," he said, "never to strike for world-mastery. The
world-power that I then dreamed of was to create for the
German Empire on all sides the most absolute confidence as a
quiet, honest, and peaceable neighbor. I have vowed that if
ever the time comes that history shall speak of a German
world-power, or a Hohenzollern world-power, this should not be
based upon conquest, but should come through the mutual
striving of nations after common purposes."
It is not difficult to believe in the perfect truthfulness of
this assertion of high motives, and the perfect sincerity with
which they have been obeyed, while seeing at the same time how
much, in their working, they have threatened the peace of the
world. As the power of Germany has grown under his hand, the
Kaiser has been tempted more and more to impose his will on
neighbors whose cannon were not as ready or their sharpened
bayonets as many as his. The world-power of his desire has
become more and more a dictatorial power. The peace he has
preserved by it has been peace on his own terms, more than
once. The result has been to excite throughout the world such
a feeling of being menaced by war as had not been known since
Napoleon’s day, and to impel among nations, big and little, a
more feverish and competitive arming for war than ever busied
them before. As worked out by the man, the Kaiser’s policy of
peace-making by the tools of war has certainly lost the
innocence it had when conceived by the boy.
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The German Side of the Navy-building Question.
When, in March, 1909, debate on the Navy Estimates in England
started excitement over the rapidity with which Germany seemed
to have developed the building of Dreadnoughts, Chancellor
Bülow, on the 29th of that month, said in the Reichstag: "The
Federated Governments entertain no thoughts of entering into
competition with British sea-power by means of the
construction of the German navy. According to the provisions
of the Navy Law, the immovable purpose of German naval policy
is founded upon the fact that we desire to create our naval
armaments solely for the protection of our coasts and our
trade. It is, moreover, an indisputable fact that the
programme of our naval construction lies open in absolute
publicity. We have nothing to keep secret, nothing to hide,
and it is not intended to accelerate the carrying out of our
construction programme beyond the limits of time contemplated
by the law (_über die gesetzliche Frist hinaus zu
beschleunigen_). All rumours to the contrary are false. In
the autumn of 1912, at the earliest, we shall have ready for
service the 13 large new ships, including three armoured
cruisers, provided by law."
This statement was supplemented by one from Admiral Tirpitz,
who said:
"Now, as previously, we build all ships in about 36 months
—about 40 months in the small yards. To that period are added
trials, which last for several months. Equally inaccurate is
the assertion that, with a view to more rapid construction,
the contracts for the newer ships are placed sooner than is
allowed by the estimates. All that is true is the following:
Subject to approval by the Reichstag, contracts for two ships
of the 1909 financial programme were last autumn promised to
two private yards at comparatively low prices. This was done
because there was a danger that, if orders for four ships were
placed at the same time at the beginning of 1909 there would
be a considerable advance in price. If orders for two ships
were already placed the Imperial Navy Office was in a much
more favourable position for placing orders for the other two.
We can put the Imperial yards into competition with the
private yards. The Imperial yards cannot undertake more than
two ships at once. The private firms, therefore, will be
compelled to ask lower terms. If the matter has been kept
secret, that is solely because the firms must not be made
aware of the business transactions of the Navy Office.
Contracts for the ships have not been placed; assurances only
have been given. The contract is concluded only after the
voting of the estimate. The period for delivery is 36 months
from April 1, 1909. Not a penny is available for the
‘promised’ ships before April 1. That must be clear to
everybody who knows the Parliamentary conditions and our
accounts system. Not even indirectly has any money been
procured from banks for the yards in any way whatever by the
agency of the Navy Office.
"In regard to the placing of the order for the first of the
two ships special account was taken of the fact that the yard
in question is principally engaged in the construction of this
kind of ship. Accelerated completion of these two ships is
neither asked for nor intended. The firms get their money only
in quarterly instalments. Contracts for the two other ships of
this year’s programme are not to be placed until some months
after the conditions for tendering are drawn up late in the
summer. As the private yards no more than the Imperial yards
know whether they will get the orders for these ships, there
can be no possibility of special preparation of material. If
there has been any such accumulation, it is, presumably, due
to business reasons, certainly to no incentive of ours.
"In conclusion, I repeat once more with emphasis that, as the
Imperial Chancellor has already said, we shall have ready for
use in 1912 ten Dreadnoughts and three Invincibles—in all 13,
and not 17, large modern ships—and that not in the spring, but
in the autumn. How far it is right to base comparisons of
naval strength upon the number of Dreadnoughts is a question
which I shall not here discuss."
As to the suggested readiness and desire of Great Britain to
join in an international agreement for the limiting of naval
armaments, the Germans have always had a rather reasonable
answer, which was phrased forcibly by one of the Agrarian
organs when it said:
"When the weaker promises the stronger to abstain from all
means of increasing his strength, the strong man needs to make
no further effort to retain his relative preponderance for
ever. If the other naval Powers entered into such an
agreement, England, without taking upon herself any further
burdens, would retain mastery at sea before which all must
bow. Little need as we have to interfere with regard to
England’s programme, even so little need has England to look
askance upon our construction of ships, not to attack England,
but only in order to have a naval power with which even the
strongest opponent will not light-heartedly engage in battle.
This good right of ours we shall not surrender by any
agreement."
{706}
But a better view was that taken by one of the German
Conservative journals, the _Kreuz Zeitung_, which said
last summer: "First of all we must complete our construction
programme. Before that we could not agree to any limitation of
naval armaments. Otherwise we should not be able to create the
navy of moderate size which corresponds to our position as a
seafaring people. … Even after the completion of our
construction programme our navy will be but a dwarf as
compared with the British Navy. Nevertheless, the moment ought
then to have arrived for entering into an international
agreement about limitation of armaments, and on the part of
Germany there will, presumably, be readiness for it."
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Elasticity of the German Navy Law.
At the annual meeting of the German Navy League in June, 1909,
Admiral Weber, speaking of the German Navy Law, praised its
elasticity. "In international relations," he said, "it had
lately proved to be a political instrument of equal force with
the American Monroe doctrine and the English two-Power
standard. In 1906 the Reichstag had agreed to increase the
size of capital ships without altering the number. The
amending law of 1908 (which shortened the ‘life’ of
battleships) had rendered possible a rational fulfilment of
all immediate possibilities with regard to battleships, small
cruisers, torpedo-boats, and submarines."
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Italian and Austrian Programmes of Naval Construction.
A despatch from Rome in May, 1909, announced that the minister
of marine, Admiral Mirabello, had obtained the approval of the
Cabinet to a naval programme that provides for the
construction within three years at a total expense of
$52,800,000 of four "Dreadnoughts" and a number of fast scout
cruisers. A local paper stated that the decision to build
these vessels was reached after Italy had learned that
Austria-Hungary was going to spend $40,000,000 on increased
naval power.
Four months later, on the 1st of October, a report came to the
English Press from Rome as follows:
"The Minister of Marine announced in June that the ships would
be begun at once, and completed before the middle of 1912.
Only one, the Dante Alighieri, has yet been laid down, and
owing to some blunder with regard to her steel plates, no work
has been done on her for more than a month. The second is
still awaiting the completion of a building slip before it can
be laid down. As to the other two, according to the
_Tribuna_, the contracts, which ought to have been
concluded with two shipbuilding firms last June, have not yet
been even examined by the Council of State; consequently
neither firm has yet been able to begin the work which will be
necessary in its yards before the ships can be laid down. The
_Tribuna_ throws the blame upon the bureaucratic system."
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Italian Fighting Strength at the End of 1909.
The fighting strength of the Italian Navy was reckoned by the
Rome correspondent of the London _Times_, in November,
1909, as follows:
"Counting in all four of the San Giorgio cruisers [only two of
which were then finished] as forming part of the available
navy at the end of this year, and setting aside some 20 ships
of various kinds and 40 or 50 torpedo-boats, which may,
however, be of some secondary use, the full fighting force of
the Italian navy at the beginning of 1910 should be six
first-class battleships, five second class battleships, seven
first-class armoured cruisers, three second-class armoured
cruisers, 19 destroyers, and 36 first-class torpedo-boats. But
it must be borne in mind that eight of the first 21 fighting
units—the five battleships and three armoured cruisers
described here as of the second class—are not very modern
ships.
"The shipbuilding programme of Admiral Mirabello promises,
besides other less important vessels, four battleships of the
Dreadnought type. As far as one could learn at first these
ships were to be on much the same lines as the Bellerophon,
with a displacement of 18,200, and an armament of ten 12 inch
guns. The chief question then was, When would they be ready
for sea? Admiral Mirabello said in 1912. In order to effect
this he would have had to revolutionize the whole system of
shipbuilding in the Italian navy."
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Japan’s Armament, Present and Prospective.
The naval status of Japan in December, 1909, as ascertained
and described by the Tokio correspondent of T_he Times_,
London, was as follows:
"Ever since the Russo-Japanese War it has been well-nigh
impossible for the public to form a clear idea of what steps
were in progress with regard to the expansion and maintenance
of the Japanese Navy. In the year before the outbreak of the
conflict—namely, 1903, a programme of expansion was approved
by the Diet. It involved the building of three battleships,
three armoured cruisers, and two second-class cruisers; that
is to say, eight fighting vessels, displacing 100,000 tons
approximately. The cost was set down as ten millions sterling,
and the programme was to have been spread over a period of 11
years, ending in 1913. Subsequently, however, owing to
financial expediency, the time of completion was extended,
first to 1915, and thereafter to 1916, so that seven years
still remain. Knowing this and observing carefully what ships
were laid down from time to time, there should have been, it
will appear, no difficulty in forming a clear perception of
the actual conditions at any moment.
