MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN BOSTON—A SECRET EXPEDITION—ITS OBJECT—LEE’S
PLAN FOR THE SECURITY OF NEW YORK—OPINION OF ADAMS ON THE
SUBJECT—INSTRUCTIONS TO LEE—TRANSACTIONS OF LEE IN CONNECTICUT—LEE’S
POLICY IN REGARD TO THE TORIES—UNEASINESS IN NEW YORK—LETTER OF THE
COMMITTEE OF SAFETY TO LEE—HIS REPLY—HIS OPINION OF THE PEOPLE OF
CONNECTICUT—OF THE HYSTERICAL LETTER FROM THE NEW YORK CONGRESS.
Early in the month of January, there was a great stir of preparation in
Boston harbor. A fleet of transports were taking in supplies, and making
arrangements for the embarkation of troops. Bomb-ketches and
flat-bottomed boats were getting ready for sea, as were two
sloops-of-war, which were to convey the armament. Its destination was
kept secret; but was confidently surmised by Washington.
In the preceding month of October, a letter had been laid before
Congress, written by some person in London of high credibility, and
revealing a secret plan of operations said to have been sent out by
ministers to the commanders in Boston. The following is the purport:
Possession was to be gained of New York and Albany, through the
assistance of Governor Tryon, on whose influence with the tory part of
the population, much reliance was placed. These cities were to be very
strongly garrisoned. All who did not join the king’s forces were to be
declared rebels. The Hudson River, and the East River or Sound, were to
be commanded by a number of small men-of-war and cutters, stationed in
different parts, so as wholly to cut off all communication by water
between New York and the provinces to the northward of it; and between
New York and Albany, except for the king’s service; and to prevent,
also, all communication between the city of New York and the provinces
of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and those to the southward of them. “By
these means,” said the letter, “the administration and their friends
fancy they shall soon either starve out or retake the garrisons of Crown
Point and Ticonderoga, and open and maintain a safe intercourse and
correspondence between Quebec, Albany and New York; and thereby offer
the fairest opportunity to their soldiery and the Canadians, in
conjunction with the Indians to be procured by Guy Johnson, to make
continual irruptions into New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Connecticut,
and so distract and divide the Provincial forces, as to render it easy
for the British army at Boston to defeat them, break the spirits of the
Massachusetts people, depopulate their country, and compel an absolute
subjection to Great Britain.”[41]
It was added that a lord, high in the American department, had been very
particular in his inquiries about the Hudson River; what sized vessels
could get to Albany; and whether, if batteries were erected in the
Highlands, they would not control the navigation of the river, and
prevent vessels from going up and down.
This information had already excited solicitude respecting the Hudson,
and led to measures for its protection. It was now surmised that the
expedition preparing to sail from Boston, and which was to be conducted
by Sir Henry Clinton, might be destined to seize upon New York. How was
the apprehended blow to be parried? General Lee, who was just returned
from his energetic visit to Rhode Island, offered his advice and
services in the matter. In a letter to Washington, he urged him to act
at once, and on his own responsibility, without awaiting the tardy and
doubtful sanction of Congress, for which, in military matters, Lee had
but small regard.
“New York must be secured,” writes he, “but it will never, I am afraid,
be secured by due order of the Congress, for obvious reasons. They find
themselves awkwardly situated on this head. You must step in to their
relief. I am sensible no man can be spared from the lines under present
circumstances; but I would propose that you should detach me into
Connecticut, and lend your name for collecting a body of volunteers. I
am assured that I shall find no difficulty in assembling a sufficient
number for the purposes wanted. This body, in conjunction (if there
should appear occasion to summon them) with the Jersey regiment under
the command of Lord Stirling, now at Elizabethtown, will effect the
security of New York, and the expulsion or suppression of that dangerous
banditti of tories, who have appeared on Long Island, with the professed
intention of acting against the authority of Congress. Not to crush
these serpents before their rattles are grown would be ruinous.
“This manœuvre, I not only think prudent and right, but absolutely
necessary to our salvation; and if it meets, as I ardently hope it will,
with your approbation, the sooner it is entered upon the better; the
delay of a single day may be fatal.”
Washington, while he approved of Lee’s military suggestions, was
cautious in exercising the extraordinary powers so recently vested in
him, and fearful of transcending them. John Adams was at that time in
the vicinity of the camp, and he asked his opinion as to the
practicability and expediency of the plan, and whether it “might not be
regarded as beyond his line.”
Adams, resolute of spirit, thought the enterprise might easily be
accomplished by the friends of liberty in New York, in connection with
the Connecticut people, “who are very ready,” said he, “upon such
occasions.”
As to the expediency, he urged the vast importance, in the progress of
this war, of the city and province of New York, and the Hudson River,
being the _nexus_ of the northern and southern colonies, a kind of key
to the whole continent, as it is a passage to Canada, to the Great
Lakes, and to all the Indian nations. No effort to secure it ought to be
omitted.
That it was within the limits of Washington’s command, he considered
perfectly clear, he being “vested with full power and authority, to act
as he should think for the good and welfare of the service.”
If there was a body of people on Long Island, armed to oppose the
American system of defence, and furnishing supplies to the British army
and navy, they were invading American liberty as much as those besieged
in Boston.
If, in the city of New York, a body of tories were waiting only for a
force to protect them, to declare themselves on the side of the enemy,
it was high time that city was secured.[42]
Thus fortified, as it were, by congressional sanction, through one of
its most important members, who pronounced New York as much within his
command as Massachusetts; he gave Lee authority to carry out his plans.
