In 1895 and in 1698 a scholar, K'ang Yo-wei, who was admitted into the

presence of the emperor, submitted to him memoranda in which he called

for radical reform. K'ang was a scholar who belonged to the empiricist

school of philosophy of the early Manchu period, the so-called Han

school. He was a man of strong and persuasive personality, and had such

an influence on the emperor that in 1898 the emperor issued several

edicts ordering the fundamental reorganization of education, law, trade,

communications, and the army. These laws were not at all bad in

themselves; they would have paved the way for a liberalization of

Chinese society. But they aroused the utmost hatred in the conservative

gentry and also in the moderate reformers among the gentry. K'ang Yo-wei

and his followers, to whom a number of well-known modern scholars

belonged, had strong support in South China. We have already mentioned

that owing to the increased penetration of European goods and ideas,

South China had become more progressive than the north; this had added

to the tension already existing for other reasons between north and

south. In foreign policy the north was more favourable to Russia and

radically opposed to Japan and Great Britain; the south was in favour of

co-operation with Britain and Japan, in order to learn from those two

states how reform could be carried through. In the north the men of the

south were suspected of being anti-Manchu and revolutionary in feeling.

This was to some extent true, though K'ang Yo-wei and his friends were

as yet largely unconscious of it.

When the empress Tz[)u] Hsi saw that the emperor was actually thinking

about reforms, she went to work with lightning speed. Very soon the

reformers had to flee; those who failed to make good their escape were

arrested and executed. The emperor was made a prisoner in a palace near

Peking, and remained a captive until his death; the empress resumed her

regency on his behalf. The period of reforms lasted only for a few

months of 1898. A leading part in the extermination of the reformers was

played by troops from Kansu under the command of a Mohammedan, Tung

Fu-hsiang. General Yüan Shih-k'ai, who was then stationed at Tientsin in

command of 7,000 troops with modern equipment, the only ones in China,

could have removed the empress and protected the reformers; but he was

already pursuing a personal policy, and thought it safer to give the

reformers no help.

There now began, from 1898, a thoroughly reactionary rule of the dowager

empress. But China's general situation permitted no breathing-space. In

1900 came the so-called Boxer Rising, a new popular movement against the

gentry and the Manchus similar to the many that had preceded it. The

Peking government succeeded, however, in negotiations that brought the

movement into the service of the government and directed it against the

foreigners. This removed the danger to the government and at the same

time helped it against the hated foreigners. But incidents resulted

which the Peking government had not anticipated. An international army

was sent to China, and marched from Tientsin against Peking, to liberate

the besieged European legations and to punish the government. The

Europeans captured Peking (1900); the dowager empress and her prisoner,

the emperor, had to flee; some of the palaces were looted. The peace

treaty that followed exacted further concessions from China to the

Europeans and enormous war indemnities, the payment of which continued

into the 1940's, though most of the states placed the money at China's

disposal for educational purposes. When in 1902 the dowager empress

returned to Peking and put the emperor back into his palace-prison, she

was forced by what had happened to realize that at all events a certain

measure of reform was necessary. The reforms, however, which she

decreed, mainly in 1904, were very modest and were never fully carried

out. They were only intended to make an impression on the outer world

and to appease the continually growing body of supporters of the reform

party, especially numerous in South China. The south remained,

nevertheless, a focus of hostility to the Manchus. After his failure in

1898, K'ang Yo-wei went to Europe, and no longer played any important

political part. His place was soon taken by a young Chinese physician

who had been living abroad, Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), who turned the

reform party into a middle-class revolutionary party.

12 _End of the dynasty_

Meanwhile the dowager empress held her own. General Yüan Shih-k'ai, who

had played so dubious a part in 1898, was not impeccably loyal to her,

and remained unreliable. He was beyond challenge the strongest man in

the country, for he possessed the only modern army; but he was still

biding his time.

In 1908 the dowager empress fell ill; she was seventy-four years old.

When she felt that her end was near, she seems to have had the captive

emperor Tê Tsung assassinated (at 5 p.m. on November 14th); she herself

died next day (November 15th, 2 p.m.): she was evidently determined that

this man, whom she had ill-treated and oppressed all his life, should

not regain independence. As Tê Tsung had no children, she nominated on

the day of her death the two-year-old prince P'u Yi as emperor (reign

name Hsüan-t'ung, 1909-1911).

The fact that another child was to reign and a new regency to act for

him, together with all the failures in home and foreign policy, brought

further strength to the revolutionary party. The government believed

that it could only maintain itself if it allowed Yüan Shih-k'ai, the

commander of the modern troops, to come to power. The chief regent,

however, worked against Yüan Shih-k'ai and dismissed him at the

beginning of 1909; Yüan's supporters remained at their posts. Yüan

himself now entered into relations with the revolutionaries, whose

centre was Canton, and whose undisputed leader was now Sun Yat-sen. At

this time Sun and his supporters had already made attempts at

revolution, but without success, as his following was as yet too small.

It consisted mainly of young intellectuals who had been educated in

Europe and America; the great mass of the Chinese people remained

unconvinced: the common people could not understand the new ideals, and

the middle class did not entirely trust the young intellectuals.

The state of China in 1911 was as lamentable as could be: the European

states, Russia, America, and Japan regarded China as a field for their

own plans, and in their calculations paid scarcely any attention to the

Chinese government. Foreign capital was penetrating everywhere in the

form of loans or railway and other enterprises. If it had not been for

the mutual rivalries of the powers, China would long ago have been

annexed by one of them. The government needed a great deal of money for

the payment of the war indemnities, and for carrying out the few reforms

at last decided on. In order to get money from the provinces, it had to

permit the viceroys even more freedom than they already possessed. The

result was a spectacle altogether resembling that of the end of the

T'ang dynasty, about A.D. 900: the various governors were trying to make

themselves independent. In addition to this there was the revolutionary

movement in the south.

The government made some concession to the progressives, by providing

the first beginnings of parliamentary rule. In 1910 a national assembly

was convoked. It had a Lower House with representatives of the provinces

(provincial diets were also set up), and an Upper House, in which sat

representatives of the imperial house, the nobility, the gentry, and

also the protectorates. The members of the Upper House were all

nominated by the regent. It very soon proved that the members of the

Lower House, mainly representatives of the provincial gentry, had a much

more practical outlook than the routineers of Peking. Thus the Lower

House grew in importance, a fact which, of course, brought grist to the

mills of the revolutionary movement.

In 1910 the first risings directed actually against the regency took

place, in the province of Hunan. In 1911 the "railway disturbances"

broke out in western China as a reply of the railway shareholders in the

province of Szechwan to the government decree of nationalization of all

the railways. The modernist students, most of whom were sons of

merchants who owned railway shares, supported the movement, and the

government was unable to control them. At the same time a great

anti-Manchu revolution began in Wuch'ang, one of the cities of which

Wuhan, on the Yangtze, now consists. The revolution was the result of

government action against a group of terrorists. Its leader was an

officer named Li Yüan-hung. The Manchus soon had some success in this

quarter, but the other provincial governors now rose in rapid

succession, repudiated the Manchus, and declared themselves independent.

Most of the Manchu garrisons in the provinces were murdered. The

governors remained at the head of their troops in their provinces, and

for the moment made common cause with the revolutionaries, from whom

they meant to break free at the first opportunity. The Manchus

themselves failed at first to realize the gravity of the revolutionary

movement; they then fell into panic-stricken desperation. As a last

resource, Yüan Shih-k'ai was recalled (November 10th, 1911) and made

prime minister.

Yüan's excellent troops were loyal to his person, and he could have made

use of them in fighting on behalf of the dynasty. But a victory would

have brought no personal gain to him; for his personal plans he

considered that the anti-Manchu side provided the springboard he needed.

The revolutionaries, for their part, had no choice but to win over Yüan

Shih-k'ai for the sake of his troops, since they were not themselves

strong enough to get rid of the Manchus, or even to wrest concessions

from them, so long as the Manchus were defended by Yüan's army. Thus

Yüan and the revolutionaries were forced into each other's arms. He then

began negotiations with them, explaining to the imperial house that the

dynasty could only be saved by concessions. The revolutionaries--apart

from their desire to neutralize the prime minister and general, if not

to bring him over to their side--were also readier than ever to

negotiate, because they were short of money and unable to obtain loans

from abroad, and because they could not themselves gain control of the

individual governors. The negotiations, which had been carried on at

Shanghai, were broken off on December 18th, 1911, because the

revolutionaries demanded a republic, but the imperial house was only

ready to grant a constitutional monarchy.

Meanwhile the revolutionaries set up a provisional government at

Nanking (December 29th, 1911), with Sun Yat-sen as president and Li

Yüan-hung as vice-president. Yüan Shih-k'ai now declared to the imperial

house that the monarchy could no longer be defended, as his troops were

too unreliable, and he induced the Manchu government to issue an edict

on February 12th, 1912, in which they renounced the throne of China and

declared the Republic to be the constitutional form of state. The young

emperor of the Hsüan-t'ung period, after the Japanese conquest of

Manchuria in 1931, was installed there. He was, however, entirely

without power during the melancholy years of his nominal rule, which

lasted until 1945.

In 1912 the Manchu dynasty came in reality to its end. On the news of

the abdication of the imperial house, Sun Yat-sen resigned in Nanking,

and recommended Yüan Shih-k'ai as president.

Chapter Eleven

THE REPUBLIC (1912-1948)

1 _Social and intellectual position_

In order to understand the period that now followed, let us first

consider the social and intellectual position in China in the period

between 1911 and 1927. The Manchu dynasty was no longer there, nor were

there any remaining real supporters of the old dynasty. The gentry,

however, still existed. Alongside it was a still numerically small

middle class, with little political education or enlightenment.

The political interests of these two groups were obviously in conflict.

But after 1912 there had been big changes. The gentry were largely in a

process of decomposition. They still possessed the basis of their

existence, their land, but the land was falling in value, as there were

now other opportunities of capital investment, such as export-import,

shareholding in foreign enterprises, or industrial undertakings. It is

important to note, however, that there was not much fluid capital at

their disposal. In addition to this, cheaper rice and other foodstuffs

were streaming from abroad into China, bringing the prices for Chinese

foodstuffs down to the world market prices, another painful business

blow to the gentry. Silk had to meet the competition of Japanese silk

and especially of rayon; the Chinese silk was of very unequal quality

and sold with difficulty. On the other hand, through the influence of

the Western capitalistic system, which was penetrating more and more

into China, land itself became "capital", an object of speculation for

people with capital; its value no longer depended entirely on the rents

it could yield but, under certain circumstances, on quite other

things--the construction of railways or public buildings, and so on.

These changes impoverished and demoralized the gentry, who in the course

of the past century had grown fewer in number. The gentry were not in a

position to take part fully in the capitalist manipulations, because

they had never possessed much capital; their wealth had lain entirely

in their land, and the income from their rents was consumed quite

unproductively in luxurious living.

Moreover, the class solidarity of the gentry was dissolving. In the

past, politics had been carried on by cliques of gentry families, with

the emperor at their head as an unchangeable institution. This edifice

had now lost its summit; the struggles between cliques still went on,

but entirely without the control which the emperor's power had after all

exercised, as a sort of regulative element in the play of forces among

the gentry. The arena for this competition had been the court. After the

destruction of the arena, the field of play lost its boundaries: the

struggles between cliques no longer had a definite objective; the only

objective left was the maintenance or securing of any and every hold on

power. Under the new conditions cliques or individuals among the gentry

could only ally themselves with the possessors of military power, the

generals or governors. In this last stage the struggle between rival

groups turned into a rivalry between individuals. Family ties began to

weaken and other ties, such as between school mates, or origin from the

same village or town, became more important than they had been before.

For the securing of the aim in view any means were considered

justifiable. Never was there such bribery and corruption among the

officials as in the years after 1912. This period, until 1927, may

therefore be described as a period of dissolution and destruction of the

social system of the gentry.

