On the question for inserting the words, "and fixt"

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.

M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

Doc^r Franklyn said he approved of the amendment just made for rendering

the salaries as fixed as possible; but disliked the word "_liberal_." He

would prefer the word moderate if it was necessary to substitute any

other. He remarked the tendency of abuses in every case, to grow of

themselves when once begun, and related very pleasantly the progression

in ecclesiastical benefices, from the first departure from the

gratuitous provision for the Apostles, to the establishment of the papal

system. The word "liberal" was struck out nem con.

On the motion of M^r Pierce, that the wages should be paid out of the

National Treasury,

Mass^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.

M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. G. ay.

Question on the clause relating to term of service & compensation of

1^{st} branch,

Mass^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.

M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On a question for striking out the "_ineligibility_ of members of the

Nat^l Legis: to _State offices_,"

Mass^{ts} div^d. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no.

M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On the question for agreeing to the clause as amended,

Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.

M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On a question for making members of the Nat^l Legislature _ineligible_

to any office under the Nat^l Gov^t for the term of 3 years after

ceasing to be members,

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no.

M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the question for such ineligibility for one year,

Mass^{ts} ay. C^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.

M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On question moved by Mr. Pinckney, for striking out "incapable of

re-election into 1^{st} branch of the Nat^l Legisl. for ---- years, and

subject to recall" ag^d to nem. con.

On question for striking out from the Resol: 5 the words requiring

members of the Senatorial branch to be of the age of ---- years at least

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no.

M^d no. V^a no. N. C. div^d. S. C. no. Geo. div^d.

On the question for filling the blank with 30 years as the

qualification; it was agreed to,

Mass^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.

M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

M^r Spaight moved to fill the blank for the duration of the

appointm^{ts} to the 2^d branch of the National Legislature with the

words "7 years."

M^r Sherman, thought 7 years too long. He grounded his opposition he

said on the principle that if they did their duty well, they would be

reelected. And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be

allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred 5 years which w^d be

between the terms of the 1^{st} branch & of the executive.

M^r Pierce proposed 3 years. 7 years would raise an alarm. Great

mischiefs had arisen in England from their septennial Act which was

reprobated by most of their patriotic Statesmen.

M^r Randolph was for the term of 7 years. The democratic licentiousness

of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The

object of this 2^d branch is to controul the democratic branch of the

Nat^l Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch being

more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm

it. The Senate of Maryland constituted on like principles had been

scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be

apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some

measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness

& independence may be the more necessary also in this branch, as it

ought to guard the Constitution ag^{st} encroachments of the Executive

who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular

branch.

M^r Madison, considered 7 years as a term by no means too long. What we

wished was to give to the Gov^t that stability which was every where

called for, and which the Enemies of the Republican form alledged to be

inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much

stability by the term of Seven years. His fear was that the popular

branch would still be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much

lamented that we had so little direct experience to guide us. The

Constitution of Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy to this

part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Mary^d created just

suspicions of danger from it. In some instances perhaps it may have

erred by yielding to the H. of Delegates. In every instance of their

opposition to the measures of the H. of D. they had had with them the

suffrages of the most enlightened and impartial people of the other

States as well as of their own. In the States where the Senates, were

chosen in the same manner as the other branches, of the Legislature, and

held their seats for 4 years, the institution was found to be no check

whatever ag^{st} the instabilities of the other branches. He conceived

it to be of great importance that a stable & firm Gov^t, organized in

the republican form should be held out to the people. If this be not

done, and the people be left to judge of this species of Gov^t by y^e

operations of the defective systems under which they now live, it is

much to be feared the time is not distant when, in universal disgust,

they will renounce the blessing which they have purchased at so dear a

rate, and be ready for any change that may be proposed to them.

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1 · 第 44 / 114 题