448.
Philosophy defined by Kant: "_The science of the limitations of
reason_"!!
449.
According to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art of discovering truth. On
the other hand, the Epicurians, who availed themselves of Aristotle's
_sensual_ theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical opposition to the
search for truth: "Philosophy is the art of _Life._"
450.
_The three great naïvetés:--_
Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if ...);
Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if ...);
Knowledge as a means to the "denial of Life"--inasmuch as it leads to
disappointment--(as if ...).
451.
As if there were a "truth" which one could by some means approach!
452.
Error and ignorance are fatal.--The assumption that _truth has been
found_ and that ignorance and error are at an end, constitutes one
of the most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted that it be
generally accepted, it paralyses the will to test, to investigate,
to be cautious, and to gather experience: it may even be regarded as
criminal--that is to say, as a _doubt_ concerning truth....
"Truth" is therefore more fatal than error and ignorance, because it
paralyses the forces which lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The
passion for _idleness_ now stands up for "truth" ("Thought is pain
and misery!"), as also do order, rule, the joy of possession, the
pride of wisdom--in fact, _vanity._--it is easier to _obey_ than to
_examine_; it is more gratifying to think "I possess the truth," than
to see only darkness in all directions; ... but, above all, it is
reassuring, it lends confidence, and alleviates life--it "improves"
the character inasmuch as it _reduces mistrust._" Spiritual peace," "a
quiet conscience"--these things are inventions which are only possible
provided "_Truth be found._"--"By their fruits ye shall know them." ...
"Truth" is the truth because it makes men _better...._ The process goes
on: all goodness and all success is placed to the credit of "truth."
This is the _proof by success_: the happiness, contentment, and the
welfare of a community or of an individual, are now understood to be
the _result of the belief in morality_.... Conversely: _failure_ is
ascribed to a _lack_ of faith.
453.
The causes of error lie just as much in the _good_ as in the _bad will_
of man:--in an incalculable number of cases he conceals reality from
himself, he falsifies it, so that he may not suffer from his good or
bad will. God, for instance, is considered the shaper of man's destiny;
he interprets his little lot as though everything were intentionally
sent to him for the salvation of his soul,--this act of ignorance in
"philology," which to a more subtle intellect would seem unclean and
false, is done, in the majority of cases, with perfect _good faith._
Goodwill, "noble feelings," and "lofty states of the soul" are just as
underhand and deceptive in the means they use as are the passions love,
hatred, and revenge, which morality has repudiated and declared to be
egotistic.
Errors are what mankind has had to pay for most dearly: and taking them
all in all, the errors which have resulted from goodwill are those
which have wrought the most harm. The illusion which makes people
happy is more harmful than the illusion which is immediately followed
by evil results: the latter increases keenness and mistrust, and
purifies, the understanding; the former merely narcoticises....
Fine feelings and noble impulses ought, speaking physiologically, to be
classified with the narcotics: their abuse is followed by precisely the
same results as the abuse of any other opiate--_weak nerves_.
454.
Error is the most expensive luxury that man can indulge in: and if the
error happen to be a physiological one, it is fatal to life. What has
mankind paid for most dearly hitherto? For its "truths ": for every one
of these were errors _in physiologicis>_....
455.
Psychological _confusions_: the _desire for belief_ is confounded with
the "will to truth" (for instance, in Carlyle). But the _desire for
disbelief_ has also been confounded with the "will to truth" (a need of
ridding one's self of a belief for a hundred reasons: in order to carry
one's point against certain "believers"). _What is it that inspires
Sceptics?_ The hatred of dogmatists--or a need of repose, weariness as
in Pyrrho's case.
The _advantages_ which were expected to come from truth, were the
advantages resulting from a belief in _it_: for, in itself, truth could
have been thoroughly painful, harmful, and even fatal. Likewise truth
was combated only on account of the advantages which a victory over it
would provide--for instance, emancipation from the yoke of the ruling
powers.
The method of truth was _not_ based upon motives of truthfulness, but
upon _motives of power, upon the desire to be superior._
_How is_ truth _proved_? By means of the feeling of increased
power,--by means of utility,--by means of indispensability,--_in short,
by means of its advantages_ (that is to say, hypotheses concerning what
truth should be like in order that it may be embraced by us). But this
involves _prejudice_: it is a sign that _truth_ does not enter the
question at all....
What is the meaning of the "will to truth," for instance in the
Goncourts? and in the _naturalists_?--A criticism of "objectivity."
Why should we know: why should we not prefer to be deceived?...
But what was needed was always belief--and _not_ truth.... Belief
is created by means which are quite _opposed_ to the method of
investigation: _it even depends upon the exclusion of the latter._
456.
A certain degree of faith suffices to-day to give us an _objection_
to what is believed--it does more, it makes us question the spiritual
healthiness of the believer.
457.
