THE PLAYER'S ILLUSION

The player at games of skill is always tempted to attribute to himself

a capacity superior to his real power. Such is the theorem advanced

in a curious study, half psychological and half algebraic, by an

Algerian engineer, Monsieur V. Cornetz. The player's desire to win,

the recollection of his past successes, his confidence in himself,

necessarily cause him, at a given moment, to think himself stronger

than he really is. So that, if he wins, he is not surprised; but if he

loses, he will tell himself: "I could have done better; I didn't do

my best, I didn't concentrate all my attention." For such an estimate

of himself to be just, it would be necessary for the player to base

the idea of his strength not only upon the average of his previous

victories, but also of his defeats. Self-conceit, however, prevents

unsuccessful contests from coming to his mind to counterbalance the

remembrance of his winnings. It comes about, then, that the player

constantly overrates himself, and in all good faith. Whatever be

his character, he is never tempted to attribute to himself a value

less than his real worth. The modesty of certain players is all upon

the surface and the mistrust of themselves, which they proclaim, is

transformed into excessive confidence as soon as the game has begun.

A player is a man who always compares himself to other men. He judges

himself, not as an individual independent of his surroundings, but

under the pressure of a vanity that is ever egged on by the presence of

rival vanities. The moment two such vanities clash, each of necessity

seeks victory, and begins by attributing to itself, without the least

regard for reality, the strength necessary for success. To accept the

combat is in itself, is it not, to believe that one is the stronger?

Monsieur Cornetz deals particularly with the chess-player, but his

observations, as he himself says in his preface, are applicable to

all games that are not purely games of chance, and even to athletic

contests, fencing matches, and one might add, military operations,

even of the most serious nature. To wage battle is to play a game.

This psychology of the player is also that of the general. How many

battles have been lost because the general overestimated himself. How

many governments even have fallen because they were abandoned to the

illusions of their self-conceit! Does not Napoleon III gayly setting

out for the frontier provide the spectacle par excellence of the player

who overrates himself? There is no such thing as a disinterested

contest; the dullest game of cards excites in the opponents a certain

desire to win. The very persons who boasted of their entire detachment

are often the most eager to win once the game has started; they enter

into it excitedly and when worsted keep watching for a favorable

opening. Those players who believe that they play the game for the sole

interest of its combinations, its emotions, are then, admitting their

good faith, the victims of an illusion: they judge themselves to be

other than they are. This is a rather common attitude in life. We all

of us believe ourselves more or less to be other than we really are;

so much so that an ingenious philosopher, M. Jules de Gaultier, has

created a special term by which to denominate this universal penchant.

He calls it _Bovarysm_, referring to the heroine of Flaubert's novel,

who thought herself a _grande amoureuse_ when she was really nothing

but a poor little sick woman. The player who pretends that he plays

without any interest in victory is afflicted with _Bovarysm_. But

perhaps he is also intent upon shielding his self-conceit in case

of failure. Beaten, he will vow that he had as good a time as if he

had won. This is a manner of self-consolation that does not lack a

certain elegance. The fox who found the grapes too sour has furnished

us with a charming example of this disdainful attitude. M. Cornetz

has seen, in Algiers, on an old Arabian chess-board, this motto: "The

loser always has his excuse." The basis of these excuses is this: "I

should have played otherwise. If I had used such and such a pawn, or

queen, or card, I would doubtless have won." Who has not been present

at those post mortems where the players forget only this, that they

know, at the moment of discussion, things that they did not know while

the game was in full swing? The truth is that at a given moment, when

one is seriously playing the game, one is playing as well as he can,

no more and no less. The loser has an excuse; very well. But it is

precisely because he is the loser. The winner needs none. To be winner

is a fact; to be loser is another. There is in facts a logic, and the

reason of the strongest is always the best. To believe, when one has

been beaten, that one might not have been, is by that very fact to

suppose that one might, at that moment, have been another person, which

is absurd. But perhaps this illusion is due to inevitable causes. The

chief point is, as I have already said, that at the moment when we have

been beaten we recall, not our former defeats, but rather our former

victories, and the victories only. We attribute to ourselves a general

capability, a capability that is a matter of principle, and which may

not be shaken by an accidental momentary inferiority. It never occurs

to us, "our vanity prevents it," that our real worth is probably but

a fairly equitable composite of equally accidental inferiorities and

superiorities. The balance will always incline toward the side of our

self-conceit.

It should be recognized that, if this illusion of our self-conceit has

its great inconveniences, if it vitiates our critical judgment, not

only of ourselves but of others, if it betrays us into false estimates,

it possesses, on the other hand, great advantages. "The illusion

that accompanies man in the course of his life," says M. Cometz, "is

a necessary condition of existence, a precious product of the vital

instinct." The man who overestimates himself is also he who is capable

of surpassing himself. It is necessary, in this great game of life, to

have confidence in oneself. If one estimated oneself only at his proper

value, one would not estimate himself sufficiently. If we did not grant

to ourselves a power superior to our real power, we would never dare to

undertake the impossible; now it is perhaps only the impossible that is

worthy of being undertaken. From the purely practical point of view,

if the end to be attained were not embellished by illusion, would we

ever set about the task? It is well for a man, after a game of chess,

to be able to say in all simplicity: "I could have played otherwise."

That is not true, of course, but it may create in the future a great

truth. Error is a great generator of truths. The truth of today has

its root in the error of yesterday. Illusions have often created real

powers. "You could do better," says the teacher to his pupil. He thus

implants in the child's mind a belief, an idea which will at once

engender a hope, and in the future, a force. Then let us not scoff too

gayly at the player who has such firm confidence in himself. Doubtless

this selfsame confidence will lead him to accept unequal battles in

which he will be worsted; but it will happen also that he will emerge

victor from struggles into which he would not have dared to venture

had not beneficent illusion considerably magnified in his eyes his

real capacity. And finally, it happens in many cases that the real

worth of a person coincides with the estimate placed upon him by his

self-conceit. One need not trust to it too much; it's only a matter of

a game. On the other hand one need not on that account fear to repeat

the old proverb: "Nothing venture, nothing have." All languages of

the world have similar proverbs. This helps to show that all peoples

have recognized that certain efforts are impossible without certain

illusions, and that, of all principles of action, the most powerful and

the most fruitful is still self-confidence.

Philosophic Nights in Paris Being selections from Promenades Philosophiques · 第 16 / 28 题