M^r Gov^r Morris moved to commit so much of the Report as relates to "1
member for every 40,000 inhabitants." His view was that they might
absolutely fix the number for each State in the first instance; leaving
the Legislature at liberty to provide for changes in the relative
importance of the States, and for the case of new States.
M^r Wilson 2^{ded} the motion; but with a view of leaving the Committee
under no implied shackles.
M^r Ghorum apprehended great inconveniency from fixing directly the
number of Representatives to be allowed to each State. He thought the
number of Inhabitants the true guide; tho' perhaps some departure might
be expedient from the full proportion. The States also would vary in
their relative extent by separations of parts of the largest States. A
part of Virg^a is now on the point of a separation. In the province of
Mayne a Convention is at this time deliberating on a separation from
Mas^{ts}. In such events the number of representatives ought certainly
to be reduced. He hoped to see all the States made small by proper
divisions, instead of their becoming formidable as was apprehended, to
the Small States. He conceived that let the Gen^l Government be modified
as it might, there would be a constant tendency in the State
Governm^{ts} to encroach upon it: it was of importance therefore that
the extent of the States sh^d be reduced as much & as fast as possible.
The stronger the Gov^t shall be made in the first instance the more
easily will these divisions be effected; as it will be of less
consequence in the opinion of the States whether they be of great or
small extent.
M^r Gerry did not think with his Colleague that the large States ought
to be cut up. This policy has been inculcated by the middling and
smaller States, ungenerously & contrary to the spirit of the
Confederation. Ambitious men will be apt to solicit needless divisions,
till the States be reduced to the size of Counties. If this policy
should still actuate the small States, the large ones cou'd not
confederate safely with them; but would be obliged to consult their
safety by confederating only with one another. He favored the commitment
and thought that Representation ought to be in the Combined ratio of
numbers of Inhabitants and of wealth, and not of either singly.
M^r King wished the clause to be committed, chiefly in order to detach
it from the Report with which it had no connection. He thought also that
the Ratio of Representation proposed could not be safely fixed, since in
a century & a half our computed increase of population would carry the
number of representatives to an enormous excess; that y^e number of
inhabitants was not the proper index of ability & wealth; that property
was the primary object of Society; and that in fixing a ratio this ought
not to be excluded from the estimate.--With regard to new States, he
observed that there was something peculiar in the business which had not
been noticed. The U. S. were now admitted to be proprietors of the
Country N. West of the Ohio. Cong^s by one of their ordinances have
impoliticly laid it out into ten States, and have made it a fundamental
article of compact with those who may become settlers, that as soon as
the number in any one state shall equal that of the smallest of the 13
original States, it may claim admission into the Union. Delaware does
not contain it is computed more than 35,000 souls, and for obvious
reasons will not increase much for a considerable time. It is possible
then that if this plan be persisted in by Cong^s 10 new votes may be
added, without a greater addition of inhabitants than are represented by
the single vote of Pen^a. The plan as it respects one of the new States
is already irrevocable, the sale of the lands having commenced, and the
purchasers & settlers will immediately become entitled to all the
privileges of the compact.
M^r Butler agreed to the Commitment if the Committee were to be left at
liberty. He was persuaded that the more the subject was examined, the
less it would appear that the number of inhabitants would be a proper
rule of proportion. If there were no other objection the changeableness
of the standard would be sufficient. He concurred with those who thought
some balance was necessary between the old & the new States. He
contended strenuously that property was the only just measure of
representation. This was the great object of Govern^t; the great cause
of war; the great means of carrying it on.
M^r Pinkney saw no good reason for committing. The value of land had
been found on full investigation to be an impracticable rule. The
contributions of revenue including imports & exports must be too
changeable in their amount; too difficult to be adjusted; and too
injurious to the non-commercial States. The number of inhabitants
appeared to him the only just & practicable rule. He thought the blacks
ought to stand on an equality with the whites: But w^d agree to the
ratio settled by Cong^s. He contended that Cong^s had no right under the
articles of Confederation to authorize the admission of new States; no
such case having been provided for.
