MONOTONOUS STATE OF AFFAIRS BEFORE BOSTON—WASHINGTON ANXIOUS FOR
ACTION—EXPLOIT OF PUTNAM—ITS DRAMATIC CONSEQUENCES—THE FARCE OF THE
BLOCKADE OF BOSTON—AN ALARMING INTERRUPTION—DISTRESSES OF THE
BESIEGED—WASHINGTON’S IRKSOME PREDICAMENT—HIS BOLD PROPOSITION—DEMUR OF
THE COUNCIL OF WAR—ARRIVAL OF KNOX WITH ARTILLERY—DORCHESTER HEIGHTS TO
BE SEIZED AND FORTIFIED—PREPARATIONS FOR THE ATTEMPT.
The siege of Boston continued through the winter, without any striking
incident to enliven its monotony. The British remained within their
works, leaving the beleaguering army slowly to augment its forces. The
country was dissatisfied with the inaction of the latter. Even Congress
was anxious for some successful blow that might revive popular
enthusiasm. Washington shared this anxiety, and had repeatedly, in
councils of war, suggested an attack upon the town, but had found a
majority of his general officers opposed to it. He had hoped some
favorable opportunity would present, when, the harbor being frozen, the
troops might approach the town upon the ice. The winter, however, though
severe at first, proved a mild one, and the bay continued open. General
Putnam, in the mean time, having completed the new works at Lechmere
Point, and being desirous of keeping up the spirit of his men, resolved
to treat them to an exploit. Accordingly, from his “impregnable
fortress” of Cobble Hill, he detached a party of about two hundred,
under his favorite officer, Major Knowlton, to surprise and capture a
British guard stationed at Charlestown. It was a daring enterprise, and
executed with spirit. As Charlestown Neck was completely protected,
Knowlton led his men across the mill-dam, round the base of the hill,
and immediately below the fort; set fire to the guard-house and some
buildings in its vicinity; made several prisoners, and retired without
loss; although thundered upon by the cannon of the fort. The exploit was
attended by a dramatic effect on which Putnam had not calculated. The
British officers, early in the winter, had fitted up a theatre, which
was well attended by the troops and tories. On the evening in question,
an afterpiece was to be performed, entitled “The Blockade of Boston,”
intended as a burlesque on the patriot army which was beleaguering it.
Washington is said to have been represented in it as an awkward lout,
equipped with a huge wig, and a long rusty sword, attended by a country
booby as orderly sergeant, in rustic garb, with an old firelock seven or
eight feet long.
The theatre was crowded, especially by the military. The first piece was
over, and the curtain was rising for the farce, when a sergeant made his
appearance, and announced that “the alarm guns were firing at
Charlestown, and the Yankees attacking Bunker’s Hill.” At first this was
supposed to be a part of the entertainment, until General Howe gave the
word, “Officers, to your alarm posts.”
Great confusion ensued; every one scrambled out of the theatre as fast
as possible. There was, as usual, some shrieking and fainting of ladies;
and the farce of “The Blockade of Boston” had a more serious than comic
termination.
The London Chronicle, in a sneering comment on Boston affairs, gave
Burgoyne as the author of this burlesque afterpiece, though perhaps
unjustly. “General Burgoyne has opened a theatrical campaign, of which
himself is sole manager, being determined to act with the Provincials on
the defensive only. Tom Thumb has been already represented; while, on
the other hand, the Provincials are preparing to exhibit, early in the
spring, ’Measure for Measure.’”
The British officers, like all soldiers by profession, endeavored to
while away the time by every amusement within their reach; but, in
truth, the condition of the besieged town was daily becoming more and
more distressing. The inhabitants were without flour, pulse, or
vegetables; the troops were nearly as destitute. There was a lack of
fuel, too, as well as food. The smallpox broke out, and it was necessary
to inoculate the army. Men, women and children either left the city
voluntarily, or were sent out of it; yet the distress increased. Several
houses were broken open and plundered; others were demolished by the
soldiery for fuel. General Howe resorted to the sternest measures to put
a stop to these excesses. The provost was ordered to go the rounds with
the hangman, and hang up the first man he should detect in the fact,
without waiting for further proof for trial. Offenders were punished
with four hundred, six hundred, and even one thousand lashes. The wife
of a private soldier, convicted of receiving stolen goods, was sentenced
to one hundred lashes on her bare back, at the cart’s tail, in different
parts of the town, and an imprisonment of three months.
Meanwhile, Washington was incessantly goaded by the impatient murmurs of
the public, as we may judge by his letters to Mr. Reed. “I know the
integrity of my own heart,” writes he, on the 10th of February; “but to
declare it, unless to a friend, may be an argument of vanity. I know the
unhappy predicament I stand in; I know that much is expected of me; I
know that, without men, without arms, without ammunition, without any
thing fit for the accommodation of a soldier, little is to be done; and,
what is mortifying, I know that I cannot stand justified to the world
without exposing my own weakness, and injuring the cause, by declaring
my wants; which I am determined not to do, further than unavoidable
necessity brings every man acquainted with them.
