importance of isolating, in so far as might be, the republican contagion
within the confines of France, and preventing it from spreading
further--requested Lord Malmesbury, as the fittest and most experienced
diplomatist whose services they could command, to proceed on a special
mission to the court of Berlin, and attempt by every means in his power to
recall the king from his false and unnatural position. So great seemed the
necessity of accommodation, that England was inclined to accede, perhaps
too much, to the demands of her ally, rather than allow the war upon which
so much depended to be so meanly and pitifully abandoned. The following
extract from Lord Grenville's instructions will show the spirit which
actuated our ministry. "If the _alleged distress_ of the king of Prussia's
_treasury_ is wholly _feigned_, it will in that case be evident, that the
determination of the king of Prussia is taken rather to break his
alliance with the maritime powers, and to risk the dangers which may
result from the final establishment of the Jacobin principles in France,
than to contribute to the indemnification which Austria has in view. In
that case, all attempts at other arrangements must be useless, and nothing
will remain to be done, except to insist on the succours being
furnished; and, in case of non-compliance with that demand, to prepare the
declaration necessary to be given in for the purpose of annulling the
defensive treaty. If, on the other hand, the pecuniary difficulties which
are stated _have a real existence_, the disposition to co-operate further
in the war may still exist; and, in that case, some advantage might be
derived from the adoption of such arrangements as might enable his majesty
to contribute towards removing those difficulties, and securing the king
of Prussia's co-operation in the war, but without departing from the just
claims resulting from the existing treaty." The reciprocal feelings of
Austria and Prussia are thus significantly noticed in another part of the
same document. "With respect to Austria, I must observe to your lordship,
that the utmost jealousy prevails between the two courts of Vienna and
Berlin; that the former has certainly been deceived by the extent given to
the late acquisitions of Prussia in Poland; and that the latter is
unquestionably desirous of checking, at least by indirect means, the plans
of indemnity which the emperor is now pursuing towards France." With
Holland and Austria, Lord Malmesbury was ordered, in all his negotiations
with the Prussian court, to keep himself in intimate concert; in fact, it
seems to have been expected, that if these powers went cordially along
with England, Prussia durst not adopt a step which would have exposed her
to summary chastisement. It might have been well if such a threat had been
intimated directly; but England had not yet learned to appreciate her own
unbounded resources, and to rely with confidence upon herself. Afterwards,
as at Copenhagen and elsewhere, she adopted the true method of dealing
with a false ally, or a suspected neutral. At the beginning of the war,
she transacted with other states on the belief that they were actuated by
the same honourable feelings as herself--that they regarded treaties as
inviolable--that they were ready, for the general good, to sacrifice
something of private interest. It is needless to say how often and how
cruelly she was deceived!
Before setting out on his mission, Lord Malmesbury had a personal
interview with George III., and received from him, verbally, some private
instructions, which are most worthy of preservation. Far too little
justice has been done to the manly intellect of that king. Stubborn he may
have been, and wedded to opinions which, in this age at least, may not be
favourably regarded by the million; but this, at least, we can fearlessly
say--that every thought, every sentiment, every action of his life, bore
the impress of a high and noble mind--that he was an Englishman in the
best sense of the word, bold, and resolute, and sincere; and those who
value the free and just constitution of this country and its greatness,
have cause to bless Providence that so faithful a sovereign occupied the
throne during a period of anarchy which threatened to revolutionize the
world, to uproot the Christian faith, and to engulf Europe, perhaps
irrevocably, in the horrors of a Reign of Terror. How clear and king-like
is the following language! "A few clear words are better, perhaps, than
long instructions. I believe that the king of Prussia is an honest man at
the bottom, although a weak one. You must first represent to him, that if
he allows his moral character the same latitude in his explanation of the
force of treaties, as he has allowed it in other still more sacred ties,"
(referring to his marriage,) "all good faith is at an end, and no
engagement can be binding. You must then state to him how much his honour
is engaged in joining in this business, in not giving up a cause in which
he had begun so nobly. Then you should apply to his interest, that the
event of the war must either fail or succeed; that if he withdrew himself
from the number of coalesced powers, in either case he would suffer from
leaving them. In the first case, (the fate of the war,) he perhaps would
be the first to feel the consequences of suffering this _Tartarian horde_
to overrun Europe. In the second, if we succeed, he certainly might be
sure, that not having contributed his share to the success would put him,
in respect to the other powers, in a situation of consideration and want
of consequence, and that he would not be consulted or referred to in the
general system of Europe, when that became a matter of discussion. That if
you fail in referring him to these three great points, his _integrity_,
his _honour_, and his _interest_, it will be certain nothing can be done;
and although I have the greatest confidence in your skill and abilities,
yet I shall rest assured in that case that _no_ skill nor any ability
would be equal to success."
