LIII. I am fully persuaded, that if the case on which the council of
king Ptolemy deliberated, had been referred to the politicians of
our Europe, and in our age, that not one of them would have advised
the putting to death of Pompey; but it is likely there would have
been very few of them so generous, as to recommend the receiving and
protecting him. In truth, although not only generous, but hazardous
resolutions, may be appendages to the punctilios of princes, and may
spring from that source, they are very rarely suggested to them by
their counsellors. Thus, if a point of this sort was to be discussed
by the council of a king now-a-days, the consideration of the danger
of protecting Pompey on the one hand, and the scandal of sacrificing
him to the resentment of Cæsar on the other, would most probably have
determined them to pursue the middle way, of neither entertaining
nor injuring him, and would have left to his own election, the choice
of another asylum, and to his fortune, the good or bad exit from his
troubles; nor do I doubt but that in the court of Ptolemy there were
some, and possibly the major part, of this opinion. Notwithstanding
this, if I had been a member of that council, I should have given my
vote for the most benign, not only as the most honest, but the most
useful and beneficial resolve they could have fallen upon; and I even
think, it would have had great weight with the king, if any one of
those who assisted at it, had recommended to him the protection of
Pompey, for the reasons, supported with some such arguments as follow,
which altogether I shall call
A declamation on behalf of Pompey.
LIV. Whoever tells you, sir, that from an apprehension of Cæsar,
you should destroy Pompey, would persuade you to fear men more than
the gods. I will suppose Cæsar to be so unjust, as to be capable of
thanking you for putting Pompey to death, and of being irritated
against you for not doing it. This same act of flattery to Cæsar, is
so palpable an offence against heaven, that he who advises you to it,
cannot possibly entertain a doubt of its being such; for if he should
tell you, that by such a conduct you would conform to the will of the
gods, who have declared themselves favourable to Cæsar, he would
advance a sophistry unworthy to be heard in so august and solemn an
assembly; for what delirium is it to imagine, that we may continue to
oppress those, who groan under the weight of adverse fortune, upon a
pretence, of co-operating with the Supreme Providence? According to
this mode of reasoning, it would be right to give a sick man poison
instead of medicine, instead of binding up the sores of the wounded, to
cut and stab him afresh, and instead of succouring the poor, to take
from him the little he has. The gods are able to make people unhappy,
for this is a prerogative annexed to their sovereign power, which
they sometimes exert, by way of exercising the patience and constancy
of those they afflict, and with a view of affording to others an
opportunity of manifesting their clemency, and of administering to the
misfortunes of the distressed. Thus he who lends a compassionate hand
to assist those whom the gods have thought fit to make unhappy, does
not counteract their dispensations, but rather shews a compliance with,
and an obedience to, the immutable principles of their laws.
LV. To insinuate to you, in order to make Pompey a delinquent, that by
seeking an asylum here, he sought the ruin of your kingdom, amounts
to the same thing, as saying he meditates burning the temple, who
from the fury of his enemies, takes refuge at the altars of it. Pompey
does not pretend to compel, but only intreats you; neither, in his
intreaty, does he point out the bounds to which you should extend your
protection to him; nor although he should point them out, could any
consequences be deduced from thence to your disadvantage; for that
cannot take away from you, neither now, nor at any time after he shall
have put himself into your hands, the right of deliberating upon, and
after a just estimation of your power, your obligation, and your risk,
of determining to act by him, as the urgency of your affairs may make
it necessary. Furthermore, if you reflect, you will find that he has a
right to demand your protection, although it may be dangerous for you
to afford it him. You owe to him the sceptre you now sway, which he
restored to your father; nor is the probable hazard of the same crown,
which was certainly restored to you, an adequate recompence to the man
who restored it.
LVI. Having hitherto endeavoured to shew, that it would be just and
right to protect Pompey; my next argument shall be to prove, that it
would be convenient and advantageous also; although I am very well
aware, that in the eyes of an ordinary politician, this will appear an
extravagant paradox.