M^r Davy was for committing the clause in order to get at the merits of
the question arising on the Report. He seemed to think that wealth or
property ought to be represented in the 2^d branch; and numbers in the
1^{st} branch.
On the Motion for committing as made by M^r Gov^r Morris,
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The members app^d by Ballot were M^r Gov^r Morris, M^r Gorham, M^r
Randolph, M^r Rutlidge, M^r King.
M^r Wilson signified that his view in agreeing to the co[~m]itm^t was
that the Com^e might consider the propriety of adopting a scale similar
to that established by the Constitution of Mass^{ts} which w^d give an
advantage to y^e small States without substantially departing from the
rule of proportion.
M^r Wilson & M^r Mason moved to postpone the clause relating to money
bills in order to take up the clause relating to an equality of votes in
the Second branch.
On the question Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The clause relating to equality of votes being under consideration,
Doc^r Franklin observed that this question could not be properly put by
itself, the Co[~m]ittee having reported several propositions as mutual
conditions of each other. He could not vote for it if separately taken,
but should vote for the whole together.
Col. Mason perceived the difficulty & suggested a reference of the rest
of the Report to y^e Committee just appointed, that the whole might be
brought into one view.
M^r Randolph disliked y^e reference to that Committee, as it consisted
of members from States opposed to the wishes of the smaller States, and
could not therefore be acceptable to the latter.
M^r Martin & M^r Jenifer moved to postpone the clause till the Com^e
last appointed sh^d report.
M^r Madison observed that if the uncommitted part of the Report was
connected with the part just committed, it ought also to be committed;
if not connected, it need not be postponed till report should be made.
On the question for postponing, moved by M^r Martin & M^r
Jenifer,--Con^t N. J. Del. M^d V^a Geo. ay. P^a N. C. S. C. no.
Mass. N. Y. divided.
The 1^{st} clause relating to the originating of money bills was then
resumed.
M^r Govern^r Morris was opposed to a restriction of this right in either
branch, considered merely in itself and as unconnected with the point of
representation in the 2^d branch. It will disable the 2^d branch from
proposing its own money plans, and giving the people an opportunity of
judging by comparison of the merits of those proposed by the 1^{st}
branch.
M^r Wilson could see nothing like a concession here on the part of the
smaller States. If both branches were to say yes or no, it was of little
consequence which should say yes or no first, which last. If either was
indiscriminately to have the right of originating, the reverse of the
Report, would he thought be most proper; since it was a maxim that the
least numerous body was the fittest for deliberation; the most numerous
for decision. He observed that this discrimination had been transcribed
from the British into several American constitutions. But he was
persuaded that on examination of the American experiments it would be
found to be a trifle light as air. Nor could he ever discover the
advantage of it in the Parliamentary history of G. Britain. He hoped if
there was any advantage in the privilege, that it would be pointed out.
M^r Williamson thought that if the privilege were not common to both
branches it ought rather to be confined to the 2^d as the bills in that
case would be more narrowly watched, than if they originated with the
branch having most of the popular confidence.
M^r Mason. The consideration which weighed with the Committee was that
the 1^{st} branch would be the immediate representatives of the people,
the 2^d would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the
people's money, they might soon forget the source from whence they
received it. We might soon have an aristocracy. He had been much
concerned at the principles which had been advanced by some gentlemen,
but had the satisfaction to find they did not generally prevail. He was
a friend to proportional representation in both branches; but supposed
that some points must be yielded for the sake of accomodation.
M^r Wilson. If he had proposed that the 2^d branch should have an
independent disposal of public money, the observations of (Col. Mason)
would have been a satisfactory answer. But nothing could be farther from
what he had said. His question was how is the power of the 1^{st} branch
increased or that of the 2^d diminished by giving the proposed privilege
to the former? Where is the difference, in which branch it begins, if
both must concur, in the end?
