* This fragment (found among Col. Ingersoll's papers) is a
mere outline of a contemplated answer to Archdeacon Farrar's
article in the North American Review, May, 1810, entitled:
"A Few Words on Col. Ingersoll."
ARCHDEACON FARRAR, in the opening of his article, in a burst of
confidence, takes occasion to let the world know how perfectly angelic
he intends to be. He publicly proclaims that he can criticise the
arguments of one with whom he disagrees, without resorting to invective,
or becoming discourteous. Does he call attention to this because most
theologians are hateful and ungentlemanly? Is it a rare thing for the
pious to be candid? Why should an Archdeacon be cruel, or even ill-bred?
Yet, in the very beginning, the Archdeacon in effect says: Behold, I
show you a mystery--a Christian who can write about an infidel, without
invective and without brutality. Is it then so difficult for those who
love their enemies to keep within the bounds of decency when speaking of
unbelievers who have never injured them?
As a matter of fact, I was somewhat surprised when I read the
proclamation to the effect that the writer was not to use invective,
and was to be guilty of no discourtesy; but on reading the article, and
finding that he had failed to keep his promise, I was not surprised.
It is an old habit with theologians to beat the living with the bones of
the dead. The arguments that cannot be answered provoke epithet.
ARCHDEACON FARRAR criticises several of my statements: _The same rules
or laws of probability must govern in religious questions as in others_.
This apparently self-evident statement seems to excite almost the ire of
this Archdeacon, and for the purpose of showing that it is not true,
he states, first, that "the first postulate of revelation is that it
appeals to man's spirit;" second, that "the spirit is a sphere of being
which transcends the spheres of the senses and the understanding;"
third, that "if a man denies the existence of a spiritual intuition,
he is like a blind man criticising colors, or a deaf man criticising
harmonies;" fourth, that "revelation must be judged by its own
criteria;" and fifth, that "St. Paul draws a marked distinction between
the spirit of the world and the spirit which is of God," and that the
same Saint said that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the
spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, and he cannot know
them, because they are spiritually discerned." Let us answer these
objections in their order.
1. "The first postulate of revelation is that it appeals to man's
spirit." What does the Archdeacon mean by "spirit"? A man says that he
has received a revelation from God, and he wishes to convince another
man that he has received a revelation--how does he proceed? Does he
appeal to the man's reason? Will he tell him the circumstances under
which he received the revelation? Will he tell him why he is convinced
that it was from God? Will the Archdeacon be kind enough to tell how the
spirit can be approached passing by the reason, the understanding,
the judgment and the intellect? If the Archdeacon replies that the
revelation itself will bear the evidence within itself, what then, I
ask, does he mean by the word "evidence"? Evidence about what? Is it
such evidence as satisfies the intelligence, convinces the reason, and
is it in conformity with the known facts of the mind?
It may be said by the Archdeacon that anything that satisfies what he
is pleased to call the spirit, that furnishes what it seems by nature to
require, is of supernatural origin. We hear music, and this music seems
to satisfy the desire for harmony--still, no one argues, from that
fact, that music is of supernatural origin. It may satisfy a want in the
brain--a want unknown until the music was heard--and yet we all agree
in saying that music has been naturally produced, and no one claims that
Beethoven, or Wagner, was inspired.
The same may be said of things that satisfy the palate--of statues, of
paintings, that reveal to him who looks, the existence of that of
which before that time he had not even dreamed. Why is it that we love
color--that we are pleased with harmonies, or with a succession of
sounds rising and falling at measured intervals? No one would answer
this question by saying that sculptors and painters and musicians were
inspired; neither would they say that the first postulate of art is that
it appeals to man's spirit, and for that reason the rules or laws of
probability have nothing to do with the question of art.
2. That "the spirit is a sphere of being which transcends the spheres of
the senses and the understanding." Let us imagine a man without senses.
He cannot feel, see, hear, taste, or smell. What is he? Would it be
possible for him to have an idea? Would such a man have a spirit to
which revelation could appeal, or would there be locked in the dungeon
of his brain a spirit, that is to say, a "sphere of being which
transcends the spheres of the senses and the understanding"? Admit that
in the person supposed, the machinery of life goes on--what is he more
than an inanimate machine?
3. That "if a man denies the very existence of a spiritual intuition,
he is like a blind man criticising colors, or a deaf man criticising
harmonies." What do you mean by "spiritual intuition"? When did this
"spiritual intuition" become the property of man--before, or after,
birth? Is it of supernatural, or miraculous, origin, and is it possible
that this "spiritual intuition" is independent of the man? Is it based
upon experience? Was it in any way born of the senses, or of the effect
of nature upon the brain--that is to say, of things seen, or heard, or
touched? Is a "spiritual intuition" an entity? If man can exist without
the "spiritual intuition," do you insist that the "spiritual intuition"
can exist without the man?
You may remember that Mr. Locke frequently remarked: "Define your
terms." It is to be regretted that in the hurry of writing your article,
you forgot to give an explanation of "spiritual intuition."
I will also take the liberty of asking you how a blind man could
criticise colors, and how a deaf man could criticise harmonies. Possibly
you may imagine that "spiritual intuition" can take cognizance of
colors, as well as of harmonies. Let me ask: Why cannot a blind man
criticise colors? Let me answer: For the same reason that Archdeacon
Farrar can tell us nothing about an infinite personality.
4. That "revelation must be judged by its own criteria." Suppose the
Bible had taught that selfishness, larceny and murder were virtues;
would you deny its inspiration? Would not your denial be based upon
a conclusion that had been reached by your reason that no intelligent
being could have been its author--that no good being could, by any
possibility, uphold the commission of such crimes? In that case would
you be guided by "spiritual intuition," or by your reason?
When we examine the claims of a history--as, for instance, a history
of England, or of America, are we to decide according to "spiritual
intuition," or in accordance with the laws or rules of probability?
Is there a different standard for a history written in Hebrew, several
thousand years ago, and one written in English in the nineteenth
century? If a history should now be written in England, in which the
most miraculous and impossible things should be related as facts, and
if I should deny these alleged facts, would you consider that the author
had overcome my denial by saying, "history must be judged by its own
criteria"?
5. That "the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God,
for they are foolishness unto him, and he cannot know them, because they
are spiritually discerned." The Archdeacon admits that the natural man
cannot know the things of the spirit, because they are not naturally,
but spiritually, discerned. On the next page we are told, that "the
truths which Agnostics repudiate have been, and are, acknowledged by
all except a fraction of the human race." It goes without saying that
a large majority of the human race are natural; consequently, the
statement of the Archdeacon contradicts the statement of St. Paul.
The Archdeacon insists that all except a fraction of the human race
acknowledge the truths which Agnostics repudiate, and they must
acknowledge them because they are by them spiritually discerned; and
yet, St. Paul says that this is impossible, and insists that "the
natural man cannot know the things of the spirit of God, because they
are spiritually discerned."
There is only one way to harmonize the statement of the Archdeacon and
the Saint, and that is, by saying that nearly all of the human race
are unnatural, and that only a small fraction are natural, and that the
small fraction of men who are natural, are Agnostics, and only those who
accept what the Archdeacon calls "truths" are unnatural to such a degree
that they can discern spiritual things.
Upon this subject, the last things to which the Archdeacon appeals, are
the very things that he, at first, utterly repudiated. He asks, "Are we
contemptuously to reject the witness of innumerable multitudes of the
good and wise, that--with a spiritual reality more convincing to them
than the material evidences which converted the apostles,"--they have
seen, and heard, and their hands have handled the "Word of Life"? Thus
at last the Archdeacon appeals to the evidences of the senses.