"LA VICTOIRE INTÉGRALE"
In the endeavour to give a connected statement of the very dangerous
German offensive, conducted by their spies and agents in Paris, at the
most critical period of the whole war, I have been obliged to some
extent to anticipate events in order to show Clemenceau's share in the
exposure of this organised treachery. By 1917, as already recorded,
anti-patriotic and pro-German intrigues in Paris and France had become
more and more harmful to that "sacred unity" which had been constituted
to present an unbroken front to the enemy. After the miserable
breakdown of Russia, largely due to the Bolshevik outbreak fostered
by German intrigue and subsidised by German money, the position was
exceedingly dangerous. German troops withdrawn from the Eastern front
were poured into France and Flanders by hundreds of thousands, and the
Allied armies were hard put to it to hold their own. At this time,
when it was all-important to maintain the spirit of the French army,
the enemy offensive in Paris and throughout France became more and
more active. What made the situation exceptionally critical was the
fact that the rank and file of the French soldiery began to feel that,
however desperately they might fight at the front, they were being
systematically betrayed in the rear. While, therefore, Clemenceau, in
his capacity as Senator and President of the Inter-Allied Parliamentary
Committee, voiced the great and growing discontent of the country with
the lack of real statesmanship displayed in the conduct of the war, he
also fulminated against the weakness of the wobbling Ministers who,
knowing that defeatism and treachery were fermenting all round them,
took no effective steps to counteract this pernicious propaganda.
The notorious _Bonnet Rouge_ group, however, with M. Joseph Caillaux,
Bolo Pasha, Almereyda and others in close touch with M. Jean Longuet
and his pacifist friends of the Socialist Party, were allowed to carry
on their virulent anti-French campaign in the Press and in other
directions practically unchecked. It might even have been thought that
these persons had the sympathy and support of members of the Government.
Thus, when M. Painlevé took office on M. Ribot's resignation in August,
1917, the outlook was dark all round. The position of the Allied armies
was by no means satisfactory: the state of affairs in Paris itself was
not such as to engender confidence: Mr. Lloyd George's headlong speech
of depreciation on his return from Italy had undone all the good of the
unanimous resolution passed by the Inter-Allied Parliamentary Committee
of which Clemenceau was President, declaring that no peace could be
accepted which did not secure the realisation of national claims and
the complete triumph of justice all along the line. In short, a fit
of despondency, almost deepening into despair, had come over Allied
statesmen. Notwithstanding distrust, however, war-weariness was not
spreading among the soldiers and sailors. But among the politicians
it was, and German "peace offensives" were being welcomed in quarters
which were supposed to be resolute for "_la victoire intégrale_." M.
Painlevé's administration was scarcely hoisted into the saddle before
it was ignominiously thrown out again. The instability of successive
French Ministries was becoming a danger which extended far beyond
the limits of France. The unification of the Allied command and the
concentration of effort on the Western front had become imperative.
The arrest of all those against whom there was serious suspicion of
treason, no matter how highly they might be placed, was a necessity of
the moment. Vigorous support for the generals and armies engaged in
resisting the reinforced enemy was called for from every quarter. So
the President, M. Poincaré, found himself in a dilemma. But none of
the leading politicians who had been prominent since the war began was
prepared to take the responsibility of forming an administration and
then acting upon the lines which the situation demanded.
It was at this crisis, perhaps the most dangerous that France has had
to face in all her long history, that the President asked Clemenceau to
become the Prime Minister. He was then seventy-six years of age and had
withdrawn from all those conferences and discussions behind the scenes
which, under ordinary circumstances, invariably precede the acceptance
of office. The Socialists declared that, no matter what Clemenceau's
policy might be, they could not serve under him as President of
Council. Clemenceau could not rely upon support from M. Poincaré, and
on every ground he was much disinclined to come to the front under
existing conditions. But his duty to France and its Republic outweighed
all other considerations, and this old statesman shouldered the burden
which far younger men declined to take up.
The Socialists went quite wild against him--to the lasting injury, as
I hold, of their party and their cause--the Radicals and Republicans
themselves were more than doubtful of the possibility of his success.
Many politicians and journalists of the Right doubted whether they
could make common cause with the man who above all other things stood
for the permanence of Republicanism and was the bitter enemy of
Clericalism in every shape. Shrewd judges of public opinion stated that
his Ministry could not last three months.