He was to raise volunteers in Connecticut; march at their head to New
York; call in military aid from New Jersey; put the city and the posts
on the Hudson, in a posture of security against surprise; disarm all
persons on Long Island and elsewhere, inimical to the views of Congress,
or secure them in some other manner if necessary; and seize upon all
medicines, shirts and blankets, and send them on for the use of the
American army.
Lee departed on his mission on the 8th of January. On the 16th, he was
at New Haven, railing at the indecision of Congress. They had ordered
the enlistment of troops for the security of New York. A Connecticut
regiment under Colonel Waterbury had been raised, equipped, and on the
point of embarking for Oyster Bay, on Long Island, to attack the tories,
who were to be attacked on the other side by Lord Stirling, “when
suddenly,” says Lee, “Colonel Waterbury received an order to disband his
regiment; and the tories are to remain unmolested till they are joined
by the king’s assassins.”
Trumbull, the governor of Connecticut, however, “like a man of sense and
spirit,” had ordered the regiment to be reassembled, and Lee trusted it
would soon be ready to march with him. “I shall send immediately,” said
he, “an express to the Congress, informing them of my situation, and at
the same time, conjuring them not to suffer the accursed Provincial
Congress of New York to defeat measures so absolutely necessary to
salvation.”
Lee’s letter to the President of Congress, showed that the instructions
dictated by the moderate and considerate spirit of Washington, were not
strong enough on some points, to suit his stern military notions. The
scheme, simply of disarming the tories, seemed to him totally
ineffectual; it would only embitter their minds, and add virus to their
venom. They could and would always be supplied with fresh arms by the
enemy. That of seizing the most dangerous, would, from its vagueness, be
attended with some bad consequences, and could answer no good one. “The
plan of explaining to these deluded people the justice of the American
cause, is certainly generous and humane,” observed he; “but I am afraid
will be fruitless. They are so riveted in their opinions, that I am
persuaded, should an angel descend from heaven with his golden trumpet,
and ring in their ears that their conduct was criminal, he would be
disregarded.”
Lee’s notion of the policy proper in the present case was, to disarm the
disaffected of all classes, supplying our own troops with the arms thus
seized; to appraise their estates, and oblige them to deposit at least
one half the value with the Continental Congress, as a security for good
behavior; to administer the strongest oath that could be devised, that
they would act offensively and defensively in support of the common
rights; and finally, to transfer all such as should prove refractory, to
some place in the interior, where they would not be dangerous.
The people of New York, at all times very excitable, were thrown into a
panic on hearing that Lee was in Connecticut, on his way to take
military possession of the city. They apprehended his appearance there
would provoke an attack from the ships in the harbor. Some, who thought
the war about to be brought to their own doors, packed up their effects,
and made off into the country with their wives and children. Others
beleaguered the committee of safety with entreaties against the
deprecated protection of General Lee. The committee, through Pierre Van
Cortlandt, their chairman, addressed a letter to Lee, inquiring into the
motives of his coming with an army to New York, and stating the
incapacity of the city to act hostilely against the ships of war in
port, from deficiency of powder, and a want of military works. For
these, and other reasons, they urged the impropriety of provoking
hostilities for the present, and the necessity of “saving appearances,”
with the ships of war, till at least the month of March, when they hoped
to be able to face their enemies with some countenance.
“We, therefore,” continued the letter, “ardently wish to remain in peace
for a little time, and doubt not we have assigned sufficient reasons for
avoiding at present, a dilemma, in which the entrance of a large body of
troops into the city, will almost certainly involve us. Should you have
such an entrance in design, we beg at least the troops may halt on the
western confines of Connecticut, till we have been honored by you with
such an explanation on this important subject, as you may conceive your
duty may permit you to enter upon with us, the grounds of which, you may
easily see, ought to be kept an entire secret.”
Lee, in reply, dated Stamford, Jan. 23d, disclaimed all intention of
commencing actual hostilities against the men-of-war in the harbor; his
instructions from the commander-in-chief being solely to prevent the
enemy from taking post in the city, or lodging themselves on Long
Island. Some subordinate purposes were likewise to be executed, which
were much more proper to be communicated by word of mouth than by
writing. In compliance with the wishes of the committee, he promised to
carry with him into the town just troops enough to secure it against any
present designs of the enemy, leaving his main force on the western
border of Connecticut. “I give you my word,” added he, “that no active
service is proposed, as you seem to apprehend. If the ships of war are
quiet, I shall be quiet; but I declare solemnly, that if they make a
pretext of my presence to fire on the town, the first house set on
flames by their guns shall be the funeral pile of some of their best
friends.”
In a letter to Washington, written on the following day, he says of his
recruiting success in Connecticut: “I find the people throughout this
province, more alive and zealous than my most sanguine expectations. I
believe I might have collected two thousand volunteers. I take only four
companies with me, and Waterbury’s regiment. * * * These Connecticutians
are, if possible, more eager to go out of their country, than they are
to return home, when they have been absent for any considerable time.”
Speaking of the people of New York, and the letter from their Provincial
Congress, which he encloses: “The whigs,” says he, “I mean the stout
ones, are, it is said, very desirous that a body of troops should march
and be stationed in the city—the timid ones are averse, merely from the
spirit of procrastination, which is the characteristic of timidity. The
letter from the Provincial Congress, you will observe, breathes the very
essence of this spirit; it is wofully hysterical.”
By the by, the threat contained in Lee’s reply about a “funeral pile,”
coming from a soldier of his mettle, was not calculated to soothe the
hysterical feelings of the committee of safety. How he conducted himself
on his arrival in the city, we shall relate in a future chapter.