{707}
"But naturally the war produced a radical change in the plans
of the Japanese Admiralty. It became necessary at once to
adopt special measures for recouping the losses suffered in
battle, as well as for renewing armaments. Of course the
general public was not taken into official confidence in such
matters, and some time elapsed before people became vaguely
conscious that not one building programme only, but three, had
been taken in hand. Occasionally announcements were made of the
launch of such-and-such a battleship or the laying down of
such-and-such a cruiser, but as to which vessel belonged to
which programme, and what dimensions the several programmes
were ultimately to take, nothing could be clearly ascertained.
Now, at length, this obscurity has been removed. It is seen
that two of the programmes were undertaken with funds included
in the war expenditures, and that, therefore, the nation is
not required to make any further provision of money on these
accounts. These programmes are, first, an emergency programme,
carried out with what is called an ‘implementing fund,’ and,
secondly, an emergency programme carried out with an
‘adjustment fund.’ Under the three programmes, respectively,
the following vessels have been bought, built, or are
building:—
Third Period Expansion Programme.
Tons.
Katori, battleship 15,950
Kashima, battleship 16,400
Ibuki, armoured cruiser 14,600
Emergency Implementing Programme.
Aki, battleship 19,150
Satsuma, battleship 19,150
Tsukuba, armoured cruiser 13,750
Ikoma, armoured cruiser 13,750
Kurama, armoured cruiser 14,600
Tone, cruiser 4,400
Yodo, despatch boat 1,250
Mogami, despatch boat 1,350
Emergency Adjustment Programme.
Kawachi, battleship 21,000
Settsu, battleship 21,000
"There is here a total of 13 ships displacing 176,000 tons,
approximately, and to these have to be added 29 destroyers
built under the ‘emergency implementing programme.’ As for
the vessels which have still to be built, but which have not
yet been laid down, they are as follows:-
Third Period Programme.
Battleship, 1 16,000 tons
Armoured cruisers, 2 11,000 tons each
Cruisers, 2 5,000 tons each
Emergency Implementing Programme.
Armoured cruiser, 1 14,600 tons
Cruisers, 2 4,100 tons each
Destroyers, several 375 tons each
Torpedo-boats, 6 120 tons each
"These eight vessels, exclusive of torpedo craft, aggregate
over 70,000 tons, and if the two lists be combined, we get a
total of 21 ships displacing 247,000 tons, approximately,
apart from about 35 destroyers and six torpedo boats. …
"It may be mentioned that in February last the ships on the
active list of the Japanese Navy were:—
Battleships 13
Armoured Cruisers 12
Other Cruisers 43
Destroyers 59
Torpedo-boats 69"
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Russian "Dreadnoughts" Building.
"The keels of the four Dreadnoughts which are to represent the
nucleus of Russia’s future navy were laid down in St.
Petersburg this morning. The materials to be employed will be
throughout Russian; the designs and the supervision will be
British. It is an open secret that the Tsar has taken a deep
personal interest in arrangements that have been made for
placing the contracts for the new ships."
_St. Petersburg Correspondent
London Times, June 16, 1909._
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The United States Navy in 1909.
As summarized in the Annual Report of the Navy Department for
the fiscal year 1909, the United States Navy was composed, on
the 30th of June in that year, of the following vessels:
_Fit for Service, including those under Repair:_
First-class battle ships, 25;
second-class battle ship, 1;
armored cruisers, 12;
armored ram, 1;
single-turret harbor-defense monitors, 4;
double-turret monitors, 6;
protected cruisers, 22;
unprotected cruisers, 3;
scout cruisers, 3;
gunboats, 9;
light-draft gunboats, 3;
composite gunboats, 8;
training ships, 3;
training brigantine, 1;
special class (Dolphin, Vesuvius), 2;
gunboats under 500 tons, 12;
torpedo boat destroyers, 16;
steel torpedo boats, 33;
wooden torpedo boat, 1;
submarine torpedo boats, 12;
iron cruising vessels, steam, 5;
wooden ditto, 5;
wooden sailing vessels, 5;
tugs, 44;
auxiliary cruisers, 5;
converted yachts, 21;
colliers, 8;
transport and supply ships, 8;
hospital ships, 2;
receiving ships, 4;
prison ships, 3.
Total, 292.
_Under Construction: _
First-class battle ships, 6;
torpedo boat destroyers, 20;
submarine torpedo boats, 16;
tug, 1;
colliers, 6.
Total 49.
_Authorized_:
First-class battle ships, 2;
gunboat for Great Lakes, 1;
submarine torpedo boats, 4;
colliers, 2.
Total 9.
_Unfit for Service:_
Of all descriptions, 12.
Grand Total, 362.
Since the above report, the House of Representatives, by vote
on the 8th of April, 1910, authorized the building of two
additional battle ships of the first class, at a cost of
$6,000,000 each.
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The World-round Cruise of the American Battleship Fleet,
1907-1909.
On the 16th of December, 1907, a fleet of battle-ships which,
comprised practically the whole available fighting force of
the United States Navy steamed away from Hampton Roads, on the
longest and most notable cruise ever made by so formidable an
assemblage of ships of war. Its primary appointment was to
circuit the American continents from the Atlantic to the
Pacific shores of the United States, and the further direction
of the voyage was left for future decision. Ultimately,
invitations from foreign governments drew the fleet to
Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan, and it returned from
these visits in the Far East by way of the Suez Canal and the
Mediterranean Sea. The duration of the long voyage was a year,
two months and six days, and the total miles of ocean
traversed were about 45,000. Many foreign ports were visited,
South American, Australasian, Asiatic and European, and
boundless hospitalities were bestowed everywhere on the fleet.
Its stay of some days at San Francisco, before leaving
American waters, was the grand event of the year to Americans
of that coast, and its call at Manila gave emphasis to
American authority in the Philippines.
Until it reached San Francisco the fleet was under the command
of Rear-Admiral Robley D. Evans; but physical disabilities
then compelled the retirement of Admiral Evans, and he was
succeeded in the command by Rear-Admiral Charles S. Sperry,
under whom the remainder of the voyage was made. The sixteen
battleships of the fleet were divided into two squadrons and
four divisions, each division consisting of vessels of the
same general type; the first division comprised the
Connecticut, Admiral Evans’s flag-ship, the Kansas, the
Vermont, and the Louisiana; the second included the Georgia,
the New Jersey, the Rhode Island and the Virginia; the third
included the Minnesota, the Ohio, the Missouri, and the Maine;
the fourth contained the Alabama, the Illinois, the Kearsarge,
and the Kentucky. The battle-ships were accompanied by two
supply-ships, a repair-ship, and a tender, and were preceded
from Hampton Roads by a flotilla of six torpedo-boats and a
squadron of armored cruisers.
{708}
From San Francisco to New Zealand the voyage of 6000 miles was
made with one stop, only, at Honolulu, and so perfectly in
order, it is said, that only twice did any ship fall out of
the line of formation, in which the ships steamed steadily
together, two hundred and fifty yards apart. This order, with
time-table regularity of movement, was maintained from
beginning to end, and when, on the 22d of February, 1909,
President Roosevelt welcomed the return of the fleet to
Hampton Roads, he was able to say with just pride: "This is
the first battle fleet that ever circumnavigated the globe.
Those who perform the feat again can but follow your
footsteps. You have falsified every prediction of failure made
by the prophets. In all your long cruise not an accident
worthy of mention has happened to a single battleship, nor yet
to the cruisers or torpedo-boats. You left this coast in a
high state of battle efficiency, and you return with your
efficiency increased as a war machine, as the fleet returns in
better shape than when it left. In addition, you have shown
yourselves the best of all possible ambassadors and heralds of
peace. Wherever you have landed you have borne yourselves so
as to make us at home proud of being your countrymen."
Before the undertaking of this notable cruise of a battle-ship
fleet having no militant mission, many political reasons for
and against the movement were urged and discussed. From the
naval point of view, professionally, the true motive of the
project was stated undoubtedly by Captain A. T. Mahan, in an
article published in the _Scientific American_, and it
had no political purpose whatever. "A perfectly sufficient
reason," said Captain Mahan, "is the experience to be gained
by the fleet in making a long voyage, which otherwise might
have to be made for the first time under the pressure of war,
and the disadvantage of not having experienced at least once
the huge administrative difficulties connected with so distant
an expedition by a large body of vessels dependent upon their
own resources. By ‘own resources’ must be understood, not that
which each vessel carries in herself, but self-dependence as
distinguished from dependence on near navy-yards—the great
snare of peace times. The renewal of stores and coal on the
voyage is a big problem, whether the supply vessels accompany
the fleet or are directed to join from point to point."
The following statistics are given of the cost of the cruise:
"The fleet burned 400,320 tons of coal, costing $1,078,994.
The transportation of this coal by naval and hired colliers
cost $1,463,825. The total coal bill was $2,646,069. There
were used on the engines and other machinery 125,000 gallons
of oil costing $43,750. No official statement has been made of
the cost of ammunition used in target and battle practice. The
figure is put at above a million dollars, and $20,000,000 is
estimated as the total cost of the 14 months’ cruise."