But courage, frankness and good faith, backed by relentless
determination, and the genius that blazes up in the day of difficulty,
go far. The whole French people suddenly called to mind that this
old Radical of the Bocage of La Vendée, this Parisian of Parisians
for nearly sixty years, whatever mistakes he may have made in
opposition or in office, had invariably stood up for the greatness,
the glory, the dignity of France; that he had voted at Bordeaux for
the continuance of the war when France lay at the feet of the ruthless
conqueror and Gambotta was striving to organise his countrymen for
resistance to the death; that from those dark days of 1871 onwards he
had always vehemently adjured his countrymen to make ready to resist
coming invasion; that from August 1914 he had never failed to keep a
stout heart himself and to do his utmost to encourage his countrymen
even when the outlook was blackest for the Allies; that he had ever
been the relentless denouncer of weakness and vacillation, as he
had also been the unceasing opponent of pacifism, pro-Germanism and
treachery of every kind; that now, therefore, when _la Patrie_ was in
desperate danger, when Paris might yet be at the mercy of the enemy,
of whose hideous ruffianism they had had such bitter experience,
Georges Clemenceau was the one man to take control of democratic and
Republican France in the interest of every section of the population.
These stirring memories of the past rose up behind Clemenceau in the
present.[E]
Thus it was that the new Prime Minister, coming down from the Senate to
read his Declaration to the National Assembly, as the French custom is,
was certain beforehand of a cordial reception from the great majority
of the Deputies. What might happen afterwards depended upon himself and
his Ministry: what should occur on this his first appearance in the
tribune after nearly eight years of absence depended on themselves.
They took good care that, at the start at least, he should have no
doubt as to their goodwill. Only the Socialist minority abstained.
The Declaration itself was worthy of the occasion, and it was a
stirring scene when the veteran of the Radical Party, the Tiger of the
old days, rose to deliver it to the House, which was crowded on the
floor and in the galleries with deputies and strangers eager to hear
what he had to say:--
"Gentlemen, we have taken up the duty of government in order to carry
on the war with renewed energy and to obtain a better result from our
concentrated efforts. We are here with but one idea in our minds, the
war and nothing but the war. The confidence we ask you to give us
should be the expression of confidence in yourselves. . . . Never has
France felt more keenly the need for living and growing in the ideal
of power used on behalf of human rectitude, the resolve to see justice
done between citizens and peoples able to emancipate themselves. The
watchword of all our Governments since the war began has been victory
for the sake of justice. That frank policy we shall uphold. We have
great soldiers with a great history led by men who have been tested and
have been inspired to deeds of the highest devotion worthy of their
ancestral renown. The immortal fatherland of our common humanity,
overmastering the exultation of victory, will follow, on the lines of
its destiny, the noble aspiration for peace, through them and through
us all. Frenchmen impelled by us into the conflict have special claims
upon us. We owe them everything without reserve. Everything for France:
everything for the triumph of right. One simple duty is imposed upon
us, to stand by the soldier, to live, suffer and fight with him, and to
throw aside everything that is not for our country. The rights on our
front, the duties in our rear must be merged in one. Every zone must be
the army zone. If men there are who must cherish the hatreds of bygone
days, sweep them away.
"All civilised nations are now arrayed in the like battle against
modern forms of ancient barbarisms. Our Allies and ourselves together
constitute a solid barrier which shall not be surmounted. Throughout
the Allied front, at all times and in all places, there is nothing
but solid brotherhood, the surest basis for the coming world. . . . The
silent soldiers of the factory, the old peasants working, bent over
their soil, the vigorous women who toil, the children who help in
their weakness--these likewise are our _poilus_ who in times to come,
recalling the great things done, will be able to say with the men in
the trenches, 'I, too, was there.' . . . Mistakes have been made. Think
no more about them save only to remedy them.
"But, alas! there have also been crimes, crimes against France which
demand prompt punishment. We solemnly pledge ourselves, before you and
before the country, that justice shall be done with the full rigour of
the law. Personal considerations or political passion shall neither
divert us from fulfilling this duty nor induce us to go beyond it.
Too many such crimes have cost us the blood of our soldiers. Weakness
would mean complicity. There shall be no weakness as there shall be no
violence. Accused persons shall all be brought before courts-martial.
