The duration of the 2^d branch under consideration.
M^r Ghorum moved to fill the blank with "six years," one third of the
members to go out every second year.
M^r Wilson 2^{ded} the motion.
Gen^l Pinkney opposed six years in favor of four years. The States he
said had different interests. Those of the Southern, and of S. Carolina
in particular were different from the Northern. If the Senators should
be appointed for a long term, they w^d settle in the State where they
exercised their functions; and would in a little time be rather the
representatives of that than of the State appoint^g them.
M^r Reed mov^d that the term be nine years. This w^d admit of a very
convenient rotation, one third going out triennially. He w^d still
prefer "during good behaviour," but being little supported in that idea,
he was willing to take the longest term that could be obtained.
M^r Broome 2^{ded} the motion.
M^r Madison. In order to judge of the form to be given to this
institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served
by it. These were first to protect the people ag^{st} their rulers;
secondly to protect the people ag^{st} the transient impressions into
which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate
moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the
plan of Gov^t most likely to secure their happiness, would first be
aware, that those charg^d with the public happiness might betray their
trust. An obvious precaution ag^{st} this danger w^d be to divide the
trust between different bodies of men, who might watch & check each
other. In this they w^d be governed by the same prudence which has
prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of Gov^t, where all
business liable to abuses is made to pass thro' separate hands, the one
being a check on the other. It w^d next occur to such people, that they
themselves were liable to temporary errors, thro' want of information as
to their true interest, and that men chosen for a short term, & employed
but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same
cause. This reflection w^d naturally suggest that the Gov^t be so
constituted as that one of its branches might have an opp^y of acquiring
a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection
equally becoming a people on such an occasion, w^d be that they
themselves, as well as a numerous body of Representatives, were liable
to err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence ag^{st} this
danger would be to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose
limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose ag^{st}
impetuous councils. It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating
on a Gov^t for themselves, that as different interests necessarily
result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might
under sudden impulses be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In
all civilized Countries the people fall into different classes hav^g a
real or supposed difference of interests. There will be creditors &
debtors; farmers, merch^{ts} & manufacturers. There will be particularly
the distinction of rich & poor. It was true as had been observ^d (by M^r
Pinkney) we had not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank
which were a great source of the contests in the ancient Gov^{ts} as
well as the modern States of Europe, nor those extremes of wealth or
poverty which characterize the latter. We cannot however be regarded
even at this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which every thing that
affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a
system which we wish to last for ages, we sh^d not lose sight of the
changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of
necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the
hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its
blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the
feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the
power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have
yet been made in this Country, but symptoms, of a levelling spirit, as
we have understood, have sufficiently appeared in certain quarters, to
give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded
ag^{st} on the republican principles? How is the danger in all cases of
interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded ag^{st}?
Among other means by the establishment of a body in the Gov^t
sufficiently respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such
emergencies, the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into
that scale. Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed
Gov^t he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did
not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten any real danger;
but in pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he should require
that the long term allowed to the 2^d branch should not commence till
such a period of life, as would render a perpetual disqualification to
be re-elected little inconvenient either in a public or private view. He
observed that as it was more than probable we were now digesting a plan
which in its operation w^d decide for ever the fate of Republican Gov^t
we ought not only to provide every guard to liberty that its
preservation c^d require, but be equally careful to supply the defects
which our own experience had particularly pointed out.
M^r Sherman. Gov^t is instituted for those who live under it. It ought
therefore to be so constituted as not to be dangerous to their
liberties. The more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad Gov^t.
Frequent elections are necessary to preserve the good behavior of
rulers. They also tend to give permanency to the Government, by
preserving that good behavior, because it ensures their re-election. In
Connecticut elections have been very frequent, yet great stability &
uniformity both as to persons & measures have been experienced from its
original establishm^t to the present time; a period of more than a 130
years. He wished to have provision made for steadiness & wisdom in the
system to be adopted; but he thought six or four years would be
sufficient. He sh^d be content with either.
M^r Read wished it to be considered by the small States that it was
their interest that we should become one people as much as possible;
that State attachments sh^d be extinguished as much as possible; that
the Senate, sh^d be so constituted as to have the feelings of Citizens
of the whole.
