Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. div^d. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
M^r Ghorum moved to strike out the last member of the 3 Resol:
concerning ineligibility of members of the 1^{st} branch to office
during the term of their membership & for one year after. He considered
it as unnecessary & injurious. It was true abuses had been displayed in
G. B. but no one c^d say how far they might have contributed to preserve
the due influence of the Gov^t nor what might have ensued in case the
contrary theory had been tried.
M^r Butler opposed it. This precaution ag^{st} intrigue was necessary.
He appealed to the example of G. B. where men got into Parl^t that they
might get offices for themselves or their friends. This was the source
of the corruption that ruined their Gov^t.
M^r King, thought we were refining too much. Such a restriction on the
members would discourage merit. It would also give a pretext to the
Executive for bad appointments, as he might always plead this as a bar
to the choice he wished to have made.
M^r Wilson was ag^{st} fettering elections, and discouraging merit. He
suggested also the fatal consequence in time of war, of rendering
perhaps the best Commanders ineligible; appealing to our situation
during the late war, and indirectly leading to a recollection of the
appointment of the Co[~m]ander in Chief out of Congress.[101]
[101] According to Yates, Madison followed Wilson:
"Mr. Madison. Some gentlemen give too much weight and others
too little to this subject. If you have no exclusive clause,
there may be danger of creating offices or augmenting the
stipends of those already created, in order to gratify some
members if they were not excluded. Such an instance has
fallen within my own observation. I am therefore of opinion,
that no office ought to be open to a member, which may be
created or augmented while he is in the
legislature."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 155. Yates
gives the rest of the debate as follows:
"Mr. Mason. It seems as if it was taken for granted,
that all offices will be filled by the executive,
while I think many will remain in the gift of the
legislature. In either case, it is necessary to shut
the door against corruption. If otherwise, they may
make or multiply offices, in order to fill them. Are
gentlemen in earnest when they suppose that this
exclusion will prevent the first characters from
coming forward? Are we not struck at seeing the
luxury and venality which has already crept in among
us? If not checked we shall have ambassadors to
every petty state in Europe--the little republic of
_St. Marino_ not excepted. We must in the present
system remove the temptation. I admire many parts of
the British constitution and government, but I
detest their corruption.--Why has the power of the
crown so remarkably increased the last century? A
stranger, by reading their laws, would suppose it
considerably diminished; and yet, by the sole power
of appointing the increased officers of government,
corruption pervades every town and village in the
kingdom. If such a restriction should abridge the
right of election, it is still necessary, as it will
prevent the people from ruining themselves; and will
not the same causes here produce the same effects? I
consider this clause as the corner-stone on which
our liberties depend--and if we strike it out we are
erecting a fabric for our destruction.
"Mr. Gorham. The corruption of the English
government cannot be applied to America. This evil
exists there in the venality of their boroughs; but
even this corruption has its advantage, as it gives
stability to their government. We do not know what
the effect would be if members of parliament were
excluded from offices. The great bulwark of our
liberty is the frequency of elections, and the great
danger is the septennial parliaments.
"Mr. Hamilton. In all general questions which become
the subjects of discussion, there are always some
truths mixed with falsehoods. I confess there is
danger where men are capable of holding two offices.
Take mankind in general, they are vicious--their
passions may be operated upon. We have been taught
to reprobate the danger of influence in the British
government, without duly reflecting how far it was
necessary to support a good government. We have
taken up many ideas on trust, and at last, pleased
with their own opinions, establish them as undoubted
truths. Hume's opinion of the British constitution
confirms the remark, that there is always a body of
firm patriots, who often shake a corrupt
administration. Take mankind as they are, and what
are they governed by? Their passions. There may be
in every government a few choice spirits, who may
act from more worthy motives. One great error is
that we suppose mankind more honest than they are.
Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest;
and it will ever be the duty of a wise government to
avail itself of those passions, in order to make
them subservient to the public good--for these ever
induce us to action. Perhaps a few men in a state,
may, from patriotic motives, or to display their
talents, or to reap the advantage of public
applause, step forward; but if we adopt the clause,
we destroy the motive. I am therefore against all
exclusions and refinements, except only in this
case; that when a member takes his seat, he should
vacate every other office. It is difficult to put
any exclusive regulation into effect. We must in
some degree submit to the inconvenience."--Yates,
_Secret Proceedings_, etc., 155, 156.
Col. Mason was for shutting the door at all events ag^{st} corruption.
He enlarged on the venality and abuses in this particular in G. Britain:
and alluded to the multiplicity of foreign Embassies by Cong^s. The
disqualification he regarded as a corner stone in the fabric.
Col. Hamilton, there are inconveniences on both sides. We must take man
as we find him, and if we expect him to serve the public must interest
his passions in doing so. A reliance on pure patriotism had been the
source of many of our errors. He thought the remark of M^r Ghorum a just
one. It was impossible to say what w^d be the effect in G. B. of such a
reform as had been urged. It was known that one of the ablest
politicians (M^r Hume) had pronounced all that influence on the side of
the crown, which went under the name of corruption, an essential part of
the weight which maintained the equilibrium of the Constitution.