Over against this dying class of the gentry stood, broadly speaking, a

tripartite opposition. To begin with, there was the new middle class,

divided and without clear political ideas; anti-dynastic of course, but

undecided especially as to the attitude it should adopt towards the

peasants who, to this day, form over 80 per cent of the Chinese

population. The middle class consisted mainly of traders and bankers,

whose aim was the introduction of Western capitalism in association with

foreign powers. There were also young students who were often the sons

of old gentry families and had been sent abroad for study with grants

given them by their friends and relatives in the government; or sons of

businessmen sent away by their fathers. These students not always

accepted the ideas of their fathers; they were influenced by the

ideologies of the West, Marxist or non-Marxist, and often created clubs

or groups in the University cities of Europe or the United States. Such

groups of people who had studied together or passed the exams together,

had already begun to play a role in politics in the nineteenth century.

Now, the influence of such organizations of usually informal character

increased. Against the returned students who often had difficulties in

adjustment, stood the students at Chinese Universities, especially the

National University in Peking (Peita). They represented people of the

same origin, but of the lower strata of the gentry or of business; they

were more nationalistic and politically active and often less influenced

by Western ideologies.

In the second place, there was a relatively very small genuine

proletariat, the product of the first activities of big capitalists in

China, found mainly in Shanghai. Thirdly and finally, there was a

gigantic peasantry, uninterested in politics and uneducated, but ready

to give unthinking allegiance to anyone who promised to make an end of

the intolerable conditions in the matter of rents and taxes, conditions

that were growing steadily worse with the decay of the gentry. These

peasants were thinking of popular risings on the pattern of all the

risings in the history of China--attacks on the towns and the killing of

the hated landowners, officials, and moneylenders, that is to say of the

gentry.

Such was the picture of the middle class and those who were ready to

support it, a group with widely divergent interests, held together only

by its opposition to the gentry system and the monarchy. It could not

but be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve political

success with such a group. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the "Father of the

Republic", accordingly laid down three stages of progress in his many

works, of which the best-known are _San-min chu-i_, ("The Three

Principles of the People"), and _Chien-kuo fang-lüeh_ ("Plans for the

Building up of the Realm"). The three phases of development through

which republican China was to pass were: the phase of struggle against

the old system, the phase of educative rule, and the phase of truly

democratic government. The phase of educative rule was to be a sort of

authoritarian system with a democratic content, under which the people

should be familiarized with democracy and enabled to grow politically

ripe for true democracy.

Difficult as was the internal situation from the social point of view,

it was no less difficult in economic respects. China had recognized that

she must at least adopt Western technical and industrial progress in

order to continue to exist as an independent state. But the building up

of industry demanded large sums of money. The existing Chinese banks

were quite incapable of providing the capital needed; but the acceptance

of capital from abroad led at once, every time, to further political

capitulations. The gentry, who had no cash worth mention, were violently

opposed to the capitalization of their properties, and were in favour of

continuing as far as possible to work the soil in the old style. Quite

apart from all this, all over the country there were generals who had

come from the ranks of the gentry, and who collected the whole of the

financial resources of their region for the support of their private

armies. Investors had little confidence in the republican government so

long as they could not tell whether the government would decide in

favour of its right or of its left wing.

No less complicated was the intellectual situation at this time.

Confucianism, and the whole of the old culture and morality bound up

with it, was unacceptable to the middle-class element. In the first

place, Confucianism rejected the principle, required at least in theory

by the middle class, of the equality of all people; secondly, the

Confucian great-family system was irreconcilable with middle-class

individualism, quite apart from the fact that the Confucian form of

state could only be a monarchy. Every attempt to bolster up Confucianism

in practice or theory was bound to fail and did fail. Even the gentry

could scarcely offer any real defence of the Confucian system any

longer. With Confucianism went the moral standards especially of the

upper classes of society. Taoism was out of the question as a

substitute, because of its anarchistic and egocentric character.

Consequently, in these years, part of the gentry turned to Buddhism and

part to Christianity. Some of the middle class who had come under

European influence also turned to Christianity, regarding it as a part

of the European civilization they had to adopt. Others adhered to modern

philosophic systems such as pragmatism and positivism. Marxist doctrines

spread rapidly.

Education was secularized. Great efforts were made to develop modern

schools, though the work of development was continually hindered by the

incessant political unrest. Only at the universities, which became foci

of republican and progressive opinion, was any positive achievement

possible. Many students and professors were active in politics,

organizing demonstrations and strikes. They pursued a strong national

policy, often also socialistic. At the same time real scientific work

was done; many young scholars of outstanding ability were trained at the

Chinese universities, often better than the students who went abroad.

There is a permanent disagreement between these two groups of young men

with a modern education: the students who return from abroad claim to be

better educated, but in reality they often have only a very superficial

knowledge of things modern and none at all of China, her history, and

her special circumstances. The students of the Chinese universities have

been much better instructed in all the things that concern China, and

most of them are in no way behind the returned students in the modern

sciences. They are therefore a much more serviceable element.

The intellectual modernization of China goes under the name of the

"Movement of May Fourth", because on May 4th, 1919, students of the

National University in Peking demonstrated against the government and

their pro-Japanese adherents. When the police attacked the students and

jailed some, more demonstrations and student strikes and finally a

general boycott of Japanese imports were the consequence. In these

protest actions, professors such as Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, later president of

the Academia Sinica (died 1940), took an active part. The forces which

had now been mobilized, rallied around the journal "New Youth" (_Hsin

Ch'ing-nien_), created in 1915 by Ch'en Tu-hsiu. The journal was

progressive, against the monarchy, Confucius, and the old traditions.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu who put himself strongly behind the students, was more

radical than other contributors but at first favoured Western democracy

and Western science; he was influenced mainly by John Dewey who was

guest professor in Peking in 1919-20. Similarly tending towards

liberalism in politics and Dewey's ideas in the field of philosophy were

others, mainly Hu Shih. Finally, some reformers criticized

conservatism purely on the basis of Chinese thought. Hu Shih (born

1892) gained greatest acclaim by his proposal for a "literary

revolution", published in the "New Youth" in 1917. This revolution was

the logically necessary application of the political revolution to the

field of education. The new "vernacular" took place of the old

"classical" literary language. The language of the classical works is so

remote from the language of daily life that no uneducated person can

understand it. A command of it requires a full knowledge of all the

ancient literature, entailing decades of study. The gentry had

elaborated this style of speech for themselves and their dependants; it

was their monopoly; nobody who did not belong to the gentry and had not

attended its schools could take part in literary or in administrative

life. The literary revolution introduced the language of daily life, the

language of the people, into literature: newspapers, novels, scientific

treatises, translations, appeared in the vernacular, and could thus be

understood by anyone who could read and write, even if he had no

Confucianist education.

It may be said that the literary revolution has achieved its main

objects. As a consequence of it, a great quantity of new literature has

been published. Not only is every important new book that appears in the

West published in translation within a few months, but modern novels and

short stories and poems have been written, some of them of high literary

value.

At the same time as this revolution there took place another fundamental

change in the language. It was necessary to take over a vast number of

new scientific and technical terms. As Chinese, owing to the character

of its script, is unable to write foreign words accurately and can do no

more than provide a rather rough paraphrase, the practice was started of

expressing new ideas by newly formed native words. Thus modern Chinese

has very few foreign words, and yet it has all the new ideas. For

example, a telegram is a "lightning-letter"; a wireless telegram is a

"not-have-wire-lightning-communication"; a fountain-pen is a

"self-flow-ink-water-brush"; a typewriter is a "strike-letter-machine".

Most of these neologisms are similar in the modern languages of China

and Japan.

There had been several proposals in recent decades to do away with the

Chinese characters and to introduce an alphabet in their place. They

have all proved to be unsatisfactory so far, because the character of

the Chinese language, as it is at this moment, is unsuited to an

alphabetical script. They would also destroy China's cultural unity:

there are many dialects in China that differ so greatly from each other

that, for instance, a man from Canton cannot understand a man from

Shanghai. If Chinese were written with letters, the result would be a

Canton literature and another literature confined to Shanghai, and China

would break up into a number of areas with different languages. The old

Chinese writing is independent of pronunciation. A Cantonese and a

Pekinger can read each other's newspapers without difficulty. They

pronounce the words quite differently, but the meaning is unaltered.

Even a Japanese can understand a Chinese newspaper without special study

of Chinese, and a Chinese with a little preparation can read a Japanese

newspaper without understanding a single word of Japanese.

The aim of modern education in China is to work towards the

establishment of "High Chinese", the former official (Mandarin)

language, throughout the country, and to set limits to the use of the

various dialects. Once this has been done, it will be possible to

proceed to a radical reform of the script without running the risk of

political separatist movements, which are always liable to spring up,

and also without leading, through the adoption of various dialects as

the basis of separate literatures, to the break-up of China's cultural

unity. In the last years, the unification of the spoken language has

made great progress. Yet, alphabetic script is used only in cases in

which illiterate adults have to be enabled in a short time to read very

simple informations. More attention is given to a simplification of the

script as it is; Japanese had started this some forty years earlier.

Unfortunately, the new Chinese abbreviated forms of characters are not

always identical with long-established Japanese forms, and are not

developed in such a systematic form as would make learning of Chinese

characters easier.

2 _First period of the Republic: The warlords_

The situation of the Republic after its foundation was far from hopeful.

Republican feeling existed only among the very small groups of students

who had modern education, and a few traders, in other words, among the

"middle class". And even in the revolutionary party to which these

groups belonged there were the most various conceptions of the form of

republican state to be aimed at. The left wing of the party, mainly

intellectuals and manual workers, had in view more or less vague

socialistic institutions; the liberals, for instance the traders,

thought of a liberal democracy, more or less on the American pattern;

and the nationalists merely wanted the removal of the alien Manchu rule.

The three groups had come together for the practical reason that only so

could they get rid of the dynasty. They gave unreserved allegiance to

Sun Yat-sen as their leader. He succeeded in mobilizing the enthusiasm

of continually widening circles for action, not only by the integrity of

his aims but also because he was able to present the new socialistic

ideology in an alluring form. The anti-republican gentry, however, whose

power was not yet entirely broken, took a stand against the party. The

generals who had gone over to the republicans had not the slightest

intention of founding a republic, but only wanted to get rid of the rule

of the Manchus and to step into their place. This was true also of Yüan

Shih-k'ai, who in his heart was entirely on the side of the gentry,

although the European press especially had always energetically defended

him. In character and capacity he stood far above the other generals,

but he was no republican.

Thus the first period of the Republic, until 1927, was marked by

incessant attempts by individual generals to make themselves

independent. The Government could not depend on its soldiers, and so was

impotent. The first risings of military units began at the outset of

1912. The governors and generals who wanted to make themselves

independent sabotaged every decree of the central government; especially

they sent it no money from the provinces and also refused to give their

assent to foreign loans. The province of Canton, the actual birthplace

of the republican movement and the focus of radicalism, declared itself

in 1912 an independent republic.

Within the Peking government matters soon came to a climax. Yüan

Shih-k'ai and his supporters represented the conservative view, with the

unexpressed but obvious aim of setting up a new imperial house and

continuing the old gentry system. Most of the members of the parliament

came, however, from the middle class and were opposed to any reaction of

this sort. One of their leaders was murdered, and the blame was thrown

upon Yüan Shih-k'ai; there then came, in the middle of 1912, a new

revolution, in which the radicals made themselves independent and tried

to gain control of South China. But Yüan Shih-k'ai commanded better

troops and won the day. At the end of October 1912 he was elected,

against the opposition, as president of China, and the new state was

recognized by foreign countries.

China's internal difficulties reacted on the border states, in which the

European powers were keenly interested. The powers considered that the

time had come to begin the definitive partition of China. Thus there

were long negotiations and also hostilities between China and Tibet,

which was supported by Great Britain. The British demanded the complete

separation of Tibet from China, but the Chinese rejected this (1912);

the rejection was supported by a boycott of British goods. In the end

the Tibet question was left undecided. Tibet remained until recent years

a Chinese dependency with a good deal of internal freedom. The Second

World War and the Chinese retreat into the interior brought many Chinese

settlers into Eastern Tibet which was then separated from Tibet proper

and made a Chinese province (Hsi-k'ang) in which the native Khamba will

soon be a minority. The communist regime soon after its establishment

conquered Tibet (1950) and has tried to change the character of its

society and its system of government which lead to the unsuccessful

attempt of the Tibetans to throw off Chinese rule (1959) and the flight

of the Dalai Lama to India. The construction of highways, air and

missile bases and military occupation have thus tied Tibet closer to

China than ever since early Manchu times.

