interesting as native to the character of the writer, is the strenuous
requisition to the poet himself, that he shall within his own soul, and
for his own use of his own art, accomplish himself in criticism. It is
recorded that Walsh, "the muses' judge and friend," said to Pope--"There
is at least one virtue of writing in which an English poet of to-day may
excel his predecessors; that is--CORRECTNESS." But it is more likely that
the perception of this virtue in the poetical intellect of Pope drew out
the remark from Walsh, than that the remark suggested to the poet the
pursuit of the virtue. Pope, in his verse, in his prose, in his life,
_rules himself_. Deliberated purpose, resolutely adopted and consistently
executed, characterises the man and the writer. It is nature, or some
profounder control than a casual suggestion of a literary aim, that
imparts this pervading character. As little could he owe to another the
nice discrimination, the intellectual precision, the delicacy of
perception--in a word, the critical sense and apprehension which make up
one aspect of the mind, impressed upon the style, generally considered, of
Pope. As far, then, as the virtue of correctness is to be predicated of
his writings--and we do not believe that the countrymen of a poet go on
predicating of him, for generation after generation, gratuitously--we must
believe that we have to thank himself for it, and not Walsh.
We said, "UPON THE STYLE, GENERALLY CONSIDERED,"--for we acknowledge
exceptions and contradictions to the general position; inaccuracies and
incorrectnesses, that would make an answer to the question--"What is the
CORRECTNESS OF POPE?" a somewhat troublesome affair. But we resolutely
insist that when, in his "Essay on Criticism," he calls upon the poet
himself severely to school his own mind in preparation; when he requires,
that in working he shall not only feel and fancy, but understand too;
when, in a word, he claims that he shall possess his art AS AN ART; he
speaks, his own spirit impelling; and so stamps a fine personality, which
is one mode of originality, on his work.
The praise that is uppermost in one's mind of the _Essay on Criticism_, is
its rectitude of legislation. Pope is an orthodox doctor--a champion of
the good old cause. Hence, after almost a century and a half, this poem of
a minor (Warburton says his twentieth year) carries in our literature the
repute and weight of an authority and a standard. It is of the right good
_English_ temper--thoughtful and ardent--discreet and generous--firm, with
sensibility--bold and sedate--manly and polished. He establishes himself
in well-chosen positions of natural strength, commanding the field; and he
occupies them in the style of an experienced leader, with forces
judiciously disposed, and showing a resolute front every way of defence
and offence. You do not curiously enquire into the novelty of his
doctrines. He has done well if, in small compass, he has brought together,
and vigorously compacted and expressed with animation, poignancy, and
effect, the best precepts. Such writing is beneficial, not simply by the
truths which it newly propounds, or more luminously than heretofore
unfolds, but by the authority which it vindicates to true art--by the
rallying-point which it affords to the loyal adherents of the high and
pure muses--by the sympathy which its wins, or confirms, to good
letters--by its influence in dispersing pestilent vapours, and rendering
the atmosphere wholesome.
In perusing the "Essay on Criticism," the reader is occasionally tempted
to ask himself "whether he has under his eyes an art of criticism or an
art of poetry." 'Tis no wonder; since, in some sort, the two arts are one
and the same. They coincide largely; criticism being nothing else than the
reasoned intelligence of poetry. Just the same spirit, power, precision,
delicacy, and accomplishment of understanding, which reign in the soul of
the great poet creating, rule in that of the good critic judging. The
poet, creating, criticizes his own work; he is poet and critic both. The
critic is a poet without the creation. As Apelles is eye and hand, both;
the critic of Apelles is eye only. This identification, so far as it goes,
has been variously grounded and viewed. Of old, it was urged that only the
poet is the judge of poetry, the painter of painting, the musician of
music, and so on. Such positions proceed upon a high and reverential
estimation of art. To judge requires the depth and sharpness of
sensibility, the vivid and pathetic imagination, which characterize the
artist. It asks more. To see the picture as it should be gazed upon, to
hear the poem as it would be listened to, laborious preparation is
needed--study, strenuous and exact, learned and searching--that ardent and
lover-like communing with nature, the original of arts, and that
experience in the powers, the difficulties, and the significancy of art,
which only the dedication of the votary to the service of an art can
easily be supposed to induce. There is, in practice, a verity and an
intimacy of knowledge, without which theoretical criticism wants both
light and life. So Pope contends--
"Let such judge others who themselves excel;
And censure freely, who have written well."