_Martyrs._--To combat anything that is based upon reverence, opponents
must be possessed of both daring and recklessness, and be hindered
by no scruples.... Now, if one considers that for thousands of
years man has sanctified as truths only those things which were in
reality errors, and that he has branded any criticism of them with
the hall-mark of badness, one will have to acknowledge, however
reluctantly, that a goodly amount of _immoral deeds_ were necessary in
order to give the initiative to an attack--I mean to _reason...._ That
these immoralists have always posed as the "martyrs of truth" should
be forgiven them: the truth of the matter is that they did not stand
up and deny owing to an instinct for truth; but because of a love of
dissolution, criminal scepticism, and the love of adventure. In other
cases it is personal rancour which drives them into the province of
problems--they only combat certain points of view in order to be
able to carry their point against certain people. But, above all, it
is revenge which has become scientifically useful--the revenge of the
oppressed, those who, thanks to the truth that happens to be ruling,
have been pressed aside and even smothered....
Truth, that is to say the scientific method, was grasped and favoured
by such as recognised that it was a useful weapon of war--an instrument
of _destruction_....
In order to be honoured as opponents, they were moreover obliged
to use an apparatus similar to that used by those whom they were
attacking: they therefore brandished the concept "truth" as absolutely
as their adversaries did--they became fanatics at least in their
poses, because no other pose could be expected to be taken seriously.
What still remained to be done was left to persecution, to passion,
and the uncertainty of the persecuted--hatred waxed great, and the
first impulse began to die away and to leave the field entirely to
science. Ultimately all of them wanted to be right in the same absurd
way as their opponents.... The word "conviction," "faith," the pride
of martyrdom--these things are most unfavourable to knowledge. The
adversaries of truth finally adopt the whole subjective manner of
deciding about truth,--that is to say, by means of poses, sacrifices,
and heroic resolutions,--and thus _prolong_ the _dominion_ of the
anti-scientific method. As martyrs they compromise their very own deed.
458.
_The dangerous distinction between "theoretical" and "practical"_ in
Kant for instance, but also in the ancient philosophers:--they behave
as if pure intellectuality presented them with the problems of science
and metaphysics;--they behave as if practice should be judged by a
measure of its own, whatever the judgment of theory may be.
Against the first tendency I set up my _psychology of philosophers_:
their strangest calculations and "intellectuality" are still but the
last pallid impress of a physiological fact; spontaneity is absolutely
lacking in them, everything is instinct, everything is intended to
follow a certain direction from the first....
Against the second tendency I put my question: whether we know another
method of acting correctly, besides that of thinking correctly;
the last case _is_ action, the first presupposes thought Are we
possessed of a means whereby we can judge of the value of a method
of life differently from the value of a theory: through induction or
comparison?... Guileless people imagine that in this respect we are
better equipped, we know what is "good"--and the philosophers are
content to repeat this view. We conclude that some sort of _faith_ is
at work in this matter, and nothing more....
"Men must act; _consequently_ rules of conduct are necessary"--this is
what even the ancient Sceptics thought. The _urgent need_ of a definite
decision in this department of knowledge is used as an argument in
favour of regarding something as _true_!...
"Men must not act"--said their more consistent brothers, the Buddhists,
and then thought out a mode of conduct which would deliver man from the
yoke of action....
To adapt one's self, to live as the "_common man_" lives, and to regard
as right and proper what _he_ regards as right: this is _submission_ to
the _gregarious instinct._ One must carry one's courage and severity
so far as to learn to consider such submission a _disgrace._ One should
not live according to two standards!... One should not separate theory
and practice!...
459.
Of all that which was formerly held to be true, not one word is to be
credited. Everything which was formerly disdained as unholy, forbidden,
contemptible, and fatal--all these flowers now bloom on the most
charming paths of truth.
The whole of this old morality concerns us no longer: it contains not
one idea which is still worthy of respect. We have outlived it--we
are no longer sufficiently coarse and guileless to be forced to allow
ourselves to be lied to in this way.... In more polite language: we are
too virtuous for it.... And if truth in the old sense were "true" only
because the old morality said "yea" to it, and _had a right_ to say
"yea" to it: it follows that no truth of the past can any longer be of
use to us.... Our _criterion_ of truth is /certainly not morality: we
_refute_ an assertion when we show that it is dependent upon morality
and is inspired by noble feelings.
460.
All these values are empirical and conditioned. But he who believes
in them and who honours them, _refuses_ to acknowledge this aspect of
them. All philosophers believe in these values, and one form their
reverence takes is the endeavour to make _a priori truths_ out of them.
The falsifying nature of _reverence_....
Reverence is the supreme test of intellectual _honesty,_ but in the
whole history of philosophy there is no such thing as intellectual
honesty,--but the "love of goodness ..."
On the one hand, there is an absolute _lack of method_ in testing the
value of these values; _secondly,_ there is a general disinclination
either to test them or to regard them as conditioned at all.--All
_anti-scientific_ instincts assembled round moral values in order to
_keep science out_ of this department....