Thus instructed and accredited, Lord Malmesbury set off for Berlin by way
of Holland. He found the Dutch in considerable anxiety at the state of the
campaign, and ready to co-operate with England in any measure for
maintaining the alliance intact. At Frankfort, the monetary market of
Germany, he ascertained that the amount of treasure still left in the
Prussian treasury was estimated at forty-one or forty-two millions of
dollars; so that the plea of poverty advanced upon the part of the king
was evidently false. Immediately on his arrival at Berlin, he obtained an
interview with Frederick William; and the replies of that king to the
remonstrance of the British minister are abundantly curious. He disclaimed
all idea of lukewarmness or indifference to the results of the war, was
loud in his profession of amity to Great Britain, but wound up with the
anticipated excuse--"You will, I am sure, believe me when I tell you, _on
the faith of an honest man_, (and for being one, I hope the king your
master will give me credit,) I have not in my treasury enough to pay the
expenses of a third campaign. Those I have incurred since my accession are
not unknown to you. You also know that the late king strained the
resources to their highest pitch; that I cannot raise a new tax on my
subjects; that to attempt it would drive them to the worst consequences;
and that the nature of the Prussian monarchy is such that it cannot bear a
loan. In short, that _without my allies come to my assistance, and afford
me pecuniary support_, I shall be compelled to stop short in the war.
"I have not exhausted my treasure in idle and useless expenses; it has
been employed in forwarding measures which related to the general
interests of Europe, as well as to the particular ones of Prussia. It
cannot be those of England to see me degraded and sunk; and this
certainly, _joined to my high notion of your national character_, leaves
me without apprehension as to the consequences of the declaration I make,
which I repeat to be the sole and real cause of my apparent backwardness
in continuing the war."
It is now clear, far beyond cavil or doubt, that this sovereign's estimate
of the national character of the English, was much akin to Major
Dalgetty's appreciation of the Dutch--"They are the best paymasters in
Europe." Dalgetty, however, had one merit which we fear that history must
deny to the King of Prussia. He gave his service for his employer's money,
and was scrupulously true to his articles. Frederick William, on the
contrary, was bent upon receiving a subsidy, whilst, at the same time, he
or his ministers were attempting to negotiate a private treaty with
France. These facts come out most glaringly in the Malmesbury papers. The
envoy seems to have felt all along that he was treading on the most
slippery ground, that no reliance could be placed upon the faith or
integrity of the court with which he now had to deal; and yet
circumstances were of so pressing a nature, that he dared not, while the
smallest chance of success remained, abandon the progress of the
negotiation. The sentiments of the King of Prussia with regard to his
nearest neighbour, may be understood from the following entry in Lord
Malmesbury's diary:--"_Dec. 28, 1793._ Supper at Prince-Royal's. King told
me of bad news from Wurmser's army--that he had lost two battalions and
twenty-one pieces of cannon. _He seemed rather pleased with this bad
news_; but admitted that it would do harm by raising the spirits of the
Jacobins." In a note appended to this passage, it is added, that "this
feeling of hatred towards Austria was shared by every minister at Berlin,
and every officer in the Prussian army, and rendered all our efforts to
combine effectually the two nations against the French unavailing."