He seems, at the same time, to be aware that this doctrine is not likely
to find general favour; and that an objection will be taken up by those
with whom it is unpalatable, grounded in the poet's liability to be
seduced, beguiled, transported, misled, by his sympathy with that which is
in the art specifically his own--the inventive power. And he admits the
danger; but rebuts the objection by averring that, on the other side, the
critic who is not a poet has his own temptation. He will be run away with
by his intellectual propensities; the opinion of his own infallibillity;
the pleasure of pronouncing sentence--dispositions all, that move to a
hasty, and are adverse to a generous, decision.
"Poets are partial to _their wit_, 'tis true,
But are not critics to _their judgment_, too?"
The two arts, poetry and the criticism of poetry, thus running together,
so as that in the mind of the poet they are one thing, and that it is hard
well to distinguish in speaking of them in prose, it will not seem
surprising if Pope, intending to write of the lesser, and so inveigled
into writing of the greater, should not always distinctly know of which he
writes.
Let us cite a celebrated passage as an example of such almost unavoidable
confusion.
"First fathom nature, and your judgment frame
By her just standard, which is still the same.
Unerring NATURE, still divinely bright,
One clear, unchanged, and universal light;
Life, force, and beauty, must to all impart,
At once the source, and end, and test of art.
Art from that fund each just supply provides,
Works without show, and without pomp presides.
In some fair body thus the informing soul
With spirits feeds, with vigour fills the whole,
Each motion guides, and every nerve sustains,
Itself unseen, but in th' effect remains.
Some, to whom heaven in wit has been profuse,
Want as much more to turn it to its use;
For wit and judgment often are at strife,
Though meant each other's aid, like man and wife.
'Tis more to guide than spur the muse's steed
Restrain his fury, than provoke his speed;
The winged courser, like a generous horse,
Shows most his mettle when you check his course."
Now, lend your ears. Pray, _attend_.
It these memorable twenty lines--memorable by the truth of the thinking,
and the spirited or splendid felicity of expression--the subject of the
rules delivered is for two verses--CRITICISM PROPER, that is to say, the
faculty of judging in the mind of the critic, who is not necessarily a
poet, and whose function in the world is the judgment of the work produced
and complete, and exposed for free censure.
"First fathom nature, and your judgment frame
By her just standard, which is still the same."
This general reference to the fountain-head of law and of power, is spoken
to the critic--the writer of critiques--the public censurer--the man of
judgment.
For the next four lines, the creative power, and the presiding criticism
in the mind of the poet, and the judicial criticism in the mind of the
official critic, are all three in hand together.
"Unerring NATURE, still divinely bright,
One clear, unchanged, and universal light;
Life, force, and beauty, must to all impart,
At once the source, and end, and test of art."
Warburton has remarked, that the two last verses run parallel to one
another, inasmuch as "source" respects "life," the ever-welling--"end"
reflects "force," for the force of any thing arises from its being
directed to its end--and "test" looks back to "beauty," for every thing
acquires beauty by its being reduced to its true standard. Very well said.
But in what sense is nature the "end" of art? Warburton explains the word,
by "the design of poetry being to convey knowledge of nature in the most
agreeable manner." Might not one think that nature is this "end" rather,
inasmuch as art aims at reaching nature in our bosoms? In this
acceptation, "end" and "force" would precisely belong to one another.
In the mean time, "life" and "source" distinctly concern the creative
power in the soul of the poet; art's "end" must be known, and fixedly
looked at, as the lodestar by the mariner, by presiding criticism in the
same soul; and the "test" of art must evidently be applied by the critic
discharging his peculiar functions; whilst "unerring nature," imaged as
the sun, enlightens, of course, both poet and critic.
