1. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.

253.

This is an attempt at investigating morality without being affected by

its charm, and not without some mistrust in regard to the beguiling

beauty of its attitudes and looks. A world which we can admire, which

is in keeping with our capacity for worship--which is continually

_demonstrating_ itself--in small things or in large: this is the

Christian standpoint which is common to us all.

But owing to an increase in our astuteness, in our mistrust, and in our

scientific spirit (also through a more developed instinct for truth,

which again is due to Christian influence), this interpretation has

grown ever less and less tenable for us.

The craftiest of subterfuges: Kantian criticism. The intellect not

only denies itself every right to interpret things in that way, but

also to reject the interpretation once it has been made. People are

satisfied with a _greater_ demand upon their credulity and faith, with

a renunciation of all right to reason concerning the proof of their

creed, with an intangible and superior "Ideal" (God) as a stop-gap.

The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the Platonic, a piece

of romanticism and reaction, and at the same time a symptom of

the historical sense of a new _power_: "Spirit" itself is the

"self-revealing and self-realising ideal": we believe that in the

"process of, development" an ever greater proportion of this ideal is

being manifested--thus the ideal is being realised, faith is vested in

the _future_ into which all its noble needs are projected and in which

they are being worshipped.

The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book I and II · 第 60 / 89 题