penetrare, which [388]Cyprian desired, open doors and locks, shoot
bolts, as Lucian's Gallus did with a feather of his tail: or Gyges'
invisible ring, or some rare perspective glass, or _Otacousticon_,
which would so multiply species, that a man might hear and see all at
once (as [389] Martianus Capella's Jupiter did in a spear which he held
in his hand, which did present unto him all that was daily done upon
the face of the earth), observe cuckolds' horns, forgeries of
alchemists, the philosopher's stone, new projectors, &c., and all those
works of darkness, foolish vows, hopes, fears and wishes, what a deal
of laughter would it have afforded? He should have seen windmills in
one man's head, an hornet's nest in another. Or had he been present
with Icaromenippus in Lucian at Jupiter's whispering place, [390]and
heard one pray for rain, another for fair weather; one for his wife's,
another for his father's death, &c.; to ask that at God's hand which
they are abashed any man should hear: How would he have been
confounded? Would he, think you, or any man else, say that these men
were well in their wits? Haec sani esse hominis quis sanus juret
Orestes? Can all the hellebore in the Anticyrae cure these men? No,
sure, [391]an acre of hellebore will not do it.
That which is more to be lamented, they are mad like Seneca's blind
woman, and will not acknowledge, or [392]seek for any cure of it, for
pauci vident morbum suum, omnes amant. If our leg or arm offend us, we
covet by all means possible to redress it; [393]and if we labour of a
bodily disease, we send for a physician; but for the diseases of the
mind we take no notice of them: [394]Lust harrows us on the one side;
envy, anger, ambition on the other. We are torn in pieces by our
passions, as so many wild horses, one in disposition, another in habit;
one is melancholy, another mad; [395]and which of us all seeks for
help, doth acknowledge his error, or knows he is sick? As that stupid
fellow put out the candle because the biting fleas should not find him;
he shrouds himself in an unknown habit, borrowed titles, because nobody
should discern him. Every man thinks with himself, Egomet videor mihi
sanus, I am well, I am wise, and laughs at others. And 'tis a general
fault amongst them all, that [396] which our forefathers have approved,
diet, apparel, opinions, humours, customs, manners, we deride and
reject in our time as absurd. Old men account juniors all fools, when
they are mere dizzards; and as to sailors, ———terraeque urbesque
recedunt——— they move, the land stands still, the world hath much more
wit, they dote themselves. Turks deride us, we them; Italians
Frenchmen, accounting them light headed fellows, the French scoff again
at Italians, and at their several customs; Greeks have condemned all
the world but themselves of barbarism, the world as much vilifies them
now; we account Germans heavy, dull fellows, explode many of their
fashions; they as contemptibly think of us; Spaniards laugh at all, and
all again at them. So are we fools and ridiculous, absurd in our
actions, carriages, diet, apparel, customs, and consultations; we [397]
scoff and point one at another, when as in conclusion all are fools,
[398] and they the veriest asses that hide their ears most. A private
man if he be resolved with himself, or set on an opinion, accounts all
idiots and asses that are not affected as he is, [399]———nil rectum,
nisi quod placuit sibi, ducit, that are not so minded, [400](quodque
volunt homines se bene velle putant,) all fools that think not as he
doth: he will not say with Atticus, Suam quisque sponsam, mihi meam,
let every man enjoy his own spouse; but his alone is fair, suus amor,
&c. and scorns all in respect of himself [401]will imitate none, hear
none [402]but himself, as Pliny said, a law and example to himself. And
that which Hippocrates, in his epistle to Dionysius, reprehended of
old, is verified in our times, Quisque in alio superfluum esse censet,
ipse quod non habet nec curat, that which he hath not himself or doth
not esteem, he accounts superfluity, an idle quality, a mere foppery in
another: like Aesop's fox, when he had lost his tail, would have all
his fellow foxes cut off theirs. The Chinese say, that we Europeans
have one eye, they themselves two, all the world else is blind: (though
[403]Scaliger accounts them brutes too, merum pecus,) so thou and thy
sectaries are only wise, others indifferent, the rest beside
themselves, mere idiots and asses. Thus not acknowledging our own
errors and imperfections, we securely deride others, as if we alone
were free, and spectators of the rest, accounting it an excellent
thing, as indeed it is, Aliena optimum frui insania, to make ourselves
merry with other men's obliquities, when as he himself is more faulty
than the rest, mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur, he may take
himself by the nose for a fool; and which one calls maximum stultitiae
specimen, to be ridiculous to others, and not to perceive or take
notice of it, as Marsyas was when he contended with Apollo, non
intelligens se deridiculo haberi, saith [404] Apuleius; 'tis his own
cause, he is a convicted madman, as [405]Austin well infers in the eyes
of wise men and angels he seems like one, that to our thinking walks
with his heels upwards. So thou laughest at me, and I at thee, both at
a third; and he returns that of the poet upon us again, [406]Hei mihi,
insanire me aiunt, quum ipsi ultro insaniant. We accuse others of
madness, of folly, and are the veriest dizzards ourselves. For it is a
great sign and property of a fool (which Eccl. x. 3, points at) out of
pride and self-conceit to insult, vilify, condemn, censure, and call
other men fools (Non videmus manticae quod a tergo est) to tax that in
others of which we are most faulty; teach that which we follow not
ourselves: For an inconstant man to write of constancy, a profane liver
prescribe rules of sanctity and piety, a dizzard himself make a
treatise of wisdom, or with Sallust to rail downright at spoilers of
countries, and yet in [407]office to be a most grievous poller himself.