And now the critic, who was at the outset of the strain--six verses
ago--alone in contemplation, is dismissed for good or for ill. The poet is
on Pegasus's back; the lashing out of a heel kicks the unfortunate devil
to the devil; and away we go.
For one verse, the creative power, and the presiding criticism in the mind
of the poet, are confounded together under the freshly suggested
name--ART.
"Art from that fund each just supply provides."
That is to say, "Art," as the inventive power in the poet, draws from the
sole "fund," nature, its abundant "supplies." Art, as the critical power
in the poet, takes care that precisely the "just" supply be drawn.
In the next line, this same art, signifies this presiding criticism only.
"Works without show, and without pomp presides."
Clearly, the intent, inostensive, virtuous faculty of criticism alone,
influencing, guarding, leading, and ruling.
Then out of the four lines, which elaborate an excellent simile, due in
propriety to the presiding criticism, two are chequered with a lingering
recollection of the creative power--
"In some fair body thus the informing soul
With spirit feeds, with vigour fills the whole,
Each motion guides, and every nerve sustains;
Itself unseen, but in th' effect remains."
What feeds? What fills? You cannot help looking back to that provision of
"supplies;" and yet a profounder truth would be disclosed, another
brilliancy imparted, and an unperplexed significancy given to the fine
image, if Criticism alone might be the informing soul--if the delicate
Reason of Art in the accomplished poetical spirit, had been boldly and
frankly represented as inspiriting and invigorating, no less than as
guiding and supporting; for criticism is the virtue of art, ruling the
passions, and surely neither orator, nor poet, nor philosopher, will pause
in answering, that virtue "feeds" with "spirits," and "fills with vigour."
That which, itself unseen, remains in its effect, is clearly that
authorized criticism which genius, in the poet's soul, obeys.
In the next verse wit signifies the creative power alone.
"Some to whom Heaven in wit has been profuse."
In the next, wit is the presiding criticism alone.
"Want as much more to turn it to its use."
In the two following, wit is the creative power only, and judgment is the
presiding criticism.
"For wit and judgment often are at strife,
Though meant each other's aid, like man and wife."
The four closing verses, which deservedly ring in every ear, and grace
every tongue--lucid and vigorous--born of the true poetical
self-understanding--extol duly the presiding criticism, of which only they
speak.
"'Tis more to guide than spur the muse's steed,
Restrain his fury, than provoke his speed;
The winged courser, like a generous horse,
Shows most his mettle when you check his course."
A happy commentary on the "feeding with spirits," and "filling with
vigour," as we would accept them. The rein provokes into action the
plenitude of life that else lies unused.
By the by, Gilbert Wakefield, not the happiest of critics in his services
to Pope, here rightly warns against the unskilful and indolent error of
apprehending from the word "like" a most inapt simile, which would explain
a horse by a horse, and exalt Pegasus by cutting off his wings. The words
are clearly to be understood, "like a generous horse--AS HE IS."
We have seen, then, instructed reader, that the poet begins giving advice
to the critic. Then he entangles for a moment the critic and poet
together. Then he discards the critic wholly, and takes the poet along
with him to the end. Do not forget, we beseech you, that there are, in the
soul of the poet, two great distinct powers. There is the primary creative
power, which, strong in love and passion and imagination, converses with
nature, draws thence its heaped intellectual wealth, and transmutes it all
into poetical substance. Then there is the great presiding power of
criticism, which sits in sovereignty, ruling the work of the poet engaged
in exercising his art. These two are confounded and confused by Pope once
and again. They are so, under the name of _Art_!--which, at first,
comprehends the two; and then suddenly means only the power of criticism
in the poet. Again, they shift place confusedly under the name
"_Wit_"--which at first means the creative power only--then, the critical
power only. Then, once more, the creative power only; in which sense it is
here at last opposed explicitly to judgment. The close is, under a fit and
gallant figure, a spirited description of the creative power firily
working under the control of criticism.
