(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be demonstrated by us (the
concealed meaning behind the whole of the epistemological movement);
(2) God may be demonstrated, but as something evolving, and we are
part of it, as our pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed
meaning behind the historical movement).
It should be observed that criticism is _never_ levelled at the ideal
itself, but only at the problem which gives rise to a controversy
concerning the ideal--that is to say, why it has not yet been realised,
or why it is not demonstrable in small things as in great.
***
It makes all the difference: whether a man recognises this state of
distress as such owing to a passion or to a yearning in himself, or
whether it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by
straining his thinking powers and his historical imagination to the
utmost.
Away from the religious and philosophical points of view we find the
same phenomena. Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises
the origin of moral valuations, though it believes in them just as
much as the Christian does. (What guilelessness! As if morality could
remain when the sanctioning _deity_ is no longer present! The belief in
a "Beyond" is absolutely necessary, if the faith in morality is to be
maintained.)
_Fundamental problem_: whence comes this almighty power of _Faith?
Whence this faith in morality?_ (It is betrayed by the fact that even
the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of
it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. "Self-preservation":
the Darwinian prospect of a reconciliation of the altruistic and
egotistic principles.)
254.
An inquiry into the _origin of our moral valuations_ and tables of
law has absolutely nothing to do with the _criticism_ of them, though
people persist in believing it has; the two matters lie quite apart,
notwithstanding the fact that the knowledge of the _pudenda origo_
of a valuation does diminish its prestige, and prepares the way to a
critical attitude and spirit towards it.
What is the actual worth of our valuations and tables of moral laws?
_What is the outcome of their dominion?_ For whom? In relation to
what?--answer: for Life. But _what is Life?_ A new and more definite
concept of what "Life" is, becomes necessary here. My formula of this
concept is: Life is Will to Power.
_What is the meaning of the very act of valuing?_ Does it point back to
another, metaphysical world, or does it point down? (As Kant believed,
who lived in a period which _preceded_ the great historical movement.)
In short: _what is its origin?_ Or had it no human "origin"?--Answer:
moral valuations are a sort of explanation, they constitute a method
of interpreting. Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite
physiological conditions, as also of a definite spiritual level of
ruling judgments. _What is it that interprets?_--Our passions.
255
All virtues should be looked upon as physiological _conditions_: the
principal organic functions, more particularly, should be considered
necessary and good. All virtues are really refined _passions_ and
elevated physiological conditions.
Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the developments of
sexual relations,--justice as the development of the passion for
revenge,--virtue as the love of resistance, the will to power,--honour
as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of an equally powerful, force.
256.
Under "Morality" I understand a system of valuations which is in
relation with the conditions of a creature's life.
257.
Formerly it was said of every form of morality, "Ye shall know them by
their fruits." I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and
from it I learn the _Soil_ out of which it grew."
258.
I have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a
language of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity
or the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of
preservation and growth, are betrayed--a mode of interpretation equal
in worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar
to races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for
instance, youth or decay, etc.).
Applying this principle to the morality of Christian Europe more
particularly, we find that our moral values are signs of decline, of a
disbelief in _Life,_ and of a preparation for pessimism.
My leading doctrine is this: _there are no moral phenomena, but only a
moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation
itself lies beyond the pale of morality._
What is the meaning of the fact that we have imagined a
_contradiction_ in existence? This is of paramount importance: behind
all other valuations those moral valuations stand commandingly.
Supposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then
measure? And then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc.???
259.
A point of view: in all valuations there is a definite purpose:
the _preservation_ of an individual, a community, a race, a state,
a church, a belief, or a culture.--Thanks to the fact that people
_forget_ that all valuing has a purpose, one and the same man may swarm
with a host of contradictory valuations, and _therefore with a host of
contradictory impulses._ This is the _expression of disease in man_ as
opposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer
certain definite purposes.
This creature full of contradictions, however, has in his being a grand
method of acquiring knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates
himself _to Justice_--that is to say, to the ascertaining of principles
_beyond the valuations good and evil._
The wisest man would thus be the _richest in contradictions,_ he would
also be gifted with mental antennæ wherewith he could understand all
kinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all
the chords in his being would ring in _splendid unison_--the rarest of
_accidents_ even in us! A sort of planetary movement.
260.
"To will" is to will an object. But "object," as an idea, involves
a valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm,
"pleasant or painful," their basis?
But in an incalculable number of cases we first of all _make_ a thing
painful, by investing it with a valuation.
The compass of moral valuations: they play a part in almost every
mental impression. To us the world is _coloured_ by them.
We have imagined the purpose and value of all things: owing to this
we possess an enormous fund of _latent power,_ but the study of
_comparative_ values teaches us that values which were actually opposed
to each other have been held in high esteem, and that there have been
_many_ tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth
anything _per se_).
The analysis of individual tables of laws revealed the fact that they
were framed (often very badly) as the _conditions of existence_ for
limited groups of people, to ensure their maintenance.
Upon examining modern men, we found that there are a large number
of _very different_ values to hand, and that they no longer contain
any creative power--the fundamental principle: "the condition of
existence" is now quite divorced from the moral values. It is much
more superfluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an _arbitrary_
matter. Chaos.
Who creates _the goal_ which stands above mankind kind and above the
individual? Formerly morality was a _preservative_ measure: but nobody
wants to _preserve_ any longer, there is nothing to preserve. Thus we
are reduced to an _experimental morality,_ each must _postulate_ a goal
for himself.
261.
What is the _criterion_ of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness,
(2) its universal acceptation, etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races
must be studied and observed, and, in each case, the criterion must be
discovered, as also the thing it expresses: a belief such as: "This
particular attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of
our existence." Immoral means "that which brings about ruin." Now all
societies in which these principles were discovered have met with their
ruin: a few of these principles have been used and used again, because
every newly established community required them; this was the case, for
instance, with "Thou shalt not steal." In ages when people could not be
expected to show any marked social instinct (as, for instance, in the
age of the Roman Empire) the latter was, religiously speaking, directed
towards the idea of "spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical
parlance, towards "the greatest happiness." For even the philosophers
of Greece did not feel any more for their πολις.
262.
_The necessity of false values._--A judgment may be refuted when it is
shown that it was conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is
not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than
they can alter astigmatism in a man's eyes.
The need of their _existence_ must be understood: they are the _result_
of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.
263.
To _see_ and _reveal_ the problem of morality seems to me to be the new
task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by
moral philosophies heretofore.
264.
How false and deceptive men have always been concerning the fundamental
facts of their inner world! Here to have no eye; here to hold one's
tongue, and here to open one's mouth.
265.
There seems to be no knowledge or consciousness of the many
_revolutions_ that have taken place in moral judgments, and of
the number of times that "evil" has really and seriously been
christened "good" and _vice versa._ I myself pointed to one of these
transformations with the words "Sittlichkeit der Sitte."[3] Even
conscience has changed its sphere: formerly there was such a thing as
a gregarious pang of conscience.
[Footnote 3: The morality of custom.]
266.