Resolution 4. being taken up.
M^r Pinkney spoke as follows--[106] The efficacy of the System will
depend on this article. In order to form a right judgm^t in the case, it
will be proper to examine the situation of this Country more accurately
than it has yet been done. The people of the U. States are perhaps the
most singular of any we are acquainted with. Among them there are fewer
distinctions of fortune & less of rank, than among the inhabitants of
any other nation. Every freeman has a right to the same protection &
security; and a very moderate share of property entitles them to the
possession of all the honors and privileges the Public can bestow: hence
arises a greater equality, than is to be found among the people of any
other Country, and an equality which is more likely to continue--I say
this equality is likely to continue, because in a new Country,
possessing immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where every temptation
is offered to emigration & where industry must be rewarded with
competency, there will be few poor, and few dependent--Every member of
the Society almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving at the supreme
offices & consequently of directing the strength & sentiments of the
whole Community. None will be excluded by birth, & few by fortune, from
voting for proper persons to fill the offices of Government--the whole
community will enjoy in the fullest sense that kind of political liberty
which consists in the power the members of the State reserve to
themselves, of arriving at the Public offices, or at least, of having
votes in the nomination of those who fill them.
[106] Pinckney furnished Madison with a copy of this speech
which he transcribed, but apparently not with the whole of
it, as Madison's note at the end indicates. The original
Pinckney draft is among the Madison papers, and shows
Madison's copying to have been accurate.
If this State of things is true & the prospect of its continuing
probable, it is perhaps not politic to endeavour too close an imitation
of a Government calculated for a people whose situation is, & whose
views ought to be extremely different.
Much has been said of the Constitution of G. Britain. I will confess
that I believe it to be the best Constitution in existence; but at the
same time I am confident it is one that will not or cannot be introduced
into this Country, for many centuries.--If it were proper to go here
into a historical dissertation on the British Constitution, it might
easily be shewn that the peculiar excellence, the distinguishing feature
of that Governm^t cannot possibly be introduced into our System--that
its balance between the Crown & the people cannot be made a part of our
Constitution,--that we neither have nor can have the members to compose
it, nor the rights, privileges & properties of so distinct a class of
Citizens to guard,--that the materials for forming this balance or check
do not exist, nor is there a necessity for having so permanent a part of
our Legislative, until the Executive power is so constituted as to have
something fixed & dangerous in its principle--By this I mean a sole,
hereditary, though limited Executive.
That we cannot have a proper body for forming a Legislative balance
between the inordinate power of the Executive and the people, is evident
from a review of the accidents & circumstances which gave rise to the
peerage of Great Britain--I believe it is well ascertained that the
parts which compose the British Constitution arose immediately from the
forests of Germany; but the antiquity of the establishment of Nobility
is by no means clearly defined. Some authors are of opinion that the
dignity denoted by the titles of dux et comes, was derived from the old
Roman to the German Empire; while others are of the opinion that they
existed among the Germans long before the Romans were acquainted with
them. The institution however of Nobility is immemorial among the
Nations who may properly be termed the ancestors of Britain.--At the
time they were summoned in England to become a part of the National
Council, the circumstances which contributed to make them a Constituent
part of that constitution, must be well known to all gentlemen who have
had industry & curiosity enough to investigate the subject--The Nobles
with their possessions & dependents composed a body permanent in their
nature and formidable in point of power. They had a distinct interest
both from the King and the people; an interest which could only be
represented by themselves, and the guardianship could not be safely
intrusted to others.--At the time they were originally called to form a
part of the National Council, necessity perhaps as much as other cause,
induced the Monarch to look up to them. It was necessary to demand the
aid of his subjects in personal & pecuniary services. The power and
possessions of the Nobility would not permit taxation from any Assembly
of which they were not a part: & the blending the Deputies of the
Commons with them, & thus forming what they called their parlerment was
perhaps as much the effect of chance as of any thing else. The Commons
were at that time compleatly subordinate to the nobles, whose
consequence & influence seem to have been the only reasons for their
superiority; a superiority so degrading to the Commons that in the first
summons we find the peers are called upon to consult the commons to
consent. From this time the peers have composed a part of the British
Legislature, and notwithstanding their power and influence have
diminished & those of the Commons have increased, yet still they have
always formed an excellent balance ag^{st} either the encroachments of
the Crown or the people.
