THE PANAMA CANAL
BY
HARRY CLOW BOARDMAN
THESIS
FOR THE
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE
IN
CIVIL ENGINEERING
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
PRESENTED JUNE, 1910
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING.
June 1, 1910
This is to certify that the thesis of HARRY CLOW BOARDMAN entitled The
Panama Canal is approved by me as meeting this part of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering.
F. O. Dufour
Instructor in Charge.
Approved:
Ira O. Baker.
Professor of Civil Engineering.
OUTLINE OF THESIS ON THE PANAMA CANAL
Page
I. INTRODUCTION v
II. INTEROCEANIC CANALS 1
III. HISTORY OF THE PANAMA CANAL 6
IV. TYPE OF CANAL, (Lock or Sea-level) 13
V. LOCATION, SIZE AND PLAN 20
VI. ORGANIZATION OF FORCES 21
VII. CONSTRUCTION OF THE CANAL PRISM 26
VIII. CONSTRUCTION OF THE LOCKS 29
IX. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DAMS 33
X. SANITATION 38
XI. SOCIAL LIFE 40
XII. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE 43
I. INTRODUCTION
The building of a canal across the American Isthmus has occupied the
attention of the world for four hundred years. While yet the sailors
who crossed the sea with Columbus were living in all the vigor of
mature manhood, a Spanish engineer drew the plans for an artificial
waterway across the Isthmus and submitted them to the King of Spain.
From that time to this the building of an Isthmian Canal has been a
fascinating project in the minds of progressive men. Attempts to build
it have resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and the squandering
of millions of treasure; and this “dream of the centuries” is still
unrealized.
[Illustration:
_PROPOSED ROUTES
FOR AN
ISTHMIAN CANAL._
_FIG. 1._]
II. INTEROCEANIC CANALS
There are at least five routes which at one time or another have been
chosen and seriously considered as possible locations for the Isthmian
Canal. They are: the Atrato-Napipi, the San Blas, the Tehuantepec, the
Nicaragua, and the Panama routes.
The Atrato-Napipi route follows the river Atrato, which empties into
the Gulf of Darien, as far as the mouth of its tributary, the Napipi,
thence up that river through the mountains and empties in Capica Bay.
See Fig. 1, No. 1.
The San Blas route runs from the bay of the same name on the Atlantic
side to the river Chipo which empties in the Gulf of Panama. It is only
forty or fifty miles southeast of the Panama route. See Fig. 1, No. 2.
The Tehuantepec route begins at the bay of Coatzacoalcos in the Bay
of Campeche and ends at the harbor of Salina Cruz in the Gulf of
Tehuantepec. See Fig. 1, No. 3.
All modern engineers thrust these aside as impracticable, the first two
because of the necessity for tunnels and the last because of its great
length and number of locks. They will, therefore, receive no further
attention.
The choice of the location for an Interoceanic canal has long been
conceded by practical engineers to lie between the Nicaragua and Panama
routes. A consideration of the natural advantages and disadvantages of
these rival lines follows.
Since the Nicaragua route has been abandoned the features of the
proposed construction will receive no attention. It is highly probable
that this route would never have been seriously considered by the
United States had it not been for the fact that the Panama line was for
many years under the control of France and apparently was destined to
continue so for a considerable period.
Logically the question of harbors first suggests itself. Natural
harbors do not exist in Nicaragua nor could one be excavated and
maintained on the Atlantic side without a continual battle with forces
which, in the last fifty years, have transformed what was once an
excellent harbor at Greytown into a lagoon partially enclosed by an
ever advancing line of sand brought down by the river San Juan.
Experience on the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States
has given abundant evidence of the results of a fight with such forces.
In his “The American Isthmus and Interoceanic Canal” W. Henry Hunter
says, “The policy which fights against the forces of nature is a
mistaken one; it is foredoomed to failure. Nature may be aided in her
operations; her more gigantic forces may to some extent be curbed and
controlled; but an almost certain Nemesis pursues any effort which may
be made to arrest and to determine in an absolute way a process so
continuous as that of the filling up of the Greytown bight.”
Brito, the Pacific terminus, is little better than Greytown since “even
in the calmest weather there is a nearly constant surf, with breakers
from four to ten feet high.” Therefore, the terminus at Greytown would
always be in danger of being filled up by the Atlantic waves and the
one at Brito would constantly be liable to destruction by the Pacific
breakers.
On the other hand the natural harbors of the Panama route have
successfully met the demands of commerce for the last four hundred
years. On the Pacific end practically no harbor improvements will
be necessary. On the Atlantic the present needs are satisfied, but
the large steamers of the future may require deepening which can be
done and the resulting channel easily maintained since there is no
persistent filling in process such as characterizes the Greytown harbor.