M^r Gerry would not say that the concession was a sufficient one on the
part of the small States. But he could not but regard it in the light of
a concession. It w^d make it a constitutional principle that the 2^d
branch were not possessed of the Confidence of the people in money
matters, which w^d lessen their weight & influence. In the next place if
the 2^d branch were dispossessed of the privilege, they w^d be deprived
of the opportunity which their continuance in office 3 times as long as
the 1^{st} branch would give them of making three successive essays in
favor of a particular point.
M^r Pinkney thought it evident that the Concession was wholly on one
side, that of the large States, the privilege of originating money bills
being of no account.
M^r Gov^r Morris had waited to hear the good effects of the restriction.
As to the alarm sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there
never was, nor ever will be a civilized Society without an aristocracy.
His endeavor was to keep it as much as possible from doing mischief. The
restriction if it has any real operation, will deprive us of the
services of the 2^d branch in digesting & proposing money bills of which
it will be more capable than the 1^{st} branch. It will take away the
responsibility of the 2^d branch, the great security for good behavior.
It will always leave a plea, as to an obnoxious money bill that it was
disliked, but could not be constitutionally amended; nor safely
rejected. It will be a dangerous source of disputes between the two
Houses. We should either take the British Constitution altogether or
make one for ourselves. The Executive there has dissolved two Houses as
the only cure for such disputes. Will our Executive be able to apply
such a remedy? Every law directly or indirectly takes money out of the
pockets of the people. Again What use may be made of such a privilege in
case of great emergency? Suppose an Enemy at the door, and money
instantly & absolutely necessary for repelling him, may not the popular
branch avail itself of this duress, to extort concessions from the
Senate destructive of the Constitution itself. He illustrated this
danger by the example of the Long Parliament's exped^{ts} for subverting
the H. of Lords; concluding on the whole that the restriction would be
either useless or pernicious.
Doc^r Franklin did not mean to go into a justification of the Report,
but as it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the 2^d
branch from medling with money bills, he could not but remark that it
was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of
their money, & how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim that those
who feel, can best judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained,
if money affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of
the people. This was his inducement to concur in the report. As to the
danger or difficulty that might arise from a Negative in the 2^d where
the people w^d not be proportionately represented, it might easily be
got over by declaring that there should be no such negative; or if that
will not do, by declaring that there shall be no such branch at all.
M^r Martin said that it was understood in the Committee that the
difficulties and disputes which had been apprehended, should be guarded
ag^{st} in the detailing of the plan.
M^r Wilson. The difficulties & disputes will increase with the attempts
to define & obviate them. Queen Anne was obliged to dissolve her
Parliam^t in order to terminate one of these obstinate disputes between
the two Houses. Had it not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one
can say what the result would have been. The point is still sub judice
in England. He approved of the principles laid down by the Honble
President (Doct^r Franklin) his Colleague, as to the expediency of
keeping the people informed of their money affairs. But thought they
would know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one way as in the
other.
Gen^l Pinkney was astonished that this point should have been considered
as a concession. He remarked that the restriction to money bills had
been rejected on the merits singly considered, by 8 States ag^{st} 3.
and that the very States which now called it a concession, were then
ag^{st} it as nugatory or improper in itself.
On the Question whether the clause relating to money bills in the Report
of the Com^e consisting of a member from each State, sh^d stand as part
of the Report
Mass^{ts} divid^d Con^t ay. N. Y. div^d. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. div^d
A Question was then raised whether the question was carried in the
affirmative; there being but 5 ays out of 11. States present. The words
of the rule are (see May 28).
On this question: Mas. Con^t N. J. P^a Del. M^d N. C. S. C. Geo.
ay. N. Y. V^a no
(In several preceding instances like votes had sub silentio been entered
as decided in the affirmative.)