I have said that such a body cannot exist in this Country for ages, and
that untill the situation of our people is exceedingly changed no
necessity will exist for so permanent a part of the Legislature. To
illustrate this I have remarked that the people of the United States are
more equal in their circumstances than the people of any other
Country--that they have very few rich men among them,--by rich men I
mean those whose riches may have a dangerous influence, or such as are
esteemed rich in Europe--perhaps there are not one hundred such on the
Continent; that it is not probable this number will be greatly
increased; that the genius of the people their mediocrity of situation &
the prospects which are afforded their industry in a Country which must
be a new one for centuries are unfavorable to the rapid distinction of
ranks. The destruction of the right of primogeniture & the equal
division of the property of Intestates will also have an effect to
preserve this mediocrity; for laws invariably affect the manners of a
people. On the other hand that vast extent of unpeopled territory which
opens to the frugal & industrious a sure road to competency &
independence will effectually prevent for a considerable time the
increase of the poor or discontented, and be the means of preserving
that equality of condition which so eminently distinguishes us.
If equality is as I contend the leading feature of the U. States, where
then are the riches & wealth whose representation & protection is the
peculiar province of this Permanent body. Are they in the hands of the
few who may be called rich; in the possession of less than a hundred
citizens? Certainly not. They are in the great body of the people, among
whom there are no men of wealth, and very few of real poverty.--Is it
probable that a change will be created, and that a new order of men will
arise? If under the British Government, for a century no such change was
probable, I think it may be fairly concluded it will not take place
while even the semblance of Republicanism remains.--How is this change
to be effected? Where are the sources from whence it is to flow? From
the landed interest? No. That is too unproductive & too much divided in
most of the States. From the Monied interest? If such exists at present,
little is to be apprehended from that source. Is it to spring from
commerce? I believe it would be the first instance in which a nobility
sprang from merchants. Besides, Sir, I apprehend that on this point the
policy of the U. States has been much mistaken. We have unwisely
considered ourselves as the inhabitants of an old instead of a new
country. We have adopted the maxims of a State full of people &
manufactures & established in credit. We have deserted our true
interest, and instead of applying closely to those improvements in
domestic policy which would have ensured the future importance of our
commerce, we have rashly & prematurely engaged in schemes as extensive
as they are imprudent. This however is an error which daily corrects
itself & I have no doubt that a few more severe trials will convince us,
that very different commercial principles ought to govern the conduct of
these States.
The people of this Country are not only very different from the
inhabitants of any State we are acquainted with in the modern world; but
I assert that their situation is distinct from either the people of
Greece or Rome, or of any State we are acquainted with among the
antients.--Can the orders introduced by the institution of Solon, can
they be found in the United States? Can the military habits & manners of
Sparta be resembled to our habits & manners? Are the distinction of
Patrician & Plebeian known among us? Can the Helvetic or Belgic
confederacies, or can the unwieldy, unmeaning body called the Germanic
Empire, can they be said to possess either the same or a situation like
ours? I apprehend not.--They are perfectly different, in their
distinctions of rank, their Constitutions, their manners & their policy.
Our true situation appears to me to be this,--a new extensive Country
containing within itself the materials for forming a Government capable
of extending to its Citizens all the blessings of Civil & religious
liberty--capable of making them happy at home. This is the great end of
Republican Establishments. We mistake the object of our Government, if
we hope or wish that it is to make us respectable abroad. Conquest or
superiority among other powers is not or ought not ever to be the object
of republican Systems. If they are sufficiently active & energetic to
rescue us from contempt & preserve our domestic happiness & security, it
is all we can expect from them,--it is more than almost any other
Government ensures to its citizens.
I believe this observation will be found generally true:--that no two
people are so exactly alike in their situation or circumstances as to
admit the exercise of the same Government with equal benefit; that a
system must be suited to the habits & genius of the People it is to
govern, and must grow out of them.
The people of the U. S. may be divided into three classes--_Professional
men_ who must from their particular pursuits always have a considerable
weight in the Government while it remains popular--_Commercial men_, who
may or may not have weight as a wise or injudicious commercial policy is
pursued.--If that commercial policy is pursued which I conceive to be
the true one, the merchants of this Country will not or ought not for a
considerable time to have much weight in the political scale.--The third
is the _landed interest_, the owners and cultivators of the soil, who
are and ought ever to be the governing spring in the system.--These
three classes, however distinct in their pursuits are individually equal
in the political scale, and may be easily proved to have but one
interest. The dependence of each on the other is mutual. The merchant
depends on the planter. Both must in private as well as public affairs
be connected with the professional men; who in their turn must in some
measure depend on them. Hence it is clear from this manifest connection,
& the equality which I before stated exists, & must for the reasons then
assign, continue, that after all there is one, but one great & equal
body of Citizens composing the inhabitants of this Country among whom
there are no distinctions of rank, and very few or none of fortune.