These deceiving interchanges run through a passage otherwise of great
lucidity and beauty, and of sterling strength and worth. Probably, most
attentive of readers, though possibly not the least perplexed, thou wilt
not rest with less satisfaction upon what is truly good in the passage,
now thou hast with us taken the trouble of detecting the slight disorder
which overshadows it. The possibility of the first confusion which slips
from the critic to the poet, attests the strength of the opinion in Pope's
mind, that the poet must entertain as an intellectual inmate a spirit of
criticism, as learned and severe as that of the mere critic. Perhaps the
latter infers how close the cognation of the creative and the critical
faculty.
And now for another striking instance of sliding, unconsciously, from
critic to poet.
"But most by numbers judge a poet's song,
And smooth or rough, with them is right or wrong:
In the bright muse, though thousand charms conspire,
Her voice is all these tuneful fools admire;
Who haunt Parnassus but to please their ear,
Not mend their minds; as some to church repair,
Not for the doctrine, but the music, there.
These equal syllables alone require,
Though oft the ear the open vowels tire;
While expletives their feeble aid do join,
And ten low words oft creep in one dull line.
While they ring round the same unvaried chimes,
With sure returns of still expected rhymes;
Where'er you find the 'cooling western breeze,'
In the next line, it 'whispers through the trees;'
If crystal streams 'with pleasing murmurs creep,'
The reader's threaten'd (not in vain) with 'sleep;'
Then, at the last and only couplet fraught
With some unmeaning thing they call a thought,
A needless Alexandrine ends the song,
That, like a wounded snake, drags its slow length along.
Leave such to tune their own dull rhymes!"--
Who are the "MOST" that "JUDGE a poet's song by numbers?" with whom
"smooth or rough is RIGHT or WRONG?" Who are "the tuneful fools," who, of
the Muse's thousand charms, "ADMIRE her tuneful voice" only? The haunters
of Parnassus, whose attraction thither is the "PLEASURE" of their ear, not
the instruction of their mind; who "REQUIRE" nothing more than "equal
syllables?"--For these first eight lines, you have the bad critic, and the
bad critic only.
But who are "THEY" that "ring round the same unvaried chimes" of rhymes;
who bestow upon "you," "the reader,"--"breeze," "trees;" "creep," and
"sleep;" whose one thought has no meaning; who have scotched the snake,
not killed it; and who are to be abandoned to the solitary delight of
their own bad verses? In these last ELEVEN lines, you have the bad poet,
and the bad poet only. Whilst in the three intermediate verses, "Though
oft the ear," &c., you have the imperceptible slide effected from critic
to poet. Did Pope know and intend this? We think not; and we think there
is in the construction itself proof positive to the inadvertency. For
where is the antecedent referred to in
"While THEY ring round?"
He who looks for it will arrive first at the "THESE," who "equal syllables
alone require." But he has now escaped from the bad poet's into almost
worse company. The said "THESE" are clearly a SECOND smaller division of
the condemned EAR-CRITICS. The greater division, the "MOST", _have_ ears,
forsooth, and can distinguish "smooth" and "rough." But "THESE" WOULD HAVE
ears. They have none; they have only FINGERS. They can tell that the
syllables keep the RULE of the measure, and that is all. They stand on the
lowest round of the ladder, or on the ground at the foot of the ladder.
| | | | |
Tho' oft the ear the open vowels tire,
is to them "excellent music," an unimpeachable verse, for it COUNTS RIGHT.
They are the arithmeticians of the Muse--no musicians.
We agree with Warburton, who says that it is "impossible to give a full
and exact idea of poetical criticism without considering at the same time
the _art of poetry_, so far as poetry is an ART." But we must contend,
that a poet who addresses or discourses of two such distinct species as
the writer who criticizes, and the writer who is criticized--two human
beings, at least, placed in such very different predicaments--is bound
continually to know and to keep his reader aware, which he exhorts and
which he smites--the sacrificer or the victim.
You have in your memory, and a thousand times recollected, the following
fine passage; but are you sure that you have fully and clearly understood,
as well as felt it?
"A _little learning_ is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring;
There shallow drafts intoxicate the brain,
And drinking largely sobers us again.
Fired at first sight with what the Muse imparts,
In fearless youth we tempt the heights of arts,
While from the bounded level of our mind
Short views we take, nor see the length behind;
But more advanced, behold with strange surprise,
Far distant views of endless science rise!
