“_It is hoped_ that the Arragonese army _History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1

(the line) “up, but being an independent command, no order has yet

been sent. An express went after Palafox, who will return here this

morning, and _then, it is hoped_, that he will send an order to

general O’Neil at Sanguessa to march instantly; and _further, it is

hoped_, that general O’Neil will obey this order without waiting

for one from his immediate chief, Palafox, the captain-general of

Arragon, who is at Zaragoza; at all events, there is a loss of

above 24 hours by the happy system of independent commands, which

may make the difference of our having 18,000 men more or less in

the battle that may be fought whenever the French are ready.” ...

“Making me compliments of there being no secrets with their allies,

they” (the members of the council of war) “obliged me to sit down,

which I did for a quarter of an hour, enough to be quite satisfied

of the miserable system established by this junta” ... “In short, I

pitied poor Castaños and poor Spain, and came away disgusted to the

greatest degree.”

_Col. Graham to Lord W. Bentinck, Centruenigo, Nov. 13, 1808._

“If any thing can make the junta sensible of the absurdity of their

conduct this will. It would indeed have been more felt if a great

part of the division had been lost, as might well have happened.

But the difficulty of passing so many men with artillery, and in

small boats, and the time that would have been required so great,

that I can hardly persuade myself these people can be so foolish

as ever seriously to have entertained the idea. But with whatever

intentions, whether merely as a pretence for assuming the command

for the purpose of irritating Castaños; whether from the silly

vanity of exercising power, and doing something which, if by great

good luck it had succeeded, might have proved what might be done

with a more active commander; or whether from a real conviction

of the excellence of the scheme, it must be equally evident to

every military man, indeed to every man of common sense, that it

is impossible things can succeed in this way; and then the junta

itself interferes, and to worse purpose.”

_Castaños’s Vindication._

“The nation is deceived in a thousand ways; as an example, it

believed that our armies were greatly superior to those of

the enemy, reckoning 80,000 men that of the centre, when your

excellencies” (the junta) “knew that it only amounted to 26,000

men.” ... “Madrid possessed money and riches; the nobles and loyal

inhabitants of that capital wished to give both the one and the

other; but whilst the armies were suffering the horrors of famine,

naked, and miserable, the possessions and jewels of the good

Spaniards remained quiet in Madrid, that they might be soon seized

by the tyrant, as they were in the end.”

_Stuart’s Despatch, August 7, 1808._

“No province shares the succours granted by Great Britain, although

they may not be actually useful to themselves. No gun-boats have

been sent from Ferrol to protect St. Ander or the coast of Biscay;

and the Asturians have in vain asked for artillery from the dépôts

of Gallicia. The stores landed at Gihon, and not used by the

Asturians, have remained in that port and in Oviedo, although they

would have afforded a seasonable relief to the army of general

Blake. The money brought by the Pluto for Leon, which has not

raised a man, remains in the port where it was landed.”

_Major Cox to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, August 3, 1808._

“I freely confess that I cannot help feeling some degree of

apprehension that this great and glorious cause may be ruined by

the baneful effects of jealousy and division.”

_Major Cox to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, August 27._

“The fact is, their” (the junta of Seville) “attention has been for

some time past so much occupied by vain and frivolous disputes, and

by views of private interest and advantage, that they seem to have

neglected entirely every concern of real importance, and almost

to have lost sight of the general interests of the country.” ...

“A million of dollars have, I understand, been sent out.” ... “It

certainly would not be prudent to intrust so large a sum to the

management of the temporary government of a particular province,

without having a sufficient security for its proper application.

My own opinion is, that the less money which is given to them the

better, until the general government is formed. This junta have

shown too evident signs of a wish to aggrandize themselves, and

a disinclination to afford those aids to other provinces, which

they had it in their power to grant, not to afford just grounds

of suspicion, that their boasted loyalty and patriotism have at

times been mixed with unworthy considerations of self-interest and

personal advantage.”

_Ditto, Sept. 5._

“By Mr. Duff’s present instructions, he would have had no option”

(distributing the money), “even though the _iniquitous project of

partition_, which your excellency knows was once contemplated, were

still in existence.”

_Ditto, Sept. 7._

“A dispute between the two juntas” (Seville and Grenada), “which

had nearly been productive of the most serious consequences,

and would probably have ended in open hostility, had it not

been prevented by the moderate, but decided conduct, of general

Castaños.”

_Ditto, Sept. 10._

“The supreme junta of Seville have latterly manifested very

different views, and, I am sorry to say, they seem almost to have

lost sight of the common cause, and to be wholly addicted to their

particular interests: instead of directing their efforts to the

restoration of their legitimate sovereign and the established form

of national government, they are seeking the means of fixing the

permanency of their own, and endeavouring to separate its interests

from those of the other parts of Spain. To what other purpose can

be attributed the order given to general Castaños, not to march

on any account beyond Madrid? To what the instructions given to

their deputy, don Andrea Miñiano, to uphold the authority, and

preserve the integrity of the junta of Seville; to distinguish the

army to which he is attached by the name of the army of Andalusia;

to preserve constantly the appellation, and not to receive any

orders but what came directly from this government? And above all,

what other motive could induce the strong and decided measure of

enforcing obedience to those orders, by withholding from general

Castaños the means of maintaining his troops, in case of his

refusing to comply with them?”--“What has been the late occupation

of the junta of Seville? Setting aside the plans which were formed

for augmenting the Spanish army in these provinces, and neglecting

the consideration of those which have been proposed in their stead,

their attention has been taken up in the appointment of secretaries

to the different departments, in disposing of places of emolument,

in making promotions in the army, appointing canons in the church,

and instituting orders of knighthood. Such steps as these make

their designs too evident.”

_Captain Carrol to sir David Baird, Llanes, Dec. 17, 1808._

“This province” (Asturias), “the first to declare war with France,

has, during seven months, taken no steps that I can discover to

make arrangements against the event of the enemy’s entering the

province.” ... “What has been done with the vast sums of money

that came from England, you will naturally ask? Plundered and

misapplied: every person who had or has any thing to do with money

concerns endeavouring to keep in hand all he can, and be ready, let

affairs turn out as they may, to help himself.”

_Lord William Bentinck to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, Sept. 19,

1808._

“Notwithstanding the professions of the Junta, their conduct has

evidently fallen short of them, and I think it would be very

desirable that more money should not fall into their hands.”

_Major Cox to sir H. Dalrymple, Seville, 10 July and 27th do._

“The proclamation of Florida Blanca was received here some time

ago, but was carefully suppressed by the government.”

Other publications containing maxims similar to those inculcated

by the proclamation of Florida Blanca have appeared, but are

suppressed here with equal care.

SECTION VI.--CENTRAL JUNTA.

_Lord Wm. Bentinck to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808._

“I am sorry to say that the new government do not seem to proceed

with the despatch and energy which the critical situation of the

country demands.”

_Ditto to sir H. Burrard, Madrid, Oct. 8._

“In my last letter I adverted to the inactivity and apparent

supineness which prevailed in the central council in regard to the

military, as well as to the other business of the government.”

_Ditto to sir John Moore, Nov. 8._

“But it is upon the spot where the exact state of the armies,

and the extraordinary inefficiency of the government, whose past

conduct promises so little for the future, are known, that the

danger must be the more justly appreciated.” ... “The most simple

order, however urgent the case, cannot be obtained from the

government without a difficulty, solicitation, and delay, that is

quite incredible.”

_Sir John Hope to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808._

“It is perfectly evident that they” (the junta) “are altogether

without a plan as to their future military operations, either in

the case of success or misfortune. Every branch is affected by the

disjointed and inefficient construction of their government.”

_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 18, 1808._

“Lord William Bentinck, as well as myself, have made repeated

representations, and I have given in paper after paper to obtain

something like promptitude and vigour; but though loaded with fair

promises in the commencement, we scarcely quit the members of the

junta before their attention is absorbed in petty pursuits and the

wrangling which impedes even the simplest arrangements necessary

for the interior government of a country.” ... “In short, we are

doing what we can, not what we wish; and I assure you we have

infamous tools to work with.”

_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Seville, Jan. 2, 1809._

“Morla’s treason is abused, but passed over; and the arrival of

money from Mexico, which is really the arrival of spoil for the

French, seems to have extinguished every sentiment the bad views

and the desperate state of things ought to have created.”

_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Jan. 10, 1809._

“Castaños, Heredia, Castelar, and Galluzzo, are all here. These

unfortunate officers are either prisoners or culprits, waiting the

decision of government on their conduct in the late transactions.

If the state of affairs should allow the government to continue in

existence they will probably wait many months, for no determination

is to be expected from people who have in no one instance punished

guilt or rewarded merit since they ruled the country. The junta

indeed, to say the truth, is at present absolutely null, and

although they represent the sovereign authority I have never

witnessed the exercise of their power for the public good.”

_Mr. Frere to sir John Moore. Las Santos, Dec. 16, 1808._

“The subject of the ships in Cadiz had not escaped me, but I

thought it so _very dangerous_ to suggest to the junta any idea

except that of living and dying on Spanish ground, that I avoided

the mention of any subject that could seem to imply that I

entertain any other prospects.”

SECTION VII.--RELATING TO THE PASSIVE STATE OF THE PEOPLE.

_Sir John Moore’s Journal, Dec. 9, 1808._

“In this part the people are passive. We find the greatest

difficulty to get people to bring in information.”

_Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere. Sahagun, Dec. 23, 1808._

“If the Spaniards are enthusiastic or much interested in this

cause, their conduct is the most extraordinary that was ever

exhibited.”

_Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Dec. 31, 1808, Astorga._

“I arrived here yesterday, where, contrary to his promise, and to

my expectation, I found the marquis la Romana, with a great part

of his troops. Nobody can describe his troops to be worse than he

does, and he complains as much as we do of the indifference of the

inhabitants, his disappointment at their want of enthusiasm; and

said to me in direct terms, that had he known how things were, he

neither would have accepted the command nor have returned to Spain.

With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are

quite absurd, and then returns to the helpless state of his army

and of the country.”

_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Nov. 17, 1808._

“The tranquillity of Madrid is truly wonderful.”

_Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Dec. 6._

“Destitute as we are of magazines, and without receiving even a

show of assistance either from the government or inhabitants of the

country, who, on the contrary, in many instances, even thwarted our

plans and measures; we could not have advanced without exposing

ourselves to almost certain destruction.”

_Sir David Baird to lord Castlereagh, Nov. 22, 1808, Astorga._

“Major Stuart of the 95th regiment, who was despatched in front

of this place to obtain information, reports that the inhabitants

appear perfectly depressed by their losses, and seem to abandon all

hope of making a successful resistance.”