For a people thus circumstanced are we then to form a Government & the
question is what sort of Government is best suited to them.
Will it be the British Gov^t? No. Why? Because G. Britain contains three
orders of people distinct in their situation, their possessions & their
principles.--These orders combined form the great body of the Nation.
And as in national expences the wealth of the whole community must
contribute, so ought each component part to be properly & duly
represented.--No other combination of power could form this due
representation, but the one that exists.--Neither the peers or the
people could represent the royalty, nor could the Royalty & the people
form a proper representation for the Peers.--Each therefore must of
necessity be represented by itself, or the sign of itself; and this
accidental mixture has certainly formed a Government admirably well
balanced.
But the U. States contain but one order that can be assimilated to the
British Nation,--this is the order of Commons. They will not surely then
attempt to form a Government consisting of three branches, two of which
shall have nothing to represent. They will not have an Executive &
Senate (hereditary) because the King & Lords of England are so. The same
reasons do not exist and therefore the same provisions are not
necessary.
We must as has been observed suit our Governm^t to the people it is to
direct. These are I believe as active, intelligent & susceptible of good
Governm^t as any people in the world. The Confusion which has produced
the present relaxed State is not owing to them. It is owing to the
weakness & (defects) of a Gov^t incapable of combining the various
interests it is intended to unite, and destitute of energy.--All that we
have to do then is to distribute the powers of Gov^t in such a manner,
and for such limited periods, as while it gives a proper degree of
permanency to the Magistrate, will reserve to the people, the right of
election they will not or ought not frequently to part with.--I am of
opinion that this may easily be done; and that with some amendments the
propositions before the Committee will fully answer this end.
No position appears to me more true than this; that the General Gov^t
cannot effectually exist without reserving to the States the possession
of their local rights. They are the instruments upon which the Union
must frequently depend for the support & execution of their powers,
however immediately operating upon the people, and not upon the States.
Much has been said about the propriety of abolishing the distinction of
State Governments, & having but one general System. Suffer me for a
moment to examine this question.[107]
[107] The residue of this speech was not furnished, like the
above, by Mr. Pinckney.--Madison's Note.
Yates' report of the speech is meagre. The closing
paragraph, apparently the part lacking in Madison's report,
is:
"While we were dependent on the crown of Great Britain, it
was in contemplation to form the whole into one; but it was
found impracticable. No legislature could make good laws for
the whole, nor can it now be done. It would necessarily
place the power in the hands of the few nearest the seat of
government. State governments must therefore remain, if you
mean to prevent confusion. The general negative powers will
support the general government. Upon these considerations, I
am led to form the second branch differently from the
report. These powers are important, and the number not too
large, upon the principle of proportion. I have considered
the subject with great attention; and I propose this plan
(reads it), and if no better plan is proposed, I will then
move its adoption."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 163.
The mode of constituting the 2^d branch being under consideration.
The word "national" was struck out, and "United States" inserted.
M^r Ghorum, inclined to a compromise as to the rule of proportion. He
thought there was some weight in the objections of the small States. If
V^a should have 16. votes & Del^{re} with several other States together
16, those from Virg^a would be more likely to unite than the others, and
would therefore have an undue influence. This remark was applicable not
only to States, but to Counties or other districts of the same State.
Accordingly the Constitution of Mass^{ts} had provided that the
representatives of the larger districts should not be in an exact ratio
to their numbers, and experience he thought had shewn the provision to
be expedient.
M^r Read. The States have heretofore been in a sort of partnership. They
ought to adjust their old affairs before they open a new account. He
brought into view the appropriation of the co[~m]on interest in the
Western lands, to the use of particular States. Let justice be done on
this head; let the fund be applied fairly & equally to the discharge of
the general debt, and the smaller States who had been injured; would
listen then perhaps to those ideas of just representation which had been
held out.
M^r Ghorum, did not see how the Convention could interpose in the case.
Errors he allowed had been committed on the subject. But Cong^s were now
using their endeavours to rectify them. The best remedy would be such a
Government as would have vigor enough to do justice throughout. This was
certainly the best chance that could be afforded to the smaller States.
