CONJECTURES AS TO THE INTENTIONS OF THE ENEMY—CONSEQUENT
PRECAUTIONS—CORRESPONDENCE WITH GREENE RESPECTING FORT
WASHINGTON—DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY—LEE LEFT IN COMMAND AT
NORTHCASTLE—INSTRUCTIONS TO HIM—WASHINGTON AT PEEKSKILL—VISITS TO THE
POSTS IN THE HIGHLANDS.
Various were the speculations at head-quarters on the sudden movement of
the enemy. Washington writes to General William Livingston (now governor
of the Jerseys): “They have gone towards the North River and King’s
Bridge. Some suppose they are going into winter quarters, and will sit
down in New York without doing more than investing Fort Washington. I
cannot subscribe wholly to this opinion myself. That they will invest
Fort Washington, is a matter of which there can be no doubt; and I think
there is a strong probability that General Howe will detach a part of
his force to make an incursion into the Jerseys, provided he is going to
New York. He must attempt something on account of his reputation, for
what has he done as yet, with his great army?”
In the same letter he expressed his determination, as soon as it should
appear that the present manœuvre was a real retreat, and not a feint, to
throw over a body of troops into the Jerseys to assist in checking
Howe’s progress. He, moreover, recommended to the governor to have the
militia of that State put on the best possible footing, and a part of
them held in readiness to take the place of the State levies, whose term
of service would soon expire. He advised, also, that the inhabitants
contiguous to the water, should be prepared to remove their stock,
grain, effects, and carriages, on the earliest notice.
In a letter of the same date, he charged General Greene, should Howe
invest Fort Washington with part of his force, to give the garrison all
possible assistance.
On the following day (Nov. 8), his aide-de-camp, Colonel Tilghman,
writes to General Greene from head-quarters: “The enemy are at Dobbs’
Ferry with a great number of boats, ready to go into Jersey, _or proceed
up the river_.”
Greene doubted any intention of the enemy to cross the river; it might
only be a feint to mislead; still, as a precaution, he had ordered
troops up from the flying camp, and was posting them opposite Dobbs’
Ferry, and at other passes where a landing might be attempted; the whole
being under the command of General Mercer.
Affairs at Fort Washington soon settled the question of the enemy’s
intentions with regard to it. Lord Percy took his station with a body of
troops before the lines to the south. Knyphausen advanced on the north.
The Americans had previously abandoned Fort Independence, burnt its
barracks, and removed the stores and cannon. Crossing King’s Bridge,
Knyphausen took a position between it and Fort Washington. The approach
to the fort, on this side, was exceedingly steep and rocky; as, indeed,
were all its approaches excepting that on the south, where the country
was more open, and the ascent gradual. The fort could not hold within
its walls above one thousand men; the rest of the troops were
distributed about the lines and outworks. While the fort was thus
menaced, the chevaux-de-frise had again proved inefficient. On the night
of the 5th, a frigate and two transports, bound up to Dobbs’ Ferry, with
supplies for Howe’s army, had broken through; though, according to
Greene’s account, not without being considerably shattered by the
batteries.
Informed of these facts, Washington wrote to Greene on the 8th: “If we
cannot prevent vessels from passing up the river, and the enemy are
possessed of all the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it
answer to hold a post from which the expected benefit cannot be had? I
am, therefore, inclined to think, that it will not be prudent to hazard
the men and stores at Mount Washington; but, as you are on the spot, I
leave it to you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington as
you may judge best, and so far revoking the orders given to Colonel
Magaw, to defend it to the last.”
Accounts had been received at head-quarters of a considerable movement
on the preceding evening (Nov. 7th), among the enemy’s boats at Dobbs’
Ferry, with the intention, it was said, of penetrating the Jerseys, and
falling down upon Fort Lee. Washington, therefore, in the same letter
directed Greene to have all the stores not necessary to the defence
removed immediately, and to destroy all the stock, the hay and grain, in
the neighborhood, which the owners refused to remove. “Experience has
shown,” adds he, “that a contrary conduct is not of the least advantage
to the poor inhabitants, from whom all their effects of every kind are
taken without distinction and without the least satisfaction.”
Greene, in reply (Nov. 9th), adhered with tenacity to the policy of
maintaining Fort Washington. “The enemy,” said he, “must invest it with
double the number of men required for its defence. They must keep troops
at King’s Bridge, to cut off all communication with the country, and in
considerable force, for fear of an attack.” He did not consider the fort
in immediate danger. Colonel Magaw thought it would take the enemy until
the end of December to carry it. In the mean time, the garrison could at
any time be brought off, and even the stores removed, should matters
grow desperate. If the enemy should not find it an object of importance,
they would not trouble themselves about it; if they should, it would be
a proof that they felt an injury from its being maintained. The giving
it up would open for them a free communication with the country by the
way of King’s Bridge.[126]
It is doubtful when or where Washington received this letter, as he left
the camp at Northcastle at eleven o’clock of the following morning.
There being still considerable uncertainty as to the intentions of the
enemy, all his arrangements were made accordingly. All the troops
belonging to the States west of the Hudson, were to be stationed in the
Jerseys, under command of General Putnam. Lord Stirling had already been
sent forward with the Maryland and Virginia troops to Peekskill, to
cross the river at King’s Ferry. Another division composed of
Connecticut and Massachusetts troops, under General Heath, was to
co-operate with the brigade of New York militia under General George
Clinton, in securing the Highland posts on both sides of the river.