The prospects of the Allies became daily more gloomy. Wurmser, the
Austrian general, was driven back, the blockade of Landau raised, and this
moment was selected by the Prussian king and his ministers to force a
subsidy under the significant threat of an entire withdrawal of his army,
which for the present remained in a state of suspicious inactivity. Russia
at this juncture came forward to interfere. The Prince de Nassau, a
spurious dignitary and favourite of Catharine, arrived at Berlin with a
communication for Frederick William, urging him in the strongest manner to
act in concert with his allies, and representing very forcibly that the
partition of Poland, and the engagements he contracted for his share,
obliged him to continue the war, and that his own declarations and
manifestoes from the first, by his own confession, made him a principal in
it. Notwithstanding this good advice, the Empress cautiously abstained on
hinting at pecuniary succours, being probably aware that a Russian subsidy
would answer his majesty's purpose as well as one from England. Early in
the year 1794, the Duke of Brunswick resigned the command of the Prussian
forces. He was succeeded by Marshal Moellendorff--a soldier of some
reputation, but old, testy, and pragmatical.
After much time wasted in preliminaries, and continued threats on the part
of Prussia to withdraw immediately from the alliance unless subsidies were
forthcoming, Lord Malmesbury was empowered to make the following
proposals: Two millions sterling were to be given to the King of Prussia
to bring 100,000 men into the field. Of this sum England was to furnish
two-fifths, or L800,000; Austria and Holland, each one-fifth; and the
remainder was to be considered as an advance from Prussia, to be
reimbursed by France at the restoration of peace. Munificent as this
proposal may appear--and it really was so when the relative situation of
the parties is considered--it did not at first sight appear large enough
to satisfy the craving appetite of Frederick William, who, in a private
interview with Lord Malmesbury, had the assurance to demand for the
proposed succours no less a sum than _twenty millions_ of dollars, without
reckoning the "bread and forage!" The firm conduct and resolute tone of
Lord Malmesbury, seem at last to have convinced the rapacious monarch that
in grasping at too much he might lose all; and, after a great deal of
shabby negotiation and bargaining, a settlement was nearly effected on the
original terms. Austria, however, positively declined to become bound for
any part of the subsidy--we doubt not for sufficient reasons. Holland, in
more alarm, was willing to contribute her share; but so many impediments
were thrown in the way of a settlement by the machinations of the French
party at Berlin, that Lord Malmesbury found it indispensable to quit that
court and conclude the negotiation at the Hague. He was accompanied
thither by the Prussian minister, Haugwiz--a man whose character for
honesty must be left to the verdict of posterity--and on the nineteenth
April 1794, a treaty was concluded between Prussia, Holland, and England,
by which the former power was bound to furnish an army of 62,000 men,
under a Prussian commander-in-chief, to be subsidized by the other states,
and to serve against their common enemies. The maritime powers agreed to
pay his Prussian majesty L50,000 per month to the end of the year,
L300,000 to put the army in motion, and L100,000 on its return home. All
conquests made were to be at the disposal of the maritime powers.
Thus did Prussia, vaunting herself to be peculiarly the military power of
Europe, sell the services of her army for hire, with as little reservation
as ever did the mercenary troops of Switzerland or Brabant. The very idea
of such an individual transaction carries with it something degrading; as
a state-bargain, it is humiliation. One quality only can be brought
forward to redeem the sellers of their national armies from contempt, and
that is the most scrupulous fidelity to the cause of the parties from whom
they have accepted their hire. There is no treachery so base as the
desertion of a paid ally.