The soldier of justice shall make common cause with the soldier in
the field. No more pacifist plots: no more German intrigues. Neither
treason nor semi-treason. War, nothing but war. Our country shall not
be placed between two fires. Our country shall learn that she is really
defended.
* * * * *
"The day will come when from Paris to the smallest village of France
storms of cheers will welcome our victorious colours tattered by
shell-fire and drenched with blood and tears--the glorious memorials
of our great dead. It is for us to hasten the coming of that day, that
glorious day, which will fitly take its place beside so many others in
our history. These are our unshakable resolves, gentlemen: we ask you
to give them the sanction of your approval."
Such is a free summary of a Ministerial pronouncement that will ever
be memorable in the annals of France and of mankind. It swept the
Chamber away as the recital marched on. But organised attacks upon the
President of the Council at once followed. Now came the supreme test
of the mental and physical efficiency of this wonderful old man whose
youth is so amazing. He could read a telling manifesto with vigour
and effect. Would he be able to reply with equal power to a series of
interrogations in an atmosphere to which he had been a stranger for so
many years? Questions, by no means all of them friendly, poured in upon
Clemenceau from every part of the Chamber. From his attitude towards
Caillaux and Malvy to his view of the League of Nations and his policy
in regard to negotiations with the enemy, no point was missed that
might embarrass or irritate the statesman who had undertaken to stand
in the gap. He showed immediately that he was fully capable of taking
his own part. The fervour of the new France was heard in every phrase
of his crushing reply:
"You do not expect me to talk of personal matters. I am not here for
that. Still, I have heard enough to understand that the criticisms upon
me should make me modest. I feel humble for the mistakes I have already
made and for those which I am likely to make. I do not think I can
be accused of having sought power. But I am in power. I hope it will
not be a misfortune for my country. You tell me I have made mistakes.
Perhaps you do not know the worst of them. I am here because these are
terrible times when those who through all the struggle have loved their
country more than they knew see the hopes of the nation centred on
them. I am here through the pressure of public opinion, and I am almost
afraid of what it will demand of me, of what it expects of me.
"I have been asked to explain myself in regard to war aims, and as to
the idea of a League of Nations. I have replied in my declaration, 'We
must conquer for the sake of justice.' That is clear. We live in a
time when words have great power, but they have not the power to set
free. The word 'justice' is as old as mankind. Do you imagine that the
formula of a League of Nations is going to solve everything?
"There is a committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even now
preparing a scheme for a League of Nations. Among its members are the
most authoritative exponents of international law. I undertake that
immediately their labours are finished I will table the outcome of it
in this Chamber, if I am still Prime Minister--which does not seem
likely." (Laughter and cheers.)
"I am not unfavourable to arbitration. It was I who sent M. Léon
Bourgeois to The Hague, where a series of conventions were agreed upon
which Germany is now engaged in violating. Many believe that a miracle
will bring about a League of Nations. I do not myself think that a
League of Nations will be one of the results of this war. If to-morrow
you proposed to me that Germany should be included in a League of
Nations, I should not consent. What guarantees do you offer me?
Germany's signature? Go and ask the Belgians what they think of that.
"You never weary of saying that the first thing is for Germany herself
to destroy German militarism, but she is far from destroying it; she
still holds it fast.
"M. Forgeot wants to make war, but while we are making war he wants
us to talk about peace. Personally, I believe that when you are doing
things you should talk as little as possible. Do M. Forgeot's ideas
come within the range of practical politics? Do people believe that
the men in the trenches and the women in the factories do not think of
peace? Our thoughts are theirs. They are fighting to obtain some decent
security of life; and when you ask me my war aims, I reply that my war
aim is victory in full." (Loud cheers and Socialist interruption.)
"I understand your aspirations, some of which I share, but do not let
us make mistakes about war. All these men want peace. But if, while
they are fighting, the rumour goes round that delegates of one or other
belligerent country are discussing terms of peace--that yesterday we
were on the eve of peace, that next day there was a break-off--then
we are condemned to flounder about in mud and in blood for years
still. That is the way to disarm and discourage us all. For these
reasons, I am not in favour of Conferences where citizens of different
belligerent countries discuss peace which the Governments alone are
able to decide. I want to make war. This means that for the moment we
must silence all factious discussion. Is there a man who has been more
of a party man than I? I see to-day that I have been far too much of a
party man. My programme is a military and economic programme. We have
got Allies, to whom we owe loyalty and fidelity, which must override
every other consideration.