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The World Naval Armament.
Fleets of the Great Powers in March, 1910.
A British Parliamentary Paper made public on the 29th of
April, 1910, gave statistics of the navies of the greater
Powers as they existed on the 31st of March. The following
summary of the figures appeared in the next issue of _The
Mail_. The letters at the heads of the columns signify—
E., England;
F., France;
R., Russia;
G., Germany;
I., Italy;
U., United States; and
J., Japan:--
Ships Built.
E. F. R. G. I. U. J.
Battleships 56 17 7 33 10 30 14
Armored C. D. Vessels - 8 2 7 - 10 -
Armored Cruisers 38 20 4 9 8 15 12
Protected Cruisers, I. 18 5 7 - - 3 2
Protected Cruisers, II. 35 9 2 23 3 16 11
Protected Cruisers, III 16 8 2 12 11 2 6
Unprotected Cruisers 2 - - 10 - 5 6
Scouts 8 - - - - 3 -
Torpedo Vessels 23 10 6 1 5 2 2
T. B. Destroyers 150 60 97 85 21 25 57
Torpedo Boats 116 246 63 82 96 30 69
Submarines 63 56 30 8 7 18 9
Ships Building.
E. F. R. G. I. U. J.
Battleships 9 6 8 8 2 4 3
Armored Cruisers 3 2 2 3 2 - 1
Protected Cruisers, II. 9 - - 5 - - 3
Unprotected Cruisers 2 - - - - - -
T. B. Destroyers 37 17 - 12 2 15 2
Submarines 11 23 3 * - 10 3
* Number uncertain.
----------WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR: End--------
----------WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: Start--------
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1899-1909.
General Treaties of Arbitration concluded since the First
Peace Conference at The Hague.
"Arbitration in the sense of the present day dates from Jay’s
Treaty of 1794, in which Great Britain and the United States
bound themselves to arbitrate contested boundary claims
(Article 5); claims preferred by British creditors (Article
6); and, more especially, the claims of American and British
creditors based upon ‘irregular or illegal captures or
condemnations of their vessels and other property’ (Article
7). …
"The first award under it [Jay’s Treaty] was made in 1798, so
that exactly one hundred years elapsed until the call of the
First Hague Conference. Arbitrations in this period were very
frequent. Writers differ as to the exact number; for example
Dr. Darby instances no less than 471 cases, but in his
enthusiasm for the peaceful settlement of international
differences he has included a large number of interstate
arrangements, which cannot be regarded as international
arbitrations in the strict sense of the word. Mr. Fried, in
his Handbook of the Peace Movement, enumerates some 200. M. La
Fontaine gives a list of 177 instances to the year 1900, which
should be reduced to 171 arbitrations or agreements to
arbitrate before the meeting of the First Conference in 1899.
Professor John Bassett Moore is more conservative and
enumerates 136 cases of international arbitration during the
nineteenth century, in 57 of which the United States was a
party, with a like number of 57 to which Great Britain has
been a party.
{709}
"But, as happily said by M. Descamps, arbitration is not a
question of mathematics, and whether the instances be 471,
according to Darby or 136, according to Professor Moore, the
recourse to arbitration bids fair to become a habit with
nations."
_James Brown Scott,
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907,
Volume 1, pages 210 and 224-225._
Dr. Scott cites from M. La Fontaine a table showing the
participation of each State in arbitration. Germany has no
representation in the table, either as a whole or by any of
its parts; whereas every other nation of the least importance
in the world appears as having arbitrated some of its
disputes, prior to the preparation of this table.
At the First Peace Conference, of 1899, an attempt, strongly
supported, was made to frame and secure the adoption of a
treaty of arbitration by which the nations would bind
themselves to arbitrate a carefully selected list of subjects.
This failed, says Dr. Scott, in the work quoted above, "owing
to the opposition of Germany. As a compromise, Article 19 of
the convention for the peaceful adjustment of international
differences was adopted:
"‘Independently of existing general or special treaties
imposing the obligation to have recourse to arbitration on the
part of any of the Signatory Powers, these powers reserve to
themselves the right to conclude, either before the
ratification of the present convention or subsequent to that
date, new agreements, general or special, with a view of
extending the obligation to submit controversies to
arbitration to all cases which they consider suitable for such
submission’ (re-enacted in 1907 as Article 40).
"The article did not seem at the time to be of any special
importance and it was generally looked upon as useless because
independent and sovereign States possess the right without
special reservation to conclude arbitration agreements,
general or special, without being specifically empowered to do
so. The fact is, however, that this article, insignificant and
useless as it may seem, marks, one may almost say, an era in
the history of arbitration. The existence of the article has
called attention to the subject of arbitration and by
reference to it many States have negotiated arbitration
treaties. It is true that there is no legal obligation created
by the article and it is difficult to find a moral one, for it
is not declared to be the duty of any State to conclude
arbitration treaties. The moral effect of the article has,
however, been great and salutary, and the existence of
numerous arbitration treaties based upon the reservation
contained in the article shows the attention and respect which
nations pay to the various provisions of the Hague
Conference."
Dr. Scott adds to these remarks a list of treaties, of the
character contemplated, which had been entered into since the
First Hague Conference, up to the time at which he wrote, with
appended notes describing briefly the nature of the variously
broadened or narrowed reference clauses contained in them. A
more extended list has been published since by the
International Peace Bureau of Berne, Switzerland, for a copy
of which I am indebted to Mr. Frederick P. Keppel, Secretary
of Columbia University, New York. The list below is mainly
that of the International Peace Bureau, with the addition of a
few more recent treaties to which the United States has been a
party, obtained from the State Department at Washington. Some,
but not all, of Dr. Scott’s notes have been borrowed, with his
permission.
In the list of treaties as they are given here the date of
signature is entered first, with the prefix S.; that of
ratification follows, with the prefix R. When two dates of
ratification are given, the first is that by the government
named first in the entry of the parties to the treaty in
question. [Notes "A", "B", "C" and "E" are defined following
entry 105 below.]
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST:
List of States between which Permanent Treaties of Arbitration
have been concluded since the First Peace Conference at The
Hague, with the Dates of their Signature and Ratification.
1. Brazil and Chile.
S. May 18, 1899.
R. March 7, 1906, at Santiago.
2. Argentine and Uruguay.
S. June 8, 1899.
R. December 21, 1901.
Additional protocol
S. December 21, 1901.
R. December 18, 1901.
3. Argentine and Paraguay,
S. November 6, 1899.
R. June 5, 1902.
Additional protocol
S. January 25, 1902.
R. June 5, 1902.
4. Bolivia and Peru.
S. November 21, 1901.
R. December 29, 1903.
5. Spain and Mexico.
S. January 11, 1902.
R. July 18, 1902.
6. Nicaragua, Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica.
S. January 20, 1902.
[R. No date given.]
7. Argentine and Spain.
S. January 28, 1902.
[R. No date given.]
8. Spain and Salvador.
S. January 28, 1902.
R. July 18, 1902.
9. Spain and Dominican Republic.
S. January 28, 1902.
R. July 18, 1902.
10. Spain and Uruguay.
S. January 28, 1902.
R. July 18, 1902.
11. Pan-American Treaty of obligatory arbitration between
Argentine, Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay.
Peru, Dominican Republic, Salvador, and Uruguay (for
differences relating to diplomatic privileges, rights of
navigation, questions of frontiers and interpretation and
enforcement of treaties). E
S. January 29, 1902, at Mexico. According to Article 21 of the
Treaty it would become of force as soon as three States among
those which signed the Treaty should make known their
approbation to the government of Mexico, which would
communicate the information to other governments. It has been
ratified by the governments of Salvador, May 28, 1902, of
Guatemala, August 25, 1902, and of Uruguay, January 31, 1903.
12. Special Treaty between the seventeen States represented at
the Pan-American Conference at Mexico, including the United
States of America, relating to the adjustment by means of
arbitration of difficulties resulting from financial
questions.
S. January 30, 1902, at Mexico.
[R. No date given.]
13. Argentine and Bolivia.
S. February 3, 1902.
R. March 13, 1902.
14. Bolivia and Spain.
S. February 17, 1902.
R. October 10, 1903.
15. Colombia and Spain.
S. February 17, 1902
R. July 18, 1902.
16. Spain and Guatemala.
S. February 28, 1902.
R. July 18, 1902.
{710}
17. Mexico and Persia.
S. May 14, 1902.
[R. No date given.]
18. Argentine and Chile. E
S. May 28, 1902.
R. July 30, 1902.
19. Germany and Venezuela.
S. May 7, 1903.
(R. La ratification n’a pas étc exigée.)
20. Paraguay and Peru.
S. May 18, 1903.
[R. No date given.]
21. France and Great Britain. C
S. October 14, 1903.
R. February 25, 1904.
22. Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and Salvador.
S. November, 1903.
[R. No date given.]
23. France and Italy. C
S. December 25, 1903.
R. March 26, 1904-March 7, 1904.
24. Great Britain and Italy. C
S. February 1, 1904.
Not ratified.
25. Denmark and The Netherlands. B
S. February 12, 1904.
R. March 8, 1906, at The Hague.
26. Spain and France. C
S. February 26, 1904.
R. March 7, 1904-April 20, 1904.
27. Spain and Great Britain. C
S. February 27, 1904.
R. March 7, 1904-March 16, 1904.
28. France and The Netherlands. C
S. April 6, 1904.
R. July 5, 1905, at Paris.
29. Spain and Portugal.
S. May 31, 1904.
Not ratified.