This argues weakness, and is an evident sign of such parties'
indiscretion. [408]Peccat uter nostrum cruce dignius? Who is the fool
now? Or else peradventure in some places we are all mad for company,
and so 'tis not seen, Satietas erroris et dementiae, pariter
absurditatem et admirationem tollit. 'Tis with us, as it was of old (in
[409]Tully's censure at least) with C. Pimbria in Rome, a bold,
hair-brain, mad fellow, and so esteemed of all, such only excepted,
that were as mad as himself: now in such a case there is [410]no notice
taken of it.
Nimirum insanus paucis videatur; eo quod
Maxima pars hominum morbo jactatur eodem.
When all are mad, where all are like opprest
Who can discern one mad man from the rest?
But put case they do perceive it, and some one be manifestly convicted
of madness, [411]he now takes notice of his folly, be it in action,
gesture, speech, a vain humour he hath in building, bragging, jangling,
spending, gaming, courting, scribbling, prating, for which he is
ridiculous to others, [412]on which he dotes, he doth acknowledge as
much: yet with all the rhetoric thou hast, thou canst not so recall
him, but to the contrary notwithstanding, he will persevere in his
dotage. 'Tis amabilis insania, et mentis gratissimus error, so
pleasing, so delicious, that he [413] cannot leave it. He knows his
error, but will not seek to decline it, tell him what the event will
be, beggary, sorrow, sickness, disgrace, shame, loss, madness, yet
[414]an angry man will prefer vengeance, a lascivious his whore, a
thief his booty, a glutton his belly, before his welfare. Tell an
epicure, a covetous man, an ambitious man of his irregular course, wean
him from it a little, pol me occidistis amici, he cries anon, you have
undone him, and as [415]a dog to his vomit, he returns to it again; no
persuasion will take place, no counsel, say what thou canst,
Clames licet et mare coelo
———Confundas, surdo narras,[416]
demonstrate as Ulysses did to [417]Elpenor and Gryllus, and the rest of
his companions those swinish men, he is irrefragable in his humour, he
will be a hog still; bray him in a mortar, he will be the same. If he
be in an heresy, or some perverse opinion, settled as some of our
ignorant Papists are, convince his understanding, show him the several
follies and absurd fopperies of that sect, force him to say, veris
vincor, make it as clear as the sun, [418]he will err still, peevish
and obstinate as he is; and as he said [419]si in hoc erro, libenter
erro, nec hunc errorem auferri mihi volo; I will do as I have done, as
my predecessors have done, [420]and as my friends now do: I will dote
for company. Say now, are these men [421]mad or no, [422]Heus age
responde? are they ridiculous? cedo quemvis arbitrum, are they sanae
mentis, sober, wise, and discreet? have they common sense? ———[423]uter
est insanior horum? I am of Democritus' opinion for my part, I hold
them worthy to be laughed at; a company of brain-sick dizzards, as mad
as [424]Orestes and Athamas, that they may go ride the ass, and all
sail along to the Anticyrae, in the ship of fools for company together.
I need not much labour to prove this which I say otherwise than thus,
make any solemn protestation, or swear, I think you will believe me
without an oath; say at a word, are they fools? I refer it to you,
though you be likewise fools and madmen yourselves, and I as mad to ask
the question; for what said our comical Mercury?
[425]Justum ab injustis petere insipientia est.
I'll stand to your censure yet, what think you?
