Lord Haldane's Official Report of
His Conciliatory Mission Prior to the War
_Lord Haldane, the British Minister for War in 1912, was sent on a
mission to Berlin in that year to confer with the German Chancellor,
Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, in the hope of reaching some agreement with
Germany for a mutual reduction of armament, and for the establishment
of conditions that would preserve European peace. The hope regarding
armaments was not fulfilled, and the conversations that had taken place
were not made public by either Government; but late in May, 1918,
in view of the revelations of Prince Lichnowsky regarding Germany's
responsibility for the war, the British Government at length published
Lord Haldane's report. It is in the form of a daily record, beginning
Feb. 8, 1912, and is here reproduced in full, with the exception of
parts relating solely to British defensive measures:_
"At the interview with the Chancellor, which took place at 2 o'clock
and lasted for more than an hour and a half, I began by giving him
the message of good wishes for the conversations and for the future
of Anglo-German relations with which the King had intrusted me at the
audience I had before leaving. He was pleased with this message, and
intimated that he would write through the German Ambassador to thank
the King. I then said that perhaps it would be convenient if I defined
the capacity in which I was in Berlin, and there to talk to him; and
I defined it as above intimated. I proceeded to ask whether he wished
to make any observations or desired that I should begin. He wished
me to begin, and I went on at once to speak to him as arranged in a
conversation I had had with Sir Edward Grey before leaving London."
"I told him that I felt there had been a great deal of drifting away
between Germany and England, and that it was important to ask what was
the cause. To ascertain this, events of recent history had to be taken
into account. Germany had built up, and was building up, magnificent
armaments, and with the aid of the Triple Alliance she had become the
centre of a tremendous group. The natural consequence was that other
powers had tended to approximate. I was not questioning for a moment
Germany's policy, but this was the natural and inevitable consequence
in the interests of security. We used to have much the same situation
with France when she was very powerful on the sea that we had with
Germany now. While the fact to which I referred created a difficulty,
the difficulty was not insuperable; for two groups of powers might be
on very friendly relations if there was only an increasing sense of
mutual understanding and confidence. The present seemed to me to be a
favorable moment for a new departure. The Morocco question was now out
of the way, and we had no agreements with France or Russia except those
that were in writing and published to the world.
"The Chancellor interrupted me, and asked me whether this was really
so. I replied that I could give him the assurance that it was so
without reserve, and that in the situation, which now existed I saw no
reason why it should not be possible for us to enter into a new and
cordial friendship, carrying the two old ones into it, perhaps, to the
profit of Russia and France as well as Germany herself. He replied that
he had no reason to differ from this view."
"In connection with my remarks as to the events of last Summer, he
interposed that we had military preparations. I replied that no
preparations had been made which were other than those required to
bring the capacity of the British Army in point of mobilization to
something approaching the standard which Germany had long ago reached,
and which was with her a matter of routine. For this purpose we had
studied our deficiencies and modes of operation * * * We could not be
caught unprepared."