LVII. I shall begin with asking, what opinion ought we to entertain of
Cæsar, to think that he would look with benign eyes, and a grateful
heart, on a horrible act of perfidy, although it was committed to
disincumber him of that enemy, who has already disputed, and may
perhaps contend again with him for the empire? It seems to me, sir,
that this is the light in which it is laboured to represent Cæsar to
you; but if he truly is not such a sort of man, the treachery which
Theodotus proposes to you, will be very useless; but I will add, that
although he is that sort of man, you will not avoid, but rather augment
the danger of losing your crown, by being guilty of it. If Cæsar is
blinded by the passion of ambition to such an extreme degree, that it
would excite him, for the sake of gratifying it, to trample every sort
of duty and obligation under foot; this vile piece of service, will
not exempt or protect you from his despoiling you of your kingdom;
his ambition, if this is his only idol, will prompt him to extend his
dominion by all possible ways and means, whether just or unjust; and
the opulent kingdom of Egypt, is not so contemptible an acquisition,
that an ambitious man will forbear to seize it, for the sake of
rewarding a perfidious one with its possession.
LVII. The worst is, that by following the advice of Theodotus, you will
furnish Cæsar with a specious pretence for usurping your kingdom; and
therefore I say, that so far from avoiding the danger of losing it,
by adopting his plan, you would increase the risk. That Cæsar is very
sagacious and penetrating, is well known to all the world; and although
he might be glad to hear that Pompey was put to death; after the deed
was executed, he would affect to lament it. He, in appearance at least,
would detest the treachery of receiving Pompey into Egypt, under a
promise of security upon the royal word, for the purpose of taking
away his life. From this equivocal or critical state of Cæsar’s mind,
there might be but a short transition to his taking the resolution
of depriving you of your crown, and perhaps your life also. He might
do it for the sake of gratifying his ambition, and endeavouring to
persuade the world, that he was actuated by no other motive than that
of punishing the treacherous murderer of Pompey; and although he might
foresee, the Romans would never believe that this was his motive; he
well knows they would applaud the action, as they idolized Pompey while
living, and will adore his memory when dead. Other nations, who on
account of their being less penetrating, may not see into the artful
policy of Cæsar, will only contemplate in your ruin, a punishment
correspondent to your crime, and will admire the heroic justice of
Cæsar, who chastised the wicked act, although the commission of it was
never so convenient to him. Consider, sir, whether Cæsar will lose so
fine an opportunity of flattering the Roman people, of recommending
himself to the world for a just man, and of adding to the Imperial
crown he is fabricating, the precious gem of this kingdom.
LIX. We know that Cæsar, in all his actions and designs, has proposed
to himself Alexander of Macedon as the only example he would wish to
imitate. We are informed, that having in a temple of Spain, seen a
statue of that hero, it raised in his imagination a contemplation of
his glory, and caused him to shed tears of envy. Attend now, sir, to
what I am about to say to you. Immediately after Darius was defeated by
Alexander in the battle of Arbela, that unhappy king, who was become
a fugitive from the conqueror, was treacherously murdered by Bessus
the governor of Bactria, who thought by putting him to death, that
he should gain the favour of Alexander. But what followed? Why, that
Alexander caused him to be arrested, and torn to pieces by his own
immediate order as some tell us, or as others say, delivered him to
Oxathres the brother of Darius, to be dealt with as he thought proper.
Consider, sir, how great an affinity there is between the battles of
Arbela and Pharsalia, between the fortunes of Pompey and Darius, and
between the genius and tempers of Cæsar and Alexander. How much is it
to be dreaded, that if you act by Pompey, as Bessus did by Darius, that
Cæsar will do by you, as Alexander did by Bessus? He will find himself
precisely in the same circumstances of Alexander, and will, without
doubt, be strangely flattered with the idea of imitating him, and
especially in an action, which he knows was applauded by all the world.
We find ourselves also in the city of Alexandria, which was founded
by, and took its name from, Alexander; and even this circumstance, may
contribute to augment your danger, because, if ever he should think fit
to visit this city, it would revive in his imagination the idea of its
founder.