But forasmuch as I undertook at first, that kingdoms, provinces,
families, were melancholy as well as private men, I will examine them
in particular, and that which I have hitherto dilated at random, in
more general terms, I will particularly insist in, prove with more
special and evident arguments, testimonies, illustrations, and that in
brief. [426]Nunc accipe quare desipiant omnes aeque ac tu. My first
argument is borrowed from Solomon, an arrow drawn out of his
sententious quiver, Pro. iii. 7, Be not wise in thine own eyes. And
xxvi. 12, Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit? more hope is of a
fool than of him. Isaiah pronounceth a woe against such men, cap. v.
21, that are wise in their own eyes, and prudent in their own sight.
For hence we may gather, that it is a great offence, and men are much
deceived that think too well of themselves, an especial argument to
convince them of folly. Many men (saith [427]Seneca) had been without
question wise, had they not had an opinion that they had attained to
perfection of knowledge already, even before they had gone half way,
too forward, too ripe, praeproperi, too quick and ready, [428]cito
prudentes, cito pii, cito mariti, cito patres, cito sacerdotes, cito
omnis officii capaces et curiosi, they had too good a conceit of
themselves, and that marred all; of their worth, valour, skill, art,
learning, judgment, eloquence, their good parts; all their geese are
swans, and that manifestly proves them to be no better than fools. In
former times they had but seven wise men, now you can scarce find so
many fools. Thales sent the golden tripos, which the fishermen found,
and the oracle commanded to be [429] given to the wisest, to Bias, Bias
to Solon, &c. If such a thing were now found, we should all fight for
it, as the three goddesses did for the golden apple, we are so wise: we
have women politicians, children metaphysicians; every silly fellow can
square a circle, make perpetual motions, find the philosopher's stone,
interpret Apocalypses, make new Theories, a new system of the world,
new Logic, new Philosophy, &c. Nostra utique regio, saith
[430]Petronius, our country is so full of deified spirits, divine
souls, that you may sooner find a God than a man amongst us, we think
so well of ourselves, and that is an ample testimony of much folly.
My second argument is grounded upon the like place of Scripture, which
though before mentioned in effect, yet for some reasons is to be
repeated (and by Plato's good leave, I may do it, [431]δίς τὸ καλὸν
ρηθέν ὀυδέν βλάπτει) Fools (saith David) by reason of their
transgressions. &c. Psal. cvii. 17. Hence Musculus infers all
transgressors must needs be fools. So we read Rom. ii., Tribulation and
anguish on the soul of every man that doeth evil; but all do evil. And
Isaiah, lxv. 14, My servant shall sing for joy, and [432]ye shall cry
for sorrow of heart, and vexation of mind. 'Tis ratified by the common
consent of all philosophers. Dishonesty (saith Cardan) is nothing else
but folly and madness. [433] Probus quis nobiscum vivit? Show me an
honest man, Nemo malus qui non stultus, 'tis Fabius' aphorism to the
same end. If none honest, none wise, then all fools. And well may they
be so accounted: for who will account him otherwise, Qui iter adornat
in occidentem, quum properaret in orientem? that goes backward all his
life, westward, when he is bound to the east? or hold him a wise man
(saith [434]Musculus) that prefers momentary pleasures to eternity,
that spends his master's goods in his absence, forthwith to be
condemned for it? Nequicquam sapit qui sibi non sapit, who will say
that a sick man is wise, that eats and drinks to overthrow the
temperature of his body? Can you account him wise or discreet that
would willingly have his health, and yet will do nothing that should
procure or continue it? [435]Theodoret, out of Plotinus the Platonist,
holds it a ridiculous thing for a man to live after his own laws, to do
that which is offensive to God, and yet to hope that he should save
him: and when he voluntarily neglects his own safety, and contemns the
means, to think to be delivered by another: who will say these men are
wise?
A third argument may be derived from the precedent, [436]all men are
carried away with passion, discontent, lust, pleasures, &c., they
generally hate those virtues they should love, and love such vices they
should hate. Therefore more than melancholy, quite mad, brute beasts,
and void of reason, so Chrysostom contends; or rather dead and buried
alive, as [437] Philo Judeus concludes it for a certainty, of all such
that are carried away with passions, or labour of any disease of the
mind. Where is fear and sorrow, there [438]Lactantius stiffly
maintains, wisdom cannot dwell,
———qui cupiet, metuet quoque porro,
Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.[439]
Seneca and the rest of the stoics are of opinion, that where is any the
least perturbation, wisdom may not be found. What more ridiculous, as
[440]Lactantius urges, than to hear how Xerxes whipped the Hellespont,
threatened the Mountain Athos, and the like. To speak ad rem, who is
free from passion? [441]Mortalis nemo est quem non attingat dolor,
morbusve, as [442]Tully determines out of an old poem, no mortal men
can avoid sorrow and sickness, and sorrow is an inseparable companion
from melancholy. [443]Chrysostom pleads farther yet, that they are more
than mad, very beasts, stupefied and void of common sense: For how
(saith he) shall I know thee to be a man, when thou kickest like an
ass, neighest like a horse after women, ravest in lust like a bull,
ravenest like a bear, stingest like a scorpion, rakest like a wolf, as
subtle as a fox, as impudent as a dog? Shall I say thou art a man, that
hast all the symptoms of a beast? How shall I know thee to be a man? by
thy shape? That affrights me more, when I see a beast in likeness of a
man.
