The Chancellor seemed much pleased with Lord Haldane's explanation,
and said: "There had been much talk of our fleet and our army, and
the steps we had taken, but that he understood the position I had
indicated." "I said, in reply, that it was a pleasure to me to hear
this, and that I hoped I should carry him with me still further in my
belief that if Germany had really, which I did not at all suppose,
intended to crush France and destroy her capacity to defend herself, we
in England would have had such a direct interest in the result that we
could not have sat by and seen this done."
"He said he did not dissent from this view, nor did he wish to hamper
our freedom in such a case. But he wished to propose a formula; the
balance of power was a phrase he did not like, though he admitted that
the historical considerations I had referred to made it natural that
some grouping should take place, and that England should lean toward
the weaker side. He had, however, proposed, in his communication to us,
a formula of neutrality which might go a long way to help."
"I said I cordially agreed with the good intention of his formula, the
working of which was that neither was to enter into any combinations
against the other. If this meant combinations for attack or aggression,
I was entirely of his mind. But I must put on spectacles in looking at
his words, and, first of all, I would put on German spectacles. How
would Germany find herself if, when bound by such a formula, we were so
wicked as to attack her ally Austria or to try to grab Denmark, which
was of deep strategical interest to her? Again, suppose Germany joined
in an attack on Japan or Portugal or Belgium--he then interposed 'or
Holland'--but I said I really hadn't all our treaties sufficiently in
my head to be as sure about Holland as I was about the others. Or if,
I added, Germany were to pounce upon France and proceed to dismember
her, what would happen? He answered that these cases were not at all
likely, but he admitted that they were fatal to his formula. I asked
him whether he would be satisfied with mutual undertakings against
aggressive or unprovoked attacks and against all combinations, military
and naval agreements, and plans directed to the purpose of aggression
and unprovoked attack. He said it was very difficult to define what was
meant by aggression or unprovoked attack. I replied that you could not
define the number of grains which it took to make a heap, but one knew
a heap when one saw one." * * *