“My own situation is so irksome to me at times, that, if I did not
consult the public good more than my own tranquillity, I should long ere
this have put every thing on the cast of a die. So far from my having an
army of twenty thousand men, well armed, I have been here with less than
one half of that number, including sick, furloughed, and on command; and
those neither armed nor clothed as they should be. In short, my
situation has been such, that I have been obliged to use art, to conceal
it from my own officers.”
How precious are those letters! And how fortunate that the absence of
Mr. Reed from camp, should have procured for us such confidential
outpourings of Washington’s heart at this time of its great trial.
He still adhered to his opinion in favor of an attempt upon the town. He
was aware that it would be attended with considerable loss, but believed
it would be successful if the men should behave well. Within a few days
after the date of this letter, the bay became sufficiently frozen for
the transportation of troops. “This,” writes he to Reed, “I thought,
knowing the ice would not last, a favorable opportunity to make an
assault upon the troops in town. I proposed it in council; but behold,
though we had been waiting all the year for this favorable event, the
enterprise was thought too dangerous. Perhaps it was; perhaps the
irksomeness of my situation led me to undertake more than could be
warranted by prudence. I did not think so, and I am sure yet that the
enterprise, if it had been undertaken with resolution, must have
succeeded; without it, any would fail.”
His proposition was too bold for the field-officers assembled in council
(Feb. 16th), who objected that there was not force, nor arms and
ammunition sufficient in camp for such an attempt. Washington acquiesced
in the decision, it being almost unanimous; yet he felt the irksomeness
of his situation. “To have the eyes of the whole continent,” said he,
“fixed with anxious expectation of hearing of some great event, and to
be restrained in every military operation for want of the necessary
means of carrying it on, is not very pleasing, especially as the means
used to conceal my weakness from the enemy, conceal it also from our
friends, and add to their wonder.”
In the council of war above mentioned, a cannonade and bombardment were
considered advisable, as soon as there should be a sufficiency of
powder; in the mean time, preparations might be made for taking
possession of Dorchester Heights, and Noddle’s Island.
At length the camp was rejoiced by the arrival of Colonel Knox, with his
long train of sledges drawn by oxen, bringing more than fifty cannon,
mortars, and howitzers, beside supplies of lead and flints. The zeal and
perseverance which he had displayed in his wintry expedition across
frozen lakes and snowy wastes, and the intelligence with which he had
fulfilled his instructions, won him the entire confidence of Washington.
His conduct in this enterprise was but an earnest of that energy and
ability which he displayed throughout the war.
Further ammunition being received from the royal arsenal at New York,
and other quarters, and a reinforcement of ten regiments of militia,
Washington no longer met with opposition to his warlike measures.
Lechmere Point, which Putnam had fortified, was immediately to be
supplied with mortars and heavy cannon, so as to command Boston on the
north; and Dorchester Heights, on the south of the town, were forthwith
to be taken possession of. “If any thing,” said Washington, “will induce
the enemy to hazard an engagement, it will be our attempting to fortify
those heights, as, in that event taking place, we shall be able to
command a great part of the town, and almost the whole harbor.” Their
possession, moreover, would enable him to push his works to Nook’s Hill,
and other points opposite Boston, whence a cannonade and bombardment
must drive the enemy from the city.
The council of Massachusetts, at his request, ordered the militia of the
towns contiguous to Dorchester and Roxbury, to hold themselves in
readiness to repair to the lines at those places with arms, ammunition
and accoutrements, on receiving a preconcerted signal.
Washington felt painfully aware how much depended upon the success of
this attempt. There was a cloud of gloom and distrust lowering upon the
public mind. Danger threatened on the north and on the south. Montgomery
had fallen before the walls of Quebec. The army in Canada was shattered.
Tryon and the tories were plotting mischief in New York. Dunmore was
harassing the lower part of Virginia, and Clinton and his fleet were
prowling along the coast, on a secret errand of mischief.
Washington’s general orders evince the solemn and anxious state of his
feelings. In those of the 26th of February, he forbade all playing at
cards and other games of chance. “At this time of public distress,”
writes he, “men may find enough to do in the service of God and their
country, without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality. * * * *
It is a noble cause we are engaged in; it is the cause of virtue and
mankind; every advantage and comfort to us and our posterity depend upon
the vigor of our exertions; in short, freedom or slavery must be the
result of our conduct; there can, therefore, be no greater inducement to
men to behave well. But it may not be amiss to the troops to know, that,
if any man in action shall presume to skulk, hide himself, or retreat
from the enemy without the orders of his commanding officer, he will be
instantly shot down as an example of cowardice; cowards having too
frequently disconcerted the best formed troops by their dastardly
behavior.”
In the general plan it was concerted, that, should the enemy detach a
large force to dislodge our men from Dorchester Heights, as had been
done in the affair of Bunker’s Hill, an attack upon the opposite side of
the town should forthwith be made by General Putnam. For this purpose he
was to have four thousand picked men in readiness, in two divisions,
under Generals Sullivan and Greene. At a concerted signal from Roxbury,
they were to embark in boats near the mouth of Charles River, cross
under cover of the fire of three floating batteries, land in two places
in Boston, secure its strong posts, force the gates and works at the
Neck, and let in the Roxbury troops.