30. France and Sweden. C
S. July 9, 1904.
R. November 9, 1904.
31. France and Norway. C
S. July 9, 1904.
R. November 9, 1904.
32. Germany and Great Britain. C
S. July 12, 1904.
Without reserve of ratification.
33. Great Britain and Sweden. C
S. August 11, 1904.
R. November 9, 1904.
34. Great Britain and Norway. C
S. August 11, 1904.
R. November 9, 1904.
35. The Netherlands and Portugal.
S. October 1, 1904.
R. October 29, 1908, at The Hague.
36. Spain and Nicaragua.
S. October 4, 1904.
R. March 19, 1908.
37. Belgium and Russia. A
S. October 17/30, 1904.
R. September 9/August 27, 1905-July 27 /August 9, 1905.
38. Belgium and Switzerland. A
S. November 15, 1904.
R. August 19, 1905.
39. Great Britain and Switzerland. C
S. November 16, 1904.
R. July 12, 1905.
40. Great Britain and Portugal. C
S. November 16, 1904.
Not ratified.
41. Germany and The United States of America.
S. November 22, 1904.
Not ratified.
42. Italy and Switzerland. C
S. November 23, 1904.
R. December 5, 1905.
43. Norway and Russia. A
S. November 26/December 9, 1904.
R. February 27, 1905-February 12/25, 1905.
44. Russia and Sweden. A
S. November 26/December 9, 1904.
R. February 12/25-February 27/14, 1905.
45. Belgium and Sweden. A
S. November 30, 1904.
R. August 11, 1905.
46. Belgium and Norway. A
S. November 30, 1904.
R. August 11, 1905-October 30, 1906.
47. Austria-Hungary and Switzerland. C
S. December 3, 1904.
R. October 17, 1905, at Vienna.
48. France and Switzerland. C
S. December 14, 1904.
R. July 13, 1905.
49. Sweden and Switzerland. A
S. December 17, 1904.
R. July 13, 1905.
50. Norway and Switzerland. A
S. December 17, 1904.
R. July 13, 1905.
51. Austria-Hungary and The United States of America.
S. January 6, 1905.
Not ratified.
52. Austria-Hungary and Great Britain. C
S. January 11, 1905.
R. May 17, 1905, at Loudon.
53. Spain and Sweden.
S. January 23, 1905.
R. March 20, 1905.
54. Spain and Norway.
S. January 23, 1905.
R. March 20, 1905.
55. Belgium and Spain. A
S. January 23, 1905.
R. December 16-July 28, 1905.
56. Great Britain and The Netherlands. C
S. February 15, 1905.
R. July 12, 1905, at London.
57. Denmark and Russia. A
S. February 16/March 1, 1905.
R. April 11, 1905-March 20/April 3, 1905.
58. Italy and Peru.
S. April 18, 1905.
R. November 11, 1905.
59. Belgium and Greece. A
S. April 19/May 2, 1905.
R. July 9/22, 1905.
60. Belgium and Denmark. A
S. April 26, 1905.
R. May 2, 1906.
61. Portugal and Sweden. C
S. May 6, 1905.
Not ratified.
62. Norway and Portugal. C
S. May 6, 1905.
Not ratified.
63. Italy and Portugal. C
S. May 11, 1905.
Not ratified.
64. Spain and Honduras.
S. May 13, 1905.
R. July 16, 1906.
65. Belgium and Roumania. A
S. May 27/14, 1905.
R. October 9/September 26, 1905.
66. Portugal and Switzerland. C
S. August 18, 1905.
R. October 23, 1908, at Berne.
67. Argentine and Brazil.
S. September 7, 1905.
R. September 28, 1908-October 2, 1908.
68. Colombia and Peru.
S. September 12, 1905.
R. July 6, 1906, with the modus _rivendi_.
69. Denmark and France. C
S. September 15, 1905.
R. May 31, 1906.
70. Denmark and Great Britain. C
S. October 25, 1905.
R. May 4, 1906.
71. Norway and Sweden. A
S. October 26, 1905.
Without reserve of ratification.
72. Denmark and Spain. A
S. December 1, 1905.
R. May 10, 1906-May 14. 1906.
73. Denmark and Italy. B
S. December 16, 1905.
R. May 22--March 30, 1906.
74. Austria-Hungary and Portugal. C
S. February 13, 1906.
R. October 16, 1908, at Vienna.
75. Belgium and Nicaragua.
S. March 6, 1906.
Not ratified.
76. France and Portugal. C
S. July 29, 1906.
Not ratified.
77. Denmark and Portugal. B
S. March 20, 1907.
R. October 26, 1908, at Copenhagen.
78. Nicaragua and Salvador.
S. April 3, 1907.
Not ratified.
79. Spain and Switzerland. C
S. May 14, 1907.
R. July 9, 1907.
80. Argentine and Italy.
S. September 18, 1907.
Not ratified.
81. Italy and Mexico.
S. October 16, 1907.
R. December 31, 1907.
82. Honduras, Guatemala, Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
S. December 20, 1907, at Washington.
R. March, 1908.
83. United States of America and France. D
S. February 10, 1908.
R. March 12, 1908, at Washington.
84. United States of America and Greece.-
S. February 29, 1908.
Not ratified [?].
85. United States of America and Switzerland. D
S. February 29, 1908.
R. December 23, 1908.
86. United States of America and Mexico. D
S. March 24, 1908.
R. June 27, 1908, at Washington.
{711}
87. United States of America and Italy. D
S. March 28, 1008.
R. January 22, 1900.
88. United States of America and Great Britain. D
S. April 4, 1008.
R. June 4, 1908, at Washington.
89. United States of America and Norway. D
S. April 4, 1908.
R. June 24, 1908, at Washington.
90. United States of America and Portugal. D
S. April 6, 1908.
R. November 14, 1908.
91. United States of America and Spain. D
S. April 20, 1908.
R. June 2, 1908, at Washington.
92. United States of America and Sweden. D
S. May 2, 1908.
R. August 18, 1908, at Washington.
93. United States of America and The Netherlands. D
S. May 2, 1908.
R. March 25, 1909.
94. United States of America and Japan. D
S. May 5, 1908.
R. August 24, 1908, at Washington.
95. Denmark and the United States of America. D
S. May 18, 1908.
R. March 29, 1909.
96. Denmark and Sweden. D
S. July 17, 1908.
Not ratified.
97. China and the United States of America. D
S. October 8, 1908.
R. April 6, 1909.
98. Denmark and Norway.
S. October 8, 1908.
Not ratified.
99. United States of America and Austria-Hungary. D
S. January 15, 1909, at Washington.
R. May 13, 1909.
100. United States of America and Peru. D
S. December 5, 1908, at Washington.
R. June 29, 1909.
101. United States of America and Salvador. D
S. December 21, 1908, at Washington.
R. July 3, 1909.
102. United States of America and Costa Rica. D
S. January 13, 1909, at Washington.
R. July 20, 1909.
NOTES.
The treaties differ in the range given to the obligation
imposed on the signatory parties, as to the nature of the
differences which they shall submit to arbitration. Most of
them, however, are divisible in this respect into three
classes, distinguished above by the reference letters "A,"
"B," and "C," and the distinction described in the following
notes thus marked, from Dr. Scott’s work. Treaties concluded
by the United States have an otherwise distinct character, as
explained in note "D."
A.—The article of reference in these treaties is substantially
(when not identically) as follows:
"The high contracting parties agree to submit to the permanent
Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the
Convention of July 29, 1899, the differences which may arise
between them in the cases enumerated in Article 3, in so far
as they affect neither the independence, the honor, the vital
interests, nor the exercise of sovereignty of the contracting
countries, and provided it has been impossible to obtain an
amicable solution by means of direct diplomatic negotiations
or by any other method of conciliation.
"1. In case of disputes concerning the application or
interpretation of any convention concluded or to be concluded
between the high contracting parties and relating—a. To
matters of international private law; b. To the management of
companies; c. To matters of procedure, either civil or
criminal, and to extradition.
"2. In cases of disputes concerning pecuniary claims based on
damages, when the principle of indemnity has been recognized
by the parties.
"Differences which may arise with regard to the interpretation
or application of a convention concluded or to be concluded
between the high contracting parties and in which third powers
have participated or to which they have adhered shall be
excluded from settlement by arbitration."
"B. The treaties of this noble class are the few thus far
concluded which pledge the parties engaged in them to submit
_all differences that may arise between them to pacific
arbitration_, reserving no dispute, of any nature, to
become a possible entanglement in war. The formula of
reference in them is substantially this:
"The high contracting parties agree to submit to the permanent
Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the
Convention of July 29, 1899, all differences of every nature
that may arise between them, and which cannot be settled by
diplomacy, and this even in the case of such differences as
have had their origin prior to the conclusion of the present
Convention."
C.—The reference clause in these treaties is substantially
alike in all, to the following purpose:
"Differences which may arise of a legal nature, or relating to
the interpretation of treaties existing between the two
contracting parties, and which it may not have been possible
to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred to the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, established at The Hague by the
convention of the 29th July, 1899; provided, nevertheless,
that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence,
or the honor of the two contracting States, and do not concern
the interests of third parties."