"We have not yet achieved victory. We have come to a cruel phase of
the war. A time of privation is at hand, a time when our spirit must
rise to greater heights yet. Do not, then, speak of peace. We all want
peace, we are making great sacrifices to obtain peace, but we must get
rid of old animosities and turn solidly against the enemy. Leave all
other questions alone.
"There is one on which, however, I must touch. Scandals have been
spoken of. Do you think we can have three years of war without
Germany trying to keep spies busy in our midst? I complained that our
look-out was insufficient, and events have too clearly shown that I
was right. I am told to tell you the truth. You shall have it. But we
must distinguish between crimes and accusations. As the examination
proceeds facts will be disclosed which will have their effect. How
can you expect me to mention names or reveal fragments of truth?
Certain people have been guilty of indiscretion, want of reflection,
or weakness. It is not I but the judge who has to decide. You shall
have the truth. In what form? If there is any revelation of a political
nature to make there is a political tribunal in this country to make
it. It shall judge. Just as civil justice must do its work during war
time, so must political justice." (A voice: "Caillaux!") "I mention no
name. A journalist has freedom as to what he may say, it is his own
responsibility; but the head of the Government has a quite different
task. I am here to put the law in motion if political acts have been
committed which are subject to a jurisdiction beyond the ordinary
tribunals.
"Those facts will be brought before the tribunal, but I refuse here to
accuse any man.
"Justice is our weapon against treason, and where treason is concerned
there can be no possibility of pardon. In any case, you have got
a Government which will try to _govern_ in the strict, but high,
idealistic sense of the word. Where I differ from you, gentlemen of
the Extreme Left, is when you want to bring abstract conceptions into
the field of hard facts. That is impossible. We shall try to govern
honestly and in a Republican spirit. You are not obliged to think we
shall succeed. But we shall do our best. If we make mistakes, others
have done so before us, others will do so after us. If at last we see
before us the long-awaited dawn of victory, I hope--if it is only
to complete the beauty of the picture--that you will pass a vote of
censure upon me, and I shall go happy away! I know you will not do
that; but allow me to point out, as I have a right to tell you, that
you have almost passed a vote of censure on me already before listening
to my Ministerial programme. I challenge you to say that we have made
any attempt to deceive you. If we get painful news, our hearts will
bleed, but we shall tell that news to you here. We have never given
anybody the right to suppose that we constitute a peril to any class of
citizen or a danger to the national defence. If you think the contrary,
prove it, and I will leave the House. But if you believe that what we
want above all is the welfare of France, give us your confidence, and
we will endeavour to be worthy of it."
His deeds have been on a level with his words. Bolo and Duval shot:
Caillaux in gaol: Malvy exiled by decree of the Senate: the _Bonnet
Rouge_ gang tried and condemned: the wretched intrigue in Switzerland
with the poor German tool, Austria exposed and crushed: a new spirit
breathed into all public affairs: the army reassured by his perpetual
presence under fire and his unfailing resolve at the War Office that
the splendid capacity and intrepidity of all ranks at the front shall
not be sacrificed by treachery or cowardice at the rear: the Higher
Command brimful of enthusiasm and confidence, due to the appointment of
the military genius Foch as generalissimo of the United Allied Armies
and the reinstatement of General Mangin at the head of his _corps
d'armée_: the Allies, like France herself, convinced that they have at
last discovered a man. Such was the stirring work that Clemenceau had
been doing since he took office.
So to-day Clemenceau is still democratic dictator of the French
Republic as no man has been for more than a century. When the enemy
was arrayed in overwhelming numbers close to Amiens and within a few
miles of Calais, when the German War Lords were decreeing the permanent
subjugation of the territories they occupied in the West and in the
East, when the long-range guns were bombarding the capital and the
removal of the seat of government to the provinces was again being
considered, the great French nation felt more confident of its future
than at any moment since the victories won around Verdun. To every
question Clemenceau's answer invariably was, "Je fais la guerre. Je
fais la guerre. Je fais la guerre."
Those who doubted were convinced: those who were doubtful saw their
aspirations realised: those who had never wavered cheered for victory
right ahead.