In Outer Mongolia Russian interests predominated. In 1911 there were

diplomatic incidents in connection with the Mongolian question. At the

end of 1911 the Hutuktu of Urga declared himself independent, and the

Chinese were expelled from the country. A secret treaty was concluded in

1912 with Russia, under which Russia recognized the independence of

Outer Mongolia, but was accorded an important part as adviser and helper

in the development of the country. In 1913 a Russo-Chinese treaty was

concluded, under which the autonomy of Outer Mongolia was recognized,

but Mongolia became a part of the Chinese realm. After the Russian

revolution had begun, revolution was carried also into Mongolia. The

country suffered all the horrors of the struggles between White Russians

(General Ungern-Sternberg) and the Reds; there were also Chinese

attempts at intervention, though without success, until in the end

Mongolia became a Soviet Republic. As such she is closely associated

with Soviet Russia. China, however, did not quickly recognize Mongolia's

independence, and in his work _China's Destiny_ (1944) Chiang Kai-shek

insisted that China's aim remained the recovery of the frontiers of

1840, which means among other things the recovery of Outer Mongolia. In

spite of this, after the Second World War Chiang Kai-shek had to

renounce _de jure_ all rights in Outer Mongolia. Inner Mongolia was

always united to China much more closely; only for a time during the war

with Japan did the Japanese maintain there a puppet government. The

disappearance of this government went almost unnoticed.

At the time when Russian penetration into Mongolia began, Japan had

entered upon a similar course in Manchuria, which she regarded as her

"sphere of influence". On the outbreak of the first world war Japan

occupied the former German-leased territory of Tsingtao, at the

extremity of the province of Shantung, and from that point she occupied

the railways of the province. Her plan was to make the whole province a

protectorate; Shantung is rich in coal and especially in metals. Japan's

plans were revealed in the notorious "Twenty-one Demands" (1915).

Against the furious opposition especially of the students of Peking,

Yüan Shih-k'ai's government accepted the greater part of these demands.

In negotiations with Great Britain, in which Japan took advantage of the

British commitments in Europe, Japan had to be conceded the predominant

position in the Far East.

Meanwhile Yüan Shih-k'ai had made all preparations for turning the

Republic once more into an empire, in which he would be emperor; the

empire was to be based once more on the gentry group. In 1914 he secured

an amendment of the Constitution under which the governing power was to

be entirely in the hands of the president; at the end of 1914 he secured

his appointment as president for life, and at the end of 1915 he induced

the parliament to resolve that he should become emperor.

This naturally aroused the resentment of the republicans, but it also

annoyed the generals belonging to the gentry, who had the same ambition.

Thus there were disturbances, especially in the south, where Sun Yat-sen

with his followers agitated for a democratic republic. The foreign

powers recognized that a divided China would be much easier to penetrate

and annex than a united China, and accordingly opposed Yüan Shih-k'ai.

Before he could ascend the throne, he died suddenly--and this

terminated the first attempt to re-establish monarchy.

Yüan was succeeded as president by Li Yüan-hung. Meanwhile five

provinces had declared themselves independent. Foreign pressure on China

steadily grew. She was forced to declare war on Germany, and though this

made no practical difference to the war, it enabled the European powers

to penetrate further into China. Difficulties grew to such an extent in

1917 that a dictatorship was set up and soon after came an interlude,

the recall of the Manchus and the reinstatement of the deposed emperor

(July 1st-8th, 1917).

This led to various risings of generals, each aiming simply at the

satisfaction of his thirst for personal power. Ultimately the victorious

group of generals, headed by Tuan Ch'i-jui, secured the election of Fêng

Kuo-chang in place of the retiring president. Fêng was succeeded at the

end of 1918 by Hsü Shih-ch'ang, who held office until 1922. Hsü, as a

former ward of the emperor, was a typical representative of the gentry,

and was opposed to all republican reforms.

The south held aloof from these northern governments. In Canton an

opposition government was set up, formed mainly of followers of Sun

Yat-sen; the Peking government was unable to remove the Canton

government. But the Peking government and its president scarcely counted

any longer even in the north. All that counted were the generals, the

most prominent of whom were: (1) Chang Tso-lin, who had control of

Manchuria and had made certain terms with Japan, but who was ultimately

murdered by the Japanese (1928); (2) Wu P'ei-fu, who held North China;

(3) the so-called "Christian general", Fêng Yü-hsiang, and (4) Ts'ao

K'un, who became president in 1923.

At the end of the first world war Japan had a hold over China amounting

almost to military control of the country. China did not sign the Treaty

of Versailles, because she considered that she had been duped by Japan,

since Japan had driven the Germans out of China but had not returned the

liberated territory to the Chinese. In 1921 peace was concluded with

Germany, the German privileges being abolished. The same applied to

Austria. Russia, immediately after the setting up of the Soviet

government, had renounced all her rights under the Capitulations. This

was the first step in the gradual rescinding of the Capitulations; the

last of them went only in 1943, as a consequence of the difficult

situation of the Europeans and Americans in the Pacific produced by the

Second World War.

At the end of the first world war the foreign powers revised their

attitude towards China. The idea of territorial partitioning of the

country was replaced by an attempt at financial exploitation; military

friction between the Western powers and Japan was in this way to be

minimized. Financial control was to be exercised by an international

banking consortium (1920). It was necessary for political reasons that

this committee should be joined by Japan. After her Twenty-one Demands,

however, Japan was hated throughout China. During the world war she had

given loans to the various governments and rebels, and in this way had

secured one privilege after another. Consequently China declined the

banking consortium. She tried to secure capital from her own resources;

but in the existing political situation and the acute economic

depression internal loans had no success.

In an agreement between the United States and Japan in 1917, the United

States, in consequence of the war, had to give their assent to special

rights for Japan in China. After the war the international conference at

Washington (November 1921-February 1922) tried to set narrower limits to

Japan's influence over China, and also to re-determine the relative

strength in the Pacific of the four great powers (America, Britain,

France, Japan). After the failure of the banking plan this was the last

means of preventing military conflicts between the powers in the Far

East. This brought some relief to China, as Japan had to yield for the

time to the pressure of the western powers.

The years that followed until 1927 were those of the complete collapse

of the political power of the Peking government--years of entire

dissolution. In the south Sun Yat-sen had been elected generalissimo in

1921. In 1924 he was re-elected with a mandate for a campaign against

the north. In 1924 there also met in Canton the first general congress

of the Kuomintang ("People's Party"). The Kuomintang (in 1929 it had

653,000 members, or roughly 0.15 per cent of the population) is the

continuation of the Komingtang ("Revolutionary Party") founded by Sun

Yat-sen, which as a middle-class party had worked for the removal of the

dynasty. The new Kuomintang was more socialistic, as is shown by its

admission of Communists and the stress laid upon land reform.

At the end of 1924 Sun Yat-sen with some of his followers went to

Peking, to discuss the possibility of a reunion between north and south

on the basis of the program of the People's Party. There, however, he

died at the beginning of 1925, before any definite results had been

attained; there was no prospect of achieving anything by the

negotiations, and the south broke them off. But the death of Sun Yat-sen

had been followed after a time by tension within the party between its

right and left wings. The southern government had invited a number of

Russian advisers in 1923 to assist in building up the administration,

civil and military, and on their advice the system of government had

been reorganized on lines similar to those of the soviet and commissar

system. This change had been advocated by an old friend of Sun Yat-sen,

Chiang Kai-shek, who later married Sun's sister-in-law. Chiang Kai-shek,

who was born in 1886, was the head of the military academy at Whampoa,

near Canton, where Russian instructors were at work. The new system was

approved by Sun Yat-sen's successor, Hu Han-min (who died in 1936), in

his capacity of party leader. It was opposed by the elements of the

right, who at first had little influence. Chiang Kai-shek soon became

one of the principal leaders of the south, as he had command of the

efficient troops of Canton, who had been organized by the Russians.

The People's Party of the south and its governments, at that time fairly

radical in politics, were disliked by the foreign powers; only Japan

supported them for a time, owing to the anti-British feeling of the

South Chinese and in order to further her purpose of maintaining

disunion in China. The first serious collision with the outer world came

on May 30th, 1925, when British soldiers shot at a crowd demonstrating

in Shanghai. This produced a widespread boycott of British goods in

Canton and in British Hong Kong, inflicting a great loss on British

trade with China and bringing considerable advantages in consequence to

Japanese trade and shipping: from the time of this boycott began the

Japanese grip on Chinese coastwise shipping.

The second party congress was held in Canton in 1926. Chiang Kai-shek

already played a prominent part. The People's Party, under Chiang

Kai-shek and with the support of the communists, began the great

campaign against the north. At first it had good success: the various

provincial governors and generals and the Peking government were played

off against each other, and in a short time one leader after another was

defeated. The Yangtze was reached, and in 1926 the southern government

moved to Hankow. All over the southern provinces there now came a

genuine rising of the masses of the people, mainly the result of

communist propaganda and of the government's promise to give land to the

peasants, to set limits to the big estates, and to bring order into the

taxation. In spite of its communist element, at the beginning of 1927

the southern government was essentially one of the middle class and the

peasantry, with a socialistic tendency.

3 _Second period of the Republic: Nationalist China_

With the continued success of the northern campaign, and with Chiang

Kai-shek's southern army at the gates of Shanghai (March 21st, 1927), a

decision had to be taken. Should the left wing be allowed to gain the

upper hand, and the great capitalists of Shanghai be expropriated as it

was proposed to expropriate the gentry? Or should the right wing

prevail, an alliance be concluded with the capitalists, and limits be

set to the expropriation of landed estates? Chiang Kai-shek, through his

marriage with Sun Yat-sen's wife's sister, had become allied with one of

the greatest banking families. In the days of the siege of Shanghai

Chiang, together with his closest colleagues (with the exception of Hu

Han-min and Wang Chying-wei, a leader who will be mentioned later),

decided on the second alternative. Shanghai came into his hands without

a struggle, and the capital of the Shanghai financiers, and soon foreign

capital as well, was placed at his disposal, so that he was able to pay

his troops and finance his administration. At the same time the Russian

advisers were dismissed or executed.

The decision arrived at by Chiang Kai-shek and his friends did not

remain unopposed, and he parted from the "left group" (1927) which

formed a rival government in Hankow, while Chiang Kai-shek made Nanking

the seat of his government (April 1927). In that year Chiang not only

concluded peace with the financiers and industrialists, but also a sort

of "armistice" with the landowning gentry. "Land reform" still stood on

the party program, but nothing was done, and in this way the confidence

and co-operation of large sections of the gentry was secured. The choice

of Nanking as the new capital pleased both the industrialists and the

agrarians: the great bulk of China's young industries lay in the Yangtze

region, and that region was still the principal one for agricultural

produce; the landowners of the region were also in a better position

with the great market of the capital in their neighbourhood.

Meanwhile the Nanking government had succeeded in carrying its dealings

with the northern generals to a point at which they were largely

out-manoeuvred and became ready for some sort of collaboration (1928).

There were now four supreme commanders--Chiang Kai-shek, Fêng Yü-hsiang

(the "Christian general"), Yen Hsi-shan, the governor of Shansi, and the

Muslim Li Chung-yen. Naturally this was not a permanent solution; not

only did Chiang Kai-shek's three rivals try to free themselves from his

ever-growing influence and to gain full power themselves, but various

groups under military leadership rose again and again, even in the home

of the Republic, Canton itself. These struggles, which were carried on

more by means of diplomacy and bribery than at arms, lasted until 1936.

Chiang Kai-shek, as by far the most skilful player in this game, and at

the same time the man who had the support of the foreign governments

and of the financiers of Shanghai, gained the victory. China became

unified under his dictatorship.

As early as 1928, when there seemed a possibility of uniting China, with

the exception of Manchuria, which was dominated by Japan, and when the

European powers began more and more to support Chiang Kai-shek, Japan

felt that her interests in North China were threatened, and landed

troops in Shantung. There was hard fighting on May 3rd, 1928. General

Chang Tso-lin, in Manchuria, who was allied to Japan, endeavoured to

secure a cessation of hostilities, but he fell victim to a Japanese

assassin; his place was taken by his son, Chang Hsüeh-liang, who pursued

an anti-Japanese policy. The Japanese recognized, however, that in view

of the international situation the time had not yet come for

intervention in North China. In 1929 they withdrew their troops and

concentrated instead on their plans for Manchuria.