M^r Hamilton. He did not mean to enter particularly into the subject. He
concurred with M^r Madison in thinking we were now to decide forever the
fate of Republican Government; and that if we did not give to that form
due stability and wisdom, it would be disgraced & lost among ourselves,
disgraced & lost to mankind forever. He acknowledged himself not to
think favorably of Republican Government; but addressed his remarks to
those who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone
their Government as high as possible. He professed himself to be as
zealous an advocate for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted he
should be as willing a martyr to it though he differed as to the form in
which it was most eligible.--He concurred also in the general
observations of (M^r Madison) on the subject, which might be supported
by others if it were necessary. It was certainly true that nothing like
an equality of property existed; that an inequality would exist as long
as liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very
liberty itself. This inequality of property constituted the great &
fundamental distinction in Society. When the Tribunitial power had
levelled the boundary between the _patricians_ & _plebeians_, what
followed? The distinction between rich & poor was substituted. He meant
not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose principally to remark
that (M^r Sherman) seemed not to recollect that one branch of the
proposed Gov^t was so formed, as to render it particularly the guardians
of the poorer orders of Citizens; nor to have adverted to the true
causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Con^t. Under the
British system as well as the federal, many of the great powers
appertaining to Gov^t particularly all those relating to foreign Nations
were not in the hands of the Gov^t there. Their internal affairs also
were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes many of which were
peculiar to that Country. Of late the Governm^t had entirely given way
to the people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary functions
in order to prevent those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere.
He asks M^r S. whether the State at this time dare impose & collect a
tax on y^e people? To these causes & not to the frequency of elections,
the effect as far as it existed ought to be chiefly ascribed.
M^r Gerry, wished we could be united in our ideas concerning a permanent
Gov^t. All aim at the same end, but there are great differences as to
the means. One circumstance He thought should be carefully attended to.
There was not 1/1000 part of our fellow citizens who were not ag^{st}
every approach towards Monarchy. Will they ever agree to a plan which
seems to make such an approach. The Convention ought to be extremely
cautious in what they hold out to the people. Whatever plan may be
proposed will be espoused with warmth by many out of respect to the
quarter it proceeds from as well as from an approbation of the plan
itself. And if the plan should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent
opposition, it is easy to foresee that discord & confusion will ensue,
and it is even possible that we may become a prey to foreign powers. He
did not deny the position of M^r Madison, that the majority will
generally violate justice when they have an interest in so doing: But
did not think there was any such temptation in this Country. Our
situation was different from that of G. Britain; and the great body of
lands yet to be parcelled out & settled would very much prolong the
difference. Notwithstanding the symptoms of injustice which had marked
many of our public Councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to
leave hopes, that there would be a sufficient sense of justice & virtue
for the purpose of Gov^t. He admitted the evils arising from a frequency
of elections; and would agree to give the Senate a duration of four or
five years. A longer term would defeat itself. It never would be adopted
by the people.
M^r Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen from others, but w^d
add an observation or two which he believed had not yet been suggested.
Every nation may be regarded in two relations 1 to its own citizens. 2
to foreign nations. It is therefore not only liable to anarchy & tyranny
within, but has wars to avoid & treaties to obtain from abroad. The
Senate will probably be the depository of the powers concerning the
latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of
foreign Nations. The true reason why G. Britain has not yet listened to
a commercial treaty with us has been, because she had no confidence in
the stability or efficacy of our Government. 9 years with a rotation,
will provide these desirable qualities; and give our Gov^t an advantage
in this respect over Monarchy itself. In a Monarchy much must always
depend on the temper of the man. In such a body, the personal character
will be lost in the political. He w^d add another observation. The
popular objection ag^{st} appointing any public body for a long term was
that it might by gradual encroachments prolong itself first into a body
for life, and finally become a hereditary one. It would be a
satisfactory answer to this objection that as 1/3 would go out
triennially, there would be always three divisions holding their places
for unequal times, and consequently acting under the influence of
different views, and different impulses.--On the question for 9 years,
1/3 to go out triennially,
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t, no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.