So pleased at first the towering Alps we try,
Mount o'er the vales, and seem to tread the sky,
Th' eternal snows appear already past,
And the first clouds and mountains seem the last.
But those attain'd, we tremble to survey
The growing labours of the lengthen'd way,
Th' increasing prospect tires our wondering eyes,
Hills peep o'er hills, and Alps on Alps arise."
The precept must be given to somebody. To whom? The whole Essay addresses
itself to two descriptions of persons--to those who _will be_ critics, and
to those who _will be_ poets. Both are here addressed, and
indistinctively. But we may distinguish--nay, must--in turning verse into
prose. What is the counsel bestowed? "Meddle not with criticism, as a
professed or unprofessed critic, unless you are prepared to invade the
depths of criticism." "Touch not the lyre of Apollo to call forth a tone,
unless you are willing to put your hand under the most rigorous discipline
in the school of the musicians." What is the motive, the reason of the
counsel? The twofold monitory and hortatory counsel, proceeds upon a
twofold contemplation; upon the view of the beginning, and upon that of
the end.
A taste of criticism--the possession of half a dozen rules--the sitting,
for a few furtive and perilous instants, upon that august seat of high
judgment, before which the great wits of all ages and nations come to
receive their award--infatuates the youthful untempered brain with
dazzling, bewildering, and blinding self-opinion. Enough to mislead is
easily learned. Right dictates of clearest minds--oracles of the old
wisdom--crudely misunderstood. Rules of general enunciation made false in
the applying, by the inability of perceiving in the instance the
differencing conditions which qualify the rule, or suspend it. So, on the
other hand, canons of a narrower scope, stretched beyond their true
intent. And last, and worst of all, in the ignorance and in the disdain of
statutes, and sanctions, and preceding authoritative judgments--the
humours and fancies, the likings and the mislikings, the incapable
comprehension and the precipitate misapprehensions of an untrained,
uninstructed, inexperienced, self-unknowing spirit, howsoever of Nature
gifted or ungifted, to be taken for the standard of the worth which the
generations of mankind have approved, or which has newly risen up to
enlighten the generations of mankind!
Abstain, then, from judging, O Critic that wilt be! Humble thine
understanding in reverence! Open thy soul to beliefs! Yield up thy heart,
dissolving and overcome, to love! Cultivate self-suspicion! and learn!
learn! learn! The bountiful years that lift up the oak to maturity, shall
rear, and strengthen, and ripen thee! Knowledge of books, knowledge of
men, knowledge of Nature--and solicited, and roused, and sharpened, in the
manifold and studious conversation with books, and with men, and with
Nature--last and greatest--the knowledge of thyself--shall bring thee out
large-hearted, high-minded, sensitive, apprehensive, comprehensive,
informed and original, clear and profound, genial and exact, scrutinizing
and pardoning, candid, and generous, and just--in a word, a finished
CRITIC. The steadfast and mighty laws of the moral and intellectual world
have taken safe care and tutelage of thee, and confer upon thee, in thy
now accomplished powers, the natural and well-earned remuneration of
honestly, laboriously, and pertinaciously dedicated powers!
And as for thee, O Poet that wilt be, con thou, by night and by day, the
biography of JOHN MILTON!
And now--in conclusion--for the very noblest strain in didactic poetry.
"Those Rules of old discover'd, not devised,
Are Nature still, but Nature methodised;
Nature, like Liberty, is but restrain'd
By the same laws which first herself ordain'd.
"Hear how learn'd Greece her useful rules indites,
When to repress, and when indulge our flights:
High on Parnassus' top her sons she show'd,
And pointed out those arduous paths they trod;
Held from afar, aloft, th' immortal prize,
And urged the rest by equal steps to rise:
Just precepts thus from great examples given,
She drew from them what they derived from Heaven.
The gen'rous critic fann'd the poet's fire,
And taught the world with reason to admire.
Then Criticism the Muse's handmaid proved,
To dress her charms, and make her more beloved.
* * * * *