Until the time of the "Manchurian incident" (1931), the Nanking

government steadily grew in strength. It gained the confidence of the

western powers, who proposed to make use of it in opposition to Japan's

policy of expansion in the Pacific sphere. On the strength of this

favourable situation in its foreign relations, the Nanking government

succeeded in getting rid of one after another of the Capitulations.

Above all, the administration of the "Maritime Customs", that is to say

of the collection of duties on imports and exports, was brought under

the control of the Chinese government: until then it had been under

foreign control. Now that China could act with more freedom in the

matter of tariffs, the government had greater financial resources, and

through this and other measures it became financially more independent

of the provinces. It succeeded in building up a small but modern army,

loyal to the government and superior to the still existing provincial

armies. This army gained its military experience in skirmishes with the

Communists and the remaining generals.

It is true that when in 1931 the Japanese occupied Manchuria, Nanking

was helpless, since Manchuria was only loosely associated with Nanking,

and its governor, Chang Hsüeh-liang, had tried to remain independent of

it. Thus Manchuria was lost almost without a blow. On the other hand,

the fighting with Japan that broke out soon afterwards in Shanghai

brought credit to the young Nanking army, though owing to its numerical

inferiority it was unsuccessful. China protested to the League of

Nations against its loss of Manchuria. The League sent a commission (the

Lytton Commission), which condemned Japan's action, but nothing further

happened, and China indignantly broke away from her association with the

Western powers (1932-1933). In view of the tense European situation

(the beginning of the Hitler era in Germany, and the Italian plans of

expansion), the Western powers did not want to fight Japan on China's

behalf, and without that nothing more could be done. They pursued,

indeed, a policy of playing off Japan against China, in order to keep

those two powers occupied with each other, and so to divert Japan from

Indo-China and the Pacific.

China had thus to be prepared for being involved one day in a great war

with Japan. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to postpone war as long as possible.

He wanted time to establish his power more thoroughly within the

country, and to strengthen his army. In regard to external relations,

the great powers would have to decide their attitude sooner or later.

America could not be expected to take up a clear attitude: she was for

peace and commerce, and she made greater profits out of her relations

with Japan than with China; she sent supplies to both (until 1941). On

the other hand, Britain and France were more and more turning away from

Japan, and Russo-Japanese relations were at all times tense. Japan tried

to emerge from her isolation by joining the "axis powers", Germany and

Italy (1936); but it was still doubtful whether the Western powers would

proceed with Russia, and therefore against Japan, or with the Axis, and

therefore in alliance with Japan.

Japan for her part considered that if she was to raise the standard of

living of her large population and to remain a world power, she must

bring into being her "Greater East Asia", so as to have the needed raw

material sources and export markets in the event of a collision with the

Western powers; in addition to this, she needed a security girdle as

extensive as possible in case of a conflict with Russia. In any case,

"Greater East Asia" must be secured before the European conflict should

break out.

4 _The Sino-Japanese war_ (1937-1945)

Accordingly, from 1933 onward Japan followed up her conquest of

Manchuria by bringing her influence to bear in Inner Mongolia and in

North China. She succeeded first, by means of an immense system of

smuggling, currency manipulation, and propaganda, in bringing a number

of Mongol princes over to her side, and then (at the end of 1935) in

establishing a semi-dependent government in North China. Chiang Kai-shek

took no action.

The signal for the outbreak of war was an "incident" by the Marco Polo

Bridge, south of Peking (July 7th, 1937). The Japanese government

profited by a quite unimportant incident, undoubtedly provoked by the

Japanese, in order to extend its dominion a little further. China still

hesitated; there were negotiations. Japan brought up reinforcements and

put forward demands which China could not be expected to be ready to

fulfil. Japan then occupied Peking and Tientsin and wide regions between

them and south of them. The Chinese soldiers stationed there withdrew

almost without striking a blow, but formed up again and began to offer

resistance. In order to facilitate the planned occupation of North

China, including the province of Shantung, Japan decided on a

diversionary campaign against Shanghai. The Nanking government sent its

best troops to the new front, and held it for nearly three months

against superior forces; but meanwhile the Japanese steadily advanced in

North China. On November 9th Nanking fell into their hands. By the

beginning of January 1938, the province of Shantung had also been

conquered.

Chiang Kai-shek and his government fled to Ch'ung-k'ing (Chungking), the

most important commercial and financial centre of the interior after

Hankow, which was soon threatened by the Japanese fleet. By means of a

number of landings the Japanese soon conquered the whole coast of China,

so cutting off all supplies to the country; against hard fighting in

some places they pushed inland along the railways and conquered the

whole eastern half of China, the richest and most highly developed part

of the country. Chiang Kai-shek had the support only of the

agriculturally rich province of Szechwan, and of the scarcely developed

provinces surrounding it. Here there was as yet no industry. Everything

in the way of machinery and supplies that could be transported from the

hastily dismantled factories was carried westward. Students and

professors went west with all the contents of their universities, and

worked on in small villages under very difficult conditions--one of the

most memorable achievements of this war for China. But all this was by

no means enough for waging a defensive war against Japan. Even the

famous Burma Road could not save China.

By 1940-1941 Japan had attained her war aim: China was no longer a

dangerous adversary. She was still able to engage in small-scale

fighting, but could no longer secure any decisive result. Puppet

governments were set up in Peking, Canton, and Nanking, and the Japanese

waited for these governments gradually to induce supporters of Chiang

Kai-shek to come over to their side. Most was expected of Wang

Ching-wei, who headed the new Nanking government. He was one of the

oldest followers of Sun Yat-sen, and was regarded as a democrat. In

1925, after Sun Yat-sen's death, he had been for a time the head of the

Nanking government, and for a short time in 1930 he had led a government

in Peking that was opposed to Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship. Beyond any

question Wang still had many followers, including some in the highest

circles at Chungking, men of eastern China who considered that

collaboration with Japan, especially in the economic field, offered good

prospects. Japan paid lip service to this policy: there was talk of

sister peoples, which could help each other and supply each other's

needs. There was propaganda for a new "Greater East Asian" philosophy,

_Wang-tao_, in accordance with which all the peoples of the East could

live together in peace under a thinly disguised dictatorship. What

actually happened was that everywhere Japanese capitalists established

themselves in the former Chinese industrial plants, bought up land and

securities, and exploited the country for the conduct of their war.

After the great initial successes of Hitlerite Germany in 1939-1941,

Japan became convinced that the time had come for a decisive blow

against the positions of the Western European powers and the United

States in the Far East. Lightning blows were struck at Hong Kong and

Singapore, at French Indo-China, and at the Netherlands East Indies. The

American navy seemed to have been eliminated by the attack on Pearl

Harbour, and one group of islands after another fell into the hands of

the Japanese. Japan was at the gates of India and Australia. Russia was

carrying on a desperate defensive struggle against the Axis, and there

was no reason to expect any intervention from her in the Far East.

Greater East Asia seemed assured against every danger.

The situation of Chiang Kai-shek's Chungking government seemed hopeless.

Even the Burma Road was cut, and supplies could only be sent by air;

there was shortage of everything. With immense energy small industries

were begun all over western China, often organized as co-operatives;

roads and railways were built--but with such resources would it ever be

possible to throw the Japanese into the sea? Everything depended on

holding out until a new page was turned in Europe. Infinitely slow

seemed the progress of the first gleams of hope--the steady front in

Burma, the reconquest of the first groups of inlands; the first bomb

attacks on Japan itself. Even in May, 1945, with the war ended in

Europe, there seemed no sign of its ending in the Far East. Then came

the atom bomb, bringing the collapse of Japan; the Japanese armies

receded from China, and suddenly China was free, mistress once more in

her own country as she had not been for decades.

Chapter Twelve

PRESENT-DAY CHINA

1 _The growth of communism_

In order to understand today's China, we have to go back in time to

report events which were cut short or left out of our earlier discussion

in order to present them in the context of this chapter.

Although socialism and communism had been known in China long ago, this

line of development of Western philosophy had interested Chinese

intellectuals much less than liberalistic, democratic Western ideas. It

was widely believed that communism had no real prospects for China, as a

dictatorship of the proletariat seemed to be relevant only in a highly

industrialized and not in an agrarian society. Thus, in its beginning

the "Movement of May Fourth" of 1919 had Western ideological traits but

was not communistic. This changed with the success of communism in

Russia and with the theoretical writings of Lenin. Here it was shown

that communist theories could be applied to a country similar to China

in its level of development. Already from 1919 on, some of the leaders

of the Movement turned towards communism: the National University of

Peking became the first centre of this movement, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, then

dean of the College of Letters, from 1920 on became one of its leaders.

Hu Shih did not move to the left with this group; he remained a liberal.

But another well-known writer, Lu Hsün (1881-1936), while following Hu

Shih in the "Literary Revolution," identified politically with Ch'en.

There was still another man, the Director of the University Library, Li

Ta-chao, who turned towards communism. With him we find one of his

employees in the Library, Mao Tse-tung. In fact, the nucleus of the

Communist Party, which was officially created as late as 1921, was a

student organization including some professors in Peking. On the other

hand, a student group in Paris had also learned about communism and had

organized; the leaders of this group were Chou En-lai and Li Li-san. A

little later, a third group organized in Germany; Chu Tê belonged to

this group. The leadership of Communist China since 1949 has been in the

hands of men of these three former student groups.

After 1920, Sun Yat-sen, too, became interested in the developments in

Soviet Russia. Yet, he never actually became a communist; his belief

that the soil should belong to the tiller cannot really be combined with

communism, which advocates the abolition of individual land-holdings.

Yet, Soviet Russia found it useful to help Sun Yat-sen and advised the

Chinese Communist Party to collaborate with the KMT (Kuomintang). This

collaboration, not always easy, continued until the fall of Shanghai in

1927.

In the meantime, Mao Tse-tung had given up his studies in Peking and had

returned to his home in Hunan. Here, he organized his countrymen, the

farmers of Hunan. It is said that at the verge of the northern

expedition of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao's adherents in Hunan already numbered

in the millions; this made the quick and smooth advance of the

communist-advised armies of Chiang Kai-shek possible. Mao developed his

ideas in written form in 1927; he showed that communism in China could

be successful only if it was based upon farmers. Because of this

unorthodox attitude, he was for years severely attacked as a

deviationist.

When Chiang Kai-shek separated from the KMT in 1927, the main body of

the KMT remained in Hankow as the legal government. But now, while

Chiang Kai-shek executed all leftists, union leaders, and communists who

fell into his hands, tensions in Hankow increased between the Chinese

Communist Party and the rest of the KMT. Finally, the KMT turned against

the communists and reunited with Chiang Kai-shek. The remaining

communists retreated to the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, the centre of

Mao's activities; even the orthodox communist wing, which had condemned

Mao, now had to come to him for protection from the KMT. A small

communist state began to develop in Kiangsi, in spite of pressure and,

later, attacks of the KMT against them. By 1934, this pressure became so

strong that Kiangsi had to be abandoned, and in the epic "Long March"

the rest of the communists and their army fought their way through all

of western and north-western China into the sparsely inhabited,

underdeveloped northern part of Shensi, where a new socialistic state

was created with Yen-an as its capital.

After the fall of the communist enclave in Kiangsi, the prospects for

the Nationalist regime were bright; indeed, the unification of China was

almost achieved. At this moment a new Japanese invasion threatened and

demanded the full attention of the regime. Thus, in spite of talk about

land reform and other reforms which might have led to a liberalization

of the government, no attention was given to internal and social

problems except to the suppression of communist thought. Although all

leftist publications were prohibited, most historians and sociologists

succeeded in writing Marxist books without using Marxist terminology, so

that they escaped Chiang's censors. These publications contributed

greatly to preparing China's intellectuals and youth for communism.

