The 3^d Resol: resumed.
On Question yesterday postponed by S. Carol: for agreeing to the whole
sentence "for allowing an adequate compensation to be paid out of the
_Treasury of the U. States_"
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pen^a ay. Del. no.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divided. So the question
was lost, & the sentence not inserted:
Gen^l Pinkney moves to strike out the ineligibility of members of the
1^{st} branch to offices established "by a particular State." He argued
from the inconveniency to which such a restriction would expose both the
members of the 1^{st} branch, and the States wishing for their services;
& from the smallness of the object to be attained by the restriction.
It w^d seem from the ideas of some that we are erecting a Kingdom to be
divided ag^{st} itself,[102] he disapproved such a fetter on the
Legislature.
[102] According to Yates Wilson followed Pinckney:
"Mr. Wilson. I perceive that some gentlemen are of opinion
to give a bias in favor of state governments. This question
ought to stand on the same footing."--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 157.
M^r Sherman seconds the motion. It w^d seem that we are erecting a
Kingdom at war with itself. The Legislature ought not to [be] fettered
in such a case. On the question
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. M^d div^d.
Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Madison renewed his motion yesterday made & waved to render the
members of the 1^{st} branch "ineligible during their term of service, &
for one year after--to such offices only as should be established, or
the emoluments thereof augmented, by the Legislature of the U. States
during the time of their being members." He supposed that the
unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of salaries, were the
evils most experienced, & that if the door was shut ag^{st} them: it
might properly be left open for the appoint^t of members to other
offices as an encouragem^t to the Legislative service.
M^r Alex: Martin[103] seconded the Motion.
[103] "Mr. Martin was lately Governor of North Carolina, which
office he filled with credit. He is a man of sense, and
undoubtedly is a good politician, but he is not formed to
shine in public debate, being no speaker. Mr. Martin was
once a Colonel in the American Army, but proved unfit for
the field. He is about 40 years of age."--Pierce's Notes,
_Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 332.
M^r Butler. The amend^t does not go far eno. & w^d be easily evaded.
M^r Rutlidge, was for preserving the Legislature as pure as possible, by
shutting the door against appointments of its own members to offices,
which was one source of its corruption.
M^r Mason.[104] The motion of my colleague is but a partial remedy for
the evil. He appealed to him as a witness of the shameful partiality of
the Legislature of Virginia to its own members. He enlarged on the
abuses & corruption in the British Parliament, connected with the
appointment of its members. He c^d not suppose that a sufficient number
of Citizens could not be found who would be ready, without the
inducement of eligibility to offices, to undertake the Legislative
service. Genius & virtue it may be said, ought to be encouraged. Genius,
for aught he knew, might, but that virtue should be encouraged by such a
species of venality, was an idea, that at least had the merit of being
new.
[104] Yates gives Mason's speech more fully and a speech by
Madison omitted here:
"Mr. Mason. I differ from my colleague in his proposed
amendment. Let me state the practice in the state where we
came from. There, all officers are appointed by the
legislature. Need I add, that many of their appointments are
most shameful. Nor will the check proposed by this amendment
be sufficient. It will soon cease to be any check at all. It
is asserted that it will be very difficult to find men
sufficiently qualified as legislators without the inducement
of emolument. I do believe that men of genius will be
deterred unless possessed of great virtues. We may well
dispense with the first characters when destitute of
virtue--I should wish them never to come forward--But if we
do not provide against corruption, our government will soon
be at an end; nor would I wish to put a man of virtue in the
way of temptation. Evasions and caballing would evade the
amendment. Nor would the danger be less, if the executive
has the appointment of officers. The first three or four
years we might go on well enough; but what would be the case
afterwards? I will add, that such a government ought to be
refused by the people--and it will be refused.
"Mr. Madison. My wish is that the national legislature be as
uncorrupt as possible. I believe all public bodies are
inclined, from various motives, to support its members; but
it is not always done from the base motives of venality.
Friendship, and a knowledge of the abilities of those with
whom they associate, may produce it. If you bar the door
against such attachments, you deprive the government of its
greatest strength and support. Can you always rely on the
patriotism of the members? If this be the only inducement,
you will find a great indifferency in filling your
legislative body. If we expect to call forth useful
characters, we must hold out allurements; nor can any great
inconveniency arise from such inducements. The legislative
body must be the road to public honor; and the advantage
will be greater to adopt my motion, than any possible
inconvenience."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 158.
M^r King remarked that we were refining too much in this business; and
that the idea of preventing intrigue and solicitation of offices was
chimerical. You say that no member shall himself be eligible to any
office. Will this restrain him from availing himself of the same means
which would gain appointments for himself, to gain them for his son, his
brother, or any other object of his partiality. We were losing therefore
the advantages on one side, without avoiding the evils on the other.
M^r Wilson supported the motion. The proper cure he said for corruption
in the Legislature was to take from it the power of appointing to
offices. One branch of corruption would indeed remain, that of creating
unnecessary offices, or granting unnecessary salaries, and for that the
amendment would be a proper remedy. He animadverted on the impropriety
of stigmatizing with the name of venality the laudable ambition of
rising into the honorable offices of the Government; an ambition most
likely to be felt in the early & most incorrupt period of life, & which
all wise & free Gov^{ts} had deemed it sound policy, to cherish, not to
check. The members of the Legislature have perhaps the hardest & least
profitable task of any who engage in the service of the state. Ought
this merit to be made a disqualification?