LX. I very well know, that although Cæsar should be the man we have
hitherto supposed him, still the protection of Pompey is not free from
danger. The Roman legions, in search of this illustrious fugitive,
will naturally present themselves to our imagination, destroying with
warlike fury, the country that harbours him. But if, in whatever
course we pursue, we must unavoidably encounter rocks and quicksands,
what does human prudence dictate in such a case? that we should do
what’s right and just, and leave the event to the disposal of the gods.
It is beyond a doubt, that the power of Cæsar is great; but his fortune
is no less dependant on heaven than ours, and the ray of Jupiter
pays no more respect to the proud palace, than to the humble cabin.
Thus those to whom heaven is most propitious, are likely to be most
successful.
LXI. Nor need we depend solely for our security on the special
providence of the gods, as we have resources in the ordinary course of
human events, and in the common influence of second causes. Cæsar is
yet at a great distance, and as he will have much to settle both in
Italy and Greece, in order to secure the fruits of his late victory,
it will be probably some time before he will find himself at leisure
to visit Egypt. During that interval, we may be employed in modeling
and disciplining our troops; they are not few in number, and we may
add new recruits to them; and to make the Egyptian troops equal to the
best in the world, nothing more is necessary, than that they should be
properly trained, and be commanded by a good general; because when we
had such a one in the person of our famous Sesostris, they conquered
and triumphed over the principal regions of Asia, as the ruins of the
columns that prince erected, and which time has thrown down, testify.
Nobody disputes Pompey’s being, if not the greatest soldier in the
world, at least equal to the greatest. His victories have acquired
him the epithet of great, which is a title Cæsar never attained. We
have then in him, the general we want; nor ought his reputation to be
lessened by the victory Cæsar lately obtained over him; for besides
his commanding a motley army, collected from, and composed of various
nations, he was but little or ill obeyed in that war; and this is an
evil, for which we have a remedy in our own power, by committing the
whole military government to the discretion and direction of Pompey.
If he finds himself not in a condition or situation to attack with a
prospect of victory, he will stand on the defensive, and preserve his
troops, which is the conduct he wished to have pursued in Greece. We
may also hope for many advantages from time; as in the interval of our
recess, succours may arrive to Pompey from all the world; for the whole
Roman empire, except the troops immediately in his pay, are enemies to
Cæsar; and although we should not be able to assemble an army, capable
of resisting Cæsar, his success will not be quite certain. The whole
Roman republic which commands the world, groans with affliction, under
the intolerable sensation, occasioned by the suppression of their
liberty; and it would be very extraordinary, if among the millions of
people of which it is composed, there should not be found some one
desperate enough, to sacrifice his own life, for the sake of redeeming
his country. Every man who arrives at despising, or setting no value on
his own life, may have that of Cæsar in his power; for one concealed
poignard, or one disguised dose of poison administered at his table,
would be more dangerous and fatal to him, than fifty thousand lances in
the open field. The instances of Romans, who have offered themselves
voluntary victims to the idol of fame, or the good of their country,
are numerous; and perhaps Cæsar at this time, has some one near his
person, waiting for an opportunity to repeat the same sacrifice.
LXII. There remains to us also another crutch of hope whereon to rest,
that is, the unwholesomeness of our climate. The air of Ægypt, which
is very unsalutary to the natives, is much more so to strangers. The
soldiers of Cæsar were born under, and have served in climates, which
were very different from ours. How natural then is it to suppose, that
by being detained some time in this country, the visitation of an
epidemical disorder may either demolish or incapacitate them!
LXIII. If by all, or any of these means, which are very probable
ones, you should be enabled to protect and preserve Pompey, you would
make yourself, sir, the most glorious prince in the world. The Romans
would adore you, as the vindicator and defender of their liberty, and
would look upon this kingdom, as the only temple which has afforded
sanctuary to, and preserved their idol. Other nations will applaud your
generous gratitude, and seeing how faithfully you have behaved to your
benefactor, there is no prince whatever, who will not be ready and
desirous to render you his services. What you may expect from Pompey,
is not in my power to express, nor in my imagination to conceive.