D.—In the treaties of arbitration negotiated by the United
States the article of reference is like that last quoted, in
Note C; but the following is added to it:
"In each individual case the High Contracting Parties, before
appealing to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, shall
conclude a special Agreement, defining clearly the matter in
dispute, the scope of the powers of the arbitrators, and the
periods to be fixed for the formation of the Arbitral Tribunal
and the several stages of the procedure. It is understood that
on the part of the United States such special agreements will
be made by the President of the United States, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and on the part of
Costa Rica shall be subject to the procedure required by the
Constitution and laws thereof."
This was required by the United States Senate, which rejected
a number of earlier arbitration treaties, negotiated by
Secretary Hay, because they would have allowed cases of
controversy with other nations to be referred to The Hague
Tribunal by the President without specific consent from the
Senate in each particular case. This brings the general treaty
of arbitration down very close to absurdity, leaving almost
nothing of its intended pacific influence to act.
E.—See below: A. D. 1901 (November), and 1902.
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1901 (November).
Treaty of Unreserved Arbitration for all Controversies between
Bolivia and Peru.
On the 21st of November, 1901, the republics of Bolivia and
Peru set a great example of trust in arbitration as a means of
settling controversies between nations, by concluding a
convention which pledged them for ten years to submit every
disagreement between themselves to that peaceful solution,
reserving no question whatsoever. Their example, as will be
seen, was remarkably imitated among their Spanish-American
neighbors in the following year. The subjoined are the
important articles of their compact of peace:
"Article 1.
The high contracting parties pledge themselves to submit to
arbitration all the controversies which have thus far been
pending, and those which, while the present treaty is in
force, may arise between them, whatever may be their nature
and causes provided that it has been found impossible to
settle them by direct negotiation.
"Article 2.
In each case that may arise the contracting parties shall
conclude a special agreement with a view to determining the
subject-matter of the controversy, to fixing the points that
are to be settled, the extent of the powers of the
arbitrators, and the procedure to be observed.
"Article 3.
In case the high contracting parties do not succeed in
agreeing on the points referred to in the foregoing article,
the arbitrator shall be authorized to determine, in view of
the claims of both parties, the points of fact and of law that
are to be decided for the settlement of the controversy, and
to establish the mode of procedure to be followed.
{712}
"Article 4.
The high contracting parties agree that the arbitrator shall
be the permanent court of arbitration that may be established
in virtue of the decisions adopted by the Pan-American
Conference now sitting in the City of Mexico.
"Article 5.
For these two cases: (_a_) If the court referred to in
the foregoing article shall not be created, and (_b_) if
there is need of having recourse to arbitration before that
court shall be created, the high contracting parties agree to
designate as arbitrator the Government of the Argentine
Republic, that of Spain, and that of the United Mexican States
for the performance of this duty, one to act in case of the
disability of the other, and in the order in which they are
named.
"Article 6.
If, while the present treaty is in force, and in the two
contingencies referred to in the foregoing article, different
cases of arbitration shall arise, they shall be successively
submitted for decision to the aforesaid governments in the
order above established.
"Article 7.
The arbitrator shall further be competent:
1. To pass upon the regularity of his appointment, the
validity of the agreement, and the interpretation thereof.
2. To adopt such measures as may be necessary, and to settle
all difficulties that may arise in the course of the debate.
Concerning questions of a technical or scientific character
that may arise during the debate, the opinion of the Royal
Geographical Society of London or that of the International
Geodetic Institute of Berlin shall be asked.
3. To designate the time in which he shall perform his
arbitral functions.
"Article 8.
The arbitrator shall decide in strict obedience to the
provisions of international law, and, on questions relating to
boundary, in strict obedience to the American principle of
‘uti possedetis’ of 1810, whenever, in the agreement mentioned
in article 2, the application of the special rules shall not
be established, or in case the arbitrator shall (not ?) be
authorized to decide as an amicable referee.
"Article 9.
The decision shall decide, definitely, every point in dispute,
stating the reasons therefor. It shall be prepared in
duplicate, and notice thereof shall be given to each of the
parties through its representative before the arbitrator.
"Article 10.
The decision, legally pronounced, shall decide, within the
limits of its scope, the contest between the parties.
"Article 11.
The arbitrator shall fix, in his decision, the time within
which said decision is to be executed.
"Article 12.
No appeal from the decision shall be allowed, and its
execution is intrusted to the honor of the nations that sign
this treaty.
"Nevertheless, an appeal for revision to the arbitrator who
pronounced it shall be admissible, provided that such appeal
be taken before the expiration of the time fixed for its
execution, in the following cases:
1. If the decision has been pronounced on the basis of a
counterfeit document, or of one that has been tampered with.
2. If the decision has been, either in whole or in part, the
consequence of a fact resulting from the proceedings or
documents of the case."
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1902.
Noble Treaties between Argentina and Chile for Obligatory
Arbitration of all Disputes, and for Restriction of Naval
Armaments.
Notwithstanding the fortunate arrangement, in 1898, for
arbitration of a serious boundary dispute between the
Argentine Republic and Chile (see, in Volume VI. of this work,
Argentine Republic), there continued to be troublesome
frictions between the two Spanish-American neighbors, while
awaiting the decision of the arbitrator, King Edward VII.,
which was not rendered until November 27, 1902. These had led
to a ruinous rivalry in naval armament. Reporting on this
state of affairs in May of that year, Mr. William P. Lord, the
American Minister to the Argentine Government, wrote:
"Both countries have incurred heavy expense for the equipment
and maintenance of largely increased army and naval forces.
Chile has recently contracted for two formidable warships
involving a heavy cost with the object of putting her navy
upon an equality with the Argentine navy, whereupon Argentina,
not to be outdone, contracted for two war ships larger in size
and perhaps more formidable at a like heavy cost in order to
continue and maintain her naval superiority. The costly
expenditure incurred on account of war and naval preparations
is paralyzing industrial activity and commercial enterprise.
Both countries are largely in debt and confronted with a
deficit. Both have appropriated their conversion funds which
had been set apart for a specific purpose, and which, it would
seem, should have been preserved inviolable. Neither is able
to make a foreign loan without paying a high rate of interest
and giving guarantees to meet the additional expenses which
their war policy is incurring, and both Governments know and
their people know that the only remedy to which either can
resort to meet existing financial conditions is to levy fresh
taxes of some description, notwithstanding nearly everything
that can be taxed is now taxed to the utmost limit. The weight
of taxation already imposed bears heavily upon the energies
and activities of the people. The outlook is not promising,
business being dull, wage employment scarce, and failures
frequent."
Happily, good sense prevailed over this folly very soon after
Minister Lord wrote his account of it. On the 3d of June,
1902, the same writer was enabled to forward to Washington the
text of four remarkable "peace agreements" which had been
signed on the 28th of May, at the Chilean capital, by the
Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations and the Argentine
Minister Plenipotentiary to Chile, who had been brought to
negotiations by the friendly mediation of Great Britain. The
four documents were: a political convention declaring a common
international policy on the part of the two republics; a broad
treaty of general arbitration; an agreement for the reducing
of naval forces; an agreement for the conclusive marking of
boundary lines by the engineers of the arbitrator, King
Edward. The general arbitration treaty is no less unreserved
and comprehensive than that between Peru and Bolivia and
offers another Spanish-American model for imitation in the
interest of peace. Its articles are as follows:
"Article 1.
The high contracting parties bind themselves to submit to
arbitration every difficulty or question of whatever nature
that may arise between them, provided such questions do not
affect the precepts of the respective constitutions of the two
countries, and that they can not be solved through direct
negotiation.
{713}
" Article 2.
This treaty does not embrace those questions that have given
rise to definite agreements between the two parties. In such
cases the arbitration shall be limited exclusively to
questions of validity, interpretation, or fulfillment of these
agreements.
"Article 3.
The high contracting parties designate as arbitrator the
Government of His Britannic Majesty or, in the event of either
of the powers having broken off relations with the British
Government, the Swiss Government. Within sixty days from the
exchange of ratifications the British Government and the Swiss
Government shall be asked to accept the charge of arbitrators.
"Article 4.
The points of controversy, questions or divergencies shall be
specified by the high contracting parties, who may determine
the powers of the arbitrator or any other circumstance
connected with the procedure.
"Article 5.
In the case of divergence of opinion, either party may solicit
the intervention of the arbitrator, who will determine the
circumstances of procedure, the contracting parties placing
every means of information at the service of the arbitrator.
"Article 6.
Either party is at liberty to name one or more commissioners
near the arbitrator.
"Article 7.
The arbitrator is qualified to decide upon the validity of the
obligation and its interpretation, as well as upon questions
as to what difficulties come within the sphere of the
arbitration.
"Article 8.
The arbitrator shall decide in accordance with international
law, unless the obligation involves the application of special
rules or he have been authorized to act as friendly mediator.
"Article 9.
The award shall definitely decide each point of controversy.
"Article. 10.
The award shall be drawn up in two copies.
"Article 11.
The award legally delivered shall decide within the limits of
its scope the question between the two parties.
"Article 12.
The arbitrator shall specify in his award the term within
which the award shall be carried out, and he is competent to
deal with any question arising as to the fulfillment.
"Article 13.
There can be no appeal from the award, and its fulfillment is
intrusted to the honor of the signatory powers. Nevertheless,
the recourse of revision is admitted under the following
circumstances:
1. If the award be given on the strength of a false
document;
2. If the award be the result, either partially or totally,
of an error of fact.