M^r Sherman observed that the motion did not go far enough. It might be
evaded by the creation of a new office, the translation to it of a
person from another office, and the appointment of a member of the
Legislature to the latter. A new Embassy might be established to a new
Court, & an ambassador taken from another, in order to _create_ a
vacancy for a favorite member. He admitted that inconveniences lay on
both sides. He hoped there w^d be sufficient inducements to the public
service without resorting to the prospect of desirable offices, and on
the whole was rather ag^{st} the motion of M^r Madison.
M^r Gerry thought there was great weight in the objection of M^r
Sherman. He added as another objection ag^{st} admitting the eligibility
of members in any case that it would produce intrigues of ambitious men
for displacing proper officers, in order to create vacancies for
themselves.[105] In answer to M^r King he observed that although
members, if disqualified themselves might still intrigue & cabal for
their sons, brothers &c., yet as their own interests would be dearer to
them, than those of their nearest connections, it might be expected they
would go greater lengths to promote it.
[105] Yates gives Gerry's remarks:
"This amendment is of great weight, and its consequences
ought to be well considered. At the beginning of the war, we
possessed more than Roman virtue. It appears to me it is now
the reverse. We have more land and stock-jobbers than any
place on earth. It appears to me that we have constantly
endeavored to keep distinct the three great branches of
government; but if we agree to this motion, it must be
destroyed by admitting the legislators to share in the
executive, or to be too much influenced by the executive, in
looking up to them for offices."--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 160.
M^r Madison had been led to this motion as a middle ground between an
eligibility in all cases, and an absolute disqualification. He admitted
the probable abuses of an eligibility of the members, to offices
particularly within the gift of the Legislature. He had witnessed the
partiality of such bodies to their own members, as had been remarked of
the Virginia Assembly by his colleague (Col. Mason). He appealed however
to him, in turn to vouch another fact not less notorious in Virginia,
that the backwardness of the best citizens to engage in the Legislative
service gave but too great success to unfit characters. The question was
not to be viewed on one side only. The advantages & disadvantages on
both ought to be fairly compared. The objects to be aimed at were to
fill all offices with the fittest characters, & to draw the wisest &
most worthy citizens into the Legislative service. If on one hand,
public bodies were partial to their own members; on the other they were
as apt to be misled by taking characters on report, or the authority of
patrons and dependents.
All who had been concerned in the appointment of strangers on those
recommendations must be sensible of this truth. Nor w^d the partialities
of such Bodies be obviated by disqualifying their own members.
Candidates for office would hover round the seat of Gov^t or be found
among the residents there, and practise all the means of counting the
favor of the members. A great proportion of the appointments made by the
States were evidently brought about in this way. In the General Gov^t
the evil must be still greater, the characters of distant states, being
much less known throughout the U. States than those of the distant parts
of the same State. The elections by Congress had generally turned on men
living at the seat of the fed^l Gov^t or in its neighbourhood.--As to
the next object, the impulse to the Legislative service, was evinced by
experience to be in general too feeble with those best qualified for it.
This inconveniency w^d also be more felt in the Nat^l Gov^t than in the
State Gov^{ts} as the Sacrifices req^d from the distant members, w^d be
much greater, and the pecuniary provisions, probably, more
disproportionate. It w^d therefore be impolitic to add fresh objections
to the Legislative service by an absolute disqualification of its
members. The point in question was whether this would be an objection
with the most capable citizens. Arguing from experience he concluded
that it would. The Legislature of Virg^a would probably have been
without many of its best members, if in that situation, they had been
ineligible to Cong^s to the Gov^t & other honorable offices of the
State.
M^r Butler thought Characters fit for office w^d never be unknown.
Col. Mason. If the members of the Legislature are disqualified, still
the honors of the State will induce those who aspire to them to enter
that service, as the field in which they can best display & improve
their talents, & lay the train for their subsequent advancement.
M^r Jenifer remarked that in Maryland, the Senators chosen for five
years, c^d hold no other office & that this circumstance gained them the
greatest confidence of the people.
On the question for agreeing to the motion of M^r Madison,
Mass^{ts} div^d. C^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Sherman mov^d to insert the words "and incapable of holding" after
the words "eligible to offices" w^{ch} was agreed to without opposition.
The word "established" & the words "Nat^l Gov^t" were struck out of the
Resolution 3^d.
M^r Spaight called for a division of the question, in consequence of
which it was so put, as that it turned in the first member of it, "on
the ineligibility of members _during the term for which they were
elected_"--whereon the States were,
Mass^{ts} div^d. C^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On the 2^d member of the sentence extending ineligibility of members to
one year after the term for which they were elected Col. Mason thought
this essential to guard ag^{st} evasions by resignations, and
stipulations for office to be filled at the expiration of the
legislative term. M^r Gerry, had known such a case. M^r Hamilton.
Evasions c^d not be prevented--as by proxies--by friends holding for a
year, & then opening the way &c. M^r Rutlidge admitted the possibility
of evasions, but was for contracting them as possible.
Mass. no. C^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a div^d. Del. ay.
Mar^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Adj^d.