LXIV. But admitting, sir, that these well founded hopes should be
frustrated, and that heaven should continue to prosper the arms of
Cæsar, that Fortune should regulate the motions of its inconstant
wheel, so as that it shall always turn in his favour; that we
should see the Roman legions batter down the walls of Alexandria,
and afterwards be witnesses to the demolition of those of Memphis,
and behold all the other cities of Lower Ægypt in danger of being
destroyed; and that in consequence of this, we find ourselves under an
absolute necessity of capitulating with Cæsar; which is the greatest
difficulty and distress, to which we can be driven by Fortune; but
please to observe, sir, that although you should be reduced to this
necessity, you would even then find your affairs in a better state,
than there is any probability of your finding them, provided you
follow the advice that has been given you by Theodotus. Cæsar would
require you to deliver up Pompey, and it is most likely would offer
you in return, the restitution of all he has conquered; for the whole
country that is inundated by the Nile, would be of but little value
to him, compared to the possession of a person, who by a thousand
accidents, might have it in his power to overturn his whole empire.
You might then make this exchange, and remain master of your kingdom,
and might justify yourself to all the world, by pleading the hard law
of necessity as an excuse for what you did. But what infatuation, what
madness would it be, sir, for you to persuade yourself, that it would
be right at this time to put Pompey treacherously to death, without
more advantage to yourself, than what you might obtain hereafter, by
delivering him up without infamy? I have said without more advantage,
and I ought to add to it with greater danger. If you commit so base an
action, it is probable that Cæsar, either from motives of virtue, or
excited to it by hypocrisy, will punish you severely. If you think
him generous, you must conclude that he will be extremely irritated
against you, both for your cruelty, and your ingratitude, and because
you offered him a provoking indignity, by supposing him capable of
accepting a treachery for a compliment; and because also, you deprived
him of a precious opportunity, of manifesting his clemency to Pompey
in distress. If you consider him only as an ambitious and profound
politician, you may suppose he will act the same part from motives of
dissimulation, that he would have acted from motives of generosity, and
to gain credit with the world, would treat you as a delinquent. You
will have none of this to apprehend, when, forced to it by necessity,
you find yourself obliged to deliver up Pompey, because in this last
case, the reasons for treating you in the manner we have just been
describing will not exist, and because also it was never known, that
Cæsar failed to preserve the faith of his engagements, or that he
treated with cruelty, those he had vanquished.
LXV. Nor should we omit, that Cæsar’s good opinion of your personal
conduct to Pompey, may co-operate with his virtue, and have an
influence on his policy. Cæsar is not ignorant, that you have always
been well affected to Pompey and his cause, and when Cæsar finds Pompey
has perished by your hands, he will readily conclude, that you would
have dealt the same treatment to him, and with a better will, provided
the victor had been the vanquished. Consider now, what sort of an
opinion Cæsar must entertain of you, when he reflects, that your not
committing the same treachery by him, is owing to his fortune, and not
your good-will, but that in spite of your malevolent disposition, his
fortune has insured his safety.
LXVI. The arguments, sir, with which I have proved, that without
attending to the justice of the case, it was more for your interest
to protect than to destroy Pompey, will serve to prove, that it will
be more beneficial to you to entertain him than to send him away. The
sending him away, will not oblige Cæsar, but will offend Pompey, and
will also make you appear ungrateful in the eyes of the whole world.
Pompey driven from this coast, will become a wanderer by sea and by
land, in search of some safe hole or corner, wherein to hide himself,
till the desperation of one, or the conspiracy of many, shall deprive
Cæsar of his life; and in all probability, it will not be long, before
this contingent happens. If this event should fall out, Pompey would
then be master in much greater security than he ever was, of all
that Cæsar at present enjoys. Consider now, if this should ever be
the case, what you would have reason to expect from his hands for
driving him out of your kingdom, after he had fixed the crown on the
head of your father. Cæsar while he rules, as he is not ignorant that
you are disaffected to him, will always consider you as an enemy, who
only wants power or resolution to act openly as such. The service of
your abandoning Pompey, will not oblige him, and will debase you,
for he cannot fail to see clearly, that you did it through fear. His
dislike to you will continue, and you will add to it, his contempt and
disesteem.