The troops which would remain at Northcastle after the departure of
Heath and his division, were to be commanded by Lee. Washington’s letter
of instructions to that general is characterized by his own modesty, and
his deference for Lee’s superior military experience. He suggests,
rather than orders, yet his letter is sufficiently explicit. “A little
time now,” writes he, “must manifest the enemy’s designs, and point out
to you the measures proper to be pursued by that part of the army under
your command. I shall give no directions, therefore, on this head,
having the most entire confidence in your judgment and military
exertions. One thing, however, I will suggest, namely, that the
appearance of embarking troops for the Jerseys may be intended as a
feint to weaken us, and render the post we now hold more vulnerable, or
the enemy may find that troops are assembled with more expedition, and
in greater numbers, than they expected, on the Jersey shore, to oppose
them; and, as it is possible, from one or other of these motives, that
they may yet pay the party under your command a visit, it will be
unnecessary, I am persuaded, to recommend to you the propriety of
putting this post, if you stay at it, into a proper posture of defence,
and guarding against surprises. But I would recommend it to your
consideration, whether, under the suggestion above, your retiring to
Croton Bridge, and some strong post still more easterly (covering the
passes through the Highlands), may not be more advisable than to run the
hazard of an attack with unequal numbers. At any rate, I think all your
baggage and stores, except such as are necessary for immediate use,
ought to be to the northward of Croton River. * * * * You will consider
the post at Croton’s (or Pine’s) Bridge as under your immediate
care. * * * * If the enemy should remove the whole, or the greater part
of their force to the west side of Hudson’s River, I have no doubt of
your following with all possible dispatch, leaving the militia and
invalids to cover the frontiers of Connecticut in case of need.”
We have been minute in stating these matters, from their bearing on
subsequent operations.
On the 10th of November, Washington left the camp at Northcastle, at 11
o’clock, and arrived at Peekskill at sunset; whither General Heath, with
his division, had preceded him by a few hours. Lord Stirling was there,
likewise, having effected the transportation of the Maryland and
Virginia troops across the river, and landed them at the ferry south of
Stony Point; though a better landing was subsequently found north of the
point. His lordship had thrown out a scouting party in the advance, and
a hundred men to take possession of a gap in the mountain, through which
a road passed toward the Jerseys.
Washington was now at the entrance of the Highlands, that grand defile
of the Hudson, the object of so much precaution and solicitude. On the
following morning, accompanied by Generals Heath, Stirling, James and
George Clinton, Mifflin, and others, he made a military visit in boats
to the Highland posts. Fort Montgomery was in a considerable state of
forwardness, and a work in the vicinity was projected to co-operate with
it. Fort Constitution commanded a sudden bend of the river, but Lord
Stirling, in his report of inspection, had intimated that the fort
itself was commanded by West Point opposite. A glance of the eye,
without going on shore, was sufficient to convince Washington of the
fact. A fortress subsequently erected on that point, has been considered
the Key of the Highlands.
On the morning of the 12th, at an early hour, Washington rode out with
General Heath to reconnoitre the east side of the Hudson, at the gorge
of the Highlands. Henry Wisner, in a report to the New York Convention,
had mentioned a hill to the north of Peekskill, so situated, with the
road winding along the side of it, that ten men on the top, by rolling
down stones, might prevent ten thousand from passing. “I’ll believe,”
said he, “nothing more need be done than to keep great quantities of
stones at the different places where the troops must pass, if they
attempt penetrating the mountains.”
Near Robinson’s Bridge, in this vicinity, about two miles from
Peekskill, Washington chose a place where troops should be stationed to
cover the south entrance into the mountains; and here, afterwards, was
established an important military depot called Continental Village.
On the same day (12th), he wrote to General Lee, inclosing a copy of
resolutions just received from Congress, respecting levies for the new
army, showing the importance of immediately beginning the recruiting
service. If no commissioners arrived from Rhode Island, he was to
appoint the officers recommended to that State by General Greene. “I
cannot conclude,” adds he, “without reminding you of the military and
other stores about your encampment, and at Northcastle, and to press the
removal of them above Croton Bridge, or such other places of security as
you may think proper. General Howe, having sent no part of his force to
Jersey yet, makes the measure more necessary, as he may turn his views
another way, and attempt their destruction.”
It was evidently Washington’s desire that Lee should post himself, as
soon as possible, beyond the Croton, where he would be safe from
surprise, and at hand to throw his troops promptly across the Hudson,
should the Jerseys be invaded.
Having made all these surveys and arrangements, Washington placed Heath
in the general command of the Highlands, with written instructions to
fortify the passes with all possible despatch, and directions how the
troops were to be distributed on both sides of the river; and here we
take occasion to give some personal notice of this trusty officer.
Heath was now in the fortieth year of his age. Like many of the noted
officers of the Revolution, he had been brought up in rural life, on an
hereditary farm near Boston; yet, according to his own account, though
passionately fond of agricultural pursuits, he had also, almost from
childhood, a great relish for military affairs, and had studied every
treatise on the subject in the English language, so that he considered
himself “fully acquainted with the _theory_ of war, in all its branches
and duties, from the private soldier to the commander-in-chief.”
He describes himself to be of a middling stature, light complexion, very
corpulent and bald-headed, so that the French officers who served in
America, compared him, in person, to the Marquis of Granby.[127]
Such was the officer intrusted with the command of the Highland passes,
and encamped at Peekskill, their portal. We shall find him faithful to
his trust; scrupulous in obeying the letter of his instructions; but
sturdy and punctilious in resisting any undue assumption of authority.