WASHINGTON CROSSES THE HUDSON—ARRIVES AT FORT LEE—AFFAIRS AT FORT
WASHINGTON—QUESTION ABOUT ITS ABANDONMENT—MOVEMENTS OF HOWE—THE FORT
SUMMONED TO SURRENDER—REFUSAL OF COLONEL MAGAW—THE FORT ATTACKED—CAPTURE
OF THE FORT AND GARRISON—COMMENTS OF WASHINGTON ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS.
On the morning of the 12th of November, Washington crossed the Hudson,
to the ferry below Stony Point, with the residue of the troops destined
for the Jerseys. Far below were to be descried the Phœnix, the Roebuck,
and the Tartar, at anchor in the broad waters of Haverstraw Bay and the
Tappan Sea, guarding the lower ferries. The army, thus shut out from the
nearer passes, was slowly winding its way by a circuitous route through
the gap in the mountains, which Lord Stirling had secured. Leaving the
troops which had just landed, to pursue the same route to the
Hackensack, Washington, accompanied by Colonel Reed, struck a direct
course for Fort Lee, being anxious about affairs at Fort Washington. He
arrived there on the following day, and found, to his disappointment,
that General Greene had taken no measures for the evacuation of that
fortress; but on the contrary, had reinforced it with a part of Colonel
Durkee’s regiment, and the regiment of Colonel Rawlings, so that its
garrison now numbered upwards of two thousand men; a great part,
however, were militia. Washington’s orders for its evacuation had, in
fact, been discretionary, leaving the execution of them to Greene’s
judgment, “as being on the spot.” The latter had differed in opinion as
to the policy of such a measure; and Colonel Magaw, who had charge of
the fortress, was likewise confident it might be maintained.
Colonel Reed was of opposite counsels; but then he was personally
interested in the safety of the garrison. It was composed almost
entirely of Pennsylvania troops under Magaw and Lambert Cadwalader;
excepting a small detachment of Maryland riflemen commanded by Otho H.
Williams. They were his friends and neighbors, the remnant of the brave
men who had suffered so severely under Atlee and Smallwood.[131] The
fort was now invested on all sides but one; and the troops under Howe
which had been encamped at Dobbs’ Ferry, were said to be moving down
toward it. Reed’s solicitude was not shared by the garrison itself.
Colonel Magaw, its brave commander, still thought it was in no immediate
danger.
Washington was much perplexed. The main object of Howe was still a
matter of doubt with him. He could not think that Sir William was moving
his whole force upon that fortress, to invest which, a part would be
sufficient. He suspected an ulterior object, probably a Southern
expedition, as he was told a large number of ships were taking in wood
and water at New York. He resolved, therefore, to continue a few days in
this neighborhood, during which he trusted the designs of the enemy
would be more apparent; in the mean time he would distribute troops at
Brunswick, Amboy, Elizabethtown and Fort Lee, so as to be ready at these
various points, to check any incursions into the Jerseys.
In a letter to the President of Congress he urged for an increase of
ordnance and field-artillery. The rough, hilly country east of the
Hudson, and the strongholds and fastnesses of which the Americans had
possessed themselves, had prevented the enemy from profiting by the
superiority of their artillery; but this would not be the case, should
the scene of action change to an open champaign country, like the
Jerseys.
Washington was mistaken in his conjecture as to Sir William Howe’s
design. The capture of Fort Washington was, at present, his main object;
and he was encamped on Fordham Heights, not far from King’s Bridge,
until preliminary steps should be taken. In the night of the 14th,
thirty flat-bottomed boats stole quietly up the Hudson, passed the
American forts undiscovered, and made their way through Spyt den Duivel
Creek into Harlem River. The means were thus provided for crossing that
river and landing before unprotected parts of the American works.
On the 15th, General Howe sent in a summons to surrender, with a threat
of extremities should he have to carry the place by assault. Magaw, in
his reply, intimated a doubt that General Howe would execute a threat
“so unworthy of himself and the British nation; but give me leave,”
added he, “to assure his Excellency, that, actuated by the most glorious
cause that mankind ever fought in, I am determined to defend this post
to the very last extremity.”