When the Japanese War began, the communists in Yen-an and the

Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek agreed to co-operate against the

invaders. Yet, each side remembered its experiences in 1927 and

distrusted the other. Chiang's resistance against the invaders became

less effective after the Japanese occupied all of China's ports;

supplies could reach China only in small quantities by airlift or via

the Burma Road. There was also the belief that Japan could be defeated

only by an attack on Japan itself and that this would have to be

undertaken by the Western powers, not by China. The communists, on their

side, set up a guerrilla organization behind the Japanese lines, so

that, although the Japanese controlled the cities and the lines of

communication, they had little control over the countryside. The

communists also attempted to infiltrate the area held by the

Nationalists, who in turn were interested in preventing the communists

from becoming too strong; so, Nationalist troops guarded also the

borders of communist territory.

American politicians and military advisers were divided in their

opinions. Although they recognized the internal weakness of the

Nationalist government, the fighting between cliques within the

government, and the ever-increasing corruption, some advocated more help

to the Nationalists and a firm attitude against the communists. Others,

influenced by impressions gained during visits to Yen-an, and believing

in the possibility of honest co-operation between a communist regime and

any other, as Roosevelt did, attempted to effect a coalition of the

Nationalists with the communists.

At the end of the war, when the Nationalist government took over the

administration, it lacked popular support in the areas liberated from

the Japanese. Farmers who had been given land by the communists, or who

had been promised it, were afraid that their former landlords, whether

they had remained to collaborate with the Japanese or had fled to West

China, would regain control of the land. Workers hoped for new social

legislation and rights. Businessmen and industrialists were faced with

destroyed factories, worn-out or antiquated equipment, and an unchecked

inflation which induced them to shift their accounts into foreign banks

or to favour short-term gains rather than long-term investments. As in

all countries which have suffered from a long war and an occupation,

the youth believed that the old regime had been to blame, and saw

promise and hope on the political left. And, finally, the Nationalist

soldiers, most of whom had been separated for years from their homes and

families, were not willing to fight other Chinese in the civil war now

well under way; they wanted to go home and start a new life. The

communists, however, were now well organized militarily and well

equipped with arms surrendered by the Japanese to the Soviet armies as

well as with arms and ammunition sold to them by KMT soldiers; moreover,

they were constantly strengthened by deserters from the KMT. The civil

war witnessed a steady retreat by the KMT armies, which resisted only

sporadically. By the end of 1948, most of mainland China was in the

hands of the communists, who established their new capital in Peking.

2 _Nationalist China in Taiwan_

The Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan with those soldiers who

remained loyal. This island was returned to China after the defeat of

Japan, though final disposition of its status had not yet been

determined.

Taiwan's original population had been made up of more than a dozen

tribes who are probably distant relatives of tribes in the Philippines.

These are Taiwan's "aborigines," altogether about 200,000 people in

1948.

At about the time of the Sung dynasty, Chinese began to establish

outposts on the island; these developed into regular agricultural

settlements toward the end of the Ming dynasty. Immigration increased in

the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth centuries. These Chinese

immigrants and their descendants are the "Taiwanese," Taiwan's main

population of about eight million people as of 1948.

Taiwan was at first a part of the province of Fukien, whence most of its

Chinese settlers came; there was also a minority of Hakka, Chinese from

Kuangtung province. When Taiwan was ceded to Japan, it was still a

colonial area with much lawlessness and disorder, but with a number of

flourishing towns and a growing population. The Japanese, who sent

administrators but no settlers, established law and order, protected the

aborigines from land-hungry Chinese settlers, and attempted to abolish

headhunting by the aborigines and to raise the cultural level in

general. They built a road and railway system and strongly stressed the

production of sugar cane and rice. During the Second World War, the

island suffered from air attacks and from the inability of the Japanese

to protect its industries.

After Chiang Kai-shek and the remainder of his army and of his

government officials arrived in Taiwan, they were followed by others

fleeing from the communist regime, mainly from Chekiang, Kiangsu, and

the northern provinces of the mainland. Eventually, there were on Taiwan

about two million of these "mainlanders," as they have sometimes been

called.

When the Chinese Nationalists took over from the Japanese, they assumed

all the leading positions in the government. The Taiwanese nationals who

had opposed the Japanese were disappointed; for their part, the

Nationalists felt threatened because of their minority position. The

next years, especially up to 1952, were characterized by terror and

bloodshed. Tensions persisted for many years, but have lessened since

about 1960.

The new government of Taiwan resembled China's pre-war government under

Chiang Kai-shek. First, to maintain his claim to the legitimate rule of

all of China, Chiang retained--and controlled through his party, the

KMT--his former government organization, complete with cabinet

ministers, administrators, and elected parliament, under the name

"Central Government of China." Secondly, the actual government of

Taiwan, which he considered one of China's provinces, was organized as

the "Provincial Government of Taiwan," whose leading positions were at

first in the hands of KMT mainlanders. There have since been elections

for the provincial assembly, for local government councils and boards,

and for various provincial and local positions. Thirdly, the military

forces were organized under the leadership and command of mainlanders.

And finally, the education system was set up in accordance with former

mainland practices by mainland specialists. However, evolutionary

changes soon occurred.

The government's aim was to make Mandarin Chinese the language of all

Chinese in Taiwan, as it had been in mainland China long before the War,

and to weaken the Taiwanese dialects. Soon almost every child had a

minimum of six years of education (increased in 1968 to nine years),

with Mandarin Chinese as the medium of instruction. In the beginning few

Taiwanese qualified as teachers because, under Japanese rule, Japanese

had been the medium of instruction. As the children of Taiwanese and

mainland families went to school together, the Taiwanese children

quickly learned Mandarin, while most mainland children became familiar

with the Taiwan dialect. For the generation in school today, the

difference between mainlander and Taiwanese has lost its importance. At

the same time, more teachers of Taiwanese origin, but with modern

training, have begun to fill first the ranks of elementary, later of

high-school, and now even of university instructors, so that the end of

mainland predominance in the educational system is foreseeable.

The country is still ruled by the KMT, but although at first hardly any

Taiwanese belonged to the Party, many of the elective jobs and almost

all positions in the provincial government are at present (1969) in the

hands of Taiwanese independents, or KMT members, more of whom are

entering the central government as well. Because military service is

compulsory, the majority of common soldiers are Taiwanese: as career

officers grow older and their sons show little interest in an army

career, more Taiwan-Chinese are occupying higher army positions. Foreign

policy and major political decisions still lie in the hands of mainland

Chinese, but economic power, once monopolized by them, is now held by

Taiwan-Chinese.

This shift gained impetus with the end of American economic aid, which

had tied local businessmen to American industry and thus worked to the

advantage of mainland Chinese, for these had contacts in the United

States, whereas the Taiwan-Chinese had contacts only in Japan. After the

termination of American economic aid, Taiwanese trade with Japan, the

Philippines, and Korea grew in importance and with it the economic

strength of Taiwan-Chinese businessmen. After 1964, Taiwan became a

strong competitor of Hong Kong and Japan in some export industries, such

as electronics and textiles. We can regard Taiwan from 1964 on as

occupying the "takeoff" stage, to use Rostow's terminology--a stage of

rapid development of new, principally light and consumer, industries.

There has been a rapid rise of industrial towns around the major cities,

and there are already many factories in the countryside, even in some

villages. Electrification is essentially completed, and heavy

industries, such as fertilizer and assembly plants and oil refineries,

now exist.

This rapid industrialization was accompanied by an unusually fast

development of agriculture. A land-reform program limited land

ownership, reduced rents, and redistributed formerly Japanese-owned

land. This was the program that the Nationalist government had attempted

unsuccessfully to enforce in liberated China after the Pacific War. It

is well known that the abolition of landlordism and the distribution of

land to small farmers do not in themselves improve or enlarge

production. The Joint Council on Rural Reconstruction, on which American

advisers worked with Chinese specialists to devise a system comparable

to American agricultural extension services but possessing added

elements of community development, introduced better seeds, more and

better fertilizers, and numerous other innovations which the farmers

quickly adopted, with the result that the island became

self-supporting, in spite of a steadily growing population (thirteen

million in 1968).

At the same time, the government succeeded in stabilizing the currency

and in eliminating corruption, thus re-establishing public confidence

and security. Good incomes from farming as well as from industries were

invested on the island instead of flowing into foreign banks. In

addition, the population had enough surplus money to buy the products of

the new domestic industries as these appeared. Thus, the

industrialization of Taiwan may be called "industrialization without

tears," without the suffering, that is, of proletarian masses who

produce objects which they cannot afford for themselves. Today, even

lower middle-class families have television consoles which cost the

equivalent of US $200; they own electric fans and radios; they are

buying Taiwan-produced refrigerators and air conditioners; and more and

more think of buying Taiwan-assembled cars. They encourage their

children to finish high school and to attend college if at all possible;

competition for admission is very strong in spite of the continuous

building of new schools and universities. Education to the level of the

B.A. is of good quality, but for most graduate study students are still

sent abroad. Taiwan complains about the "brain drain," as about 93 per

cent of its students who go overseas do not return, but in many fields

it has sufficient trained manpower to continue its development, and in

any case there would not be enough jobs available if all the students

returned. Most of these expatriates would be available to develop

mainland China, if conditions there were to change in a way that would

make them compatible with the values with which these expatriates grew

up on Taiwan, or with the Western democratic values which they absorbed

abroad.

Chiang Kai-shek's government still hopes that one day its people will

return to the mainland. This hope has changed from hope of victory in a

civil war to hope of revolutionary developments within Communist China

which might lead to the creation of a more liberal government in which

men with KMT loyalties could find a place. Because they are Chinese, the

present government and, it is believed, the majority of the people,

consider themselves a part of China from which they are temporarily

separated. Therefore they reject the idea, proposed by some American

politicians, that Taiwan should become an independent state. There are,

mainly in the United States and Japan, groups of Taiwan-Chinese who

favour an independent Taiwan, which naturally would be close to Japan

politically and economically. One may agree with their belief that

Taiwan, now larger than many European countries, could exist and

flourish as an independent country; yet few Chinese will wish to divorce

themselves from the world's largest society.

3 _Communist China_

Both Taiwan and mainland China have developed extremely quickly. The

reasons do not seem to lie solely in the form of government, for the

pre-conditions for a "takeoff" existed in China as early as the 1920's,

if not earlier. That is, the quick development of China could have

started forty years ago but was prevented, primarily for political

reasons. One of the main pre-conditions for quick development is that a

large part of the population is inured to hard and repetitive work. The

Chinese farmer was accustomed to such work; he put more time and energy

into his land than any other farmer. He and his fellows were the

industrial workers of the future: reliable, hard-working, tractable,

intelligent. To train them was easy, and absenteeism was never a serious

problem, as it is in other developing nations. Another pre-condition is

the existence of sufficient trained people to manage industry. Forty

years ago China had enough such men to start modernization; foreign

assistance would have been necessary in some fields, but only briefly.

Another requirement (at least in the period before radio and television)

is general literacy. Meaningful statistical data on literacy in China

before 1937 are lacking. Some authors remark that before 1800 probably

all upper-class sons and most daughters were educated, and that men in

the middle and even in the lower classes often had some degree of

literacy. In this context "educated" means that these persons could read

classical poetry and essays written in literary Chinese, which was not

the language of daily conversation. "Literacy," however, might mean only

that a person could read and write some 600 characters, enough to

conduct a business and to read simple stories. Although newspapers today

have a stock of about 6,000 characters, only some 600 characters are

commonly used, and a farmer or worker can manage well with a knowledge

of about 100 characters. Statements to the effect that in 1935 some 70

per cent of all men and 95 per cent of all women were illiterate must

include the last category in these figures. In any case, the literacy

program of the Nationalist government had penetrated the countryside and

had reached even outlying villages before the Pacific War.

The transportation system in China before the war was not highly

developed, but numerous railroads connecting the main industrial centers

did exist, and bus and truck services connected small towns with the

larger centers. What were missing in the pre-war years were laws to

protect the investor, efficient credit facilities, an insurance system

supported by law, and a modern tax structure. In addition, the monetary

system was inflation-prone. Although sufficient capital probably could

have been mobilized within the country, the available resources either

went into foreign banks or were invested in enterprises providing a

quick return.