Volcanoes have long been plentiful in Central America, especially near
the proposed Nicaragua canal. Nicaragua Lake, so geologists say, owes
its separation from the Pacific to a great upheaval. There is now an
active volcano near which ships would have to pass. From January 1,
1901 to April 30, 1904, a period of forty consecutive months, the
instruments of the Instituto-Fisico Geografico, located 60 miles
from the locks of the proposed canal, recorded 43 tremors, 91 slight
shocks and 35 strong shocks, some of which lasted 16 minutes. Similar
observations at Panama for the same period revealed only 6 tremors and
4 slight shocks, the longest being for a period of only 10 seconds. The
lock gates of a canal might very easily be injured by earthquakes; and
common sense would dictate that other things being equal, the canal
should be placed where the shocks are fewest.
Strong trade winds rush through the San Juan gorge at all seasons.
The rainfall near the Atlantic is enormous, averaging from 260 to 270
inches per year, and rain may be expected any day. In the western
part the fall is only 65 inches, and there is also a well defined dry
season. Clear vision is essential to safe passage through the canal
and it is extremely doubtful if it could be obtained under the above
conditions. Still more serious perhaps is the excessive curvature of
the channel for 50 miles of its course. It is impossible to reduce the
curvature to the limit which experience on the Suez canal has proved
necessary for safety and speed. Furthermore the channel must carry off
to the sea the drainage from 12,000 square miles of territory. This
cannot do otherwise than create currents and eddies unfavorable to
navigation.
The Panama route has no continued strong winds; the curvature is
comparatively favorable; the annual rainfall is from 140 inches on the
Atlantic coast to about 60 inches on the Pacific, with a definite dry
season of three months; and the concensus of expert engineering opinion
is that there need be no objectionable currents if proper provision
is made for the regulation of the Chagres river. This phase will be
discussed later as will also the question of curvature.
Much has been said about the advantages furnished by Lake Nicaragua
which covers about 70 miles of the Canal route. However, for 29 miles
of that distance, an artificial channel through soft mud would be
necessary, and dredging would probably be practically continuous for
maintenance.
From a purely engineering standpoint the most serious objection to this
route is the liability to interruption for lack of water in seasons
of extreme drought which are not at all uncommon in that region. Upon
first thought it seems that a lake 3,000 square miles in extent cannot
be other than an ideal source of supply, but such is not the case.
By the proposed dam on the lower San Juan river the channel of the
stream would become an arm of the lake through which all shipping would
have to pass, the depth of water being, of course, dependent upon the
lake level. This level has a natural variation of 13 feet. Under the
projected conditions the whole outflow would pass over the dam about
50 miles away from the lake proper. The present high water mark cannot
be exceeded without flooding valuable lands, nor, on the other hand,
can the channel depth be made as great as desirable because the river
bed is crossed by many rock ledges, and the cost of excavation fixes
a limit to the depth economically practicable. The Isthmian Canal
Commission of 1899–’01 concluded that the variation would have to be
reduced to 7 feet. This means that the level would be held between
104 and 111 feet above tide water and the river bed excavated enough
to give a minimum sailing depth of 40 feet. Records show no regular
succession of high and low lake years; and as it is plainly impossible
to keep a reserve sufficient to control such an enormous expanse of
water, the regulation of this most important matter would be left to
the judgment of the operator controlling the overflow at the dam.
Carelessness or bad judgment on his part might therefore easily stop
traffic for an indefinite period.
There is a similar question in regard to Gatun Lake of the Panama line
although the majority of authorities anticipate no trouble from that
source. A more complete discussion of this danger will be given later.
Concerning the actual difficulties of construction at Nicaragua, little
need be said inasmuch as no work is now contemplated there. The San
Juan dam of the Nicaragua and the Gatun dam of the Panama route both
present conditions which have never been met before. Also the deep cuts
of the Culebra find their counterpart in portions of the longer route.
The time-saving element is of more apparent than real importance
because the time lost on the longer sea-voyage for the Panama route
would be practically balanced by the gain of time in actual passage
through the canal, the Nicaragua route being about four times as long
as the Panama route. Henry L. Abbot, in his “Problems of the Panama
Canal”, estimates that 34 hours more time would be required for passage
by way of the Nicaragua than by way of the Panama route.
An excellent reason for the adoption of the Panama rather than the
Nicaragua route was the existence of a good railroad and the fact
that the French had actually completed about two fifths of the work
required.
SUMMARY OF COMPARISON
Below is given a summary of the comparisons which have just been
discussed.
_Panama Route_ _Nicaragua Route_
There are two good harbors. There are no good harbors.
There is a good railroad. There is a very poor railroad.
Two-fifths of the work is completed. No work is completed.
The projected construction, according A dam without precedent in
to the majority of canal work is projected.
engineers, is justified by good
engineering practice.
Except at Bohio, the annual rainfall The most difficult works are
nowhere exceeds 93 inches. where the rainfall is nearly
256 inches.
The length is 50 miles. The length is 176 miles.
There are no active volcanoes. There is one active volcano
near the route.
The time of transit is 14 hours. The time of transit is 44 hours.
The curvature is comparatively The curvature is sharp.
gentle.