Apprised by the Colonel of his peril, General Greene sent over
reinforcements, with an exhortation to him to persist in his defence;
and despatched an express to Washington, who was at Hackensack, where
the troops which had crossed from Peekskill were encamped. It was
nightfall when Washington arrived at Fort Lee. Greene and Putnam were
over at the besieged fortress. He threw himself into a boat, and had
partly crossed the river, when he met those generals returning. They
informed him of the garrison’s having been reinforced, and assured him
that it was in high spirits, and capable of making a good defence. It
was with difficulty, however, they could prevail on him to return with
them to the Jersey shore, for he was excessively excited.
Early the next morning (16th), Magaw made his dispositions for the
expected attack. His forces, with the recent addition, amounted to
nearly three thousand men. As the fort could not contain above a third
of that number, most of them were stationed about the outworks.
Colonel Lambert Cadwalader, with eight hundred Pennsylvanians, was
posted in the outer lines, about two miles and a half south of the fort,
the side menaced by Lord Percy with sixteen hundred men. Colonel
Rawlings, of Maryland, with a body of troops, many of them riflemen, was
stationed by a three-gun battery, on a rocky, precipitous hill, north of
the fort, and between it and Spyt den Duivel Creek. Colonel Baxter, of
Bucks County, Pennsylvania, with his regiment of militia, was posted
east of the fort, on rough, woody heights, bordering the Harlem River,
to watch the motions of the enemy, who had thrown up redoubts on high
and commanding ground, on the opposite side of the river, apparently to
cover the crossing and landing of troops.
Sir William Howe had planned four simultaneous attacks; one on the north
by Knyphausen, who was encamped on the York side of King’s Bridge,
within cannon shot of Fort Washington, but separated from it by high and
rough hills, covered with almost impenetrable woods. He was to advance
in two columns, formed by detachments made from the Hessians of his
corps, the brigade of Rahl, and the regiment of Waldeckers. The second
attack was to be by two battalions of light infantry, and two battalions
of guards, under Brigadier-general Mathew, who was to cross Harlem River
in flat-boats, under cover of the redoubts above mentioned, and to land
on the right of the fort. This attack was to be supported by the first
and second grenadiers, and a regiment of light infantry under command of
Lord Cornwallis. The third attack, intended as a feint to distract the
attention of the Americans, was to be by Colonel Sterling, with the
forty-second regiment, who was to drop down the Harlem River in bateaux,
to the left of the American lines, facing New York. The fourth attack
was to be on the south, by Lord Percy, with the English and Hessian
troops under his command, on the right flank of the American
intrenchments.[132]
About noon, a heavy cannonade thundering along the rocky hills, and
sharp volleys of musketry, proclaimed that the action was commenced.
Knyphausen’s division was pushing on from the north in two columns, as
had been arranged. The right was led by Colonel Rahl, the left by
himself. Rahl essayed to mount a steep, broken height called Cock Hill,
which rises from Spyt den Duivel Creek, and was covered with woods.
Knyphausen undertook a hill rising from the King’s Bridge road, but soon
found himself entangled in a woody defile, difficult to penetrate, and
where his Hessians were exposed to the fire of the three-gun battery,
and Rawlings’ riflemen.
While this was going on at the north of the fort, General Mathew, with
his light infantry and guards, crossed the Harlem River in the
flat-boats, under cover of a heavy fire from the redoubts.