Immediately after the treaty was signed, Lord Malmesbury was recalled to
London "for information." The advantage which was taken in the absence of
this clear-sighted and able diplomatist, may be gathered from subsequent
events. We doubt however, whether, had he remained on the spot, he could
have counteracted the evils, which appear to us more the result of a
preconceived intention to betray, than the sudden consequence of a plot,
or the predominance of a new hostile party in the court or cabinet of
Berlin. On the 27th of May, the first instalment of the subsidy, L300,000,
was remitted from the British Treasury. About the same time, Lord
Malmesbury returned to Holland, and renewed his entreaty, through Haugwiz,
that the Prussian army might be put in motion. This was positively
refused, until advice was received of the payment of the subsidy at
Berlin. Frederick William had removed to Poland to look after his
ill-gotten possessions. His minister, Haugwiz, very shortly retired to
Berlin, and never returned. Moellendorff, in command of the army,
peremptorily refused, in the face of the treaty, and of the apparent
commands of his master, to leave the Rhine, and take up his position in
the Low Countries--in short, he would obey no orders, and did all in his
power to thwart and counteract the Austrian. Meanwhile, the French
advanced in irresistible power. On the 26th of June they were victorious
at Fleury--a battle which established the reputation of General Jourdain,
and settled the fate of the Netherlands. In Flanders, Moreau defeated
Clairfait, and took Ypres. General Walmoden evacuated Bruges. The Duke of
York was obliged to abandon Tournay and Oudenarde to their fate, and
retired upon Antwerp on the 3d of July.
This was a period of great anxiety to Lord Malmesbury; for although there
are many occasions wherein even the ablest diplomatist must fail, more
especially when there is a total absence of good faith on the other side,
yet the crisis was so alarming as to impress him with the sense of more
than usual responsibility. The following extract from his diary will show
his opinion of the Prussians:--"June 26. To Keyserlautern, Prussian
headquarters--repetition of the same language--great, but shabby art and
cunning--ill-will, jealousy, and every sort of dirty passion. The marshal
proposes a memorial to us, which we decline receiving, and he dispatches
his first aide-de-camp, Meyerinck, to the King of Prussia, with his
account of what we had said. (N.B.--It appears that these were
exaggerated, and calculated to do mischief, and embroil the negotiation.")
Shortly afterwards, he writes thus to the Duke of Portland:--"I must thank
you on a separate sheet for your few confidential lines. If we listened
only to our _feelings_, it would be difficult to keep any measure with
Prussia. But your opinion and that of Mr Pitt, is one of sound political
wisdom, and I am well pleased it has prevailed. _We must consider it as an
alliance with the Algerines_, whom it is no disgrace to pay, or any
impeachment of good sense to be cheated by."
The ministry of Great Britain, however, found it necessary to come to an
immediate and explicit understanding with the Prussians, who, though
utterly useless and inactive, continued with the utmost punctuality to
draw the monthly subsidy. A good opportunity was afforded by the conduct
of the Prussian minister at London, who, with unparalleled effrontery,
took upon himself to complain of the manner in which the late treaty had
been executed with reference to the disposition of the forces. Lord
Grenville's reply was decided. If the treaty had not hitherto been
punctually executed, it was notorious to all Europe, that the failure had
not been on the part of England. The British resident at Berlin was
further desired to intimate, "that the continuance of the liberal subsidy
granted by his majesty will depend solely on the faithful execution of the
engagement taken by Marshal Moellendorff, and on the efficient service of
the Prussian army under his command." This announcement led to a
conference between Baron Hardenberg on the part of Prussia, and Lord
Malmesbury and Baron Kinckel as representing Great Britain and Holland.
Hardenberg began with the usual assurances of the continued good wishes
and intentions of his king, who, he said, had been deceived by a cabal,
but who would, _so soon as the Polish war was over_, return to Berlin, and
then every thing would go well. He further proposed that Lord Malmesbury
should return to Berlin, and resume his negotiations there.
"This was said to Kinckel and me with a clear and evident view to
prevail on us to renew the subsidy treaty, as the term of its
expiration draws near, and as the court of Berlin is uneasy at our
negotiations at Vienna, and apprehensive of the event of an attack on
Warsaw. It was too thinly veiled not to be seen through. I therefore
answered, that I was fearful _the evil was done_; that if the king
and his ministers had acted up to the sentiments M. Hardenberg now
mentioned, or even if I saw a sincere disposition of doing it now, by
Moellendorff's army _really acting_, it certainly would be good
grounds to hope, but that this was not the case.