No troublesome winds and Heavy trade winds and strong
cross-currents are expected. currents would be troublesome.
III. HISTORY OF THE PANAMA ROUTE
The Panama route as a line of transit was first established between the
years 1517 and 1520. The first settlement on the site of old Panama,
six or seven miles east of the present city, was made in 1517. The
Atlantic end, called Nombre de Dios, was built in 1519. Here Balboa was
tried and executed. It grew rapidly in importance and in 1521 became a
city by royal decree.
Even at that early date a road was established across the Isthmus.
It, however, did not enter the city of Panama, but at the Pacific end
passed through a small town called Cruces on the Chagres river about 17
miles distant, and at the Atlantic end passed through Nombre de Dios.
The latter terminus did not prove satisfactory so the town of Porto
Bello was made the Atlantic Port in 1597. This also was subsequently
abandoned. At least part of this road was paved, and bridges were built
over the streams. Even today its course is well defined.
As early as 1534 boats began to pass up and down the Chagres river
between Cruces and its mouth on the Caribbean shore and thence along
the coast to Nombre de Dios, and later to Porto Bello. The commerce
thus begun increased rapidly during the sixteenth century and Panama
became a very important commercial center with a trade extending to
the Spice Islands and the Asiatic coast. It was at the height of its
power in 1585 and was called the “toll-gate between western Europe and
Eastern Asia.”
In time this commercial prosperity, which enriched Spain, called the
attention of her rulers and others to the possibility of constructing
an interoceanic ship-canal. Tradition says that Charles V ordered a
survey in 1520 to determine the feasibility of a canal, but that the
governor reported such an undertaking absolutely impossible for any
monarch.
From that time the prosperity of Panama increased rapidly. Lines of
trade were established with the west coast of South America and the
Pacific ports of Central America. Its glory came to a sudden end when,
on the sixth of February, 1671, it was sacked and burned by Morgan’s
buccaneers. A new city, the present Panama, was founded in 1673, but
the old one was never rebuilt.
The project of a canal on this route, because of its romantic and
commercial interest, was kept alive for more than three centuries
without definite action being taken. Finally, in 1876, a French Company
was organized at Paris to make surveys preparatory to building a ship
canal across the Isthmus.
Lieutenant L. N. E. Wyse, a French naval officer, had immediate charge
of the work. He obtained a concession, known as the Wyse Concession,
from Colombia giving France the necessary rights for the construction
of a canal.
In May, 1879, an international congress was convened in Paris under
the auspices of Ferdinand de Lesseps, to consider the question of the
best location and plan for the canal. This congress, after a two weeks
session, decided in favor of a sea-level canal without locks to be
located on the Panama route.
Immediately after this action the Panama Canal Company was organized
under the general laws of France with Ferdinand de Lesseps as its
president. The Wyse concession was purchased by the company, and after
two attempts the stock was successfully floated in December, 1880. Two
years were then devoted to surveys and preliminary work. In the plan
first adopted the canal was to be 29.5 feet deep and 72 feet wide at
the bottom. Leaving Colon, the canal passed through low ground to the
valley of the Chagres river at Gatun; thence through the valley to
Obispo where it left the river and crossed the continental divide by
means of a tunnel and reached the Pacific through the valley of the
Rio Grande. The tides on the Pacific were to be overcome by sloping
the bottom of the Pacific end of the canal. No provision was made for
controlling the Chagres.
Early in the eighties a tidal lock near the Pacific was added to the
plan, and various schemes for the control of the Chagres were proposed,
the one most favored being the construction of the dam at Gamboa. The
tunnel idea was soon abandoned.
The French engineers estimated that the excavation would be about
157,000,000 cubic yards, that eight years would be required for
completion, and that the cost would be $127,600,000. Work proceeded
continuously until 1887, when a change to the lock type was made in
order to secure the use of the canal as soon as possible, it being
understood that the construction of a sea-level canal was not to be
abandoned but merely deferred until financial conditions would allow
its completion. This new plan placed the summit level above the Chagres
river, and proposed to supply this summit level with water pumped
from that stream. Work went on until 1889 when the company became
bankrupt; and on February 4, a liquidator was appointed to take charge
of its affairs. Work was stopped on May 15, 1889.
The liquidator appointed a commission of eleven engineers to give him
technical advice as to the condition of the work and the best methods
for its completion. Five of these commissioners visited the Isthmus and
reported on May 5, 1890. The report contained plans for the completion
of a lock canal and emphasized the necessity for more complete
examinations before beginning work. This advice was followed by the
liquidator who at once took steps for the formation of a new company,
and at the same time continued to take careful observations on the
Isthmus, and these observations have been of great value since then.
The New Panama Canal Company was organized in October, 1894. It
proposed to construct a sea-level canal from the Atlantic as far as
Bohio (See Map, pp 45), where a dam was to form a lake as far as Bas
Obispo, the difference in elevation being overcome by two locks. The
summit level extended from Bas Obispo to Paraiso, and was reached
by two more locks and received water from an artificial reservoir
formed by a dam at Alhajuela in the upper Chagres valley. Four dams
were located on the Pacific side, the two middle ones at Pedro Miguel
combined in a flight.