He made good his landing, after being severely handled by Baxter and his
men, from behind rocks and trees, and the breastworks thrown up on the
steep river bank. A short contest ensued. Baxter, while bravely
encouraging his men, was killed by a British officer. His troops,
overpowered by numbers, retreated to the fort. General Mathew now pushed
on with his guards and light infantry to cut off Cadwalader. That
officer had gallantly defended the lines against the attack of Lord
Percy, until informed that Colonel Sterling was dropping down Harlem
River in bateaux to flank the lines, and take him in the rear. He sent
off a detachment to oppose his landing. They did it manfully. About
ninety of Sterling’s men were killed or wounded in their boats, but he
persevered, landed, and forced his way up a steep height, which was well
defended, gained the summit, forced a redoubt, and took nearly two
hundred prisoners. Thus doubly assailed, Cadwalader was obliged to
retreat to the fort. He was closely pursued by Percy with his English
troops and Hessians, but turned repeatedly on his pursuers. Thus he
fought his way to the fort, with the loss of several killed and more
taken prisoners; but marking his track by the number of Hessians slain.
The defence on the north side of the fort was equally obstinate and
unsuccessful. Rawlings with his Maryland riflemen and the aid of the
three-gun battery, had for some time kept the left column of Hessians
and Waldeckers under Knyphausen at bay. At length Colonel Rahl, with the
right column of the division, having forced his way directly up the
north side of the steep hill at Spyt den Duivel Creek, came upon
Rawlings’ men, whose rifles, from frequent discharges, had become foul
and almost useless, drove them from their strong post, and followed them
until within a hundred yards of the fort, where he was joined by
Knyphausen, who had slowly made his way through dense forest and over
felled trees. Here they took post behind a large stone house, and sent
in a flag, with a second summons to surrender.
Washington, surrounded by several of his officers, had been an anxious
spectator of the battle from the opposite side of the Hudson. Much of it
was hidden from him by intervening hills and forest; but the roar of
cannonry from the valley of Harlem River, the sharp and incessant
reports of rifles, and the smoke rising above the tree tops, told him of
the spirit with which the assault was received at various points, and
gave him for a time a hope that the defence might be successful. The
action about the lines to the south lay open to him, and could be
distinctly seen through a telescope; and nothing encouraged him more
than the gallant style in which Cadwalader with an inferior force
maintained his position. When he saw him, however, assailed in flank,
the line broken, and his troops, overpowered by numbers, retreating to
the fort, he gave up the game as lost. The worst sight of all, was to
behold his men cut down and bayoneted by the Hessians while begging
quarter. It is said so completely to have overcome him, that he wept
“with the tenderness of a child.”
Seeing the flag go into the fort from Knyphausen’s division, and
surmising it to be a summons to surrender, he wrote a note to Magaw,
telling him that if he could hold out until evening, and the place could
not be maintained, he would endeavor to bring off the garrison in the
night. Captain Gooch, of Boston, a brave and daring man, offered to be
the bearer of the note. “He ran down to the river, jumped into a small
boat, pushed over the river, landed under the bank, ran up to the fort
and delivered the message:—came out, ran and jumped over the broken
ground, dodging the Hessians, some of whom struck at him with their
pieces and others attempted to thrust him with their bayonets; escaping
through them, he got to his boat and returned to Fort Lee.”[133]
Washington’s message arrived too late. “The fort was so crowded by the
garrison, and the troops which had retreated into it, that it was
difficult to move about. The enemy, too, were in possession of the
little redoubts around, and could have poured in showers of shells and
ricochet balls that would have made dreadful slaughter.” It was no
longer possible for Magaw to get his troops to man the lines; he was
compelled, therefore, to yield himself and his garrison prisoners of
war. The only terms granted them were, that the men should retain their
baggage and the officers their swords.
The sight of the American flag hauled down, and the British flag waving
in its place, told Washington of the surrender. His instant care was for
the safety of the upper country, now that the lower defences of the
Hudson were at an end. Before he knew any thing about the terms of
capitulation, he wrote to General Lee, informing him of the surrender,
and calling his attention to the passes of the Highlands and those which
lay east of the river; begging him to have such measures adopted for
their defence as his judgment should suggest to be necessary. “I do not
mean,” added he, “to advise abandoning your present post, contrary to
your own opinion; but only to mention my own ideas of the importance of
those passes, and that you cannot give too much attention to their
security, by having works erected on the most advantageous places for
that purpose.”