"Hardenberg employed every argument, and every _trick_, within the
narrow compass of his means, to persuade me they were earnestly
anxious to unite with us, and disposed to rectify their past
behaviour; but I remained firm, and absolutely declined giving in to
a belief of it.
"This led him to say _that we could not do without the Prussians_,
and that we _must_ continue the subsidy; that, therefore, it was
wisest and best to do it in the manner the most useful and
conciliatory. I replied, that without deciding on this strong
question of _necessity_, I could not but observe that, by stating it
as an argument, he brought his court on a level with the lowest
German prince, and supposed it to be actuated by principles like
those of the dey of Algiers; and that, if _necessity_ was to decide
the measure, it required no negotiation, it would do itself, and I
felt myself by no means in a rank to conduct _such_ a business."
On the 1st of October, instructions arrived from England to suspend the
subsidy; and on the 25th of the same month, Baron Hardenberg, on the part
of Prussia, declared the treaty at an end, which was followed by a direct
order from the king to withdraw his army altogether. On the 2d of
November, Lord Malmesbury received his recall.
We have been induced to dwell somewhat minutely upon this singular
negotiation, because its details have never yet been placed with
sufficient clearness before the public. We are now, for the first time,
admitted, through the medium of the Malmesbury papers, to a sight of the
hidden machinery, by means of which the colossal panorama of Europe was
made so ominously to revolve. Much is there, too, of importance, and
useful for the future, in the portraitures of national bad faith and
individual worthlessness which appear throughout the whole transaction.
Prussia was fortunate in her subsequent miseries. These, and these alone,
have made the pen of the historian, and the tongue of the orator, slow to
denounce the enormous measure of her perfidy. Throughout the whole of this
negotiation, on the result of which the destinies of Europe for a quarter
of a century were doomed to depend, there is not one single bright spot of
candour or of honesty to relieve the darkness of the picture. In
comparison with such treachery, Pennsylvanian repudiation is venial. The
subsidy, out of which England was swindled, was for the most part applied
to the further subjugation of Poland--the troops, for which she had
contracted and paid, were used as an impediment to, and not in furtherance
of, her designs. The language employed by the Prussian minister,
Hardenberg, at his last interview with Lord Malmesbury, was that of a
sturdy freebooter, who, far from seeking to conceal his real character,
takes glory in his shame, and demands a compulsory tribute for what he is
pleased to denominate protection. It may be said that Prussia afterwards
redeemed her error. We cannot see it. To the last she remained a gripping,
faithless, avaricious power; and could she have coexisted equal with
France, there is not a shadow of a doubt that she would have surpassed
that country in her appetite for acquiring plunder. In 1806, under a
different monarch, she made peace with Napoleon on the condition of
acquiring Hanover, the hereditary dominions of the occupant of the British
throne. It was only when the fact became evident that she was utterly
mistrusted throughout Europe; that no state, even the most insignificant,
could place any reliance upon her assurances; when, through her own
conduct, France made no scruple of using her as a contemptible tool, and
her old allies regarded her with looks of menace--that Prussia made a
virtue of necessity by attempting to restore her independence. Even then
her repentance was incomplete. Lord Morpeth, when sent, before the
disastrous battle of Jena, on a special mission to the Prussian
headquarters, found Frederick William III. so distracted between the
option of a British subsidy on the one hand, and the cession of Hanover on
the other, that, with the genuine feelings of an Englishman and a man of
honour, he could scarce restrain his indignation in the presence of the
vacillating king. In our mind, the videttes of Pichegru's army had a truer
estimate than our own cabinet of the value of such an alliance, when they
thus expressed themselves at the outposts:--"Englishmen, go home: you have
no business here; you are too honest to be leagued with the Austrians and
Prussians. They will soon leave you in the lurch; and as to the Hessians,
the Landgrave will turn them all over to us to-morrow, if the Convention
offers him a ducat a-day more than you now pay him!" Yet Austria is not
chargeable with deceit--who will dare hereafter to say the like for
Prussia?