Work continued on this plan up to the time of the Spanish-American
War in 1898. About that time a “Comite Technique”, as it was called,
composed of seven French and seven foreign engineers who had been
appointed by the Board of Directors of the New Company, submitted
its final report upon the canal. It was estimated that, at a cost
of $100,000,000 a canal suitable for all commercial needs could be
completed in 10 years.
Had matters continued as before it is probable that the New Canal
Company would have completed the canal as it had planned. But the
Spanish-American War developed wholly new conditions. The trip of the
Oregon around Cape Horn drew the attention of the American people to
the importance of an interoceanic canal. Prior to this time the Board
of Directors of the New Company, although aware that the Maratime Canal
Company was actively engaged in securing funds from the United States
Congress for the Nicaragua route, were so confident that a canal by
that route could never seriously compete with their own that they
gave little attention to the efforts of their rival. Now, however,
if the newly awakened popular demand for a canal should induce the
American government to undertake the work, the New Company would face
two formidable conditions, namely, the difficulty of raising funds for
the completion of the Panama Canal would be greatly increased if the
parallel route were supported by the United States and the question of
labor would become greatly complicated.
Knowing that the favorable conditions created by the French at Panama
were unknown in the United States and certain that if known the
United States would assist rather than retard the work the Board of
Directors, on December 2, 1898, sent a complete copy of the report of
the “Comite Technique” to President McKinley and offered to explain the
exact conditions to any body of men appointed for the purpose. This
offer came at the proper time since Congress was then ready to pass
a bill to aid the Maratime Company in the construction of a canal on
the Nicaragua route. On February 27, 1899 the representatives of the
New Company were granted a hearing in the House of Representatives.
They presented a technical exhibit, and stated that their company was
authorized to reincorporate as an American company under American
laws. So ably did they present their case that ultimately on March 3,
1899, by act of Congress a commission, known as the “Isthmian Canal
Commission” was appointed by the President to determine the “most
practicable and feasible route for an Isthmian canal, with the cost of
constructing the same and placing it under the control, management, and
ownership of the United States.”
The original intention of the New Panama Canal Company in bringing
the subject before the United States was not to sell its rights on
the Isthmus but to reincorporate and receive the support of American
wealth. However, it was evident that the United States desired absolute
control, and accordingly the consent of Colombia to a transfer was
obtained and the Company prepared a classified list of its properties
which it placed before the Isthmian Canal Commission on October 2,
1901 with the statement that the sums given were not to be considered
as final but were merely presented as a basis for discussion. The
Commission, however, refused to take this view of the matter and
persisted in considering the prices offered as constituting, when
summed up, a definite lump sum for which the Company would sell its
property. This lump sum was $109,141,500. The Commission’s valuation
was $40,000,000. Consequently when the Commission made its final report
it closed with these words, “Having in view the terms offered by the
New Panama Canal Company this Commission is of the opinion that the
most practicable and feasible route for an Isthmian Canal to be under
the control, management, and ownership of the United States is that
known as the Nicaragua route.”
When the French Company heard this report it immediately offered
to sell its property for $40,000,000. Accordingly the Commission
made a supplementary report on January 18, 1902 stating that “After
considering the changed conditions that now exist, the Commission is
of the opinion that the most practicable and feasible route for an
Isthmian canal to be under the control, management, and ownership of
the United States is that known as the Panama route.”
Thus it came about that the United States was authorized to obtain
permanent possession of the concessions and properties of the New
Panama Canal Company at a very low price.
Congress meanwhile had not waited for the report of the Commission but
had passed a bill known as the Hepburn Bill, authorizing the President
to acquire the right to construct a canal at Nicaragua and to begin
the actual construction. Ten million dollars were appropriated and
contracts for material and work to the sum of $140,000,000 authorized.
Many discussions arose in the Senate; and a strong feeling in favor of
the Panama route became apparent. Senator Hanna was especially active.
He sent letters to eighty shipowners, shipmasters, officers and pilots,
in which he enclosed a description of the two routes and a list of
questions intended to bring out their relative merits from a practical
viewpoint. Their answers were all in favor of the Panama route. As a
result of the long debate a bill was passed June 26, 1902 with the
President’s approval. In effect it was as follows. The President is
authorized to acquire for the sum of $40,000,000 or less the rights and
property of the New Panama Canal Company, and by treaty with Colombia,
the perpetual control of the strip of territory necessary for operating
the canal and is then instructed to proceed and complete the work under
an Isthmian Canal Commission of seven members to be appointed by him.
One hundred and forty-five million dollars was pledged for this purpose.