On June 6th, 1918, the French Socialist group in the Chamber of
Deputies made another of those attacks upon the National Administration
which, sad to say, have done so much to discredit the whole Socialist
Party, and even the Socialist cause, throughout Europe and the world.
Pacifism and Bolshevism together--that is to say, an unholy combination
between anti-nationalism and anarchism, have indeed shaken the
influence of democratic Socialism to its foundations, just at the time
when a sound, sober and constructive Socialist policy, in harmony with
the aspirations of the mass of the people in every Allied country,
might have led mankind peacefully along the road to the new period of
national and international co-operation. The Socialist Deputies in the
Chamber held Clemenceau's Ministry, which they had done their very
utmost to discredit and weaken, directly responsible for the serious
military reverses recently undergone by the French and Allied armies.
They insisted, therefore, upon Clemenceau's appearance in the tribune.
But when they had got him in front of them their great object evidently
was not to let him speak. There this old statesman stood, exposed to
interruptions which were in the worst of bad taste. At last he thought
the opportunity for which his enemies clamoured had come, and began to
address the Assembly. But no sooner had he opened his mouth than he was
forced to give way to M. Marcel Cachin. Only then was he enabled to get
a hearing, and this is a summary of what he said:--
"I regret that, our country being in such great danger, a unanimous
vote of confidence cannot be accorded to us. But, when all is said,
the opposition of the Socialists does not in the least enfeeble the
Government. For four long years our troops have held their own at the
front with a line which was being steadily worn down. Now a huge body
of German soldiers fresh from Russia and in good heart come forward to
assail us. Some retreat was inevitable. From the moment when Russia
thought that peace could be obtained by the simple expression of wishes
to that end we all knew that, sooner or later, the enemy would be able
to release a million of men to fall upon us. That meant that such a
retirement as we have witnessed must of necessity follow. Our men have
kept their line unbroken against odds of five to one. They have often
gone sleepless for three days and even four days in succession. But
our great soldiers have had great leaders, and our army as a whole has
proved itself to be greater than even we could expect.
"The duties we have to perform here are, in contrast to their heroism,
tame and even petty. All we have to do is to keep cool and hold on. The
Germans are nothing like so clever as they believe themselves to be.
They have but a single device. They throw their entire weight into one
general assault, and push their advantage to the utmost. True they
have forced back our lines of defence. But final success is that alone
which matters, and that success for us is certain. The Government you
see before you took office with the firm resolve never to surrender. So
long as we stand here our country will be defended to the last. Give
way we never shall.
"Germany has once more staked her all on one great blow, thinking
to cow us into abandoning the conflict. Her armies have tried this
desperate game before. They tried it on the Marne, they tried it on the
Yser, they tried it at Verdun, they tried it elsewhere. But they never
have succeeded, and they never shall. Our Allies to-day are the leading
nations of the world. They have one and all pledged themselves to fight
on till victory is within our grasp. The men who have already fallen
have not fallen in vain. By their death they have once more made French
history a great and noble record. It is now for the living to finish
the glorious work done by the dead."
This great speech raised the overwhelming majority of the Assembly
to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. Nearly all present felt that the
destinies of France hung in the balance, and that any vote given which
might tend to discourage the men at the front at such a time was a
direct service rendered to the enemy whose bombs were even then falling
in the heart of Paris. The vote of confidence in Clemenceau and his
Ministry was carried by 377 votes to 110; and of these 110 more than a
third were convinced shortly afterwards that the course they had then
taken in order to preserve the unity of their forces as factionists was
unworthy of their dignity as men.
Then, too, when the tide turned and the German hordes, after fresh
glorious battles of the Marne and of the Somme, were in headlong
retreat, Clemenceau, unelated by victory as he was undiscouraged by
defeat, repeated again: "Je fais la guerre. Je fais la guerre. Je fais
la guerre." Not until the German armies were finally vanquished would
the Republican statesman talk of making peace. On both sides of the
Atlantic, therefore, as on both sides of the Channel, knowing Great
Britain and the United States by personal experience and able to gauge
the cold resolution of the one and the inexhaustible resources and
determination of the other, speaking and writing English well, he is
now, as he has been throughout this tremendous war, a tower of strength
to the forces of democracy and a very present help to all who are
resolved to break down German militarism for evermore.