"Article. 14.
The contracting parties shall pay their own expenses and each
a half of the expenses of the arbitration.
"Article 15.
The present agreement shall last for ten years from the date
of the exchange of the ratifications, and shall be renewed for
another term of ten years, unless either party shall give
notice to the contrary six months before expiry."
_Papers relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1902, pages 13-20._
In their convention on naval armaments the two governments
"renounced the acquisition of the war vessels they have in
construction and the making for the present of any new
acquisitions," agreeing to reduce their fleets to "a prudent
equilibrium."
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1902.
Ten South and Central American Nations join in Protocol
of Convention for Compulsory Arbitration.
"Ten of the nineteen nations represented at the City of Mexico
[Second Pan-American Conference, 1902] united in the project
of a treaty, to be ratified by their respective governments,
providing for compulsory arbitration of all controversies
which, in the judgment of any of the interested nations, do
not affect either their independence or national honor; and it
is prescribed that in independence and national honor are not
included controversies concerning diplomatic privileges,
limits, rights of navigation, or the validity, interpretation,
and fulfillment of treaties. Mexico became a party to this
project, but the United States declined; thus showing an
entire change of attitude on the part of these two nations
since the Washington conference of 1890. Mexico had in the
meantime adjusted its boundary dispute with Guatemala. But
since Mr. Blaine’s ardent advocacy of compulsory arbitration
the Senate of the United States had manifested its opposition
to the policy by the rejection of the Olney-Pauncefote
arbitration treaty of 1897, and it is to be inferred that the
Secretary of State did not think it wise to commit our
government to a measure which had been disapproved of by the
coordinate branch of the treaty-making power."
_J. W. Foster,
Pan-American Diplomacy
(Atlantic Monthly, April, 1902)._
See (in this Volume)
AMERICAN REPUBLICS.
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1902.
Central America.
Treaty of Compulsory Arbitration between Nicaragua, Salvador,
Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.
A treaty of compulsory arbitration and obligatory peace,
between four of the States above named, in fulfillment of the
agreement at Mexico was signed at Corinto on the 20th of
January, 1902.
See (in this Volume)
AMERICAN REPUBLICS: SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.
Its essential provisions were the following:
"The Governments of Nicaragua, Salvador, Honduras, and Costa
Rica, desirous of contributing by all the means in their power
to the maintenance of the peace and good harmony that exists
and should exist among them, have agreed to celebrate a
convention of peace and obligatory arbitration, and to that
effect have named as their respective plenipotentiaries: …
Who, after having presented their credentials and the same
being found in good and due form, have agreed upon the
following covenant:
"Article 1.
It is declared that the present convention has for object the
incorporation in form of public treaty the conclusions to
which have arrived their excellencies, the Presidents, General
Don J. Santos Zelaya, General Don Tomas Regalado, General Don
Terencio Sierra, and Don Rafael Iglesias, in the several
conferences that have been held in this port with the sole
object of maintaining and assuring, by all possible means, the
peace of Central America.
"Article 2.
The contracting Governments establish the principle of
obligatory arbitration, in order to adjust every difficulty or
question that might present itself between the contracting
parties, binding themselves in consequence to submit them to a
tribunal of Central American arbitrators.
{714}
"Article 3.
Each one of the contracting parties shall name an arbitrator
and a substitute to constitute the tribunal. The terms of the
arbitrators shall be for one year, counting from their
acceptance, and then they may be reelected.
"Article 4.
The arbitrators of those states among whom exists the
disagreement shall not form part of the tribunal for the
consideration of the concrete case, this remaining entirely
with the arbitrator or arbitrators of the remaining states.
"Article 5.
If, through pairing, there should be no decision, the tribunal
shall select a third among the substitutes. The third should
necessarily adhere to one of the views given out.
"Article 6.
As soon as a difficulty or question presents itself between
two or more states, their respective Governments shall advise
the remaining signers of the present convention.
"Article 7.
The contracting Governments establish and recognize the right
of each one of them to offer without delay, singly or
conjointly, their good offices to the Governments of the
states that are in disagreement, even without previous
acceptation by them, and though they should not have notified
them of the difficulty or question pending.
"Article 8.
The friendly offices exhausted without satisfactory result,
the government or governments that would have exercised them
shall notify the others, declaring at the proper time
arbitration proceedings. This declaration shall be
communicated with the greatest possible brevity to the member
of the tribunal corresponding to the president of same, with
the object that within a period not exceeding fifteen days the
tribunal that is to know and decide the case comes together.
The installation of the tribunal shall be communicated by
telegraph to the signing governments, demanding from the
contending parties the presentation of their claims within the
fifteen days following.
"Article 9.
The tribunal shall give its judgment within five days
following the expiration of the term which has been spoken of.
"Article 10.
The difficulties that may arise through questions of pending
limits, or through interpretation, or execution of treaties of
limits, shall be submitted by the governments interested to
the knowledge and decision of a foreign arbitrator of American
nationality
"Article 11.
The Governments of the states in dispute solemnly agree not to
execute any hostile act, warlike preparations, or mobilization
of forces, with the object of not impeding the arrangement of
the difficulty or question through the means established by
the present agreement."
On the 1st of March following the signing of this peace treaty
by the four Presidents named above, the United States Minister
to Costa Rica, Mr. William Lawrence Merry, reported to his
Government that the President of Guatemala had added his
signature to theirs.
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1903.
Gift of a Court House and Library for the Permanent Court
of Arbitration at The Hague.
By a deed signed October 7, 1903, Mr. Andrew Carnegie created
a foundation or trust under the Netherland law (a
_Stichting_ in the Dutch language), "for the purpose of
building, establishing, and maintaining in perpetuity at The
Hague a court-house and library (temple of peace) for the
permanent court of arbitration established by the treaty of
July 29, 1899." As stated in the deed, "the Netherland
Government, according to agreement, will see to the
appointment of a board of directors under proper control, and
draw up the rules according to which the ‘Stichting’ shall be
governed, so as to ensure in perpetuity its maintenance and
efficiency. The words maintaining, maintenance, in this
agreement are not to be construed as relieving the signatory
powers to the treaty of July 29, 1899, from the financial
obligations incurred and so far discharged in connection with
the permanent court of arbitration. If at any time the purpose
for which the 'Stichting' was founded should fail, the assets
of the ‘Stichting’ shall be employed for promoting the cause
of international peace and concord in such a manner as shall
be determined jointly by the sovereign of the Netherlands and
the President of the United States."
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1904.
International Peace Congresses.
The Thirteenth at Boston.
The First International Peace Congress was held in London in
1843, when men who could think of the possibility of ending
war were jeered at, and little heed was given to their talk.
In the next ten years it had six successors, all in Europe,
and three of them in Great Britain. Then came the succession
of wars in the fifties, sixties and seventies, which seemed to
discourage peace-dreams, and it was not until 1878, on the
occasion of the Paris Exposition, that an eighth international
gathering of the dreamers was attempted. Then they waited
eleven years for hope and faith enough to draw them for a
ninth time together. After that date the series ran on under
growing impulsions and encouragements, and when Boston, in
1904, invited its moving spirits to honor America, for the
first time, with their assemblage, the Congress gathered in
that city, in early October, was the Thirteenth of its name
and kind. It was given exceptional brilliancy by the
attendance of many distinguished people from abroad who had
been drawn to the United States that season by the Exposition
at St. Louis and the various conferences there.
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1904.
A Philosopher’s Plan for Ending War.
"Man lives inhabits, indeed, but what he lives for is thrills
and excitements. The only relief from Habit’s tediousness is
periodical excitement. From time immemorial wars have been,
especially for non-combatants, the supremely thrilling
excitement. Heavy and dragging at its end, at its outset every
war means an explosion of imaginative energy. The dams of
routine burst, and boundless prospects open. The remotest
spectators share the fascination. …
"This is the constitution of human nature which we have to
work against. The plain truth is that people _want_ war.
They want it anyhow; for itself; and apart from each and every
possible consequence. It is the final bouquet of life’s
fireworks. The born soldiers want it hot and actual. The
non-combatants want it in the background, and always as an
open possibility, to feed imagination on and keep excitement
going. …
{715}
"We do ill, I fancy, to talk much of universal peace or of a
general disarmament. We must go in for preventive medicine,
not for radical cure. We must cheat our foe, politically
circumvent his action, not try to change his nature. In one
respect war is like love, though in no other. Both leave us
intervals of rest; and in the intervals life goes on perfectly
well without them, though the imagination still dallies with
their possibility. … Let the general possibility of war be
left open, in Heaven’s name, for the imagination to dally
with. Let the soldiers dream of killing, as the old maids
dream of marrying. But organize in every conceivable way the
practical machinery for making each successive chance of war
abortive. Put peace-men in power; educate the editors and
statesmen to responsibility;—how beautifully did their trained
responsibility in England make the Venezuela incident
abortive! Seize every pretext, however small, for arbitration
methods, and multiply the precedents; foster rival excitements
and invent new outlets for heroic energy; and from one
generation to another, the chances are that irritations will
grow less acute and states of strain less dangerous among the
nations. Armies and navies will continue, of course, and will
fire the minds of populations with their potentialities of
greatness. But their officers will find that somehow or other,
with no deliberate intention on any one’s part, each
successive ‘incident’ has managed to evaporate and to lead
nowhere, and that the thought of what might have been remains
their only consolation."