The Hay-Herran treaty with Colombia was signed January 22, 1902, but
failed of ratification by Colombia. In November, 1903, however, there
was a successful revolution upon the Isthmus and a republican form of
government was adopted. The Hay-Bunan-Varilla treaty was thereupon made
on November 18, 1903. It was ratified by both governments on February
26, 1904. It gave the United States control of a strip of land ten
miles wide, five on each side of the canal.
Since then the work has proceeded under the complete control and
supervision of the United States. The President, whose duty it was to
provide for the government of the Canal Zone, put that as well as the
engineering into the hands of the Commission of seven members which
he had appointed. It has remained there. The office of chief engineer
has been held by three men, J. F. Wallace, J. F. Stevens and G. W.
Goethals, the first two of whom resigned.
The question of a sea-level canal was again agitated and became so
insistent that the President appointed an international board of
engineers, consisting of thirteen members, to assemble in Washington
September 1, 1905 to consider the various plans for the construction of
the canal submitted to it. The board consisted of five foreign and five
United States engineers, three of the latter having formerly served
on the canal commission. The Board visited the Isthmus on September
28, had some examinations made for its enlightenment and in November
submitted a majority report signed by the five foreign engineers and
the three former members of the commission, and a minority report, the
former advocating a sea-level canal and the latter a lock canal with
the summit level 85’ above the sea. The Isthmian Canal Commission with
but one dissenting voice recommended the adoption of the lock type
proposed by the minority.
On June 29, 1906 Congress in opposition to the majority report of the
engineers, provided that the 85-foot lock type of canal be constructed
across the Isthmus; and work has since continued on that plan. This
final decision, however, was made with reluctance by many congressmen
and some of them are regretting it today.
This Congress also decided that all materials used in building the
canal should be purchased in the United States.
Early in 1909 a special body of engineers appointed by the President
accompanied W. H. Taft on an inspection trip to Panama particularly
with a view to determining the feasibility of the Gatun dam project.
In a report made February 16 they unanimously approved the plans for
the various changes in the original project made by the engineer. This
included the widening of the locks to 110 feet and constructing the
Pacific dams at Miraflores instead of at La Boca.
IV. TYPE OF CANAL
The controversy over the relative merits of a lock and a sea-level
canal at Panama is as old as the question of building the canal itself.
Supporters of the lock canal now in process of construction have sought
to silence the storm of protest occasioned by its adoption; but in
spite of their precautions reports have reached the American public
which have created a lack of faith in the present engineers and their
methods.
It is, of course, impossible for a layman to decide arbitrarily in
favor of the lock or sea-level type. The only reasonable way to arrive
at a conclusion is to examine carefully the arguments of both factions
and reach a decision therefrom. The writer has found it difficult,
if not impossible, to obtain an accurate presentation of the facts.
Engineers high in their profession make contradictory statements.
Presumably they honestly express their convictions but their failure to
agree is strong evidence that there is a large element of uncertainty
in the whole proposition. If they, acknowledged authorities, not only
cannot arrive at a common decision in this matter, but consider it
necessary to ridicule each other’s plans, there is certainly cause to
doubt the wisdom of the present project. It is the intention of the
writer to state the principal arguments both for and against the two
types of canals as presented by their most ardent advocates.
It is generally conceded that a lock canal at Panama would cost
less than an efficient sea-level canal. Engineers on the Isthmus
make an estimate of over $100,000,000 as the minimum excess of cost
of a sea-level canal over the lock canal for construction alone.
This estimate does not include the cost of carrying on the work of
government and sanitation during the additional years which would be
required to build a sea-level canal. Furthermore, it is true that
there are many problems in connection with a sea-level canal, in
spite of its apparent simplicity, which have never been solved and
consequently no engineer can say how many millions would be required
for its completion. Experience has shown, however, that the same
unsolved problems were also true of the lock type. In their report to
the President and to Congress, the minority of the board of consulting
engineers pledged their professional reputations that if the lock
type of canal were adopted the aggregate cost of completing the
canal, exclusive of sanitation and zone government, would not exceed
$139,705,200. Not four years have passed since that report was made
yet $120,064,468.58 have already been appropriated and the great dams
and locks are only fairly begun. In the last session of Congress it
was proposed to increase the limit of the cost of construction of the
Panama Canal to $500,000,000. Senator Teller in a speech said, “I have
said again and again on the floor and I repeat it now--that if we get
the canal built for $500,000,000, whether a lock or a sea-level canal,
we shall do very well. In my judgment, we will never get that canal, in
either form, except at a cost of more than $500,000,000.” These figures
are sufficient evidence that the engineers who made the original
estimate were dealing with a subject too big for them.
At the time Congress voted to adopt a lock canal the estimated
cost of a sea-level canal, excluding the cost of sanitation, civil
government, the purchase price and interest on the investment (which
seem unnecessary refinement in view of later developments) was given
by the Board of Consulting Engineers as $247,021,000. The project on
which this estimate was made provided for a waterway 40 feet deep at
mean sea-level, 150 feet wide at the bottom in earth and 200 feet wide
in rock, with a length of 49.14 miles. On the basis of this estimate
advocates of the sea-level canal argue that on grounds of economy alone
the lock type should be abandoned in favor of the sea-level type. It
stands to reason, however, that some of the causes which have led to
an increase in cost over the original estimates for the lock canal,
such as the increase in the wage scale and the cost of material, and
the adoption of the eight-hour day, would affect equally the sea-level
project if it were undertaken.