[444]Seneca calls that of Epicurus, magnificam vocem, an heroical
speech, A fool still begins to live, and accounts it a filthy lightness
in men, every day to lay new foundations of their life, but who doth
otherwise? One travels, another builds; one for this, another for that
business, and old folks are as far out as the rest; O dementem
senectutem, Tully exclaims. Therefore young, old, middle age, are all
stupid, and dote.
[445]Aeneas Sylvius, amongst many other, sets down three special ways
to find a fool by. He is a fool that seeks that he cannot find: he is a
fool that seeks that, which being found will do him more harm than
good: he is a fool, that having variety of ways to bring him to his
journey's end, takes that which is worst. If so, methinks most men are
fools; examine their courses, and you shall soon perceive what dizzards
and mad men the major part are.
Beroaldus will have drunkards, afternoon men, and such as more than
ordinarily delight in drink, to be mad. The first pot quencheth thirst,
so Panyasis the poet determines in Athenaeus, secunda gratiis, horis et
Dyonisio: the second makes merry, the third for pleasure, quarta, ad
insaniam, the fourth makes them mad. If this position be true, what a
catalogue of mad men shall we have? what shall they be that drink four
times four? Nonne supra omnem furorem, supra omnem insanian reddunt
insanissimos? I am of his opinion, they are more than mad, much worse
than mad.
The [446]Abderites condemned Democritus for a mad man, because he was
sometimes sad, and sometimes again profusely merry. Hac Patria (saith
Hippocrates) ob risum furere et insanire dicunt, his countrymen hold
him mad because he laughs; [447]and therefore he desires him to advise
all his friends at Rhodes, that they do not laugh too much, or be over
sad. Had those Abderites been conversant with us, and but seen what
[448] fleering and grinning there is in this age, they would certainly
have concluded, we had been all out of our wits.
Aristotle in his Ethics holds felix idemque sapiens, to be wise and
happy, are reciprocal terms, bonus idemque sapiens honestus. 'Tis [449]
Tully's paradox, wise men are free, but fools are slaves, liberty is a
power to live according to his own laws, as we will ourselves: who hath
this liberty? who is free?
[450]———sapiens sibique imperiosus,
Quem neque pauperis, neque mors, neque vincula terrent,
Responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores
Fortis, et in seipso totus teres atque rotundus.
He is wise that can command his own will,
Valiant and constant to himself still,
Whom poverty nor death, nor bands can fright,
Checks his desires, scorns honours, just and right.
But where shall such a man be found? If no where, then e diametro, we
are all slaves, senseless, or worse. Nemo malus felix. But no man is
happy in this life, none good, therefore no man wise. [451]Rari quippe
boni——— For one virtue you shall find ten vices in the same party;
pauci Promethei, multi Epimethei. We may peradventure usurp the name,
or attribute it to others for favour, as Carolus Sapiens, Philippus
Bonus, Lodovicus Pius, &c., and describe the properties of a wise man,
as Tully doth an orator, Xenophon Cyrus, Castilio a courtier, Galen
temperament, an aristocracy is described by politicians. But where
shall such a man be found?
Vir bonus et sapiens, qualem vix repperit unum
Millibus e multis hominum consultus Apollo.
A wise, a good man in a million,
Apollo consulted could scarce find one.
A man is a miracle of himself, but Trismegistus adds, Maximum miraculum
homo sapiens, a wise man is a wonder: multi Thirsigeri, pauci Bacchi.