The failure to capitalize on existing means of development before the

War resulted from the chronic unrest caused by warlordism,

revolutionaries and foreign invaders, which occupied the energies of the

Nationalist government from its establishment to its fall. Once a stable

government free from internal troubles arose, national development,

whether private or socialist, could proceed at a rapid pace.

Thus, the development of Communist China is not a miracle, possible only

because of its form of government. What is unusual about Communist China

is the fact that it is the only nation possessing a highly developed

culture of its own to have jettisoned it in favour of a foreign one. What

missionaries had dreamed of for centuries and knew they would never

accomplish, Mao Tse-tung achieved; he imposed an ideology created by

Europeans and understandable only in the context of Central Europe in

the nineteenth century. How long his success will last is uncertain. One

school of analysts believes that the friction between Soviet Russia and

Communist China indicates that China's communism has become Chinese.

These men point out that Communist Chinese practices are often direct

continuations of earlier Chinese practices, customs, and attitudes. And

they predict that this trend will continue, resulting in a form of

socialism or communism distinctly different from that found in any other

country. Another school, however, believes that communism precedes

"Sinism," and that the regime will slowly eliminate traits which once

were typical of China and replace them with institutions developed out

of Marxist thinking. In any case, for the present, although the

Communist government's aim is to impose communist thought and

institutions in the country, typically Chinese traits are still

omnipresent.

Soon after the establishment of the Peking regime, a pact of friendship

and alliance with the Soviet Union was concluded (February 1950), and

Soviet specialists and civil and military products poured into China to

speed its development. China had to pay for this assistance as well as

for the loans it received from Russia, but the application of Russian

experience, often involving the duplication of whole factories, was

successful. In a few years, China developed its heavy industry, just as

Russia had done. It should not be forgotten that Manchuria, as well as

other parts of China, had modern heavy industries long before 1949. The

Manchurian factories ceased production because, when the Russians

invaded Manchuria at the end of the war, they removed the machinery to

Russia.

Russian aid to Communist China continued to 1960. Its termination slowed

development briefly but was not disastrous. Russian assistance was a

"shot in the arm," as stimulating and about as lasting as American aid

to Taiwan or to European countries. The stress laid upon heavy industry,

in imitation of Russia, increased China's military strength quickly, but

the consumer had to wait for goods which would make his life more

enjoyable. One cause of friction in China today concerns the relative

desirability of heavy industry versus consumer industry, a problem which

arose in Russia after the death of Stalin.

China's military strength was first demonstrated in the Korean War when

Chinese armies entered Korea (October 1950). Their successes contributed

to the prestige of the Peking regime at home and abroad, but they also

foreshadowed a conflict with Soviet Russia, which regarded North Korea

as lying within its own sphere of influence.

In the same year, China invaded and conquered Tibet. Tibet, under Manchu

rule until 1911, had achieved a certain degree of independence

thereafter: no republican Chinese regime ever ruled Lhasa. The military

conquest of Tibet is regarded by many as an act of Chinese imperialism,

or colonialism, as the Tibetans certainly did not want to belong to

China or be forced to change their traditional form of government.

Having regarded themselves as subjects of the Manchu but not of the

Chinese, they rose against the communist rulers in March 1959, but

without success.

Chinese control of Tibet, involving the construction of numerous roads,

airstrips, and military installations, as well as differences concerning

the international border, led in 1959 to conflicts with India, a country

which had previously sided with the new China in international affairs.

Indeed, the borders were uncertain and looked different depending on

whether one used Manchu or Indian maps. China's other border problem was

with Burma. Early in 1960 the two countries concluded a border agreement

which ended disputes dating from British colonial times.

Very early in its existence Communist China assumed control of Sinkiang,

Chinese Central Asia, a large area originally inhabited by Turkish and

Mongolian tribes and states, later conquered by the Manchu, and then

integrated into China in the early nineteenth century. The communist

action was to be expected, although after the Revolution of 1911 Chinese

rule over this area had been spotty, and during the Pacific War some

Soviet-inspired hope had existed that Sinkiang might gain independence,

following the example of Outer Mongolia, another country which had been

attached to the Manchu until 1911 and which, with Russian assistance,

had gained its independence from China. Sinkiang is of great importance

to Communist China as the site of large sources of oil and of atomic

industries and testing grounds. The government has stimulated and often

forced Chinese immigration into Sinkiang, so that the erstwhile Turkish

and Mongolian majorities have become minorities, envious of their ethnic

brothers in Soviet Central Asia who enjoy a much higher standard of

living and more freedom.

Inner Mongolia had a brief dream of independence under Japanese

protection during the war. But the majority of the population were

Chinese, and already before the Pacific War, the country had been

divided into three Chinese provinces, of which the Chinese Communists

gained control without delay.

In general, when the Chinese Communists discuss territorial claims, they

appear to seek the restoration of borders that China claimed in the

eighteenth century. Thus, they make occasional remarks about the Hi area

and parts of Eastern Siberia, which the Manchu either lost to the

Russians or claimed as their territory. North Vietnam is probably aware

that Imperial China exercised political rights over Tongking and Annam

(the present-day North and part of South Vietnam). And, treaty or no,

the Sino-Burmese question may be reopened one day, for Burma was

semi-dependent on China under the Manchu.

The build-up of heavy industry enabled China to conduct an aggressive

policy towards the countries surrounding her, but industrialization had

to be paid for, and, as in other countries, it was basically agriculture

that had to create the necessary capital. Therefore, in June 1950 a

land-reform law was promulgated. By October 1952 it had been implemented

at an estimated cost of two million human lives: the landlords. The next

step, socialization of the land, began in 1953.

The co-operative farms were supposed to achieve higher production than

small individual farms. It may be that any farmer, but particularly the

Chinese, is emotionally involved in his crop, in contrast to the

industrial worker, who often is alienated from the product he makes.

Thus the farmer is unwilling to put unlimited energy and time into

working on a farm that does not belong to him. But it may also be that

the application of principles of industrial operation to agriculture

fails because emergencies often occur in farming and are followed by

periods of leisure, whereas in industry steady work is possible.

In any case, in 1956 strains began to appear in China's economy. In

early 1958 the "Great Leap Forward" was promoted in an attempt to speed

production in all sectors. Soon after, the first communes were created,

against the advise of Russian specialists. The objective of the communes

seems to have been not only the creation of a new organizational form

which would allow the government to exercise more pressure upon farmers

to increase production, but also the correlation of labor and other

needs of industry with agriculture. The communes may have represented an

attempt to set up an organization which could function independently,

even in the event of a governmental breakdown in wartime. At the same

time, the decentralization of industries began and a people's militia

was created. The "back-yard furnaces," which produced high-cost iron of

low quality, seem to have had a similar purpose: to teach citizens how

to produce iron for armaments in case of war and enemy occupation, when

only guerrilla resistance would be possible. In the same year,

aggressive actions against offshore, Nationalist-held islands increased.

China may have believed that war with the United States was imminent.

Perhaps as a result of Russian talks with China, a detente followed in

1959, but so too did increased tension between Russia and China, while

the results of the Great Leap and its policies proved catastrophic. The

years 1961-64 provided a needed respite from the failures of the Great

Leap. Farmers regained limited rights to income from private efforts,

and improved farm techniques such as better seed and the use of

fertilizer began to produce results. China can now feed her population

in normal years.

Chinese leaders realize that an improved level of living is difficult to

attain while the birth rate remains high. They have hesitated to adopt a

family-planning policy, which would fly in the face of Marxist doctrine,

although for a short period family planning was openly recommended.

Their most efficient method of limiting the birth rate has been to

recommend postponement of marriage.

First the limitation of private enterprise and business and then the

nationalization of all important businesses following the completion of

land reform deprived many employers as well as small shopkeepers of an

occupation. But the new industries could not absorb all of the labor

that suddenly became available. When rural youth inundated the cities in

search of employment, the government returned the excess urban

population to die countryside and recruited students and other urban

youth to work on farms. Reeducation camps in outlying areas also

provided cheap farm labor.

The problem facing China or any nation that modernizes and

industrializes in the twentieth century can be simply stated.

Nineteenth-century industry needed large masses of workers which only

the rural areas could supply; and, with the development of farming

methods, the countryside could afford to send its youth to the cities.

Twentieth-century industry, on the other hand, needs technicians and

highly qualified personnel, often with college degrees, but few

unskilled workers. China has traditionally employed human labor where

machines would have been cheaper and more efficient, simply because

labor was available and capital was not. But since, with the growth of

modern industry and modern farming, the problem will arise again, the

policy of employing urban youth on farms is shortsighted.

The labor force also increased as a result of the "liberation" of women,

in which the marriage law of April 1950 was the first step. Nationalist

China had earlier created a modern and liberal marriage law; moreover,

women were never the slaves that they have sometimes been painted. In

many parts of China, long before the Pacific War, women worked in the

fields with their husbands. Elsewhere they worked in secondary

agricultural industries (weaving, preparation of food conserves, home

industries, and even textile factories) and provided supplementary

income for their families. All that "liberation" in 1950 really meant

was that women had to work a full day as their husbands did, and had, in

addition, to do house work and care for their children much as before.

The new marriage law did, indeed, make both partners equal; it also made

it easier for men to divorce their wives, political incompatibility

becoming a ground for divorce.

The ideological justification for a new marriage law was the

desirability of destroying the traditional Chinese family and its

economic basis because a close family, and all the more an extended

family or a clan, could obviously serve as a center of resistance. Land

collectivization and the nationalization of business destroyed the

economic basis of families. The "liberation" of women brought them out

of the house and made it possible for the government to exploit

dissension between husband and wife, thereby increasing its control over

the family. Finally, the new education system, which indoctrinated all

children from nursery to the end of college, separated children from

parents, thus undermining parental control and enabling the state to

intimidate parents by encouraging their children to denounce their

"deviations." Sporadic efforts to dissolve the family completely by

separating women from men in communes--recalling an attempt made almost

a century earlier by the T'ai-p'ing--were unsuccessful.

The best formula for a revolution seems to involve turning youth against

its elders, rather than turning one class against another. Not all

societies have a class system so clear-cut that class antagonism is

effective. On the other hand, Chinese youth, in its opposition to the

"establishment," to conservatism, to traditional religion, to blind

emulation of Western customs and institutions, to the traditional family

structure and the position of women, had hopes that communism would

eradicate the specific "evil" which each individual wanted abolished.

Mao and his followers had once been such rebellious youths, but by the

1960's they were mostly old men and a new youth had appeared, a

generation of revolutionaries for whom the "old regime" was dim history,

not reality. In the struggle between Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i, which became

increasingly apparent in 1966, Mao tried to retain his power by

mobilizing young people as "Red Guards" and by inciting them to make the

"Great Proletarian Revolution." The motives behind the struggle are

diverse. It is on the one hand a conflict of persons contending for

power, but there are also disagreements over theory: for example, should

China's present generation toil to make possible a better life only for

the next generation, or should it enjoy the fruits of its labor, after

its many years of suffering? Mao opposes such "weakening" and favours a

new generation willing to endure hardships, as he did in his youth.

There is also a question whether the Chinese Communist Party under the

banner of Maoism should replace the Russian party, establish Mao as the

fourth founder after Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, and become the leader of

world communism, or whether it should collaborate with the Russian

party, at least temporarily, and thus ensure China Russian support.

When, however, Chinese youth was summoned to take up the fight for Mao

and his group, forces were loosed which could not be controlled.

Following independent action by youth groups similar in nature to youth

revolts in Western countries, the power and prestige of older leaders

suffered. Even now (1969) it is impossible to re-establish unity and

order; the Mao and Liu groups still oppose each other, and local

factions have arisen. Violent confrontations, often resulting in

hundreds of deaths, occur in many provinces. The regime is no longer so

strong and unified as it was before 1966, although its end is not in

sight. Quite possibly far-reaching changes may occur in the future.

Three factors will probably influence the future of China. First, the

emergence of neo-communism, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in an attempt

to soften traditional communist practice. Second, the outcome of the war

in Vietnam. Will China be able to continue its eighteenth-century dream

of direct or indirect domination of South-east Asia? Will North Vietnam

detach itself from China and attach itself more closely to Russia? Will

Russia and China continue to create separate spheres of influence in

Asia, Africa, and South America? The first factor depends on

developments inside China, the second on events outside, and at least in

part on decisions in the United States, Japan, and Europe.