The total estimated cost by the present canal commission for completing
the work, including purchase price is $375,201,000, while the total
estimated cost of the sea-level canal made by the same commission
is $563,000,000. This latter sum is largely mere conjecture because
of the many unknown elements entering into the problem; and there
are successful engineers today who do not hesitate to state that a
sea-level canal can be constructed for less than the present lock canal.
Very few question the statement that the sea-level canal would take
longer for construction than a lock canal. The majority of the Board
of Consulting Engineers estimated that from 10 to 13 years would be
required. The Isthmian Canal Commission fixed the time at from 18 to
20 years and Lieutenant George W. Goethals, its chairman and chief
engineer, states that the lock canal will be completed by January 1,
1915.
A great objection to the narrow sea-level canal is the difficulty of
river control. The proposed plan was to construct a huge concrete
dam 180 feet high across the Chagres at Gamboa. This of itself is
a great undertaking but when done would not solve the question of
flood control, for below Gamboa there are many more streams which if
unregulated would plunge precipitately into the canal channel thereby
not only creating cross-currents extremely unfavorable to navigation,
and these would also erode the banks and settle deposits which would
necessitate continual dredging for maintenance. If these rivers were
not allowed to flow into the canal, the only other solution would be
the construction of channels on either side of the canal to take care
of this flow. This would be very expensive and decidedly dangerous
since the rivers in places would be considerably above the canal.
The old Chagres Channel and the old French diversion canal could be
utilized for a part of the distance.
It is claimed that even a sea-level canal would require a lock at the
Pacific end because of the enormous difference, sometimes 20’ between
high and low tides. Even the majority of the Board of Consulting
Engineers, the supporters of the sea-level type, considered such a lock
necessary. Since they made their report, however, a noted scientist,
Dr. C. Lely, formerly minister of waterworks of Holland, has made
an extended study of the question and states that the currents in a
sea-level canal at Panama would not exceed those now common at Suez,
namely, 2½ miles per hour.
On the other hand six huge locks are to be built on the lock canal,
and they must be used at every passage of a boat. Their upkeep and
operation will be a constant source of expense which would not exist
in a sea-level canal. If one pair of locks is destroyed or put out of
commission, the whole canal will be disabled and useless. Not only is
this so, but they are a constant source of danger. The destruction of
the gates of an upper lock, which is by no means an unknown occurrence,
would allow the upper lake to empty into the canal channel, and
probably destroy everything to the sea, including the dams. That such
accidents can occur was demonstrated at the Welland Canal when a small
steamer struck one gate and continuing her progress crashed through
four other separate gates, the locks being 240 feet long. Again, at the
Manchester Canal a vessel collided with a gate and carried it away,
allowing the water to escape in such great volumes that it caused
the other gates to give way also. Some conception of the force held
in leash by the gates at Panama may be gained when it is stated that
the “fall from the upper lock at Gatun to the empty second lock is
over five times the rate of fall in the Whirlpool Rapids at Niagara
and the depth is greater”. It is true that various safety devices are
to be installed at the locks but they can serve only to minimize not
eliminate a danger which would not exist on a sea-level canal.
The curvature in the proposed sea-level canal is gentle, but for
19 miles of its course a large ship would continually be changing
direction in a channel having a width of from one-fourth to one-fifth
of her own length and in a current which may be as great as 5 feet per
second. On the Manchester Canal all large vessels are aided by two tugs
whose duty it is to help in steering. Through the above mentioned 19
miles speed could not exceed 6 miles an hour, and whenever a ship going
the opposite direction passed, one or the other would have to stop and
tie up to the shore as they do on the Suez Canal.
The courses on the lock canal are straight, giving a clear view ahead,
and the vessels can pass without being forced to tie up. The great
Gatun Lake will permit of full speed and in all ordinary cases in the
passage from ocean to ocean enough time can be saved by reason of the
wider and straighter channels of the lock canal to compensate for the
time lost in passing through the locks.
While the question of flood control is solved by Gatun Lake the
question of water supply is not. This lake must, under the present
plans, furnish the water necessary for lockages. Experts have carefully
studied this subject, and while most of them agree that there is water
sufficient for immediate needs they also recognize the possibility of a
scarcity in the future. General L. Abbot, one of the most enthusiastic
supporters of the lock plan, states that there will be water for but
26 daily transits during the dry season which would accommodate from
30 to 40 million tons of annual traffic. Other prominent engineers
are not so sanguine and some go so far as to say the supply will be
totally inadequate even for the first years of canal operation. At any
rate there is a considerable element of uncertainty in the matter which
actual trial alone will settle. No such trouble, of course, would exist
in the operation of the sea-level canal.