_William James,
Remarks at the Peace Banquet
(Atlantic Monthly, December, 1904)._
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1904-1909.
The Interparliamentary Union.
The Interparliamentary Union, composed of members of the
parliamentary bodies of many countries, had its origin in
1888, when, on the 31st of October, thirty members of the
French Chamber of Deputies met with ten members of the British
Parliament, at Paris, to discuss the practicability of
cooperation in efforts for the promotion of international
peace. William Randal Cremer, a labor union member of
Parliament, is credited with the conception and the active
agency which set the movement on foot, and in 1903 he received
the Nobel Prize of $35,000, for distinguished service to the
cause of peace. He devoted the money to the same cause. He
received further honors from the Government of France, which
made him a Chevalier of the Legion of Honor. The results of
the undertaking he led have already acquired high importance,
and exhibit more each year. If the glorious dream of a World
Parliament, empowered to enact international law, is ever
realized, the realization may be a growth from this seed.
Thus far, the growth has produced an Interparliamentary Union
composed of representatives from the legislatures of every
country in Europe which has a really constitutional
government, and from the United States. The Congress of the
latter became represented in the Union in the winter of 1904,
and the next meeting of the Union was held at St. Louis that
year, while the Louisiana Purchase Exposition was in progress.
The membership of the Union had then risen to about 2000 in
number, drawn entirely from the national law-making bodies of
the world,—elected representatives of many millions of people,
making up a powerfully influential combination of experienced
public men. The St. Louis meeting was attended by two hundred
of these, including many of distinguished standing in the
parliaments of their several countries. This session of the
Union was under the presidency of the Honorable Richard
Bartholdt, Member of Congress from Missouri. Its most
important action was the adoption, by unanimous vote, of the
following resolution:
"_Whereas_, Enlightened public opinion and the spirit of
modern civilization alike demand that differences between
nations should be adjudicated and settled in the same manner
as disputes between individuals are adjudicated—namely, by
the arbitrament of courts in accordance with recognized
principles of law;
"The Conference requests the several governments of the world
to send representatives to an International Conference, to be
held at a time and place to be agreed upon by them, for the
purpose of considering—
"First, the questions for the consideration of which the
Conference at The Hague expressed a wish that a future
conference be called;
"Second, the negotiation of arbitration treaties between the
nations represented at the Conference to be convened;
"Third, the advisability of establishing an International
Congress to convene periodically for the discussion of
international questions;
"And this Conference respectfully and cordially requests the
President of the United States to invite all the nations to
send representatives to such a Conference."
Subsequently, this resolution was presented to the President,
at Washington, by the members of the Union, and his assent to
the request was received. Out of this came the train of
proceedings which brought about the Second Peace Conference at
The Hague.
In 1905 the meeting of the Interparliamentary Union was held
at Brussels; in 1906 at London; in 1908 at Berlin.
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1907.
The First National Peace Congress in the United States,
assembled at New York.
The Peace Congress assembled at New York April 14, 1907, (the
first National assembly of its character), on the initiative
of Andrew Carnegie, "surpassed expectation. First of all, in
numbers. Delegates registered by the thousand. The best hall
in the metropolis proved inadequate. Overflow and additional
meetings were held in other halls and in churches. For the
first time in the history of great conferences, two banquets
were necessary at the close, taking place coincidentally, with
some of the same speakers passing from one to the other, no
hotel accommodations being sufficient for the function if all
applicants were to be housed in one place. Even with this
doubling the issuance of tickets had to be stopped.
"Secondly, the Congress was the first really National peace
meeting in America. In comparison, previous peace congresses
have been sectional. But at last week’s over thirty-five
States were represented by their Governors or their
representatives, by members of State tribunals and State
Legislatures, and by Mayors of important cities. The Federal
Government was represented by members of the Hague Court, of
the Supreme, Circuit, and District Courts, and of Congress.
Thus the resultant body was a peculiarly representative
official gathering. …
{716}
"Still another striking feature of the Congress lay in the
prominent place given to the representatives of labor and
commerce, a feature comprised in two meetings, addressed by
prominent leaders of the various industries. The general
position was well taken by Mr. Samuel Gompers, President of
the American Federation of Labor: ‘Not as workers will we
permit ourselves to be shot down in order to conquer the
markets of barbarians and savages. I know of no gathering of
labor in the last twenty-five years which has not declared
itself unequivocally for international brotherhood and
peace.’"
"A final and chief feature of interest lay in the notably
practical character of the vast majority of speakers and
listeners. The Congress was no ‘collection of cranks and
fools,’ as a hard-headed man of affairs dubbed it in passing
the hall, without looking in to verify his statement. Neither
was it a collection of white-blooded, weak-kneed theorists,
feebly appreciating the actual conditions that govern
individual passions and national prejudices. As one glanced
around, there were the faces of great captains of industry, of
practical leaders of labor, of men who bulk large in
commercial enterprises, of trusted political leaders. Nor was
the Congress any mere anti-war affair: its business was
positive, not negative; it was to affirm the necessity of
substituting reason for passion. There was a general sentiment
that it ought to emphasize, not ‘rainbows’ or distant Utopias,
but only practical plans certain of realization, and of
realization, too, not in the far future, but in this very
coming summer by action at The Hague."
_The Outlook,
April 27, 1907._
Among the prominent speakers were Mr. Carnegie, who presided,
Mr. Root, Secretary of State, Governor Hughes, of New York,
Ambassador Bryce, Mr. William J. Bryan, Congressman Bartholdt,
President of the American group in the Inter-parliamentary
Union, Professor Münsterberg, President Eliot, Baron
d’Estournelles, the eminent peace advocate of France, and Mr.
W. T. Stead. Mr. Root pointed out the great obstacle to
arbitration—a fear that the tribunals selected would not be
impartial, because arbitrators are thought often to act
diplomatically rather than judicially. "We need," he said,
"for arbitrators, not distinguished public men concerned in
all the international questions of the day, but judges
interested only in the question appearing on the record before
them. Plainly, this end is to be attained by the establishment
of a court of permanent judges."
Mr. Bryan made the excellent suggestion that in time of war
money-lenders shall not be allowed to wax fat by loans, taking
advantage of a nation’s weakness and urging it to continue
hostilities. A loan by the citizens of a neutral nation, he
pointed out, is practically a loan by the nation itself, and
should be objected to as much as furnishing shot and shell.
Mr. Stead, writing of the Congress in the _American Review
of Reviews_, characterized it as "in many respects the most
notable Congress of its kind that has ever been held in the
Old World or the New," and as being "the pioneer or John the
Baptist of the Second International Conference" soon to meet
at The Hague. "It represented," he said, "the first
rudimentary, crude, but nevertheless definite effort on the
part of the New World to impress its will on the Old World."
But he thought the resolutions of the Congress, "as a whole,
were hardly worthy of the importance of the occasion or the
representative character of the conference," and criticised
the committee for taking "no steps for pressing their adoption
upon other governments than their own."
WAR, THE REVOLT AGAINST: A. D. 1907.
Second International Peace Conference at The Hague:
Its Conventions, Declarations, and Recommendations.
Text of the Convention for a Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, and of the "Final Act," with its
recommended Draft Convention for the Creation of a Judicial
Arbitration Court.
"Pursuant to a request of the Interparliamentary Union, held
at St. Louis in 1904, that a further peace conference be held,
and that the President of the United States invite all nations
to send representatives to such a conference, the late
Secretary of State, at the direction of the President,
instructed, on October 21, 1904, the representatives of the
United States accredited to each of the signatories to the
acts of The Hague Conference of 1889 to present overtures for
a second conference to the ministers for foreign affairs of
the respective countries.
"The replies received to this circular instruction of October
21, 1904, indicated that the proposition for the calling of a
second conference met with general favor. At a later period it
was intimated by Russia that the initiator of the First
Conference was, owing to the restoration of peace in the
Orient, disposed to undertake the calling of a new conference
to continue as well as to supplement the works of the first.
The offer of the Czar to take steps requisite to convene a
second international peace conference was gladly welcomed by
the President, and the Final Act of the Conference only
recites in its preamble the invitation of the President.
"The Russian Government thus assumed the calling of the
Conference, and on April 12, 1906, submitted the following
programme, which was acceptable to the Powers generally and
which served as the basis of the work of the Conference:
"1. Improvements to be made in the provisions of the
convention relative to the peaceful settlement of
international disputes as regards the Court of Arbitration and
the International commissions of inquiry.
"2. Additions to be made to the provisions of the convention
of 1899 relative to the laws and customs of war on land—among
others, those concerning the opening of hostilities, the
rights of neutrals on land, etc. Declaration of 1899. One of
these having expired, question of its being revived.
"3. Framing of a convention relative to the laws and customs
of maritime warfare, concerning—
"The special operations of maritime warfare, such as the
bombardment of ports, cities, and villages by a naval force;
the laying of torpedoes, etc.
"The transformation of merchant vessels into war ships.
"The private property of belligerents at sea.
"The length of time to be granted to merchant ships for their
departure from ports of neutrals or of the enemy after the
opening of hostilities.
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"The rights and duties of neutrals at sea, among others the
questions of contraband, the rules applicable to belligerent
vessels in neutral ports; destruction, in cases of _vis
major_, of neutral merchant vessels captured as prizes.
"In the said convention to be drafted there would be
introduced the provisions relative to war on land that would
be also applicable to maritime warfare.