M^r Wilson, the question is shall the members of the 2^d branch be
chosen by the Legislatures of the States? When he considered the amazing
extent of Country--the immense population which is to fill it, the
influence which the Gov^t we are to form will have, not only on the
present generation of our people & their multiplied posterity, but on
the whole Globe, he was lost in the magnitude of the object. The project
of Henry the 4^{th} & his Statesmen was but the picture in miniature of
the great portrait to be exhibited. He was opposed to an election by the
State Legislatures. In explaining his reasons it was necessary to
observe the twofold relation in which the people would stand, 1. as
Citizens of the Gen^l Gov^t 2. as Citizens of their particular State.
The Gen^l Gov^t was meant for them in the first capacity: the State
Gov^{ts} in the second. Both Gov^{ts} were derived from the people--both
meant for the people--both therefore ought to be regulated on the same
principles. The same train of ideas which belonged to the relation of
the Citizens to their State Gov^{ts} were applicable to their relation
to the Gen^l Gov^t and in forming the latter, we ought to proceed, by
abstracting as much as possible from the idea of the State Gov^{ts}.
With respect to the province & object of the Gen^l Gov^t they should be
considered as having no existence. The election of the 2^d branch by the
Legislatures, will introduce & cherish local interests & local
prejudices. The Gen^l Gov^t is not an assemblage of States, but of
individuals for certain political purposes--it is not meant for the
States, but for the individuals composing them; the _individuals_
therefore not the _States_, ought to be represented in it: A proportion
in this representation can be preserved in the 2^d as well as in the
1^{st} branch; and the election can be made by electors chosen by the
people for that purpose. He moved an amendment to that effect which was
not seconded.
M^r Elseworth saw no reason for departing from the mode contained in the
Report. Whoever chooses the member, he will be a Citizen of the State he
is to represent & will feel the same spirit & act the same part whether
he be appointed by the people or the Legislature. Every State has its
particular views & prejudices, which will find their way into the
general Councils, through whatever channel they may flow. Wisdom was one
of the characteristics which it was in contemplation to give the second
branch. Would not more of it issue from the Legislatures; than from an
immediate election by the people. He urged the necessity of maintaining
the existence, & agency of the States. Without their co-operation it
would be impossible to support a Republican Gov^t over so great an
extent of Country. An army could scarcely render it practicable. The
largest States are the worst Governed. Virg^a is obliged to acknowledge
her incapacity to extend her Gov^t to Kentuckey. Mass^{ts} cannot keep
the peace one hundred miles from her capitol and is now forming an army
for its support. How long Pen^a may be free from a like situation cannot
be foreseen. If the principles & materials of our Gov^t are not adequate
to the extent of these single States; how can it be imagined that they
can support a single Gov^t throughout the U. States. The only chance of
supporting a Gen^l Gov^t lies in grafting it on that of the individual
States.
Doc^r Johnson urged the necessity of preserving the State Gov^{ts} which
would be at the mercy of the Gen^l Gov^t on M^r Wilson's plan.
M^r Madison thought it w^d obviate difficulty if the present resol: were
postponed, & the 8{th} taken up, which is to fix the right of suffrage
in the 2^d branch.
Doc^r Williamson professed himself a friend to such a system as would
secure the existence of the State Gov^{ts}. The happiness of the people
depended on it. He was at a loss to give his vote as to the Senate
untill he knew the number of its members. In order to ascertain this, he
moved to insert these words after "2^d branch of the Nat^l
Legislature"--"who shall bear such proportion to the n^o of the 1^{st}
branch as 1 to ----." He was not seconded.
M^r Mason. It has been agreed on all hands that an efficient Gov^t is
necessary that to render it such it ought to have the faculty of self
defence, that to render its different branches effectual each of them
ought to have the same power of self defence. He did not wonder that
such an agreement should have prevailed in these points. He only
wondered that there should be any disagreement about the necessity of
allowing the State Gov^{ts} the same self-defence. If they are to be
preserved as he conceived to be essential, they certainly ought to have
this power. And the only mode left of giving it to them, was by allowing
them to appoint the 2^d branch of the Nat^l Legislature.
M^r Butler observing that we were put to difficulties at every step by
the uncertainty whether an equality or a ratio of representation w^d
prevail finally in the 2^d branch, moved to postpone the 4^{th} Resol: &
to proceed to the Resol: on that point. M^r Madison seconded him.