Much has been said about the relative vulnerability of the two types.
The arguments are decidedly at variance and approach the ridiculous
when placed side by side. Common sense dictates that both types
are open to injury by earthquakes or the hand of man; neither is
invulnerable. It also seems evident that a lock canal with its many
artificial devices is more open to serious injury by earthquake
than a sea-level canal. In fact it is easy to believe that a shock
severe enough to put a lock out of commission would scarcely affect a
sea-level canal at all, and all who say otherwise are prejudiced. In
fairness be it said that the danger from this source is exaggerated and
probably should not occupy as large a place in the discussion of canal
problems as has been given to it.
Lock canal advocates say a narrow sea-level canal could easily be
obstructed by an obstacle placed in the channel; sea-level advocates
say that a bag of dynamite under the lock-gates could put the canal
out of service. Both statements are true but the essential element of
difference is in degree. The obstruction in the channel would be no
real injury to the canal at all: it would necessitate merely a few days
work at the most for its removal. An injury to the locks, however,
might readily mean draining of the summit lake and the destruction
of all between it and the sea not to speak of the indefinite period
required for reconstruction. The point is that it is practically
impossible for man to seriously injure a sea-level canal; it is easily
possible for him to so injure a lock canal. However, lock canals can be
more readily defended in time of war because the points of attack are
known beforehand.
A very serious objection to the lock type is that it cannot be readily
enlarged. The locks are to be 1,000 feet long and 110 feet wide. This
is ample for the present but indications are that future needs will
be far greater. If they do become greater the Panama Canal will be an
inefficient servant and will come far short of fulfilling the purpose
which prompted its building. The sea-level canal could be enlarged by
dredges without stopping traffic through it, but with a lock canal
it is different. When the locks as constructed become inadequate the
only way to increase their capacity is to shut down the canal for years
while new and larger ones are being built.
It is unquestionably true that the ideal canal is a sea-level canal
500 feet to 600 feet wide. This is of the type known as the “Straits
of Panama” proposed by Philippi-Bunau-Varilla to the consulting
board in 1905. There is a growing feeling that this plan is the one
which will ultimately be adopted for the completion of the canal. It
contemplates the construction of a lock canal to be finally converted
into a sea-level canal. The locks were to be constructed so that as the
levels were deepened by dredging they could be eliminated, navigation
continuing during the enlargement. The material removed by the dredges
was to be deposited in the lake formed by a dam at Gamboa. The plan
was carefully considered and finally rejected because of the excessive
time and cost involved. It is interesting to note what the author of
the plans states in regard to it. He says in part, “It is easy to see
from the records that this rejection was purely based on the false
assumption that the transformation of rock into dredgable ground
would cost $2.35 (per cubic yard), when it has since been officially
demonstrated to cost eleven times less in the Suez Canal and eighteen
times less in the Manchester Canal.”
The cost at Panama of that transformation would be certainly inferior
to the cost at Manchester not only on account of the saving of expense
due to the gratuitous mechanical power given by the falls of the
Chagres but also and principally on account of the extremely soft
character of the greater part of the isthmian rocks. The electricity
generated by the falls of the lake will put in action the rock
breakers, the floating dredges, and the scows. The water in the small
barge locks will raise the scows from the level of the summit to that
of the lake and the depths of the lake will absorb the material of the
straits. Thus the Chagres, once harnessed, will offer freely by its
waters the way for the excavating and transporting instruments, by its
falls the energy to animate everything and by its upper valley the dump
to receive the spoils.
If unbiased and free-minded engineer officers of the army, having no
anterior connection with the plans under discussion, should be sent to
investigate the nature of the rock on the Isthmus and then to study in
France, England, and Japan the actual improved methods of dredging
soft and hard material the cloud would soon be dissipated. The supposed
chimera would become a real tangible thing and the United States, the
trustees of humanity in the construction of the great international
waterway, would give to the world what it wants, what it is possible
now and easy to obtain, the “Straits of Panama.” This sounds very
plausible; and it is a significant fact that engineers do not ridicule
it. Their respect for it is growing. Today rock-dredging is on trial
at Panama. If its feasibility can be there demonstrated the plan will
undoubtedly be adopted.
No man can find objections to this type when once constructed. The
objections to the narrow sea-level canal first considered do not apply
to the “Straits of Panama”, so they will stand as the ideal solution.
A canal designed to carry the world’s commerce, to furnish free
communication between the Atlantic and Pacific should be as free from
artificial devices as it is possible to make it. It is therefore hoped
that some day the present lock canal will be enlarged to an ideal,
wide, sea-level channel.