_Captain Carrol to sir John Moore, Dec. 17, 1808._

“On my arrival at Oviedo all was confusion and dismay; the

confidence between the people, the army, and the junta destroyed.”

... “Is it to be expected that the peasantry can be as hearty in

the cause of patriotism as if they were treated with justice.”

_Lieut. Boothby to sir J. Moore. La Puebla, Jan. 1. 1809._

“The Spanish soldiers now here (about 700) are merely on their way

to the marquis de la Romana; and as to any neighbouring passes,

there are no people whom I can call upon to occupy them, or should

expect to defend them, however naturally strong they may be, for

I see no people who are thinking of the enemy’s advance with any

sentiments beyond passive dislike, and hopes of protection from God

and the English army.”

_The prince of Neufchatel to the duke of Dalmatia, Dec. 10, 1808._

“The city of Madrid is quite tranquil, the shops are all open, the

public amusements are resumed.”

_General Thouvenot to the prince of Neufchatel. St. Sebastian, 29th

Nov. 1808._

“The successes obtained by the armies of the emperor, and those

which are also foreseen, begin to make a sensible impression upon

the authorities of the country, who become from day to day more

affable towards the French, and more disposed to consider the king

as their legitimate sovereign.”

_The commandant Meslin to the prince of Neufchatel. Vittoria, 29th

Nov. 1808._

“The public feeling is still bad, still incredulous of our

successes.” ... “As to the tranquillity of the country, it appears

certain.”

_Mr. Frere to sir John Moore. Merida, Dec. 14, 1808._

“A thousand barriers would be interposed against that deluge of

panic which sometimes overwhelms a whole nation, and of which at

one time I was afraid I saw the beginning in this country.” ...

“_The extinction of the popular enthusiasm in this country_, and

the means which exist for reviving it, would lead to a very long

discussion.”

Section VIII.--Miscellaneous.

_Lord Collingwood to sir H. Dalrymple. Ocean, Cadiz, June 23, 1808._

“At Minorca and Majorca they describe themselves to be strong, and

having nothing to apprehend. However, they made the proposal for

entering into a convention with us for their defence, and in the

course of it demanded money, arms, and the protection of the fleet.

When, in return for them, it was required that their fleet should

be given up to us, to be held for their king Ferdinand, or that

a part of them should join our squadron against the enemy, they

rejected all those proposals: so that whatever we did for them was

to be solely for the honour of having their friendship.”

_Captain Whittingham to sir Hew Dalrymple, June 12, 1808._

“12th June. I returned to Xerez at three o’clock, A.M. The

general sent for me and requested I would go without delay to

Gibraltar, and inform lieut.-general sir Hew Dalrymple that he at

present occupied Carmona with 3000 men (regulars), having his

head-quarters at Utrera, where his regular force would amount to

12,000 men; that it was not his intention to attempt to defend

Seville; that the heavy train of artillery, consisting of 80

pieces, was already embarked for Cadiz, under the pretext that they

were wanting for the defence of its works; and that every thing was

prepared for burning the harness, timbers, &c. &c. of the field

pieces; that he intended to fall gradually back upon Cadiz, if

forced to retreat; and that he did not at present desire that any

English troops should be landed till their numbers should amount to

8 or 10,000 men, lest the ardour of the people should oblige him to

commence an offensive system of warfare before the concentration of

a considerable Spanish and English force should afford reasonable

hopes of success.”

_Capt. Whittingham to sir H. Dalrymple. Utrera, June 29, 1808._

“The president approved of the idea, condemned the policy which

had led Spain to attempt to establish manufactories by force, and

showed clearly that the result had been the loss of a considerable

branch of the revenue, the increase of smuggling, and consequently

an enormous expense, in the payment of nearly _one hundred

thousand_ custom or rather excise officers, distributed about

the country, and the ruin of numberless families seduced by the

prospect of immediate profit to engage in illicit traffic.”

_Lord William Bentinck to sir H. Dalrymple. Madrid, Oct. 2, 1808._

“A passage of lord Castlereagh’s letter, of which I received

from you a copy, instructed you, if possible, to ascertain the

intentions of the Spanish government after the expulsion of

the French. Though not positively directed by you to ask this

information, yet the occasion appeared to make the question so

natural, and seemingly of course, and even necessary, that I

availed myself of it, and gave to general Castaños, to be laid

before count Florida Blanca, a memorandum, of which I enclose a

copy, marked A.”

_Extract from the copy marked_ A.

“It seems probable in such case that no diversion could be more

effectual or more formidable to Buonaparte than the march of a

large combined British and Spanish army over the Pyrenees, into

that part of France where there are no fortified places to resist

their passage into the very heart of the country, and into that

part where great disaffection is still believed to exist.”

_Major Fletcher, royal engineers, to sir John Moore. Betanzos, Jan.

5, 1809._

“I have the honour to report to your excellency that, in obedience

to your orders, I have examined the neck of land between the

harbour of Ferrol and the bridge of Puente de Humo. This ground

does not appear to possess any position that has not several

defects.” ... “I did not find any ground so decidedly advantageous,

and containing a small space, as to render it tenable for the

vanguard of an army to cover the embarkation of the main body.” ...

“I should have sent this report much sooner, but found it

impossible to procure post horses until my arrival at Lugo, and

since that time I have had very bad ones.”

_Ditto to Ditto. Coruña, Jan. 6, 1809._

“I am therefore led to suggest, that as Coruña is fortified,

reveted, and tolerably flanked (though the ground about it is

certainly not favourable), as it could not be carried by a

coup-demain if properly defended, as it contains a great quantity

of cover for men; and as, even against artillery, it might make

resistance for some days, it may be worth consideration whether,

under present circumstances, it may not be desirable to occupy it

in preference to the peninsula of Betanzos, should the army not

turn off for Vigo.”

* * * * *

No. XIV.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN MOORE’S CORRESPONDENCE.

_Sir J. Moore to Mr. Frere. Salamanca, Nov. 27, 1808._

“The movements of the French give us little time for discussion.

As soon as the British army has formed a junction I must, upon the

supposition that Castaños is either beaten or retreated, march upon

Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of Spain, and thus run all

risks and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation, or I must fall

back upon Portugal.” ... “The movement into Spain is one of greater

hazard, as my retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain.

I shall be entirely in the power of the Spaniards, but perhaps

this is worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain are

thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover

from their defeats; and by collecting in the south be able, with

the aid of the British army, to resist, and finally repel, the

formidable attack which is prepared against them.”

_Sir John Moore’s Journal. Salamanca, Nov. 30, 1808._

“In the night of the 28th I received an express from Mr. Stuart, at

Madrid, containing a letter from lieut.-colonel Doyle, announcing

the defeat of Castaños’s army near Tudela. They seem to have made

but little resistance, and are, like Blake’s, flying; this renders

my junction with Baird so hazardous that I dare not attempt it;

but even were it made, what chance has this army, now that all

those of Spain are beaten, to stand against the force which must

be brought against it. The French have 80,000 in Spain, and 30,000

were to arrive in 20 days from the 15th of this month. As long as

Castaños’s army remained there was a hope, but I now see none. I am

therefore determined to withdraw the army.”

_Ditto, Dec. 9._

“After Castaños’s defeat, the French marched for Madrid, the

inhabitants flew to arms, barricaded their streets, and swore to

die rather than submit. This has arrested the progress of the

French, and Madrid still holds out; this is the first instance

of enthusiasm shown; there is a chance that the example may be

followed, and the people be roused; in which case there is still

a chance that this country may be saved. Upon this chance I have

stopt Baird’s retreat, and am taking measures to form our junction

whilst the French are wholly occupied with Madrid. We are bound

not to abandon the cause as long as there is hope; but the courage

of the populace of Madrid may fail, or at any rate they may not be

able to resist; in short, in a moment things may be as bad as ever,

unless the whole country is animated and flock to the aid of the

capital, and in this part the people are passive.”

_Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh. Salamanca, Dec. 10, 1808._

“I certainly think the cause desperate, because I see no determined

spirit any where, unless it be at Zaragoza. There is however a

chance, and whilst there is that I think myself bound to run all

risks to support it I am now differently situated from what I was

when Castaños was defeated: I have been joined by general Hope, the

artillery, and all the cavalry (lord Paget, with three regiments,

is at Toro); and my junction with sir David Baird is secure, though

I have not heard from him since I ordered him to return to Astorga.”

_Ditto to Ditto, Dec. 12._

“I shall threaten the French communications and create a diversion,

if the Spaniards can avail themselves of it; but the French have in

the north of Spain from 80 to 90,000 men, and more are expected.

Your lordship may therefore judge what will be our situation if the

Spaniards do not display a determination very different from any

they have shown hitherto.”

_Sir John Moore’s journal. Sahagan, Dec. 24, 1808._

“I gave up the march on Carrion, which had never been undertaken

but with the view of attracting the enemy’s attention from the

armies assembling in the south, and in the hope of being able to

strike a blow at a weak corps, whilst it was still thought the

British army was retreating into Portugal; for this I was aware

I risked infinitely too much, but something I thought was to be

risked for the honour of the service, and to make it apparent that

we stuck to the Spaniards long after they themselves had given up

their cause as lost.”

_Sir J. Moore to lord Castlereagh. Coruña, Jan. 13, 1808._

“Your lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion, as a

military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca.

The Spanish armies were then beaten; there was no Spanish force to

which we could unite; and from the character of the government, and

the disposition of the inhabitants, I was satisfied that no efforts

would be made to aid us, or favour the cause in which they were

engaged. I was sensible, however, that the apathy and indifference

of the Spaniards would never have been believed; that had the

British been withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been

imputed to their retreat; and it was necessary to risk this army to

convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that

the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make

any efforts for themselves. It was for this reason that I marched

to Sahagun. As a diversion it has succeeded. I brought the whole

disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been

allowed to follow it, without a single movement being made by any

of what the Spaniards call armies to favour its retreat.”

* * * * *

No. XV.

This despatch from the count of Belvedere to the count of Florida

Blanca, relative to the battle of Gamonal, is an example of the

habitual exaggerations of the Spanish generals.

(Translation.)

Since my arrival at Burgos I have been attacked by the enemy: in

two affairs I repulsed him; but to-day, after having sustained

his fire for thirteen hours, he charged me with double my force,

besides cavalry, as I believe he had three thousand of the latter,

and six thousand infantry at least, and I have suffered so much

that I have retired on Lerma, and mean to assemble my army at

Aranda de Douero. I have sustained a great loss in men, equipage,

and artillery; some guns have been saved, but very few. Don Juan

Henestrosa, who commanded in the action, distinguished himself, and

made a most glorious retreat; but as soon as the cavalry attacked,

all was confusion and disorder. I shall send your excellency the

particulars by an officer when they can be procured. The volunteers

of Zafra, of Sezena, of Valentia, and the first battalion of

infantry of Truxillo, and the provincials of Badajoz, had not

arrived at Burgos, and consequently I shall be able to sustain

myself at Aranda, but they are without cartridges and ammunition. I

lament that the ammunition in Burgos could not be brought off. The

enemy followed me in small numbers: I am now retiring (10 P.M.),

fearing they may follow me in the morning. I yesterday heard from

general Blake, that he feared the enemy would attack him to-day,

but his dispositions frustrated the enemy’s designs, beginning the

action at eleven at night.

(Signed) CONDE DE BELVEDERE.

* * * * *

No. XVI.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE AUTHOR.

“Dans la même lettre que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m’écrire

vous me priez aussi, monsieur, de vous donner quelques lumières

sur la poursuite de Mr. le général sir John Moore, quand il fit

sa retraite sur la Corogne en 1809. Je ne pense pas que vous

désiriez des détails sur cette operation, car ils doivent vous être

parfaitement connus, mais je saisirai avec empressement l’occasion

que vous me procurez pour rendre à la mémoire de sir John Moore

le témoignage que ses dispositions furent toujours les plus

convenables aux circonstances, et qu’en profittant habillement des

avantages que les localités pouvaient lui offrir pour seconder sa

valeur, il m’opposa partout la resistance la plus énergique et la

mieux calculée; c’est ainsi qu’il trouva une mort glorieuse devant

la Corogne, au milieu d’un combat qui doit honorer son souvenir.”

“_Paris, ce 15 Novembre, 1824._”

* * * * *

No. XVII.

LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE.

_London, Dec. 10, 1808._

“SIR,

“The messenger, Mills, arrived here yesterday with your despatches,

No. 19 to No. 26 inclusive; and at the same time advices were

received from lieutenant-general sir David Baird, dated on the

29th ultimo at Astorga, which state that general to have received

intelligence from sir John Moore of the complete defeat of

general Castaños’s army, and of the determination taken by sir

John Moore, in consequence, to fall back upon Portugal, while sir

David Baird is directed by sir John Moore to re-embark his troops,

and to proceed to the Tagus. Thus at the same moment at which I

receive from you the caution entertained in your No. 20, that a

retreat into Portugal would be considered by the central junta

as indicating an intention to abandon the cause of Spain, his

majesty’s government receive the information that this measure has

actually been adopted, but under circumstances, which, it is to be

supposed, could not have been in the contemplation of the central

junta. To obviate, however, the possibility of such an impression,

as you apprehend, being produced upon the Spanish government by the

retreat of the British armies, I lose no time in conveying to you

his majesty’s commands, that you should forthwith give the most

positive assurance, that the object of this retreat is no other

than that of effecting in Portugal the junction which the events

of the war have unfortunately rendered impracticable in Spain,

with the purpose of preparing the whole army to move forward again

into Spain whenever, and in whatever direction their services

may be best employed in support of the common cause. In proof of

this intention, you will inform the Spanish government, that an

additional reinforcement of cavalry is at this moment sailing

for Lisbon, and that the British army in Portugal will be still

further augmented, if necessary, so as to make up a substantive

and effective force adequate to any operation, for which an

opportunity may be offered in the centre or south of Spain,

according to the course which the war may take. But while you make

this communication to the Spanish government, it is extremely

necessary that you should accompany it with a distinct and pressing

demand for the communication to you and to the British general of

whatever be the plan of operations of the Spanish armies. Sir John

Moore complains that he had not received the slightest intimation

of any such plan at the date of his last despatch of the 20th

ultimo; and I am afraid the appointment which you mention in your

No. 20 of general Morla to discuss with the British commanders the

mode of co-operation between the British and Spanish armies will

not have taken place till after the defeat of the Spanish armies

will have entirely disposed of that question for the present. The

language of sir David Baird, with respect to defect of information,

is precisely the same as that of sir John Moore. Sir D. Baird has

indeed had the advantage of some intercourse with the marquis de

la Romana; but the marquis de la Romana himself does not appear to

have been in possession of any part of the views of his government,

nor to have received any distinct account of the numbers, state,

or destination even, of either of the armies which he was himself

appointed to command. The British government has most cautiously

and scrupulously abstained from interfering in any of the counsels

of the junta, or presuming to suggest to them, by what plan they

should defend their country. But when the question is as to the

co-operation of a British force, they have a right, and it is their

duty to require, that some plan should have been formed, and being

formed, should be communicated to the British commander, in order

that he may judge of, and (if he shall approve), may be prepared

to execute the share intended to be assigned to him. You will

recollect, that the army which has been appropriated by his majesty

to the defence of Spain and Portugal is not merely a considerable

part of the disposeable force of this country: it is, in fact, the

British army. The country has no other force disposeable. It may

by a great effort reinforce the army for an adequate purpose; but

another army it has not to send. The proposals, therefore, which

are made somewhat too lightly for appending parts of this force,

sometimes to one of the Spanish armies, sometimes to another, and

the facility with which its services are called for, wherever the

exigency of the moment happens to press, are by no means suited to

the nature of the force itself, or consonant to the views, with

which his majesty has consented to employ it in Spain. You are

already apprised by my former despatch (enclosing a copy of general

Moore’s instructions), that the British army must be kept together

under its own commander, must act as one body for some distinct

object, and on some settled plan.

“It will decline no difficulty, it will shrink from no danger,

when, through that difficulty and danger, the commander is enabled

to see his way to some definite purpose. But, in order to this, it

will be necessary that such purpose should have been previously

arranged, and that the British army should not again be left as

that of sir John Moore and sir David Baird have recently been, in

the heart of Spain, without one word of information, except such as

they could pick up from common rumour, of the events passing around

them. Previously, therefore, to general sir John Moore’s again

entering Spain, it will be expected that some clear exposition

should be made to him of the system upon which the Spaniards intend

to conduct the war; the points which they mean to contest with

the advancing enemy, and those which, if pressed by a series of

reverse, they ultimately propose to defend.

“The part assigned to the British army in the combined operation

must be settled with sir John Moore, and he will be found not

unambitious of that in which he may be opposed most directly to the

enemy. The courage and constancy displayed by the junta, under the

first reverses, are in the highest degree worthy of admiration.[31]

And if they shall persevere in the same spirit, and can rouse the

country to adequate exertions, there is no reason to despair of the

ultimate safety of Spain. But it is most earnestly to be hoped,

that the same confidence which they appear to have placed in the

ability of their armies, under Blake and Castaños, to resist the

attacks of the enemy, will not be again adopted as their guide,

again to deceive them in the ulterior operations of the war. It is

to be hoped that they will weigh well their really existing means

of defence against the means of attack on the part of the enemy,

and that if they find them unequal to maintain a line of defence as

extended, as they have hitherto attempted to maintain, they will at

once fall back to that point, wherever it may be, at which they can

be sure that their stand will be permanent, and their resistance

effectual. It is obvious, that unless they can resist effectually

in the passes of the Guadarama, or in the Sierra Morena, the

ultimate point of retreat, after a series of defeats more or less

numerous and exhausting, according as they shall the sooner or the

later make up their minds to retreat, is Cadiz. Supported by Cadiz

on one side, and by the fortress of Gibraltar on the other, the

remaining armies of Spain might unquestionably make such a stand,

as no force which France could bring against them could overpower;

and the assistance of the British army would be in this situation

incalculably augmented by the communication with Gibraltar and the

sea. I am aware of the jealousy with which the mention of a British

force of any sort coupled with the name of Cadiz will be received.

But the time seems to be arrived at which we must communicate with

each other (the Spanish government and England) without jealousy

or reserve. His majesty has abjured, in the face of the world,

any motive of interested policy,--you are authorised to repeat in

the most solemn manner, if necessary, that abjuration. But if in

the midst of such sacrifices and such exertions as Great Britain

is making for Spain; if after having foregone all objects of

partial benefit, many of which the state of Spain (if we had been

so ungenerous as to take that advantage of it) would have brought

within our reach, the fair opinion of the British government

cannot be received without suspicion; there is little hope of real

cordiality continuing to subsist under reverses and misfortunes,

such as Spain must but too surely expect, and such as are at all

times the tests of sincerity and confidence. It is the opinion of

the British government that the last stand (if all else fails) must

be made at Cadiz. It is the opinion of the British government,

that this stand will be made in vain _only_ if the necessity of

resorting to it is too late acknowledged, and the means of making

it effectually not providently prepared. It is the opinion of the

British government, that on no account should the naval means of

Spain be suffered to fall into the hands of France, or those of

France to be recovered by her. It is their opinion that this may be

prevented, but to prevent it, the object must be fairly looked at

beforehand; and it is hoped that a spirit of distrust unworthy both

of those who entertain it, and of those with respect to whom it is

entertained, will not be suffered to interfere between an object of

so great importance and the means of ensuring its accomplishment.

It is absolutely necessary to lose no time in bringing this

subject fairly before the Spanish government, and if in doing so,

you should see either in M. Cevallos or in count Florida Blanca

marks of that distrust and suspicion which must fatally affect any

measure of co-operation between the British and Spanish forces,

it will be right that you should at once anticipate the subject,

and you are at liberty to communicate this despatch _in extenso_,

as the surest mode of proving the openness with which the British

government is desirous of acting, and the disdain which it would

feel of any imputation upon its disinterestedness and sincerity.

But while this object is thus to be stated to the central

government, it is not to this object alone that the services of

the British army are to be appropriated. The commander-in-chief

will have both the authority and the inclination to listen to any

proposal for any other practicable undertaking. And it is only in

the event of no such object or undertaking being presented to him

in Spain, that he is directed to confine himself to the defence of

Portugal. I am, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) “GEORGE CANNING.”

EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE, OF THE SAME

DATE AS THE ABOVE.

_December 10, 1808._

“The timely preparation of the fleets of France and Spain, now in

the harbour of Cadiz, is also a point to be pressed by you with

earnestness, but at the same time with all the delicacy which

belongs to it. In the event of _an emigration to America_ it is

obvious that this preparation should be made beforehand. And in the

case of this project not being adopted, and of a resolution being

taken to defend Cadiz to the utmost, it would still be desirable

that the fleets should be prepared for removal to Minorca, in

order to be out of the reach of any use which the disaffected in

Cadiz (of whom general Morla is represented to have expressed

considerable apprehensions), might be disposed to make of them for

compromise with the enemy.”

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE.

_December 11, 1808._

“SIR,

“Complaints have been justly made of the manner in which the

British troops, particularly those under sir David Baird, have been

received in Spain.

“The long detention of sir David Baird’s corps on board the

transports at Coruña may but too probably have contributed to

render the difficulties of a junction between the two parts of

the British army insurmountable, by giving the enemy time to

advance between them. In addition to this it is stated, that

there was a total want of preparation for supply of any sort, and

the unwillingness with which those supplies appear to have been

administered, have undoubtedly occasioned as much disappointment

as inconvenience to the British commanders. Unless some change

is effected in these particulars when the army again moves into

Spain, the advance of the British troops through that country will

be attended with more difficulty than a march through a hostile

country.”

* * * * *

No. XVIII.

RETURN OF BRITISH TROOPS EMBARKED FOR PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, IN 1808.

Extracted from the adjutant-general’s returns.

+------+------+---------+-------+

| 357 | 349 | 8688 | 9394 |Commanded by sir A. Wellesley; embarked

| | | | |

| 379 | ... | 4323 | 4702 |Commanded by generals Ackland and|

| | | | |

| 66 | ... | 4647 | 4713 |Commanded by general Spencer; embarked

| | | | |

| 712 | 563 | 10,049 |11,324 |Commanded first by sir John Moore,

| | | | |

| ... | 672 | ..... | 672 |Landed at Lisbon, Dec. 31st, 1808.

| | | | |

| 186 | ... | 943 | 1129 |Embarked at Gibraltar; sailed Aug.

| | | | |

| 94 | ... | 929 | 1023 |Commanded by gen. Beresford; embarked

| | | | |

| ... | 672 | ..... | 672 |Commanded by general C. Stewart;

| | | | |

| 798 | ... | 10,271 |11,069 |Commanded by sir D. Baird; embarked

| | | | |

| ... | ... | 1622 | ..... |Two regiments sent round to Lisbon

| | | | |

| ... | 2021 | ..... | 2021 |Commanded by lord Paget; embarked

+------+------+---------+-------+

| 2592 | 4277 | 41,472 |46,719 |

| | | | |

| | | | 1622 |Add two regiments sent to Lisbon from

| | | +-------+ Coruña.

| | | |48,341 |Grand total, of which 800 were

* * * * *

No. XIX.

RETURNS OF KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING, OF THE ARMY UNDER THE

COMMAND OF SIR A. WELLESLEY.

Key: K, killed; W, wounded; M, missing.

+-----------------------+-----------------------+------+

1808. | _Officers._ | _Men._ | |

August. | K | W | M | K | W | M | Tot. |

+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+

15th. Brillos | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 21 | 29 |

17th. Roriça | 4 | 19 | 4 | 66 | 316 | 70 | 479 |

21st. Vimiero | 4 | 35 | 2 | 131 | 499 | 49 | 720 |

+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+

for | 9 | 55 | 6 | 198 | 820 | 140 | 1228 |

+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+

* * * * *

No. XX.

BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE. RORIÇA, 17th AUG. 1808.

Extracted from the adjutant-general’s states.

Regiments.

{ {5th } }

{1st brigade, maj.-gen. Hill, {9th } 2780 }

{ {38th } }

{ }

Right {3d ditto, maj.-gen. Nightingale, {29th } 1722 } 7246

wing. { {82d } }

{ }

{ {45th } }

{5th ditto, C. Crawfurd, {50th } 2744 }

{ {91st } }

{4th brigade, brig.-gen. Bowes, {6th } 1829 }

{ {32d } }

{ }

{ {36th } }

Left {2d ditto, maj.-gen. Ferguson, {40th } 2681 } 5846

wing. { {71st } }

{ }

{ 6th ditto (light), {95th, 2d bn. } 1336 }

{ brig.-gen. Fane, {60th, 5th, bn. } }

Artillery, 18 guns, 6 and 9 lbs. 660 660

Cavalry 240 240

------

Total British 13,992

{ Infantry of the line, 1000 }

Portuguese, col. Trant, { Light Troops, 400 } 1,650

{ Cavalry, 250 }

------

Grand total, British and Portuguese,

including sick men, &c. &c. 15,642

* * * * *

No. XXI.

BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE. VIMIERO, 21st AUG. 1808.

Extracted from the adjutant-general’s states.

Regiments.

Right { { 5th } }

wing. { 1st brigade, gen. Hill, { 9th } 2780 } 2780

{ { 38th } }

{ { 50th } }

{ 6th ditto, brig.-gen. Fane, { 60th } 2293 }

{ { 95th, 2d bn} }

{ }

Centre. { { 9th } } 4953

{ 7th ditto, brig.-gen. Anstruther, { 43d, 2d bn } 2660 }

{ { 52d, 2d bn } }

{ { 97th } }

{ { 36th } }

{ 2d brigade, maj.-gen. Ferguson, { 40th } 2681 }

{ { 71st } }

{ }

Left { 3d ditto, maj.-gen. Nightingale, { 29th } 1722 }

wing. { { 82d } } 7612

{ }

{ 4th ditto, brig.-gen Bowes, { 6th } 1829 }

{ { 32d } }

{ }

{ 8th ditto, maj.-gen. Ackland, { 2d } }

{ { 20th } 1380 }

{ { 45th } }

Reserve.{ 5th brigade, brig.-gen. C. Crawfurd, { 50th } 2744 } 2744

{ { 91st } }

Artillery, 18 guns, 6 and 9lbs. 660 660

Cavalry, 20th light dragoons, 240 240

------

Total British 18,989

Portuguese, col. Trant, {Infantry, 1400 1,650

{Cavalry, 250

------

Grand total, including sick, wounded, and missing, 20,639

* * * * *

No. XXII.

RETURN OF SIR HEW DALRYMPLE’S ARMY, OCT. 1, 1808.

Head-quarters, Bemfica.

+--------------+-------------+------------+--------+

+--------------+-------------+------------+--------+

Cavalry | 1402 | 128 | 28 | 1558 |

Artillery | 2091 | 146 | 6 | 2243 |

Infantry | 25,678 | 3196 | 454 | 29,328 |

+--------------+-------------+------------+--------+

Total | 29,171 | 3470 | 488 | |

+--------------+-------------+------------+--------+

Grand total, including artificers, waggon train, &c. &c. | 33,129 |

+--------+

* * * * *

No. XXIII.

EMBARKATION RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY UNDER GENERAL JUNOT.

+------------------------------------------------------------+

|Key: Of=Officers.; Hor=Horses.; Hosp.=Hospit^l.; |

| Pris.=Prison^s; Cr.=Criminals. |

+---------------+-----------+----------+-----------------+---+

+---+------+----+--+----+---+--+----+--+---+--+------+---+---+

| Of| Men |Hor |Of| Men|Hor|Of| Men|Of|Men|Of| Men |Hor|Men|

---------+---+------+----+--+----+---+--+----+--+---+--+------+---+---+

Infantry |273|15,860|....|52|2078| 0|46|3281|17|895|..|22,635| ..| 13|

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Cavalry | 48| 1722|1176|..| 1| 1|..| 195| 1|...|..| 1974| ..| ..|

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Artillery| 21| 1015| 472|..| 6| ..|..|....|..|...|..| 1121| ..| ..|

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Engineers| 14| ....|....|..|....| ..|..|....| 3|...|..| 17| ..| ..|

---------+---+------+----+--+----+---+--+----+--+---+--+------+---+---+

Guns 10 8 lbs. }

16 4 lbs. } 35

Howitzers 4 6 inch. }

Grand total 25,747 men, 1655 horses, and 35 pieces of artillery.

Note.--On the staff of each division there are

1 General of division. 1 Inspector of reviews.

2 Generals of brigade. 1 Commissary of engineers.

7 Aides-de-camp. 2 Officers of engineers.

Artillery { 1 General.

{ 4 Colonels.

{ 2 Chefs de bataillon.

Engineers { 1 Colonel. }The remainder in the divisions.

{ 2 Captains. }

* * * * *

No. XXIV.

THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM A MINUTE MADE BY HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE

DUKE OF YORK IN 1808

Proves that sixty thousand men could have been provided for the

campaign of 1808-9 in _Spain_, without detriment to other services.

“There are present in Portugal,

Cavalry 1640 } 31,446

Infantry 34 battalions 29,806 }

“Under orders to embark, { Cavalry 3410 } 14,829

{ Infantry 11,419 }

------

Total. 46,275

------

“Of this force the 20th dragoons and 8 battalions should remain

in Portugal. The disposeable force would then be

Cavalry. Infantry.

From Portugal 1313 23,575

Under orders 3200 11,419

Force to be drawn from Sicily 8000

--------------

Total 4513 42,994

“To this may be added four reg^s of cav^{ry}

And the two brigades of guards 2560 2434

--------------

Grand total 7073 45,428

--------------

“When to this you add 4 battalions of infantry, which may be

spared, and the artillery, it will form a corps of above sixty

thousand rank and file.”

Note.--The detail of names and strength of the regiments are

omitted to save space.

* * * * *

No. XXV.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY UNDER THE COMMAND OF SIR JOHN MOORE.

_2d Division._ _3d Division._ _1st Division._

Lt.-gen. Hope. Lt.-gen. Fraser. Lt.-gen. Baird.

| | |

Brigades. Brigades. Brigades.

1st. 2d. 3d. 1st. 2d. 1st. 2d. 3d.

| | | | | | | |

4 batts. 3 batts. 3 batts. 4 batts. 3 batts. 2 batts. 3 batts. 3 batts.

_2d Flank Brigade._ _Reserve._ _1st Flank Brigade._

German.

Br.-gen. Alten. M.-gen. Paget. Col. B. Crawford.

| | |

2 Battalions. Brigades. 3 Battalions.

1st. 2d.

| |

3 batts. 2 batts.

_Cavalry._ _Artillery._

Lord Paget. Col. Harding.

| |

Brigades. 11 Brigades.

1st. 2d. |

| | 66 Pieces.

3 reg^s. 2 reg^s.

_Return of sir John Moore’s army, Dec. 19, 1808, extracted from the

adjutant-general’s morning state of that day._

+--------+----------+----------+--------+

+--------+----------+----------+--------+

Cavalry | 2278 | 182 | 794 | 3254 |

Artillery | 1358 | 97 | ... | 1455 |

Infantry | 22,222 | 3756 | 893 | 26,871 |

+--------+----------+----------|--------+

| 25,858 | 4035 | 1687 | 31,580 |

| |

Deduct | 2275 | Men composing { 3d reg. left in Portugal.

| | four battalions, viz. { 76th } Between Villa

+--------+ { 51st } Franca and

| | Total number { 59th } Lugo.

| 23,583 | under arms.

+--------+

Note.--Of 66 guns 42 were attached to the divisions, the remainder

in reserve, with the exception of one brigade of 3 lbs.

* * * * *

No. XXVI.

The following General Return, extracted from especial regimental

reports, contains the whole number of non-commissioned officers and

men, cavalry and infantry, lost during sir John Moore’s campaign:

Total.

Lost at or previous to the arrival of { Cavalry, 95 } 1397

the army at the position of Lugo, { Infantry, 1302 }

Of this number 200 were left in the wine-vaults of Bembibre,

and nearly 500 were stragglers from the troops that marched

to Vigo.

Lost between the departure of the army }

from Lugo and the embarkation at } Cavalry, 9 }

Coruña, } Infantry, 2627 } 2636

----

Grand total 4033

Of the whole number above 800 contrived to escape to Portugal, and

being united with the sick left by the regiments in that country,

they formed a corps of 1876 men, which being re-embodied under the

name of the battalions of detachments, did good service at Oporto

and Talavera.

The pieces of artillery abandoned during the retreat were six

3-pounders.

These guns were landed at Coruña without the general’s knowledge;

they never went beyond Villa Franca, and, not being horsed, were

thrown down the rocks when the troops quitted that town.

The guns used in the battle of Coruña were spiked and buried in the

sand, but the French discovered them.

N.B.--Some errors may have crept into the regimental states, in

consequence of the difficulty of ascertaining exactly where each

man was lost, but the inaccuracies could not affect the total

amount above fifty men more or less.

* * * * *

No. XXVII.

The following states of the Spanish armies are not strictly

accurate, because the original reports from whence they have

been drawn were generally very loose, and often inconsistent and

contradictory. Nevertheless, it is believed that the approximation

is sufficiently close for any useful purpose.

STATE I.

_Army of Andalusia._

1808. Armed peasantry. Regulars.

19th July, Baylen Unknown 29,000

{ Madrid, }

1st Sept. { La Mancha, } -- 30,000

{ Sierra Morena, }

STATE II.

Numbers of the Spanish armies in October, 1808, according to the

reports transmitted to sir John Moore by the military agents.

Armed peasantry,

incorporated

Regulars. with the

regular troops.

Troops upon the Ebro,

and in Biscay, 75,000 70,000 145,000

In Catalonia, 20,000 -- 20,000

In march from Aragon

to Catalonia, 10,000 -- 10,000

Ditto new levies

from Grenada, 10,000 10,000

In the Asturias, 18,000 -- 18,000

-------- -------

Total 123,000 80,000

-------

Grand total 203,000

STATE III.

Real numbers of the Spanish armies in line of battle, in the months

of October, November, and December, 1808.

_1st Line._

Cavalry. Infantry. Guns.

Army of Palafox, 550 17,500 20 } Defeated and dispersed

Army of Castaños, 2,200 24,500 48 } at Tudela.

Army of Blake, 100 30,000 26 } Ditto at the battles

Army of Romana, 1,404 8,000 25 } of Zornoza and

Asturians, -- 8,000 -- } Espinosa.

Army of count Belvedere, 1,150 11,150 30 Ditto at Gamonal.

------ ------ ---

Total 5,404 99,150 149

Deduct Romana’s cavalry }

and guns, which never } 1,404 -- 25

came into the line of }

battle }

----- ------ ---

Total, brought into 1st }

line of battle } 4,000 99,150 124 103,150

_2d Line._

Infantry. Cavalry. {Were beaten at the

{ Somosierra 30th Nov.;

General St Juan’s { murdered their general

division, 12,000 -- { at Talavera, Dec. 7th,

{ and dispersed.

Fugitives from Gamonal, } {Fled from Segovia and

commanded by general } 4,000 -- { Sepulveda, Dec. 2d, and

Heredia, } { dispersed at Talavera,

{ 7th.

Fugitives from Blake’s } {Beaten at Mancilla, 29th

army, re-organised } 6,000 1,400 { Dec.; retired into

by Romana, } { Gallicia. Infantry

{ dispersed there.

Asturian levies under } 5,000 -- Were not engaged.

Ballesteros, }

Fugitives assembled } {Defeated and dispersed,

by Galluzzo behind } 6,000 -- { 24th Dec., by the 4th

the Tagus, } { corps, at Almaraz.

------ ------

Total, brought into }

2d line, } 33,000 1,400

* * * * *

To cover Moore’s advance there were on the Ebro, in Biscay,

and in the Asturias, according to the Spanish and the

military agents reports 173,000

The real number brought into the field was 103,150

-------

Exaggeration 69,850

Note.--The real amount includes the sick in the field hospitals.

* * * * *

No. XXVIII.

SECTION I.--STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY CALLED THE FIRST PART OF THE

ARMY OF SPAIN, DATED OCT. 1, 1808.

Head-quarters, Vittoria.

King Joseph, commander-in-chief.

General Jourdan, major-general. General Belliard, chief of the staff.

Recapitulation, extracted from the imperial states, signed by the

prince of Neufchatel.

Officers included, present under arms.

Men. Horses.

Division imperial guard, commanded by gen. Dorsenne 2423 786

Do. reserve cavalry, imperial gendarmes, }

and other troops } Gen. Saligny 5417 944

Corps of marshal Bessieres 15,595 2923

Do. marshal Ney 13,756 2417

Do. marshal Moncey 16,636 } 22,640 3132

Garrison of Pampeluna 6004 }

Garrisons of Vittoria, Bilbao, St. Sebastian,}

Tolosa, Montdragon, Salinas, Bergara, } Gen.

Villa Real, Yrun, and other places of less } Lagrange 8479 1458

note }

{ Gen. Drouet }

Troops disposeable at Bayonne and the { commanding } 20,005 5196

vicinity, or in march upon that { 11th military }

place { division. }

Do. employed as moveable columns in the }

defence of the frontier from Bayonne } 6042 261

to Belgarde }

In Catalonia, gen. Duhesme 10,142 1638

Fort of Fernando Figueras, gen. Reille 4027 557

Division of gen. Chabot 1434 --

------- -----

Total 110,660 19,312

------- ------

Note.--At this period the Spaniards and the military agents always

asserted that the French had only from 35 to 45,000 men of all

weapons.

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY, CALLED “THE SECOND PART OF THE ARMY OF

SPAIN,” OCTOBER 1, 1808.

This army, composed of the troops coming from the grand army and

from Italy, was by an imperial decree, dated 7th September, divided

into six corps and a reserve.

Present under arms.

Men. Horses.

1st corps, marshal Victor, duke of Belluno 29,547 5552

5th Do. Mortier, duke of Treviso 24,405 3495

6th Do. destined for Ney, duke of Elchingen 22,694 3945

Infantry of the viceroy of Spain’s guards 1213 ...

Cavalry ditto 456 551

1st division of dragoons 3695 3994

2d ditto 2940 3069

3d ditto 2020 2238

4th ditto 3101 3316

5th ditto 2903 3068

Division of general Sebastiani 5808 185

5th regiment of dragoons 556 531

German division 6067 381

Polish ditto 6818 ...

Dutch brigade 2280 751

Westphalian light horse 522 559

General Souham’s division 7259 ...

Ditto Pino’s ditto 6803 ...

24th regiment of dragoons 664 731

Regiment of royal Italian chasseurs 560 512

Regiment of Napoleon’s dragoons 500 474

Artillery and engineers in march for Perpignan 1706 1430

------- ------

Total of 2d part 132,530 34,786

Total of 1st part 110,660 19,312

------- ------

243,190 54,098

------- ------

Grand total 243,190 men and 54,098 horses.

SECTION II.--GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, OCTOBER

10th, 1808.

KEY:

Hosp. = Hospital.

Pr. = Prisoners.

Hor. = Horses.

CH = Cav. Hors. (Cavalry Horses)

AH = Art. Hors. (Artillery Horses)

Inf. = Infantry.

+--------------+-----------+------+----+---------------------+

+-------+------+------+----+------+----+-------+------+------+

| Men. | Hor.| Men. |Hor.| Men. |Men.| Men. | CH | AH |

Belluno, | 28,797| 5615| 2201| 219| 2939| ..| 33,937| 3329| 2501|

| | | | | | | | | |

2d do. | | | | | | | | | |

-- Istria,| 20,093| 3219| 7394|1199| 5536| 30| 33,054| 3616| 802|

| | | | | | | | | |

3d do. | | | | | | | | | |

-- | | | | | | | | | |

Cornegliano,| 18,867| 3186|11,082|2472| 7522| 219| 37,690| 4537| 821|

| | | | | | | | | |

-- Dantzic,| 22,859| 2410| 955| 40| 2170| ..| 25,984| 1791| 659|

| | | | | | | | | |

-- Treviso,| 24,552| 3833| 188| 6| 1971| 2| 26,713| 1805| 2034|

| | | | | | | | | |

-- | | | | | | | | | |

Elchingen, | 29,568| 4304| 3381| 257| 5051| 33| 38,033| 2465| 2096|

| | | | | | | | | |

St. Cyr, | 35,657| 5254| 1302| 198| 4948| 200| 42,107| 4045| 1404|

| | | | | | | | | |

Abrantes, | 19,059| 2247| 2137| 1| 3528|1006| 25,730| 1776| 472|

| | | | | | | | | |

Reserve, | 34,924|23,604| 3533| 733| 3553| 392| 42,382|21,225| 3112|

| | | | | | | | | |

chasseurs, | 1,424| 1463| 256| 208| 74| ..| 1,754| 1675| ..|

| | | | | | | | | |

and | | | | | | | | | |

Germany, | 3,446| 958| 107| ..| ..| ..| 3,446| ..| 958|

| | | | | | | | | |

of France, | 8,588| 477| 107| ..| 146| 19| 8,860| 268| 209|

+-------+------+------+----+------+----+-------+------+------+

Total |247,834|56,567|32,536|5329|37,419|1901|319,690|46,828|15,068|

+-------+------+------+----+------+----+-------+------+------+

+-----------------------------------+-----------+------+

| Under arms. | Detached. | Hosp.|

+-------------+-------------+-------+------+----+------+

| Men. | Hor. | Men. | Hor. | Men. | Men. |Hor.| Men. |

+------+------+------+------+-------+------+----+------+

{French, |17,868|15,107|34,172|35,761|152,770|29,647|5052|31,401|

{Auxiliaries | 1,503| 968| 4,782| 4,831| 36,739| 2,889| 277| 6,018|

+------+------+------+------+-------+------+----+------+

Total |19,371|16,075|38,954|40,592|189,509|32,536|5329|37,419|

+------+------+------+------+-------+------+----+------+

+-----+---------------------+

| Pr. | Effective. |

+-----+-------+------+------+

| | | | |

| Men.| Men. | CH | AH |

+-----+-------+------+------+

{French, | 1771|267,629|41,565|14,253|

{Auxiliaries | 130| 52,061| 5,261| 819|

+-----+-------+------+------+

Total | 1901|319,690|46,828|15,068|

+-----+-------+------+------+

Grand total 319,690 men and 61,896 horses.

SECTION III.--STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF SPAIN, THE EMPEROR

NAPOLEON COMMANDING IN PERSON, 25th OCTOBER, 1808.

1148 Officers of the staff. 298 Battalions. 184 Squadrons.

---------------+-------------+-------+------+-----------------------

| | | | Grand total.

Present under | Detached. | Hosp. | Pr. |

arms. | | | |

Total, | | | | Cavalry Artil.

Men. Horses.| Men. Horses.| Men. | Men. | Men. horses. horses.

249,046 55,759|33,438 4943 |34,558 | 1892 | 318,934 45,242 15,498

Grand total 318,934 men and 60,740 horses.

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON COMMANDING,

15th NOVEMBER, 1808.

Officers of the staff, 1064. Battalions, 290. Squadrons, 181.

--------------+--------------+-------+-------+----------------------

| | | | Grand total.

Present under | Detached. | Hosp. | Pr. |

arms. | | | |

Total, | | | | Cavalry Artil.

Men. Horses.| Men. Horses.| Men. | Men. | Men. horses. horses.

255,876 52,430|32,245 8295 | 4517 | 1995 | 335,223 43,920 16,808

Grand total 335,223 men, and 60,728 horses.

SECTION IV.--THE STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL, JANUARY 1st,

1808.

Extracted from the imperial returns.

General Junot, commander-in-chief.

General Thiebault, chief of the staff.

1st division, general De Laborde, }

2d ditto, general Loison, } 26 battalions, 7 squadrons.

3d ditto, general Travot, }

Cavalry, general Kellerman, }

10 guns of 8 lbs. }

22 ditto 4 lbs. } 36 pieces.

4 6 inch howitzers. }

Present under arms. Effective.

Men. Horses. Men. Horses.

16,190 1,114 24,735 1,377

At Salamanca, or in march to }

join the army in Portugal. } 4,795 1,296 4,795 1,296

------ ------ ------ ------

Total 20,985 2,310 29,530 2,673

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL, 23d MAY, 1808.

Under arms. |Detached. Hosp. | Effective.

Men. Horses.|Men.Horses. Men. | Men. Horses. Art.

French, 24,446 2789 | -- -- 2449 | 29,684 3586 629

Spanish division }

of gen. Quesnel,} 9281 101 | 1087 -- 651 | 11,019 -- --

Do. gen. Caraffa, 6309 844 | 174 13 141 | 6,624 13 --

Portuguese troops, 4621 483 | 570 234 116 | 5,307 234 --

------ ---- | ---- --- ---- | ------ ---- ---

Total 38,657 4217 | 1831 247 3357 | 52,634 3835 629

Grand total 52,634 men, 4454 horses, and 36 guns.

SECTION V.--STATE OF THE “2d ARMY OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE,”

1st FEB. 1808, SPAIN.

General Dupont, commanding.

20 battalions, and 1 division of cavalry.

Head-quarters Valladolid.

Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Effective.

Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Horses.

20,729 2884 1303 334 2277 24,309 3218

Total 24,309 men, and 3218 horses.

SECTION VI.--STATE OF THE “ARMY OF OBSERVATION DE COTÉ D’OCEAN,”

1st FEB. 1808, SPAIN.

Marshal Moncey, commanding.

Head-quarters, Vittoria.

Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Effective.

Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Horses.

21,878 2547 2144 -- 4464 28,486 2547

Train of the guard 225 509

Grand total 28,711 men, and 3301 horses.

* * * * *

No. XXIX.

The following letters from lord Collingwood did not come into my

possession before the present volume was in the press. It will be

seen that they corroborate many of the opinions and some of the

facts that I have stated, and they will doubtless be read with the

attention due to the observations of such an honourable and able

man.

TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

_Ocean, Gibraltar, 30th August, 1808._

MY DEAR SIR,

I have been in great expectation of hearing of your progress with

the army, and hope the first account will be of your success

whenever you move. I have heard nothing lately of Junot at Cadiz;

but there have been accounts not very well authenticated, that

Joseph Buonaparte, in his retiring to France, was stopped by the

mass rising in Biscay, to the amount of 14,000 well-armed men,

which obliged him to return to Burgos, where the body of the French

army was stationed.

At Saragossa the French, in making their fourteenth attack upon

the town, were defeated, repulsed with great loss, and had retired

from it. There is a deputy here from that city with a commission

from the marquis de Palafox to request supplies. The first aid upon

their list is for 10 or 15,000 troops. The deputy states they have

few regulars in the province, and the war has hitherto been carried

on by all being armed. In this gentleman’s conversation I observe,

what I had before remarked in others, that he had no view of Spain

beyond the kingdom of Aragon; and in reply to the observations I

made on the necessity of a central government, he had little to

say, as if that had not yet been a subject of much consideration.

I have great hope that general Castaños, Cuesta, and those

captains-general who will now meet at Madrid will do something

effectual in simplifying the government. In a conversation I had

with Morla on the necessity of this, he seemed to think the juntas

would make many difficulties, and retain their present power as

long as they could.

I hope, my dear sir, you will give some directions about this

puzzling island (_Perexil_), which it appears to me will not be

of any future use; but the people who are on it will suffer much

in the winter, without habitations, except tents; I conceive the

purpose for which it was occupied is past, and will probably never

return; whenever they quit it, they should bring the stores away as

quietly as possible; for if I am not mistaken, the emperor has an

intention to keep them, and will remonstrate against them going. I

hope you have received good accounts from lady Dalrymple, &c.

* * * * *

I am to sail to-day for Toulon, where every thing indicates an

intention in the French to sail. Mr. Duff brought a million of

dollars to Seville, and has instructions to communicate with the

junta; but he appears to me to be too old to do it as major Cox

has done: he is still there, and I conclude will wait for your

instructions. Mr. Markland would accept with great thankfulness the

proposal you made to him to go to Valencia.

I beg my kind regards, &c.

COLLINGWOOD.

P. S. Prince Leopold is still here, and I understand intends to

stay until he hears from England. I have given passports for

Dupont and a number of French officers to go to France on parole,

ninety-three in number. General Morla was impatient to get them out

of the country. The Spaniards were much irritated against them;

they were not safe from their revenge, except in St. Sebastian’s

castle.

TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

_Ocean, off Toulon, October 18, 1808._

MY DEAR SIR,

I have received the favour of your letters of the 27th August and

5th September, and beg to offer you my sincere congratulations on

the success of the British army in Portugal, which I hope will have

satisfied the French that they are not those invincible creatures

which Buonaparte had endeavoured to persuade them they were.

It is a happy event to have rescued Portugal from the government of

France, and their carrying off a little plunder is a matter of very

secondary consideration; perhaps it may have the good effect of

keeping up the animosity of the Portuguese who suffer, and incite

them to more resistance in future.

The great business now is to endeavour to establish that sort of

government, and organise that sort of military force, which may

give security to the country; and the great difficulty in Portugal

will be to find men who are of ability to place at the head of the

several departments, who have patriotism to devote themselves to

its service, and vigour to maintain its independence. In a country

exhausted like Portugal, it will require much ingenious expedient

to supply the want of wealth and of every thing military. If it

is not found in the breasts of those to whom the people look up,

Portugal will remain in a hapless and uncertain state still.

I have not heard from sir Charles Cotton how he settled his

terms with the Russian admiral; but as he has got possession of

the ships to be sent to England, they cannot but be good: the

hoisting the English flag on the fort which surrendered to our

troops, I conclude, would be explained to the Portuguese as not to

be understood as taking possession by England for other purpose

than to be restored to its prince, as was done at Madeira; but in

this instance it ought to have been thought necessary to deprive

Siniavin of the argument he would have used of the neutrality of

the Portuguese flag, with whom his nation was not at _war_.

I left Cadiz the moment every thing in that quarter was pacific;

and Mr. Duff arrived there with a million of dollars for their use:

this money was sent to the junta of Seville, where I am afraid

there are many members unworthy of the trust.

I have only heard once from Cox since I left that quarter.

After getting the money, father Gil seemed to have dropt his

communications with major C., and their discussions were not of

a nature to excite much public interest; they consisted more in

private bickerings than of grave consult for the public weal. Tilly

seems to have been entirely disappointed in his project, both in

respect to the annexation of southern Portugal to Andalusia and the

pension of 12,000 dollars for his service in the supreme council:

of those you will be informed by major Cox. I am afraid I related

the proceedings to his majesty’s ministers of events which were

passing almost under my eye, and gave my opinion on them with

too great freedom; I mean with a freedom that is not usual; but

they were facts of which, without being possessed, his majesty’s

ministers could not have a knowledge of the real state of affairs

in Spain; and the sentiments those facts inspired were necessary

to explain my motives and the rule of conduct which I pursued.

And still I consider the great and only danger to which Spain is

now exposed is the supposition that the whole nation is possessed

of the same patriotism which, in Andalusia, Aragon, and Valencia,

led to such glorious results. It is far otherwise: there are not

many Castaños, nor Cuestas, nor Palafox’s; and take from Spain the

influence of the clergy, and its best source of power would be

lost: wherever this influence is least, the war is languid.

I wrote to you some time since to represent the state of Catalonia.

Nothing can be more indifferent to the cause than they appear

to be; yet the common peasantry have not less spirit nor less

desire to repel their enemy. They have no leaders. Palacio, the

captain-general, stays at Villa Franca, west of Barcelona, talking

of what he intends to do; and the people speak of him as either

wanting zeal in their cause or ability to direct them; while the

French from Barcelona and Figueras do just what they please. When

the French attacked Gerona he did nothing to succour it. The

greatest discomfiture they suffered was from lord Cochrane, who,

while they were employed at the siege, blew up the road, making

deep trenches in a part where the fire of his ships could be

brought upon; and when they came there he drove them from their

guns, killed many, and took some cannon.

The French fleet is here quite ready for sea, and I am doing all

that is in my power to meet them when they do come out. It is

an arduous service: the last ten days we have had gales of wind

incessantly: the difficulty of keeping a sufficient squadron is

very great. I think the storms from those Alpine mountains are

harder than in England, and of more duration.

I beg my best regards to captain Dalrymple, and my sincerest wishes

for every success to attend you.

I am, my dear sir Hew,

Your obedient and most humble servant,

COLLINGWOOD.

P. S. In the letter which I wrote to you on the state of Catalonia

I represented the necessity of sending a body of British troops to

Catalonia. There is no other prospect of the French being kept in

any bounds. The avenues to France are as open now as at any time

they have been. I have kept a ship always at Rosas Bay; her marines

have garrisoned the castle, and her company assisted in repairing

the works. The French appear to have designs on that place. The

presence of the English alone prevents them. If 18,000 men were

here of our army I think they would make Mr. Palacio come forward

and put the whole country into activity, which till then I don’t

think they ever will be.

COLLINGWOOD.

They want an English resident at Gerona, that they may have

somebody to apply to for succour....

[The rest torn off in the original.]

TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

_Ocean, off Minorca, April 8, 1809._

MY DEAR SIR,

I received the favour of your letter a few days ago, which gave me

great pleasure, after all the trouble and vexations you have had,

to hear you were all well.

I was exceedingly sorry when I saw the angry mood in which the

convention in Portugal was taken up, even before the circumstances

which led to it were at all known. Before our army landed in

Portugal the French force was reported to be very small. I remember

its being said that a body of 5000 troops were all that was

necessary to dispossess Junot. I conclude the same sort of report

went to England; and this, with the victory that was obtained, led

people to expect the extermination of the few French which were

supposed to be there; and when once the idea is entertained people

shut their eyes to difficulties.

I remember what you told me, the last time I saw you off Cadiz, of

the communications which might be made to you by an officer who

possessed the entire confidence of ministers. I thought then, that

whatever ministers had to communicate to a commander-in-chief,

could not be done better than by themselves; for intermediate

communications are always in danger of being misunderstood, and

never fail to cause doubts and disturb the judgment. I hope now it

is all over, and your uneasiness on that subject at an end.

My labours I think will never cease. I am worn down by fatigue of

my mind; with anxiety and sorrow; my health is very much impaired;

and while our affairs require an increased energy, I find myself

less able to conduct them, from natural causes. I give all my

thoughts and time, but have interruptions, from my weak state of

body, which the service will scarcely admit of. I never felt the

severity of winter more than this last. They were not gales of

wind, but hurricanes; and the consequence is, that the fleet has

suffered very much, and many of the ships very infirm. I would not

have kept the sea so long, because I know the system of blockading

must be ruinous to our fleet at last; and in no instance that I

can recollect has prevented the enemy from sailing. In the spring

we are found all rags, while they, nursed through the tempest, are

all trim. I would not have done it; but what would have become

of me if, in my preserving the ships, the French had sailed and

effected any thing in any quarter? The clamour would have been

loud, and they would have sought only for the cause in my treachery

or folly, for none can understand that there is any bad weather in

the Mediterranean. The system of blockade is ruinous; but it has

continued so long, and so much to the advantage of the mercantile

part of the nation, that I fear no minister will be found bold

enough to discontinue it. We undertake nothing against the enemy,

but seem to think it enough to prevent him taking our brigs: his

fleet is growing to a monstrous force, while ours every day gives

more proof of its increasing decrepitude.

Of the Spaniards I would not say much; I was never sanguine in

the prospect of success, and have no reason to change my opinion:

the lower class of people, those who are under the influence of

priests, would do any thing were they under proper direction; but

directors are difficult to be found. There is a canker in the

state: none of the superior orders are serious in their resistance

to the French, and have only taken a part against them thus far

from the apprehension of the resentment of the people. I believe

the junta is not free from the taint of the infection, or would

they have continued Vives Don Miguel in high and important command

after such evident proofs as he gave of want of loyalty? I do not

know what is thought of Infantado in England; but in my mind,

the man, the duke (for his rank has a great deal to do with it),

who would seat himself in Buonaparte’s council at Bayonne, sign

his decrees, which were distributed in Spain, and then say he was

forced to do it, is not the man who will do much in maintaining

the glory or the independence of any country, no such man should

be trusted now. The French troops are mostly withdrawn from Spain,

except such as are necessary to hold certain strong posts, and

enable them to return without impediment. Figueras, Barcelona, and

Rosas, are held here in Catalonia, and of course the country quite

open to them. Will the Spaniards dispossess them? The junta does

not seem to know any thing of the provinces at a distance from

them. At Tarragona the troops are ill clothed, and without pay;

on one occasion they could not march against the enemy, having no

shoes; and yet at Cadiz they have 51 millions of dollars. Cadiz

seems to be a general depôt of every thing they can get from

England. If they are not active the next two months Spain is lost.

I hope lady Dalrymple, &c. &c.

I ever am, my dear sir,

Your very faithful and obedient servant,

COLLINGWOOD.

END OF VOL. I.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] For a description of this organization, the reader is referred

to the “Precis des Evénemens Militaires, par Mathieu Dumas;” a work

of infinite labour and research, in which the military story of ten

years is told with unrivalled simplicity and elegance.

[2]

Viz.:-- about 30,000 Cavalry,

6,000 Foot Guards,

170,000 Infantry of the line,

14,000 Artillery.

-------

Total, 220,000

Of these, between 50 and 60,000 were employed in the Colonies and

in India; the remainder were disposable, because from 80 to 100,000

militia, differing from the regular troops in nothing but the

name, were sufficient for the home duties. If to this force we add

30,000 marines, the military power of England must be considered

prodigious.

[3] The anagram of Llorente.

[4] I think it necessary to state, in addition to the authorities

quoted in the margin, that I have derived my information from

officers, some French, some Italian, who were present in the tumult

of the 2d of May. On the veracity of my informants I have the

firmest reliance; their accounts agreed well, and the principal

facts were confirmed by the result of my personal inquiries at

Madrid in the year 1812.

[5] Five sail of the line and one frigate.

[6] Forty-two thousand dollars.

[7] Tio Jorge and Tio Marin, which may be rendered goodman Jorge,

and goodman Marin, were two of the real chiefs whose energy saved

Zaragoza in the first siege.

[8] The late Lord Melville.

[9] This transaction furnishes an example of the imprudence of

being precipitate in granting public honours. Lord Strangford’s

despatch relative to the emigration was written (as it is

confidently asserted) not at Lisbon, but at Salt Hill, in the

presence of sir James Yeo. His lordship (unintentionally of

course) impressed the ministers with an idea that to his personal

exertions the emigration should be attributed; whereas the prince

regent of Portugal, yielding to the vigorous negotiations of

sir Sydney Smith, not only embarked on the 27th, _before_ lord

Strangford arrived at Lisbon, but actually sailed without his

lordship’s having had any official interview with his royal

highness, and consequently without having had any opportunity to

advance or retard the emigration. The English ministers, eager

to testify their satisfaction at that event, conferred the red

riband, not upon sir Sydney Smith, who had succeeded, but upon lord

Strangford, who had failed! a result that his lordship could not

have anticipated, or he would undoubtedly have written his despatch

at Lisbon when the facts were fresh on his mind, and when he could

have more forcibly described the admiral’s share in the transaction.

[10] The coast of Portugal.

[11] This is a remarkable instance of ministerial confusion;

the despatch from sir Hew Dalrymple referred to as giving this

“assurance,” not only made no mention of a promise to the junta of

Seville, but the junta itself was not in existence at the time his

despatch was written.

[12] The occupation of Cadiz was a favourite project with the

English government at this period. They were not discouraged by

Spencer’s unsuccessful efforts to gain admittance, nor by the

representations of sir Hew Dalrymple, who had grounds for believing

that any attempt to introduce British troops there, would bring

down the greater part of Castaños’ army to oppose it by force; nor

by the consideration that in a political view such a measure would

give a subject for misrepresentation to the enemy’s emissaries,

and that, in a military view, the burthen of Cadiz would clog all

general operations in Portugal.

[13] The ministers were so intent upon occupying Cadiz, and so

little acquainted with the state of public feeling in Andalusia,

that one of those generals carried with him his appointment as

governor of that city.

[14] Yet lord Byron has gravely asserted in prose and verse that

the convention was signed at the marquis of Marialva’s house at

Cintra; and the author of “The Diary of an Invalid,” improving upon

the poet’s discovery, detected the stains of the ink spilt by Junot

upon the occasion.

[15] There is good reason to believe, that a silly intrigue carried

on through the medium of the princess of Tour and Taxis with

Talleyrand, and some others, who were even then ready to betray

Napoleon, was the real cause of the negotiation having been broken

off by Mr. Canning.

[16] Sir Walter Scott, in his Life of Napoleon, inaccurately

asserts, that sir John Moore, “sent ten thousand men, under sir

David Baird, by sea, to Coruña,” and that “_the general science

of war, upon the most extended scale_, seems to have been so

little understood or practised by the English generals at this

time, that instead of the country being carefully reconnoitred

by officers of skill, the march of the army was arranged by such

hasty and inaccurate information as could be collected from the

peasants. _By their reports general Moore was induced to divide

his army_”----What “_the general science of war upon an extended

scale_” may mean, I cannot pretend to say; but that sir David Baird

was sent by the government from England direct to Coruña, and that

sir John Moore _was not induced_ by the reports of the peasants to

divide his army, may be ascertained by a reference to the Appendix,

No. 13, section 2.

[17] Navarre and Biscay being within the French line of defence,

the inhabitants were, according to the civilians, de facto French

subjects.

[18] In the winter of 1812, captain Hill, of the royal navy, was

sent to Cronstadt to receive Spanish prisoners who had been taken

by the Russians. Of five thousand Spaniards that were delivered

to him, above four thousand were men who had escaped with Romana

from the Danish isles in 1808. Captives at Espinosa, they had

entered the French ranks, served in Napoleon’s continental wars,

and being made prisoners by the Russians in the retreat from

Moscow, were once more brought back to Spain in English vessels.

This is a curious commentary upon the silly stories that have been

promulgated relative to the desperate fighting of Blake’s army, and

the devoted courage with which, _Spartan-like_, Romana’s soldiers

died to a man upon the field of battle.

MEN.

Landed at Gihon, 9th October, 1808 9,404

Deduct cavalry, which never joined Blake’s army 1,404

-----

8,000

Prisoners delivered to captain Hill 4,500

-----

3,500

Now, if we make allowance, 1º. For natural and violent deaths

during four years of service under Napoleon, 2º. For those who

might not have been taken by the Russians, and if we believe that

some _might possibly have escaped from Espinosa alive_, the number

of Spartans will probably be thought not to have exceeded the

classical number of 300.

[19] Dukes of Infantado, of Hijar, Medina Celi, and Ossuna;

marquis Santa Cruz; counts Fernan, Miñez, and Altamira; prince of

Castello Franco, Pedro Cevallos, and the bishop of St. Ander, were

proscribed, body and goods, as traitors to France and Spain.

[20] The following remarkable instance of courage and discipline

deserves to be recorded. John Walton, a native of the south of

Ireland, and Richard Jackson, an Englishman, were posted in a

hollow road on the plain beyond the bridge, and at a distance from

their piquet. If the enemy approached, one was to fire, run back to

the brow of the hill, and give notice if there were many or few;

the other was to maintain his ground. A party of cavalry following

a hay cart stole up close to these men, and suddenly galloped in,

with a view to kill them and surprise the post. Jackson fired,

but was overtaken, and received twelve or fourteen severe wounds

in an instant; he came staggering on, notwithstanding his mangled

state, and gave the signal. Walton, with equal resolution and more

fortune, defended himself with his bayonet, and wounded several of

the assailants, who retreated, leaving him unhurt; but his cap,

his knapsack, his belts, and his musquet were cut in above twenty

places, and his bayonet was bent double, his musquet covered with

blood, and notched like a saw from the muzzle to the lock. Jackson

escaped death during the retreat, and finally recovered of his

wounds.

[21] Several thousand infantry slept in the long galleries of an

immense convent built round a square; the lower corridors were

filled with the horses of the cavalry and artillery, so thickly

stowed that it was scarcely possible for a single man to pass them,

and there was but one entrance. Two officers returning from the

bridge, being desirous to find shelter for their men, entered the

convent, and with horror perceived that a large window shutter

being on fire, and the flame spreading to the rafters above, in

a few moments the straw under the horses would ignite, and six

thousand men and animals would inevitably perish in the flames.

One of the officers, (captain Lloyd, of the forty-third,) a man of

great activity, strength, and presence of mind, made a sign to his

companions to keep silence, and springing on to the nearest horse,

run along the backs of the others until he reached the flaming

shutter, which he tore off its hinges and cast out of the window;

then returning quietly, awakened some of the soldiers, and cleared

the passage without creating any alarm, which in such a case would

have been as destructive as the flames. Captain Lloyd was a man of

more than ordinary talents; his character has been forcibly and

justly depicted in that excellent little work called the “_Life of

a Sergeant_.”

[22]

Lorges’s dragoons 1,400

La Houpaye’s ditto 1,450

Franceschi’s light cavalry 1,350

-----

Total 4,200

[23] Ninety-fifth regiment.

[24] I am aware that the returns laid before Parliament in 1809

make the sum 60,000_l._, and the whole loss during the campaign

nearly 77,000_l._; but it is easier to make an entry of one sum

for a treasury return, than to state the details accurately. The

money agents were, like the military agents, acting independently,

and all losses went down under the head of abandoned treasure. My

information is derived from officers actually present, and who all

agree that the only treasure abandoned was that at Nogales, and

that the sum was 25,000_l._ When it was ordered to be rolled over

the brink of the hill, two guns, and a battalion of infantry, were

actually engaged with the enemy to protect it, and some person in

whose charge the treasure was, exclaiming, “it is _money_!” the

general replied, “so are shot and shells.” The following anecdote

will show how such accidents may happen in war. An officer had

charge of the cars that drew this treasure; in passing a village,

a lieutenant of the fourth regiment observing that the bullocks

were exhausted, took the pains to point out where fresh and strong

animals were to be found, and advised that the tired ones should

be exchanged for others more vigorous, which were close at hand;

but the escorting officer, either ignorant of, or indifferent to

his duty, took no notice of this recommendation, and continued his

march with the exhausted cattle.

[25] The author’s eldest brother. He was returned amongst the

killed. When the French renewed the attack at Elvina he was, with

a few men, somewhat in advance of the village, for the troops

were broken into small parties by the vineyard walls and narrow

lanes. Being hurt, he endeavoured to return, but the enemy coming

down, he was stabbed, and thrown to the ground with five wounds;

and death appeared inevitable, when a French drummer rescued him

from his assailants, and placed him behind a wall. A soldier with

whom he had been struggling, irritated to ferocity, returned to

kill him, but was prevented by the drummer. The morning after

the battle the duke of Dalmatia being apprised of major Napier’s

situation, had him conveyed to good quarters, and with a kindness

and consideration very uncommon, wrote to Napoleon, desiring that

his prisoner might not be sent to France, which (from the system of

refusing exchanges) would have been destruction to his professional

prospects. The marshal also obtained for the drummer the decoration

of the legion of honour. The events of the war obliged Soult to

depart in a few days from Coruña, but he recommended major Napier

to the attention of marshal Ney; and that marshal also treated his

prisoner with the kindness of a friend rather than the rigour of

an enemy, for he quartered him with the French consul, supplied

him with money, gave him a general invitation to his house on

all public occasions, and refrained from sending him to France.

Nor did marshal Ney’s kindness stop there; for when the flag of

truce arrived, and that he became acquainted with the situation of

major Napier’s family, he suddenly waved all forms, and instead

of answering the inquiry by a cold intimation of his captive’s

existence, sent him, and with him the few English prisoners taken

in the battle, at once to England, merely demanding that none

should serve until regularly exchanged. I should not have dwelt

thus long upon the private adventures of an officer, but that

gratitude demands a public acknowledgment of such generosity, and

the demand is rendered imperative by the after misfortunes of

marshal Ney. The fate of that brave and noble-minded man is well

known. He who had fought five hundred battles for France, not one

against her, was shot as a traitor!

[26] The loss of the English army was never officially returned,

but was estimated by sir John Hope at about eight hundred. The

French loss I have no accurate account of. I have heard from

French officers that it was above three thousand men; this number,

I confess, appears to me exaggerated; but that it was very great

I can readily believe. The arms of the British were all new, the

ammunition quite fresh, and it is well known that, whether from the

peculiarity of our musquets, the physical strength and coolness of

the men, or both combined, the fire of an English line is at all

times the most destructive known. The nature of the ground also

prevented any movement of the artillery on either side; hence the

French columns in their attacks were exposed to a fire of grape

which they could not return, because of the distance of their

batteries.

[27] Sir John Moore’s sentiments upon this occasion are expressed

in the following letter, which displays the pure and elevated

patriotism that distinguished him through life, and rendered his

death heroic.

“Portsmouth, 23d July, 1808.

“MY LORD,

“I am this instant honoured with your lordship’s letter (by

messenger) of yesterday’s date. As I have already had the honour

to express my sentiments to your lordship fully at my last

interview, it is, I think, unnecessary to trouble you with a

repetition of them now.

“I am about to proceed on the service on which I have been

ordered, and it shall be my endeavour to acquit myself with

the same zeal by which I have ever been actuated when employed

in the service of my country. The communication which it has

been thought proper to make to his majesty cannot fail to give

me pleasure; I have the most perfect reliance on his majesty’s

justice, and shall never feel greater security than when my

conduct, my character, and my honour, are under his majesty’s

protection.

“I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) “JOHN MOORE.

“To the Right Honourable Viscount Castlereagh.”

[28] Note.--These two words are added in Napoleon’s own

hand-writing.

[29] _Note by the author._--This calculation was made under the

supposition that general Avril had joined Dupont.

[30] On ne comprend pas dans ces celculs les garnisons de

Pampelune, St. Sebastien, Vittoria, Tolosa, Bilbao, &c.: il n’est

pas question non plus de l’armée de Catalogne.

[31] The extract which follows this letter furnishes a curious

comment on this passage.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

In Note No. XXV in the Appendix, horizontal parentheses have been

replaced by a vertical bar |.

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been

corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within

the text and consultation of external sources.

Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,

when a predominant preference was found in the original book.

In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, some

corrections to accents have been made silently; primarily é for e,

and e for é. Incorrect spelling has been left unchanged.

The city of Logroña is mentioned 35 times; the city of Logroño 17

times. They are undoubtably the same city; the text has not been

changed. Castille is mentioned 43 times; Castile 15 times. They are

undoubtably the same region; the text has not been changed.

Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,

and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

Corrigenda:

‘the first class’ replaced by ‘of the first class’.

page number ‘436’ replaced by ‘426’.

Main text:

Pg 34: ‘at the instance’ replaced by ‘at the insistence’.

Pg 78: ‘were also dedefeated’ replaced by ‘were also defeated’.

Pg 151: ‘Genaral Thiebault’ replaced by ‘General Thiebault’.

Pg 162: ‘give birth too’ replaced by ‘give birth to’.

Pg 163: ‘Guarda, Attalaya’ replaced by ‘Guarda, Atalaya’.

Pg 165: ‘into the towu’ replaced by ‘into the town’.

Pg 189: ‘Wellelley decided’ replaced by ‘Wellesley decided’.

Pg 200: ‘the 5th batallion’ replaced by ‘the 5th battalion’.

Pg 294: ‘force under Cataños’ replaced by ‘force under Castaños’.

Pg 315: ‘to develope all’ replaced by ‘to develop all’.

Pg 344: ‘to recal the’ replaced by ‘to recall the’.

Pg 346: ‘to another æra’ replaced by ‘to another era’.

Pg 356: ‘or Albazan; united’ replaced by ‘or Almazan; united’.

Pg 361: ‘Pyrennes opening’ replaced by ‘Pyrenees opening’.

Pg 363: ‘being desseminated’ replaced by ‘being disseminated’.

Pg 367: ‘and Giupuscoa. With’ replaced by ‘and Guipuscoa. With’.

Pg 400: ‘at Calahora on’ replaced by ‘at Calahorra on’.

Pg 484: ‘or, in secresy’ replaced by ‘or, in secrecy’.

Pg 506: ‘to envelope and’ replaced by ‘to envelop and’.

Pg 517: ‘If to Valladodid’ replaced by ‘If to Valladolid’.

Pg 519: ‘the Somosierrra had’ replaced by ‘the Somosierra had’.

Appendix:

Pg ix: Missing word ‘Et’ inserted into ‘Et les communications ...’.

Pg xl: ‘route of Maffra’ replaced by ‘route of Mafra’.

Pg lxiii: ‘my last last letter’ replaced by ‘my last letter’.

Pg lxix: ‘barricadoed their’ replaced by ‘barricaded their’.

Pg lxxxii, in Note XXV : ‘bat^{ns}’ replaced by ‘batts.’.

Pg lxxxv: ‘by Galluzo behind’ replaced by ‘by Galluzzo behind’.

Pg lxxxix: ‘general Kellermann’ replaced by ‘general Kellerman’.

History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1 · 第 15 / 15 章

“_It is hoped_ that the Arragonese army will come over to fill it”