LXVII. Further, if you receive and entertain Pompey benignly, you
may in consequence of doing it, give yourself credit to a certain
amount, for having both Pompey and Cæsar in some degree under your
influence, Pompey, in virtue of having him within your dominions; and
Cæsar, because he would be disposed to grant you very advantageous
conditions, to prevail on you to deliver Pompey up. But I would not
have it understood, that I mean to recommend this, as what you ought
to do; for my opinion is, that you should absolutely risk every thing
to preserve Pompey, because you owe every thing to him. This is what
true virtue dictates; but the predicament we are in at present, is that
of consulting and considering, the reasons of state and policy for
receiving Pompey with a determination of defending him, and at the same
time not to extend that defence so far as to endanger the loss of your
kingdom. It is true, this would not be doing enough to entitle you to
the applause of the world as a generous man; but it would be sufficient
to prevent your being condemned as an unjust one. You would save your
honour, and not neglect your interest; and the judgment of heaven,
with respect to such a conduct, would coincide with that of the world.
Pompey would find himself under great obligations to you: Cæsar might
perhaps be irritated against you; but the emotions of his anger, would
soon give way to his own convenience, and even to yours. If the gods,
as they are able to do, should prosper our arms under the command of
Pompey, all the world will respect your person, your virtue, and your
power; and in spite of all Cæsar can do, after you have sustained the
losses enumerated, which will be sufficient to excuse your conduct in
the eye of the world, you will at last, by delivering up Pompey, be
able to repair all your damage.
LXVIII. This speech appeared to me proper to introduce here, not
only for the entertainment of the reader, but for his benefit and
caution also; for having in this discourse set forth so many maxims
and examples of tyrannic policy, I was apprehensive, that some
people of weak understandings, might persuade themselves, it would
be convenient and useful to practise them, if I did not at the same
time, together with the poison, administer the antidote, and shew by
such an example, that the violent expedients which Machiavelianism
proposes as convenient, are in general hurtful and pernicious, or at
least insecure and not to be relied on, and that in the very cases
in which they are represented to be necessary, there are others that
might be hit upon, which would answer the purpose much better, and
which would admit of reconciling the useful with the honest, provided
there is an upright will to adopt them, and a clear understanding to
search out and apply them; so that what they call refined policy,
is nothing more than a political dross or scum, and the production
of gross geniuses, who do not search deeper than the superficies of
things. The Machiavelians, seldom attend to more than the immediate
effect of the blow their malice meditates, without reflecting, that
the political machine is many times disposed to move in such a variety
of directions, that it often runs back on, and crushes him who first
set it in motion. I have said before, and I repeat it again, that the
instances of perverse politicians who have been happy for any length
of time, are very few, and that those few, have seldom been blessed
with more than a transient ray of the splendor of fortune; and have
been almost all shipwrecked by a sudden change of the wind, when they
thought themselves sailing on with a favourable gale, and in the most
prosperous manner. What infatuation then is it, to pursue a course,
where all the rocks in the track of it, are stained with the blood of
unhappy sufferers? Or who, with any reasonable expectation of success,
can hope to make his fortune, by following and adopting the maxims of
Machiavel, knowing the author of them lived poor and despised, and
died miserable and abhorred? Perhaps this impious politician, may not
improperly be compared to the unhappy Phlegyas described by Virgil,
who was not undeceived, till his being convinced of the delusion he
had been under could be of no service to him, and who with bitter
expressions of lamentation, and in a hideous tone of voice, proclaimed
the error of his detestable maxims, to the whole miserable group of the
damned:
_--Phlegyasque miserrimus omnes_
_Admonet, & magna testatur voce per umbras:_
_Discite justitiam, moniti, & non temnere Divos._