Alexander when he was presented with that rich and costly casket of
king Darius, and every man advised him what to put in it, he reserved
it to keep Homer's works, as the most precious jewel of human wit, and
yet [452] Scaliger upbraids Homer's muse, Nutricem insanae sapientiae,
a nursery of madness, [453]impudent as a court lady, that blushes at
nothing. Jacobus Mycillus, Gilbertus Cognatus, Erasmus, and almost all
posterity admire Lucian's luxuriant wit, yet Scaliger rejects him in
his censure, and calls him the Cerberus of the muses. Socrates, whom
all the world so much magnified, is by Lactantius and Theodoret
condemned for a fool. Plutarch extols Seneca's wit beyond all the
Greeks, nulli secundus, yet [454] Seneca saith of himself, when I would
solace myself with a fool, I reflect upon myself, and there I have him.
Cardan, in his Sixteenth Book of Subtleties, reckons up twelve
supereminent, acute philosophers, for worth, subtlety, and wisdom:
Archimedes, Galen, Vitruvius, Architas Tarentinus, Euclid, Geber, that
first inventor of Algebra, Alkindus the Mathematician, both Arabians,
with others. But his triumviri terrarum far beyond the rest, are
Ptolomaeus, Plotinus, Hippocrates. Scaliger exercitat. 224, scoffs at
this censure of his, calls some of them carpenters and mechanicians, he
makes Galen fimbriam Hippocratis, a skirt of Hippocrates: and the said
[455]Cardan himself elsewhere condemns both Galen and Hippocrates for
tediousness, obscurity, confusion. Paracelsus will have them both mere
idiots, infants in physic and philosophy. Scaliger and Cardan admire
Suisset the Calculator, qui pene modum excessit humani ingenii, and yet
[456]Lod. Vives calls them nugas Suisseticas: and Cardan, opposite to
himself in another place, contemns those ancients in respect of times
present, [457]Majoresque nostros ad presentes collatos juste pueros
appellari. In conclusion, the said [458]Cardan and Saint Bernard will
admit none into this catalogue of wise men, [459]but only prophets and
apostles; how they esteem themselves, you have heard before. We are
worldly-wise, admire ourselves, and seek for applause: but hear Saint
[460]Bernard, quanto magis foras es sapiens, tanto magis intus stultus
efficeris, &c. in omnibus es prudens, circa teipsum insipiens: the more
wise thou art to others, the more fool to thyself. I may not deny but
that there is some folly approved, a divine fury, a holy madness, even
a spiritual drunkenness in the saints of God themselves; sanctum
insanium Bernard calls it (though not as blaspheming [461]Vorstius,
would infer it as a passion incident to God himself, but) familiar to
good men, as that of Paul, 2 Cor. he was a fool, &c. and Rom. ix. he
wisheth himself to be anathematised for them. Such is that drunkenness
which Ficinus speaks of, when the soul is elevated and ravished with a
divine taste of that heavenly nectar, which poets deciphered by the
sacrifice of Dionysius, and in this sense with the poet, [462]insanire
lubet, as Austin exhorts us, ad ebrietatem se quisque paret, let's all
be mad and [463]drunk. But we commonly mistake, and go beyond our
commission, we reel to the opposite part, [464]we are not capable of
it, [465]and as he said of the Greeks, Vos Graeci semper pueri, vos
Britanni, Galli, Germani, Itali, &c. you are a company of fools.
Proceed now a partibus ad totum, or from the whole to parts, and you
shall find no other issue, the parts shall be sufficiently dilated in
this following Preface. The whole must needs follow by a sorites or
induction. Every multitude is mad, [466]bellua multorum capitum, (a
many-headed beast), precipitate and rash without judgment, stultum
animal, a roaring rout. [467]Roger Bacon proves it out of Aristotle,
Vulgus dividi in oppositum contra sapientes, quod vulgo videtur verum,
falsum est; that which the commonalty accounts true, is most part
false, they are still opposite to wise men, but all the world is of
this humour (vulgus), and thou thyself art de vulgo, one of the
commonalty; and he, and he, and so are all the rest; and therefore, as
Phocion concludes, to be approved in nought you say or do, mere idiots
and asses. Begin then where you will, go backward or forward, choose
out of the whole pack, wink and choose, you shall find them all alike,
never a barrel better herring.
Copernicus, Atlas his successor, is of opinion, the earth is a planet,
moves and shines to others, as the moon doth to us. Digges, Gilbert,
Keplerus, Origanus, and others, defend this hypothesis of his in sober
sadness, and that the moon is inhabited: if it be so that the earth is
a moon, then are we also giddy, vertiginous and lunatic within this
sublunary maze.
I could produce such arguments till dark night: if you should hear the
rest,
Ante diem clauso component vesper Olimpo:
Through such a train of words if I should run,
The day would sooner than the tale be done: