FROM VITRY TO VERDUN
I. THE BATTLE OF VITRY-LE-FRANÇOIS
In the original design of the whole battle, the action of the right or
eastern half of the Allied crescent was to be reciprocal to that of
the left——while the centre held, Sarrail was to strike out from the
region of Verdun westward against the flank of the Prince Imperial,
as Maunoury struck out eastward from the region of Paris against that
of Kluck. Something of this intention came into effect; but it was
much modified by two circumstances. In the first place, General Joffre
was driven both by major opportunity and by penury of means to make a
choice. He decided that Verdun rather than Paris must run the greater
risk, that Kluck’s headlong advance made the west the chief theatre for
his offensive; and, to make sure on the west, he further weakened the
eastern armies. It was, then, on terms of something less than equality
of numbers that Sarrail and de Langle had to meet the Crown Prince, the
IV Army, and the Saxon left, with their greatly superior equipment.
Secondly, the danger beyond the Meuse could not be ignored; and anxiety
on this score necessarily handicapped Joffre’s plan. The German idea
was to cut Verdun off on either side: no direct attack was made upon
the fortress, the Crown Prince proceeding around the entrenched camp
by the west, while the Lorraine armies approached on the east and the
IV Army swept over the empty flats of Champagne. On September 5, the
German V Army, coming down both sides of the Argonne, had reached the
open country south of the forest of Belnoue, that is, from 20 to 30
miles south-west of Verdun. It was, doubtless, expected that the Meuse
fortress would be abandoned, as, indeed, it must have been had the
French retreat continued longer. Stopped as it was, the Crown Prince
awoke from his dream of making a new and greater Sedan between Dijon
and Nancy to find himself under the necessity of forming a double
front, toward the east and the south, a very unfavourable position in
which to continue an offensive, to say nothing of the possibility of
defeat. So far, good; but the situation was anything but secure. The
French were perilously fixed on both sides of the Meuse in a long,
sharp salient which had to be defended on three sides. Maunoury and
the British, on the west, had escaped any danger of envelopment before
the battle began. Without a battalion to spare, Sarrail and Langle
stood throughout the struggle, the former with his back, the latter
with his flank, to a wall that might give way at any moment. Even a
small piercing of the French line between Verdun and Nancy would have
involved the fall of the whole salient; while a still more disastrous
realignment must have followed a failure of Castlenau and Dubail
between Nancy and the Vosges.
In these circumstances, Sarrail could not produce, Langle had not the
benefit of, such an “effect of suction” as governed the issue farther
west. If the struggle could not be harder, it was more protracted.
Partly because it became, when the French reinforcements arrived, a
death-grapple of nearly equal masses——more or less than 400,000 men
on either side——with little opportunity for manœuvre, partly because
it occurred over obscure countrysides, it has not been adequately
appreciated. It is, however, no less important than the battles of the
left and the centre; for, if there was involved in them the fate of
the capital, here not only Verdun, but Nancy and Toul, with the armies
of the eastern frontier, were in the scales. Langle and Sarrail share
equally with Gallieni and Maunoury, French, d’Espérey, and Foch the
honours of the total victory.
The theatre of this part of the conflict forms a triangle,
Vitry–Verdun–Bar-le-Duc, whose base is extended on the west to the Camp
de Mailly, on the east to the hills on the farther bank of the Meuse.
It is naturally divided into two sectors of very different character:
(1) the left, or western, stretching from Mailly to near Revigny, in
which the French 4th Army had to meet on a level front the Saxon left
and the IV Army of the Duke of Würtemberg; (2) the right, or eastern,
including the southern Argonne, the salient of Verdun, and the Heights
of the Meuse, held by Sarrail’s 3rd Army against the V Army of the
German Prince Imperial and a force from the Army of Metz. Both French
groups had been greatly weakened to help other commands, Langle giving
his 9th and 11th Corps to form Foch’s Army, while Sarrail surrendered
the 42nd Division to Foch, and the 4th Corps to Maunoury. These
transfers, necessary to provision the Generalissimo’s offensive, were
compensated just, and only just, in time; thanks to a better outlook
on the eastern frontier, Langle de Cary received the 21st Corps from
the Vosges on September 9, and on the 8th Sarrail received the 15th
Corps from Lorraine, closing with it an alarming gap between the 3rd
and 4th Armies. Sarrail then had about ten divisions to the Crown
Prince’s twelve; Langle’s force was also slightly outnumbered.
[Illustration: FRONT of the FRENCH 4TH ARMY, Evening Sept. 7]
On the evening of September 5, Langle’s front stood thus: On his
_left_, the 17th Corps faced the Saxon XIX Corps between the moorland
camp of Mailly and the Sommesous–Vitry railway. At his _centre_, across
what may be called the delta of Vitry-le-François, a wide alluvial
plain where the merged waters of the Ornain and the Saulx join the
Marne, some elements of the 12th Corps and the Colonial Corps stood
against the VIII Corps, active and reserve, of the IV Army. Vitry, an
important junction of railways, roads, and waterways, is completely
dominated by the hills to the north of the delta; and the 12th Corps,
to which its defence would have fallen, had been so punished during the
retreat that the greater part of it had to be withdrawn to the Aube for
reconstitution on the evening of September 5. The Germans, therefore,
occupied the town without much difficulty, and rapidly gathered behind
it a strong force of artillery. While the French thus lost the cover of
the Saulx and the Marne-Rhine Canal, they could still fall back upon
the St. Dizier Canal and the Marne. The centre front, at the beginning
of the battle, ran from the Mailly hills at Humbauville, through the
villages of Huiron, Frignicourt, Vauclerc, and Favresse, to Blesmes
railway junction. On Langle’s right, the 2nd Corps had passed the Saulx
and its tributary the Ornain, and the Marne-Rhine Canal, leaving only
advanced posts on the north of the valley, toward Revigny. To it were
opposed Duke Albrecht’s VIII Reserve and XVIII Active Corps. The German
programme was to break through by Vitry and Revigny into the upper
valleys of the Seine, Aube, Marne, and Ornain. Langle’s orders were to
try to make headway northward, in co-ordination with Sarrail’s attack
toward the west. In fact, he was barely able to hold his ground until
successes on either side relieved the pressure.
Happily, the German Command had not discovered the weakness of the
junction between Foch’s and Langle’s forces; and the Saxons did not
at first prove formidable. The 17th Corps was, therefore, able on
September 6 to make a short advance west of Courdemanges, nearly to the
railway. At the centre, the remaining battalions of the 12th Corps and
Lefebvre’s Colonials were attacked violently in the morning. Huiron
and Courdemanges, at the foot of the hills, were lost, but retaken
during the evening. The three delta hamlets of Frignicourt, Vauclerc,
and Ecriennes were also lost, the last two to IV Army regulars who had
crossed the St. Dizier road and canal. On the right, the enemy forced
the Marne-Rhine canal west of Le Buisson; and for a moment there was a
danger of the Colonials being cut off from the 2nd Corps. To fill the
breach, General Gerard transferred a brigade of the 4th Division from
Pargny to near Favresse. Perhaps because of the consequent weakness
of the right of the 2nd Corps, it could not hold the line of the
canal from Le Buisson to Etrepy; and Von Tchenk’s XVIII Corps entered
Alliancelles, 5 miles west of Revigny, and crossed the Ornain, in the
afternoon. Reinforced by his Reserve, Tchenk pushed his advance on the
following day, September 7, seizing Etrepy village, where the Saulx and
Ornain join across the Rhine canal, at dawn, and Sermaize a few hours
later.
Langle was here faced with a grave danger. His centre was still holding
pretty well: Huiron was again lost, but the Colonials had recovered
Ecriennes. On his left, the 17th Corps slightly improved its position,
albeit the hazardous thinness of this part of the French front could
not be much longer concealed. It was for his wings, therefore, that he
was most anxious; and thither the two promised corps of reinforcements,
the 15th and 21st, were directed. The 15th reached the right, to
prolong Sarrail’s line, just in time. The enemy had, at a heavy cost,
passed the Saulx-Ornain valley, with its many lesser water-courses,
and had reached the edge of the wooded plateau of Trois-Fontaines,
beyond which, ten miles south of Sermaize, lay the important town of
St. Dizier. To break through thus far would be to cut off Sarrail at
Bar-le-Duc from Langle at Vitry-le-François; it would be the doom of
Verdun, and probably of the French centre. The greatness of the stake,
the bitterness of the disappointment, afford the only explanation of
the abnormal savagery shown by the Crown Prince’s troops in this region.
On September 8, the fighting reached its fiercest intensity. Tchenk
pressed furiously his attack against and around Pargny, which his men
entered at 5 p.m., after suffering heavy losses. Maurupt was also
taken, but Gerard quickly recaptured it. The crisis, though not the
struggle, was over with the arrival of the 15th Corps between Couvonges
and Mognéville, threatening Tchenk’s left flank if he should attempt
any farther advance. At the centre, a reconstituted half of the 12th
Corps and the Colonial Corps were engaged in desperate combats.
Courdemanges, Ecriennes, and Mont Moret fell in the morning; but the
hill was retaken at nightfall. Several times driven out of Favresse,
a brigade of the 2nd Corps finally held the village, and arrested the
progress of the VIII Reserve Corps towards Blesmes railway junction.
With constant violence of give and take, these positions were little
changed on the following day. On the left, two regiments of the
17th Corps, pending the arrival of the other half of the 12th (23rd
Division), bore throughout the 8th the onset of a fresh Saxon Division
(xxiii of the XII Reserve Corps) to the west of Humbauville; while the
remainder of the 17th Corps fell back a little before the XIX Corps,
but advanced anew in the afternoon. In the evening, the balance was
more than restored by the appearance of Baquet’s Division of the 21st
Corps at the extreme left of the army, which next day (September 9)
drove the Saxon right back in disorder toward Sommesous, liberating
Humbauville, and enabling the 17th Corps also to gain ground. The other
Division of the 21st Corps (43rd) had now reached the scene; and, on
the 10th, Langle was able to make a strong offensive on this side, in
association with Foch’s pursuit of the retreating Saxons.
II. SARRAIL HOLDS THE MEUSE SALIENT
The French 3rd Army, when Sarrail took over its command from Ruffey
on August 30, was a thing of shreds and patches. The 42nd Division
of Sarrail’s own 6th Corps was being sent to Foch, leaving behind two
other divisions, and a brigade of a third which had been broken up. The
4th Corps was about to leave for Paris, to take part in the battle of
the Ourcq. There remained the 5th and the diminished 6th Corps, General
Paul Durand’s Group of Divisions of Reserve (67, 75, and 65), formerly
under Maunoury, the 72nd Reserve Division, forming part of the garrison
of Verdun, and the 7th Cavalry Division. Verdun depending directly
upon General Headquarters, Coutanceau and Heymann, the governor and
the divisionaire, were not subject to Sarrail’s orders; but they
co-operated admirably. Yet another southron, Sarrail was fifty-eight
years old, a tall, slight figure, with (at that time) short white
beard and moustache, blue eyes, and a gentle manner bespeaking the
scholar and thinker rather than the man of action he proved himself to
be. After service in Tunis and with the Foreign Legion, he had been
advanced by Generals André and Picquart, and rose by steady stages from
colonel in 1905 to corps commander. Across the mists of more painful
days, I recall the strong impression he made upon me when I first met
him at Verdun in December 1914.
From near the frontier, the 3rd Army had fallen back, at the end of
August, westward to the Meuse between Stenay and Vilosnes, leaving
the reserve group and garrison troops to make a thin line of defence
on the east of the river, just beyond the radius of the entrenched
camp and the edge of the Meuse Heights from Ornes to Vigneulles.
“Entrenched camp” is the conventional name; but there were no serious
entrenchments in those days, and scarcely any, as I can testify, three
months later. The forts and thickly-wooded hills were sufficient, with
the field army free, to determine the German Grand Staff to leave
Verdun, as it was leaving Paris, aside. The French, however, could yet
have no certainty on this score. During the first days of September,
the 5th and 6th Corps pivoted around the west of Verdun; and, when they
had completed the semicircle, the problem had to be faced. The hazard
of the old fortress was no mere matter of sentiment. Its fall would
mean the loss of all it could contribute to the contemplated attack on
the enemy’s flank, and of a great strength of artillery and munitions
that could not be removed, as well as of a formidable position. On the
other hand, there lay Joffre’s plan, and the reasoning that had saved
the British Army from internment at Maubeuge. The Generalissimo’s
orders were express: the 3rd Army must keep its liberty, and must,
accordingly, retire to the north of Bar-le-Duc, and possibly as far
as Joinville. It was not only Verdun, but his power of threatening
the German flank, that Sarrail hoped to save. He resolved, therefore,
to give ground as slowly as possible, keeping his right in touch with
the fortress to the last moment, and to risk, up to a certain point, a
breach of contact with de Langle de Cary. At daybreak on September 6,
his forces were ranged over the broadly-rolling fields and moorlands,
facing westward, as follows:
_Right._——Several regiments of the Verdun garrison were coming into
line about Nixéville, and the three reserve divisions were spread
thence along the Verdun–Bar highroad (afterwards famous as the “Via
Sacra”) and narrow-gauge railway as far as Issoncourt, having before
them the German XVI Active Corps reinforced some hours later by the VI
Reserve.
_Centre._——The 6th Corps extended through Beauzée south-westward to
near Vaubécourt, with d’Urbal’s cavalry about Lisle-en-Barrois, facing
the German XIII Corps.
_Left._——The 5th Corps stood across the path of the German VI and part
of the Duke of Würtemberg’s XVIII Corps among the villages north of
Revigny, from Villotte to Nettancourt.
Although the dispositions of the German V Army——one corps of which
was detained 10 miles north, and another a like distance west, of
Verdun——at this juncture do not suggest over-confidence, an order found
on the field shows that the Crown Prince now believed himself sure
of a dramatic victory. At 8 p.m. on Saturday the 5th, instructions
had been issued for the XVI, XIII, and VI Corps (in this order from
east to west), with the XVIII Reserve on their right, to drive
resolutely south, and to seize Bar-le-Duc and the Marne crossings to
and beyond Revigny, while the IV Cavalry Corps exploited the breach
between Sarrail and Langle’s forces, and hurried on “on the line
Dijon–Besançon–Belfort.” As a whole, this design at once failed. The
German advance had hardly begun when Heymann’s and Durand’s reservists,
on the north, threatened its line of supply by an attack toward
Ville-sur-Cousance, St. André, and Ippecourt; while, at the centre,
the 6th Corps pushed toward Pretz, Evres, and Sommaisne. The small
advantages gained were soon negatived, and at night the line was back
at Rampont, Souhesmes, Souilly, Seraucourt, and Rembercourt; but a half
of the Crown Prince’s units were held, if not crippled. This must have
been all the more irritating to him because of the rapid success of
his VI Corps and the IV Army. During the morning, in fact, the French
left was driven out of Laheycourt, Sommeilles, and Nettancourt, then
from Brabant and Villers-aux-Vents, and before night from Laimont and
the market-town of Revigny. The Crown Prince had reached the Marne
just as Kluck was beginning to retire from it. General Micheler and
the 5th Corps, mourning many of their men and a divisional chief,
General Roques, but cheered to think that the first reinforcements
from Lorraine would arrive on the morrow, drew together their ranks at
Villotte, Louppy, and Vassincourt.
On September 7, the encounter became closer and more severe, without
any marked change of position, the 67th and 75th Divisions, on the
right, carrying Ippecourt by assault (to lose it next day), the 6th
Corps resisting obstinately on either side of Rembercourt, and, on the
left, the 5th Corps meeting furious attacks around Vassincourt. In the
evening, the 29th Division of Castelnau’s 15th Corps passed the Marne
to Combles and Fains, two battalions of chasseurs reaching Couvonges
and the neighbouring woods. On the morning of the 8th, Sarrail’s 5th
Corps was supported and extended by the full strength of the 15th. One
brigade of the latter was directed by Vassincourt toward Revigny, but
could make no headway. Other brigades came into action near Louppy and
Mognéville; nevertheless, Villotte and Louppy-le-Château were lost.
News arriving that de Langle’s right had been driven back from Sermaize
to Cheminon, and that Duke Albrecht’s forces were at the foot of the
Trois-Fontaines plateau, d’Urbal was ordered to take his cavalry corps
round, and to harry the east flank of Tchenk’s movement. No sooner had
it reached the upper Saulx valley for this purpose than Sarrail hurried
it back and away north-eastward to meet a yet extremer danger beyond
the Meuse.
[Illustration: The VERDUN SALIENT
Evening of Sept. 7.]
Below St. Mihiel, the river meanders beside a wall of steep hills,
on the crests of which were situated a number of forts, dependencies
of the Toul and Verdun systems, designed as observatories and points
of arrest against an enemy march toward the principal crossings. The
most important of these forts were Genicourt, Troyon, and the Roman
Camp along the east, and Paroches on the west, banks. Troyon was an
extensive square structure, sunk in a deep, wide moat, and garrisoned
by about 450 men. Commanding the gap of Spada, it enjoyed, in its
remote solitude, magnificent views over the plain of the Woevre as far
as Metz, and the hills and valleys between St. Mihiel and Verdun. It
has not been explained why the troops of Metz did not reach the Meuse
earlier; probably their heavy artillery delayed them. On the morning
of September 7, there was no sign of trouble on the Heights, and the
commander of Troyon, Captain Xavier Heym, went out partridge shooting.
At noon, forces of infantry and cavalry, with thirty cannon, were
reported on the roads from Hattonchatel and Heudicourt. The bombardment
began at 2 p.m.; and before another day had passed, 400 heavy shells,
some of them from 12-inch mortars, had been thrown upon the fort,
putting seven guns out of action, and demolishing large parts of the
casemates and galleries. This news was a crown to Sarrail’s anxieties.
He had no reserves left; the 3rd Army was wholly engaged. Its right
might at any time be crushed, its left enveloped: now it was menaced in
the rear. The dispatch thither of some tired cavalry was, of course,
the merest bluff. Whatever might have been the fate of Verdun, the
crossing of the Meuse at a higher point would have meant the withdrawal
of Sarrail’s right, and the opening for the Crown Prince of the shorter
route for reinforcements and supplies which he so much needed.
On the evening of September 8, Joffre authorised the commander of the
3rd Army to draw back from Verdun along the west bank of the Meuse.
Sarrail, who by this time knew of Kluck’s retreat and the magnificent
efforts of the French centre, was determined to hold on, at least till
Troyon should fall; but the river bridges were cut and the forts left
to their own resources. At 9 a.m. on the 9th, Verdun signalled that
Fort Genicourt was being bombarded by heavy guns. At 11 o’clock, Troyon
no longer had a piece in action. There were then in the neighbouring
hills enemy columns amounting to the greater part of an army corps,
with artillery, aviation parks, and convoys. Two infantry assaults were
repelled by rifle and machine-gun fire. Meantime, General Durand’s
Reserve Divisions maintained their ground near Verdun, the 75th
suffering severely in repeated attacks on the Crown Prince’s line of
communications; and, on the left, part of the 15th Corps having pushed
across the Saulx into the Trois-Fontaines Forest, and then struck
north, Mognéville was captured by assault from two sides.
The turning-point of the battle had been reached. During the night
of September 9, while his 6th Corps was repelling a furious attempt
of the XIII and XVI Corps to break through, Sarrail learned that the
British were well over the Marne, with d’Espérey nearly abreast of
them, that Bülow had succumbed to Foch’s will, and that the Saxons had
begun to yield before Langle. Many an exhausted trooper, in lonely
thickets, ditches, and broken farm buildings, only received the glad
tidings two days later; yet the magic spark of a definite hope was
lit. The 4th Army could now look after itself. The 3rd had failed to
make good its first threat against the German flank. Even at this
distance, however, the western “effect of suction” was at last faintly
felt. The XVIII Reserve Corps was perceptibly weakening. During the
10th, the 15th Corps pushed through to the edge of the Trois-Fontaines
Forest, approached Sermaize and Andernay, and sent some hundreds of
prisoners to the rear. If the right could only hold! In the afternoon
the XIII and XVI were reinforced by the VI Reserve Corps (replaced by
the V Reserve). Rembercourt, Courcelles, Seraucourt, and Souilly, were
lost in succession. The struggle continued unrelaxed along a line but
slightly withdrawn, from Condé-en-Barrois, through Erize-la-Petite and
Neuville, to Rambluzin; and on the extreme right, about Vaudelaincourt,
the 72nd Division performed prodigies. In the evening, the 67th and
75th Reserve Divisions were actually removed from the line, preparatory
to an abandonment of Verdun. The enemy did not perceive the movement
till too late.
And the gallant four hundred of Troyon continued to bar the way to the
Meuse. Under cover of a flag, two German officers and a trumpeter rode
up to the fort, and demanded its surrender. “Never!” replied Heym; “I
shall blow it up sooner.” And finally: “Get out, I’ve seen enough of
you. _A bientôt, à Metz._”[70] Who could imagine that “_bientôt_” was
four years away?