_Arthur Pollen, the English naval critic, offers the following
observations on debatable phases of the battle:_
I have read Mr. Frothingham's article, and it seems to me to be
substantially accurate as a synopsis of the officially published
events of the afternoon and evening. The writer's comments also seem
to be judicious and fair. The battle raises, however, so many and
such large problems, strategical, tactical, and technical, that it is
impossible for any writer to exhaust the matter, or even to indicate
the disputable points in so small a space as Mr. Frothingham has been
able to devote to it.
In one or two not unimportant particulars I hold a different view of
the facts and different opinions from the writer. For example, it
seems to me that the Grand Fleet did not, as Mr. Frothingham states on
Page 339, at 6:25 form in battle line astern of the battle cruisers.
The plan published with the dispatches makes it seem more probable
that the van of the Grand Fleet followed a course considerably to the
north though parallel to that of the battle cruisers, and that it was
not until about 7:05 that they turned from an easterly to a southerly
course and formed astern of the Vice Admiral commanding the battle
cruiser fleet. The story of the action might have been very different
had circumstances permitted of the Grand Fleet going into action
astern of the Vice Admiral at 6:15.
Again, Page 337, I cannot agree that it is evident that the German
fleet was not forced into action with the Grand Fleet, but that Vice
Admiral Scheer deliberately chose to engage that force. There is
nothing to show that Scheer suspected Jellicoe was on the scene until
he began to turn from north to southeast about a quarter of an hour
before the Grand Fleet was sighted.
Again, Page 339, I cannot agree that it was the night disposition of
the fleet that was the crucial decision. It is true it ended the battle
for the night, but the decision which gave the battle its character
was taken earlier in the day, when the enemy was allowed to open the
range under the cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens. In the
existing atmospheric conditions and light it was impossible for gunnery
to be effective, even at 12,000 and 9,000 yards and the only terms on
which the German fleet could be defeated and sunk would have been those
of close action. The refusal of close action was due to the menace of
the German destroyer attacks, used on this occasion for purposes of
defense and to afford an opportunity of evasion, with masterly skill
and decisive effect. The dispositions and tactics of the night action
are a different matter, but of these we are still completely ignorant.