The third factor has to do with human nature. One may justifiably ask

whether the change in human personality which Chinese communism has

attempted to achieve is possible, let alone desirable. Studies of

animals and of human beings have demonstrated a tendency to identify

with a territory, with property, and with kin. Can the Chinese eradicate

this tendency? The Chinese have been family-centered and accustomed to

subordinating their individual inclinations to the requirements of

family and neighborhood. But beyond these established frameworks they

have been individualistic and highly idiosyncratic at all times. Under

the communist regime, however, the government is omnipresent, and people

must toe the official line. One senses the tragedy that affects

well-known scholars, writers and poets, who must degrade themselves,

their work, their past and their families in order to survive. They may

hope for comprehension of their actions, but nonetheless they must

suffer shame. Will the present government change the minds of these men

and eradicate their feelings?

Communist China has made great progress, no doubt. Soon it may equal

other developed nations. But its progress has been achieved at an

unnecessary cost in human lives and happiness.

That the regime is no longer so strong and unified as it was before 1966

does not mean that its end is in sight. Far-reaching changes may occur

in the near future. Public opinion is impressed with mainland China's

progress, as the world usually is with strong nations. And public

opinion is still unimpressed by the achievements of Taiwan and has

hardly begun to change its attitude toward the government of the

"Republic of China." To the historian and the sociologist, the

experience of Taiwan indicates that China, if left alone and freed from

ideological pressures, could industrialize more quickly than any other

presently underdeveloped nation. Taiwan offers a model with which to

compare mainland China.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

The following notes and references are intended to help the interested

reader. They draw his attention to some more specialized literature in

English, and occasionally in French and German. They also indicate for

the more advanced reader the sources for some of the interpretations of

historical events. As such sources are most often written in Chinese or

Japanese and, therefore, inaccessible to most readers, only brief hints

and not full bibliographical data are given. The specialists know the

names and can easily find details in the standard bibliographies. The

general reader will profit most from the bibliography on Chinese history

published each year in the _Journal of Asian Studies_. These Notes do

not mention the original Chinese sources which are the factual basis of

this book.

_Chapter One_

p. 7: Reference is made here to the _T'ung-chien kang-mu_ and its

translation by de Mailla (1777-85). Criticism by O. Franke, Ku

Chieh-kang and his school, also by G. Haloun.

p. 8: For the chronology, I rely here upon Ijima Tadao and my own

research. Excavations at Chou-k'ou-tien still continue and my account

should be taken as very preliminary. An earlier analysis is given by E.

von Eickstedt (_Rassendynamik von Ostasien_, Berlin 1944). For the

following periods, the best general study is still J.G. Andersson,

_Researches into the Prehistory of the Chinese_, Stockholm 1943. A great

number of new findings has been made recently, but no comprehensive

analysis in a Western language is available.

p. 9: Comparison with Ainu has been made by Weidenreich. The theory of

desiccation of Asia is not the Huntington theory, but I rely here upon

arguments by J.G. Andersson and Sven Hedin.

p. 10. The earlier theories of R. Heine-Geldern have been used here.

p. 11: This is a summary of my own theories. Concerning the Tungus

tribes, K. Jettmar (_Wiener Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte_, vol. 9,

1952, p. 484f and later studies) has proposed a more refined theory;

other parts of the theory, as far as it is concerned with conditions in

Central Asia, have been modified by F. Kussmaul (in: _Tribus_, vol.

1952-3, pp. 305-60). Archaeological data from Central Asia have been

analysed again by K. Jettmar (in: _The Museum of Far Eastern

Antiquities, Bulletin_ No. 23, 1951). The discussion on domestication of

large animals relies on the studies by C.O. Sauer, H. von Wissmann,

Menghin, Amschler, Flohr and, most recently, F. Han[vc]ar (in:

_Saeculum_, vol. 10, 1959, pp. 21-37 with further literature), and also

on my own research.

p. 12: An analysis of the situation in the South according to Western

and Chinese studies is found in H.J. Wiens, _China's March toward the

Tropics_, Hamden 1954. Much further work is now published by Ling

Shun-sheng, Rui Yi-fu and other anthropologists in Taipei. The best

analysis of denshiring in the Far East is still the book by K.J. Pelzer,

_Population and Land Utilization_, New York 1941. The anthropological

theories on this page are my own, influenced by ideas of R.

Heine-Geldern and Gordon Luce.

p. 14: Sociological theory, as developed by R. Thurnwald and others, has

been used as a theoretical tool here, together with observations by A.

Credner and H. Bernatzik. Concerning rice in Yang-shao see R.

Heine-Geldern in _Anthropos_, vol. 27, p. 595.

p. 15: Wu Chin-ting defended the local origin of Yang-shao; T.J. Arne,

J.G. Andersson and many others suggested Western influences. Most

recently R. Heine-Geldern elaborated this theory. The allusion to

Indo-Europeans refers to the studies by G. Haloun and others concerning

the Ta-Hsia, the later Yüeh-chih, and the Tocharian problem.

p. 16: R. Heine-Geldern proposed a "Pontic migration". Yin Huan-chang

discussed most recently Lung-shan culture and the mound-dwellers.

p. 17: The original _Chu-shu chi-nien_ version of the stories about Yao

has been accepted here, together with my own research and the studies by

B. Karlgren, M. Loehr, G. Haloun, E.H. Minns and others concerning the

origin and early distribution of bronze and the animal style. Smith

families or tribes are well known from Central Asia, but also from India

and Africa (see W. Ruben, _Eisenschmiede und Dämonen in Indien_, Leiden

1939, for general discussion).--For a discussion of the Hsia see E.

Erkes.

_Chapter Two_

p. 19: The discussion in this chapter relies mainly upon the Anyang

excavation reports and the studies by Tung Tso-pin and, most strongly,

Ch'en Meng-chia. In English, the best work is still H.G. Creel, _The

Birth of China_, London 1936 and his more specialized _Studies in Early

Chinese Culture_, Baltimore 1937.

p. 20: The possibility of a "megalithic" culture in the Far East has

often been discussed, by O. Menghin, R. Heine-Geldern, Cheng Tê-k'un,

Ling Shun-sheng and others. Megaliths occur mainly in South-East Asia,

southern China, Korea and Japan.--Teng Ch'u-min and others believe that

silk existed already in the time of Yang-shao.

p. 21: Kuo Mo-jo believes, that the Shang already used a real plough

drawn by animals. The main discussion on ploughs in China is by Hsü

Chung-shu; for general anthropological discussion see E. Werth and H.

Kothe.

p. 22: For the discussion of the T'ao-t'ieh see the research by B.

Karlgren and C. Hentze.

p. 23: I follow here mainly Ch'en Meng-chia, but work by B. Schindler,

C. Hentze, H. Maspero and also my own research has been considered.

p. 24: I am accepting here a narrow definition of feudalism (see my

_Conquerors and Rulers_, Leiden 1952).--The division of armies into

"right" and "left" is interesting in the light of the theories

concerning the importance of systems of orientation (Fr. Rock and

others).

p. 25: Here, the work by W. Koppers, O. Spengler, F. Han[vc]ar, V.G.

Childe and many others, concerning the domestication of the horse and

the introduction of the war-chariot in general, and work by Shih

Chang-ju, Ch'en Meng-chia, O. Maenchen, Uchida Gimpu and others

concerning horses, riding and chariots in China has been used, in

addition to my own research.

p. 26: Concerning the wild animals, I have relied upon Ch'en Meng-chia,

Hsü Chung-shu and Tung Tso-pin.--The discussion as to whether there was

a period of "slave society" (as postulated by Marxist theory) in China,

and when it flourished, is still going on under the leadership of Kuo

Mo-jo and his group. I prefer to differentiate between slaves and serfs,

and relied for factual data upon texts from oracle bones, not upon

historical texts.--The problem of Shang chronology is still not solved,

in spite of extensive work by Liu Ch'ao-yang, Tung Tso-pin and many

Japanese and Western scholars. The old chronology, however, seems to be

rejected by most scholars now.

_Chapter Three_

p. 29: Discussing the early script and language, I refer to the great

number of unidentified Shang characters and, especially, to the

composite characters which have been mentioned often by C. Hentze in his

research; on the other hand, the original language of the Chou may have

been different from classical Chinese, if we can judge from the form of

the names of the earliest Chou ancestors. Problems of substrata

languages enter at this stage. Our first understanding of Chou language

and dialects seems to come through the method applied by P. Serruys,

rather than through the more generally accepted theories and methods of

B. Karlgren and his school.

p. 30: I reject here the statement of classical texts that the last

Shang ruler was unworthy, and accept the new interpretation of Ch'en

Meng-chia which is based upon oracle bone texts,--The most recent

general study on feudalism, and on feudalism in China, is in R.

Coulborn, _Feudalism in History_, Princeton 1956. Stimulating, but in

parts antiquated, is M. Granet, _La Féodalité Chinoise_, Oslo 1952. I

rely here on my own research. The instalment procedure has been

described by H. Maspero and Ch'i Sz[)u]-ho.

p. 31: The interpretation of land-holding and clans follows my own

research which is influenced by Niida Noboru, Kat[=o] Shigeru and other

Japanese scholars, as well as by G. Haloun.--Concerning the origin of

family names see preliminarily Yang Hsi-mei; much further research is

still necessary. The general development of Chinese names is now studied

by Wolfgang Bauer.--The spread of cities in this period has been studied

by Li Chi, _The Formation of the Chinese People_, Cambridge 1928. My

interpretation relies mainly upon a study of the distribution of

non-Chinese tribes and data on early cities coming from excavation

reports (see my "Data on the Structure of the Chinese City" in _Economic

Development and Cultural Change_, 1956, pp. 253-68, and "The Formation

of Chinese Civilization" in _Sociologus_ 7, 1959, pp. 97-112).

p. 32: The work on slaves by T. Pippon, E. Erkes, M. Wilbur, Wan

Kuo-ting, Kuo Mo-jo, Niida Noboru, Kao Nien-chih and others has been

consulted; the interpretation by E.G. Pulleyblank, however, was not

accepted.

p. 33: This interpretation of the "well-field" system relies in part

upon the work done by Hsü Ti-shan, in part upon M. Granet and H.

Maspero, and attempts to utilize insight from general anthropological

theory and field-work mainly in South-East Asia. Other interpretations

have been proposed by Yang Lien-sheng, Wan Kuo-ting, Ch'i Sz[)u]-ho P.

Demiéville, Hu Shih, Chi Ch'ao-ting, K.A. Wittfogel, and others Some

authors, such as Kuo Mo-jo, regard the whole system as an utopia, but

believe in an original "village community".--The characterization of the

_Chou-li_ relies in part upon the work done by Hsü Chung-shu and Ku

Chieh-kang on the titles of nobility, research by Yang K'uan and textual

criticism by B. Karlgren, O. Franke, and again Ku Chieh-kang and his

school.--The discussion on twin cities is intended to draw attention to

its West Asian parallels, the "acropolis" or "ark" city, as well as to

the theories on the difference between Western and Asian cities (M.

Weber) and the specific type of cities in "dual societies" (H. Boeke).

p. 34: This is a modified form of the Hu Shih theory.--The problem of

nomadic agrarian inter-action and conflict has been studied for a later

period mainly by O. Lattimore. Here, general anthropological research as

well as my own have been applied.

p. 36: The supra-stratification theory as developed by R. Thurnwald has

been used as analytic tool here.

p. 38: For this period, a novel interpretation is presented by R.L.

Walker, _The Multi-State System of China_, Hamden 1953. For the concepts

of sovereignty, I have used here the _Chou-li_ text and interpretations

based upon this text.

p. 40: For the introduction of iron and the importance of Ch'i, see Chu

Hsi-tsu, Kuo Mo-jo, Yang K'uan, Sekino, Takeshi.--Some scholars (G.