V. LOCATION, SIZE, AND PLAN
The location, size and plan of the Panama Canal with several recent
changes which have been ordered by the President and adopted by the
commission is described in the “Canal Record” as follows: “A channel,
500 feet wide at sea-level will lead from deep water in Limon Bay to
Gatun, a distance of 6.76 miles. At Gatun a dam one and one-half miles
long and 115 feet high will impound the waters of the Chagres river in
a lake, the normal level of which will be 85 feet above mean sea-level,
A flight of three twin locks, each 1,000 feet long, 110 feet wide, and
allowing for 41⅓ feet of water over the sills, will raise vessels from
sea-level to the lake, or lower them from the lake to the sea-level
channel. From Gatun navigation will be through the lake in a channel
from 1,000 feet to 500 feet wide for a distance of 23.59 miles to Bas
Obispo where Culebra cut begins. The channel through the continental
divide, from Bas Obispo to Pedro Miguel, a distance of 8.11 miles
will be 300 feet wide, and the surface of the water will be at the
lake level. At Pedro Miguel vessels will be lowered from the 85-foot
level to a small lake at 55 feet above sea-level, in twin locks of
one flight. A channel 500 feet wide and 0.97 miles long will lead to
Miraflores locks, where the descent to sea-level will be made in twin
locks of two flights. The locks at Pedro Miguel and Miraflores will be
of the same dimensions as those at Gatun. From Miraflores to deep water
in Panama Bay, a distance of 8.31 miles, the channel will be 500 feet
wide and 45 feet deep at mean tide. The channel widths given are all
bottom widths. The entrance both in Limon Bay and in Panama Bay will be
protected by breakwaters.”
VI. ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
Work on the Isthmus is in the hands of an Isthmian Canal Commission,
consisting of seven members, all of whom are appointed by the
President. All of them have headquarters on the Isthmus. The present
personnel of the Commission is as follows. Lieutenant Colonel G.
Goethals, U. S. A., chairman and chief engineer; Major David Du B.
Gaillard, U. S. A., corps of engineers; Major William L. Sibert,
U. S. A., corps of engineers: Colonel William C. Gorgas, U. S. A.,
medical department; Harry Rosseau, U. S. A., civil engineer; Lieutenant
Colonel H. F. Hodges, U. S. A., corps of engineers and Joseph C. S.
Blackburn, civilian.
As chairman, Colonel Goethals receives a salary of $15,000 annually.
Majors Gaillard and Sibert and Civil Engineer Rosseau $14,000 each and
Dr. Gorgas, Colonel Hodges and Mr. Blackburn $10,000 each.
The principal departments on the Isthmus, each in charge of a head who
is directly responsible for the work carried on under his direction
are: Construction and Engineering; Quartermaster’s; Subsistence; Civil
Administration; Sanitation; Disbursements; and Examination of Accounts.
The Department of Construction and Engineering is subdivided into the
following named divisions; Atlantic Division from deep water to and
including the Gatun locks and dams; the Central Division from Gatun to
Pedro Miguel; and the Pacific Division from Pedro Miguel to the Pacific.
The Department of Construction and Engineering is under the direct
charge of the Chief Engineer. The general plans come from the office of
the Chief Engineer and details are left to division engineers, subject
to his approval. The whole idea of the organization in this department
is to place and fix responsibility, leaving to each subordinate the
carrying out of the particular work intrusted to his charge. The Chief
Engineer is assisted by the Assistant Chief Engineer, who considers
and reports upon all engineering questions submitted for final action.
The Assistant Chief Engineers have charge of the designs of the locks,
dams, and spillways, and the supervision of these particular parts of
the work. There is also attached to the Chief Engineer an assistant
who looks after mechanical forces on the Isthmus, and has supervision
over the machine shops, the cost-keeping branch of the work, the
apportionment of appropriations, and the preparation of the estimates.
There is also an assistant engineer, who has charge of all general
surveys, meteorological observations, and river hydraulics.
The Quartermaster’s Department has charge of the recruiting of labor,
the care, repair, and maintenance of quarters, the collection and
disposal of garbage and refuse, the issue of furniture, and the
delivery of distilled water and commissary supplies to the houses of
employees and the construction of all new buildings. Operating in
conjunction with the purchasing department in the United States, the
Quartermaster’s Department secures all supplies needed for construction
and other purposes, and makes purchases of material on the Isthmus when
required.
The common labor force of the Commission and Panama Railroad is more
than 25,000 men, and consists of about 6,000 Spaniards, with a few
Italians, the remainder being from the West Indies. The Spaniard is
the best worker, although he objects to working in water. The total
number on the pay rolls will average more than 30,000. Of these 5,000
are “gold men”, that is, officials, clerks and skilled laborers, all of
whom are American recruited through the Washington office. In the month
of September, 1909, there were approximately 44,000 employees on the
Isthmus on the rolls of the Commission and the Panama Railroad. There
were actually at work, on November 3, 1909, 35,311 men, 27,672 for the
Commission and 7,639 for the Panama Railroad Company. The salaries and
wages of these men are paid once a month.
This Quartermaster’s Department also has charge of the property
records, receives semiannual returns of property from all those to whom
property has been issued, and checks the returns and inventories of the
storehouses with the records compiled from the original invoices.