"4. Additions to be made to the convention of 1899 for the
adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva
Convention of 1864.
"The United States, however, reserved the right to bring to
discussion two matters of great importance not included in the
programme, namely, the reduction or limitation of armaments
and restrictions or limitations upon the use of force for the
collection of ordinary public debts arising out of contracts.
"It was finally decided that the Conference should meet at The
Hague on the 15th day of June, 1907, and thus the Conference,
proposed by the President of the United States, and convoked
by Her Majesty the Queen of The Netherlands upon the
invitation of the Emperor of All the Russias, assumed definite
shape and form. …
"In the circulars of October 21 and December 16, 1904, it was
suggested as desirable to consider and adopt a procedure by
which States nonsignatory to the original acts of The Hague
Conference may become adhering parties. This suggestion was
taken note of by the Russian Government and invitations were
issued to forty-seven countries, in response to which the
representatives of forty-four nations assembled at The Hague
and took part in the Conference. No opposition was made to the
admission of the nonsignatory States."
The delegation of the United States to the Conference was
composed of the following members: Commissioners
plenipotentiary with the rank of ambassador extraordinary:
Joseph H. Choate, of New York, Horace Porter, of New York,
Uriah M. Rose, of Arkansas; Commissioner plenipotentiary:
David Jayne Hill, of New York, envoy extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary of the United States to the
Netherlands; Commissioners Plenipotentiary with rank of
minister plenipotentiary: Brigadier General George B. Davis,
Judge-Advocate-General, United States Army, Rear-Admiral
Charles S. Sperry, United States Navy, William I. Buchanan, of
New York; Technical delegate and expert in international law:
James Brown Scott, of California; Technical delegate and
expert attache to the Commission: Charles Henry Butler, of New
York; Secretary to the Commission: Chandler Hale, of Maine;
Assistant secretaries to the Commission: A. Bailly-Blanchard,
of Louisiana, William M. Malloy, of Illinois.
"The Dutch Government set aside for the use of the Conference,
the Binnenhof, the seat of the States-General, and on the 15th
day of June, 1907, at 3 o’clock in the afternoon, the
Conference was opened by his excellency the Dutch minister for
foreign affairs in the presence of delegates representing
forty-four nations. … At the conclusion of the address of
welcome his excellency suggested as president of the
Conference His Excellency M. Nelidow, first delegate of
Russia, and, with the unanimous consent of the assembly, M.
Nelidow accepted the presidency and delivered an address." …
In accordance with the suggestion of the president, an order
of procedure, in twelve articles, was adopted, and the
Conference was divided into four Commissions, between which
the subjects specified in the programme of the Conference were
apportioned. "The actual work of the Conference was,
therefore, done in commission and committee. The results, so
far as the several commissions desired, were reported to the
Conference sitting in plenary session for approval, and after
approval, submitted to the small subediting committee for
final revision which, however, affected form, not substance.
The results thus reached were included in the Final Act and
signed by the plenipotentiaries on the 18th day of October,
1907, upon which date the Conference adjourned."
_Report of the Delegates of the United States
(60th Congress, 1st Session Senate Doc. 444)._
The results of the Conference are embodied in fourteen
Conventions duly formulated and signed, and a "Final Act" in
which certain principles are declared as being "unanimously
admitted." Of the Conventions entered into, that most
important one which provides means for a pacific solution of
international conflicts is but a revision of the Convention
for the same purpose which the Powers represented at the First
Peace Conference, of 1899, gave adhesion to, and the full text
of which is printed in Volume VI. of this work (pages
356-359). To a large extent the articles of the Convention are
unchanged, and the changes made are mostly in the nature of an
amplification of provisions and prescriptions of procedure for
carrying out the agreements set forth in the compact of 1899.
This occurs especially in Part III., relating to
"International Commissions of Inquiry," the specifications for
which, merely outlined in six articles of the Convention of
1899, were detailed with precision in twenty-eight articles of
the Convention of 1907. A similar amplification was given to
the chapters on "The System of Arbitration" and "Arbitral
Procedure." By a verbal change of some significance, the
parties to the Convention are designated "Contracting Powers,"
instead of "Signatory Powers," as before.
Other important features of the revision are noted in an
article which the Honorable David Jayne Hill, one of the
American Commission at the Conference, communicated to _The
American Review of Reviews_ of December, 1907. Dr. Hill
wrote:
"With regard to good offices and mediation, a slight step
forward was taken by the acceptance of the American
proposition that the initiative of powers foreign to the
controversy in offering them is not only ‘useful’ but
‘desirable.’ Greater precision has been given to the operation
of commissions of inquiry, whose great utility has already been
tested, but it was decided that the functions of such
commissions should be confined to a determination of facts and
should not extend to fixing responsibility. As regards
arbitration, while it was reasserted that ‘in questions of a
legal character, and especially in the interpretation or
application of international conventions, arbitration is
recognized by the contracting powers as the most efficacious
and at the same time the most equitable means of settling
differences that have not been adjusted by diplomacy,’ and,
‘in consequence, it would be desirable that, in contentions of
this character, the powers should resort to arbitration,’ it
was not found possible to render this resort an obligation.
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"It is necessary to state, however, that while unanimity upon
this proposal was not obtainable—even for a convention that
omitted all questions affecting ‘the vital interests,
independence, or honor’ of the contestants and included only a
meagre list of mainly unimportant subjects—32 powers voted in
favor of it, only 9 were opposed, and 3 abstained from voting.
As practical unanimity was held to be necessary for the
inclusion of a convention in the final act, even this very
moderate attempt at obligatory arbitration was unfruitful.
Still, as this strong manifestation of a disposition to make a
definite engagement could not conveniently be nullified
without being in some measure recognized, it was resolved,
with four abstentions, that the first commission was:
‘Unanimous (1) in recognizing the principle of obligatory
arbitration; and (2) in declaring that certain differences,
notably those relative to the interpretation and application
of conventional stipulations, are susceptible of being
submitted to obligatory arbitration without restriction.’
"Regarding this resolution as a retreat from the more advanced
position that had been taken by 32 powers, the head of the
American delegation clearly explained its attitude and
refrained from voting.
"It must, in justice, he added that some of the powers voting
against an obligatory arbitration convention probably did so
chiefly for the purpose of avoiding the isolation of others,
and that some of the powers most earnest in opposing the
project not only have negotiated special treaties of
obligatory arbitration, but declare their intention of
negotiating many more. The state of the question, then, is
this: All accept the principle of obligatory arbitration in
certain classes of cases, 32 powers are prepared to make
definite engagements with all the rest, 9 prefer to make them
only with states on whose responsibility they can rely, and 3
decline at present to commit themselves."
On the part of the United States, when this important
Convention was submitted subsequently to the Senate, it was
ratified conditionally, by the following resolution, adopted
April 2, 1908.
"_Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein_), That the Senate advise and consent to the
ratification of a convention signed by the delegates of the
United States to the Second International Peace Conference,
held at The Hague from June sixteenth to October eighteenth,
nineteen hundred and seven, for the pacific settlement of
international disputes, subject to the declaration made by the
delegates of the United States before signing said convention,
namely:
"‘Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed
as to require the United States of America to depart from its
traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or
entangling itself in the political questions of policy or
internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall
anything contained in the said convention be construed to
imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional
attitude toward purely American questions.’
"_Resolved further, as a part of this act of
ratification,_ That the United States approves this
convention with the understanding that recourse to the
permanent court for the settlement of differences can be had
only by agreement thereto through general or special treaties
of arbitration heretofore or hereafter concluded between the
parties in dispute; and the United States now exercises the
option contained in article fifty-three of said convention, to
exclude the formulation of the ‘compromis’ by the permanent
court, and hereby excludes from the competence of the
permanent court the power to frame the ‘compromis’ required by
general or special treaties of arbitration concluded or
hereafter to be concluded by the United States, and further
expressly declares that the ‘compromis’ required by any treaty
of arbitration to which the United States may be a party shall
be settled only by agreement between the contracting parties,
unless such treaty shall expressly provide otherwise."
Of the other Conventions agreed to and signed at the
Conference it will be sufficient to give here in part a
summary statement of their objects and provisions which was
prepared by the Honorable James Brown Scott, one of the
Technical Delegates to the Conference from the United States,
originally for publication in _The American Journal of
International Law_ for January, 1908. They are described by
Mr. Scott as follows:
"The second is the convention restricting the use of force for
the recovery of contract debts. This was introduced by the
American delegation, loyally and devotedly seconded by Doctor
Drago, who has battled for the doctrine to which he has given
his name. Without the support of Doctor Drago, it is doubtful
if Latin America—for whose benefit it was introduced—would
have voted for this very important doctrine. The proposition
is very short; it consists of but three articles, but we must
not measure things by their size. In full it is as follows;
‘In order to avoid between nations armed conflicts of a purely
pecuniary origin arising from contractual debts claimed from
the government of one country by the government of another
country to be due to its nationals, the contracting powers
agree not to have recourse to armed force for the collection
of such contractual debts.
"‘However, this stipulation shall not be applicable when the
debtor state refuses or leaves unanswered an offer to
arbitrate, or, in case of acceptance, makes it impossible to
formulate the terms of submission, or after arbitration, fails
to comply with the award rendered.
"‘It is further agreed that arbitration here contemplated
shall be in conformity, as to procedure, with Title IV,