Haloun) tend to interpret attacks such as the one of 660 B.C. as attacks

from outside the borders of China.

p. 41: For Confucius see H.G. Creel, _Confucius_, New York 1949. I do

not, however, follow his interpretation, but rather the ideas of Hu

Shih, O. Franke and others.

p. 42: For "chün-tz[)u]" and its counterpart "hsiao-jen" see D. Bodde

and Ch'en Meng-chia.

p 43: I rely strongly here upon O. Franke and Ku Chieh-kang and upon my

own work on eclipses.

p. 44: I regard the Confucian traditions concerning the model emperors

of early time as such a falsification. The whole concept of "abdication"

has been analysed by M. Granet. The later ceremony of abdication was

developed upon the basis of the interpretations of Confucius and has

been studied by Ku Chieh-kang and Miyakawa Hisayuki. Already Confucius'

disciple Meng Tz[)u], and later Chuang Tz[)u] and Han Fei Tz[)u] were

against this theory.--As a general introduction to the philosophy of

this period, Y.L. Feng's _History of Chinese Philosophy_, London 1937

has still to be recommended, although further research has made many

advances.--My analysis of the role of Confucianism in society is

influenced by theories in the field of Sociology of religion.

p. 45: The temple in Turkestan was in Khotan and is already mentioned in

the _Wei-shu_ chapter 102. The analysis of the famous "Book on the

transfiguration of Lao Tz[)u] into a Western Barbarian" by Wang

Wei-cheng is penetrating and has been used here. The evaluation of Lao

Tz[)u] and his pupils as against Confucius by J. Needham, in his

_Science and Civilization in China_, Cambridge 1954 _et seq_. (in volume

2) is very stimulating, though necessarily limited to some aspects only.

p. 47: The concept of _wu-wei_ has often been discussed; some, such as

Masaaki Matsumoto, interpreted the concept purely in social terms as

"refusal of actions carrying worldly estimation".

p. 49 Further literature concerning alchemy and breathing exercises is

found in J. Needham's book.

_Chapter Four_

p. 51: I have used here the general framework of R.L. Walker, but more

upon Yang K'uan's studies.

p. 52: The interpretation of the change of myths in this period is based

in part upon the work done by H. Maspero, G. Haloun, and Ku Chieh-kang.

The analysis of legends made by B. Karlgren from a philological point of

view ("Legends and Cults in Ancient China", _The Museum of Far Eastern

Antiquities, Bulletin_ No. 18, 1946, pp. 199-365) follows another

direction.

p. 53: The discussion on riding involves the theories concerning

horse-nomadic tribes and the period of this way of life. It also

involves the problem of the invention of stirrup and saddle. The saddle

seems to have been used in China already at the beginning of our period;

the stirrup seems to be as late as the fifth century A.D. The article by

A. Kroeber, _The Ancient Oikumene as an Historic Culture Aggregate_,

Huxley Memorial Lecture for 1945, is very instructive for our problems

and also for its theoretical approach.--The custom of attracting

settlers from other areas in order to have more production as well as

more manpower seems to have been known in India at the same time.

p. 54: The work done by Kat[=o] Shigeru and Niida Noboru on property and

family has been used here. For the later period, work done by Makino

Tatsumi has also been incorporated.--Literature on the plough and on

iron for implements has been mentioned above. Concerning the fallow

system, I have incorporated the ideas of Kat[=o] Shigeru, [=O]shima

Toshikaza, Hsü Ti-shan and Wan Kuo-ting. Hsü Ti-shan believes that a

kind of 3-field system had developed by this time. Traces of such a

system have been observed in modern China (H.D. Scholz). For these

questions, the translation by N. Lee Swann, _Food and Money in Ancient

China_, 1959 is very important.

p. 55: For all questions of money and credit from this period down to

modern times, the best brief introduction is by Lien-sheng Yang, _Money

and Credit in China_, Cambridge 1952. The _Introduction to the Economic

History of China_, London 1954, by E. Stuart Kirby is certainly still

the best brief introduction into all problems of Chinese Economic

history and contains a bibliography in Western and Chinese-Japanese

languages. Articles by Chinese authors on economic problems have been

translated in E-tu Zen Sun and J. de Francis, _Chinese Social History_,

Washington 1956.--Data on the size of early cities have been collected

by T. Sekino and Kat[=o] Shigeru.

p. 56: T. Sekino studied the forms of cities. C. Hentze believes that

the city even in the Shang period normally had a square plan.--T. Sekino

has also made the first research on city coins. Such a privilege and

such independence of cities disappear later, but occasionally the

privilege of minting was given to persons of high rank.--K.A. Wittfogel,

_Oriental Despotism_, New Haven 1957 regards irrigation as a key

economic and social factor and has built up his theory around this

concept. I do not accept his theory here or later. Evidence seems to

point towards the importance of transportation systems rather than of

government-sponsored or operated irrigation systems.--Concerning steel,

we follow Yang K'uan; a special study by J. Needham is under

preparation. Centre of steel production at this time was Wan (later

Nanyang in Honan).--For early Chinese law, the study by A.F.P. Hulsewé,

_Remnants of Han Law_, Leiden 1955 is the best work in English. He does

not, however, regard Li K'ui as the main creator of Chinese law, though

Kuo Mo-jo and others do. It is obvious, however, that Han law was not a

creation of the Han Chinese alone and that some type of code must have

existed before Han, even if such a code was not written by the man Li

K'ui. A special study on Li was made by O. Franke.

p. 57: In the description of border conditions, research by O. Lattimore

has been taken into consideration.

p. 59: For Shang Yang and this whole period, the classical work in

English is still J.J.L. Duyvendak, _The Book of Lord Shang_, London

1928; the translation by Ma Perleberg of _The Works of Kung-sun

Lung-tzu_, Hongkong 1952 as well as the translation of the _Economic

Dialogues in Ancient China: The Kuan-tzu_, edited by L. Maverick, New

Haven 1954 have not found general approval, but may serve as

introductions to the way philosophers of our period worked. Han Fei

Tz[)u]; has been translated by W.K. Liao, _The Complete Works of Han Fei

Tz[)u]_, London 1939 (only part 1).

p. 60: Needham does not have such a positive attitude towards Tsou Yen,

and regards Western influences upon Tsou Yen as not too likely. The

discussion on pp. 60-1 follows mainly my own researches.

p. 61: The interpretation of secret societies is influenced by general

sociological theory and detailed reports on later secret societies. S.

Murayama and most modern Chinese scholars stress almost solely the

social element in the so-called "peasant rebellions".

_Chapter Five_

p. 63: The analysis of the emergence of Ch'in bureaucracy has profited

from general sociological theory, especially M. Weber (see the new

analysis by R. Bendix, _Max Weber, an Intellectual Portrait_, Garden

City 1960, p. 117-157). Early administration systems of this type in

China have been studied in several articles in the journal _Yü-kung_

(vol. 6 and 7).

p. 65: In the discussion of language, I use arguments which have been

brought forth by P. Serruys against the previously generally accepted

theories of B. Karlgren.--For weights and measures I have referred to T.

Sekino, Liu Fu and Wu Ch'eng-lo.

p. 66: For this period, D. Bodde's _China's First Unifier_, Leiden 1938

and his _Statesman, Patriot, and General in Ancient China_, New Haven

1940 remain valuable studies.

_Chapter Six_

p. 71: The basic historical text for this whole period, the _Dynastic

History of the Han Dynasty_, is now in part available in English

translation (H.H. Dubs, _The History of the Former Han Dynasty_,

Baltimore 1938, 3 volumes).

p. 72: The description of the gentry is based upon my own research.

Other scholars define the word "gentry", if applied to China,

differently (some of the relevant studies are discussed in my note in

the _Bull. School of Orient. & African Studies_, 1955, p. 373 f.).

p. 73: The theory of the cycle of mobility has been brought forth by Fr.

L.K. Hsu and others. I have based my criticism upon a forthcoming study

of _Social Mobility in Traditional Chinese Society_. The basic point is

not the momentary economic or political power of such a family, but the

social status of the family (_Li-shih yen-chiu_, Peking 1955, No. 4, p.

122). The social status was, increasingly, defined and fixed by law

(Ch'ü T'ung-tsu).--The difference in the size of gentry and other

families has been pointed out by a number of scholars such as Fr. L.K.

Hsu, H.T. Fei, O. Lang. My own research seems to indicate that gentry

families, on the average, married earlier than other families.

p. 74: The Han system of examinations or rather of selection has been

studied by Yang Lien-sheng; and analysis of the social origin of

candidates has been made in the _Bull. Chinese Studies_, vol. 2, 1941,

and 3, 1942.--The meaning of the term "Hundred Families" has been

discussed by W. Eichhorn, Kuo Mo-jo, Ch'en Meng-chia and especially by

Hsü T'ung-hsin. It was later also a fiscal term.

p. 75: The analysis of Hsiung-nu society is based mainly upon my own

research. There is no satisfactory history of these northern federations

available in English. The compilation of W.M. MacGovern, _The Early

Empires of Central Asia_, Chapel Hill 1939, is now quite antiquated.--An

attempt to construct a model of Central Asian nomadic social structure

has been made by E.E. Bacon, _Obok, a Study of Social Structure in

Eurasia_, New York 1958, but the model constructed by B. Vladimirtsov

and modified by O. Lattimore remains valuable.--For origin and

early-development of Hsiung-nu society see O. Maenchen, K. Jettmar, B.

Bernstam, Uchida Gimpu and many others.

p. 79: Material on the "classes" (_sz[)u] min_) will be found in a

forthcoming book. Studies by Ch'ü T'ung-tsu and Tamai Korehiro are

important here. An up-to-date history of Chinese education is still a

desideratum.

p. 80: For Tung Chung-shu, I rely mainly upon O. Franke.--Some scholars

do not accept this "double standard", although we have clear texts which

show that cases were evaluated on the basis of Confucian texts and not

on the basis of laws. In fact, local judges probably only in exceptional

cases knew the text of the law or had the code. They judged on the basis

of "customary law".

p. 81: Based mainly upon my own research. K.A. Wittfogel, _Oriental

Despotism_, New Haven 1957, has a different interpretation.

p. 82: Cases in which the Han emperors disregarded the law code were

studied by Y. Hisamura.--I have used here studies published in the

_Bull, of Chinese Studies_, vol. 2 and 3 and in _Tôyô gakuho_,

vol. 8 and 9, in addition to my own research.

p. 85: On local administration see Kat[=o] Shigeru and Yen Keng-wang's

studies.

p. 86: The problem of the Chinese gold, which will be touched upon later

again, has gained theoretical interest, because it could be used as a

test of M. Lombard's theories concerning the importance of gold in the

West (_Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations_, vol. 12, Paris

1957, No. 1, p. 7-28). It was used in China from c. 600 B.C. on in form

of coins or bars, but disappeared almost completely from A.D. 200 on,

i.e. the period of economic decline (see L.S. Yang, Kat[=o]

Shigeru).--The payment to border tribes occurs many times again in

Chinese history down to recent times; it has its parallel in British

payments to tribes in the North-West Frontier Province in India which

continued even after the Independence.

p. 88: According to later sources, one third of the tributary gifts was

used in the Imperial ancestor temples, one third in the Imperial

mausolea, but one third was used as gifts to guests of the Emperor.--The

trade aspect of the tributes was first pointed but by E. Parker, later

by O. Lattimore, recently by J.K. Fairbank.--The importance of Chang

Ch'ien for East-West contacts was systematically studied by B. Laufer;

his _Sino-Iranica_, Chicago 1919 is still a classic.

p. 89: The most important trait which points to foreign trade, is the

occurrence of glass in Chinese tombs in Indo-China and of glass in China

proper from the fifth century B.C. on; it is assumed that this glass was

imported from the Near East, possibly from Egypt (O. Janse, N. Egami,

Seligman).

p. 91: Large parts of the "Discussions" have been translated by Esson M.

Gale, _Discourses on Salt and Iron_, Leiden 1931; the continuation of

this translation is in _Jour. Royal As. Society, North-China Branch_

1934.--The history of eunuchs in China remains to be written. They were

known since at least the seventh century B.C. The hypothesis has been

made that this custom had its origin in Asia Minor and spread from there

(R.F. Spencer in _Ciba Symposia_, vol. 8, No. 7, 1946 with references).

p. 92: The main source on Wang Mang is translated by C.B. Sargent, _Wang

Mang, a translation_, Shanghai 1950 and H.H. Dubs, _History of the

Former Han Dynasty_, vol, 3, Baltimore 1955.