Lee, in reply, objected to removing from his actual encampment at
Northcastle. “It would give us,” said he, “the air of being frightened;
it would expose a fine, fertile country to their ravages; and I must
add, that we are as secure as we could be in any position whatever.”
After stating that he should deposit his stores, &c., in a place fully
as safe, and more central than Peekskill, he adds: “As to ourselves,
light as we are, several retreats present themselves. In short, if we
keep a good look-out, we are in no danger; but I must entreat your
Excellency to enjoin the officers posted at Fort Lee, to give us the
quickest intelligence, if they observe any embarkation on the North
River.” As to the affair of Fort Washington, all that Lee observed on
the subject was: “Oh, general, why would you be over-persuaded by men of
inferior judgment to your own? It was a cursed affair.”
Lee’s allusion to men of inferior judgment, was principally aimed at
Greene, whose influence with the commander-in-chief seems to have
excited the jealousy of other officers of rank. So Colonel Tilghman,
Washington’s aide-de-camp, writes on the 17th, to Robert R. Livingston
of New York, “We were in a fair way of finishing the campaign with
credit to ourselves, and, I think, to the disgrace of Mr. Howe; and, had
the general followed his own opinion, the garrison would have been
withdrawn immediately upon the enemy’s falling down from Dobbs’ Ferry.
But General Greene was positive that our forces might at any time be
drawn off under the guns of Fort Lee. Fatal experience has evinced the
contrary.”[134]
Washington’s own comments on the reduction of the fort, made in a letter
to his brother Augustine, are worthy of special note. “This is a most
unfortunate affair, and has given me great mortification; as we have
lost, not only two thousand men,[135] that were there, but a good deal
of artillery, and some of the best arms we had. And what adds to my
mortification is, that this post, after the last ships went past it, was
held contrary to my wishes and opinion, as I conceived it to be a
hazardous one: but it having been determined on by a full council of
general officers, and a resolution of Congress having been received,
strongly expressive of their desire that the channel of the river which
we had been laboring to stop for a long time at that place, might be
obstructed, if possible; and knowing that this could not be done, unless
there were batteries to protect the obstructions, I did not care to give
an absolute order for withdrawing the garrison, till I could get round
and see the situation of things; and then it became too late, as the
place was invested. Upon the passing of the last ships, I had given it
as my opinion to General Greene, under whose care it was, that it would
be best to evacuate the place; but, as the order was discretionary, and
his opinion differed from mine, it was unhappily delayed too long; to my
great grief.”
The correspondence of Washington with his brother, is full of gloomy
anticipations. “In ten days from this date, there will not be above two
thousand men, if that number, of the fixed established regiments on this
side of Hudson River, to oppose Howe’s whole army; and very little more
on the other, to secure the eastern colonies, and the important passes
leading through the Highlands to Albany, and the country about the
lakes. In short it is impossible for me, in the compass of a letter, to
give you any idea of our situation, of my difficulties, and of the
constant perplexities I meet with, derived from the unhappy policy of
short enlistments, and delaying them too long. Last fall, or winter
before the army, which was then to be raised, was set about, I
represented in clear and explicit terms the evils which would arise from
short enlistments, the expense which must attend the raising an army
every year, and the futility of such an army when raised; and if I had
spoken with a prophetic spirit, I could not have foretold the evils with
more accuracy than I did. All the year since, I have been pressing
Congress to delay no time in engaging men upon such terms as would
insure success, telling them that the longer it was delayed, the more
difficult it would prove. But the measure was not commenced until it was
too late to be effected. * * * I am wearied almost to death with the
retrograde motion of things; and I solemnly protest, that a pecuniary
reward of twenty thousand pounds a year would not induce me to undergo
what I do, and, after all, perhaps to lose my character; as it is
impossible, under such a variety of distressing circumstances, to
conduct matters agreeably to public expectation.”