THE ARMY ON THE MISSOURI.
The rôle which the army was called upon to fill in the history of our
Indian affairs was a most unpleasant one. It began while the proud
spirit of the tribes was as yet unbroken, but had been aroused by
ever-increasing aggression to the point of active resistance. It then
became necessary to subdue them by force to absolute subordination to
the government, and to remove them from their larger hunting grounds
to small reservations. This thankless task devolved upon the army. It
was not merely a thankless task, but a most arduous and formidable one.
Compared with service in the Indian campaigns, that in the South during
the Civil War was a holiday pastime. What tragedy in all our national
wars can compare with the battle of the Little Big Horn? What record
of retreat and pursuit is there like that of the Nez Percé campaign of
1877? Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow had no terrors for the individual
soldier like those of the winter campaign of Crook in the Powder River
country in March, 1876, when it was so cold that the men were not
permitted to go to sleep at night for fear they would never wake up.
[Sidenote: THE WEIGHT OF A DREAD POWER.]
In the course of twenty years after 1855 military posts sprang up
all over the West. There was scarcely an Indian trail in that entire
region that did not witness the passage of government troops. From one
haunt to another his relentless pursuers tracked the desperate Indian.
Ambushes and massacres were met with crushing defeats in battle, but
the general drift of the conflict was uniformly one way. The Indian was
learning the weight of that dread power which had so far tolerated his
independence, but was now to extinguish it forever. The struggle lasted
in its main features about sixteen years, or from 1862 to 1877; but its
extreme limits were the Grattan Massacre of August 19, 1854, and the
battle of Wounded Knee, December 29, 1890.
For some years the Indians who were parties to the treaty of Laramie
observed its conditions fairly well; but in 1854 an unfortunate affair
occurred which temporarily interrupted the general peace. Some fifteen
hundred Indians of three different Sioux bands were encamped in the
Platte Valley, about six miles below Fort Laramie, in August of that
year. One of the Indians drove off and killed a stray cow belonging to
an emigrant train. The owner complained of the theft to the officer in
command at Laramie, and Lieutenant Grattan, with about twenty men, was
sent to bring in the thief. He probably did not show very much tact
in performing his delicate task, and made the mistake of attempting
to take the culprit by force in the presence of nearly ten times his
number of Indians. The result was the massacre of his entire party. The
Indians then went to the American Fur Company warehouse, where their
annuity goods were in waiting, broke open the building, and carried off
the annuities.
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF ASH HOLLOW.]
Thereupon the government ordered General Harney to take the field with
a military force, establish convenient bases of supplies, protect the
frontier and the emigrant routes, and to deal a heavy blow upon the
offending Indians. On September 3, 1855, General Harney attacked a
large force of Indians who had taken part in the Grattan massacre,
completely routed them, killed and captured upward of two hundred, and
destroyed nearly all their property. This affair took place across the
Platte River from Ash Hollow, a noted situation on the emigrant trail,
from which the battle has taken its name.
General Harney next moved his force to the Missouri River, where
the old trading post of Fort Pierre had been lately acquired by the
government, and there held councils with various tribes, which again
resulted in general pacification. In the following year the important
military post of Fort Randall was built, and Fort Pierre was abandoned
because of its undesirable situation. General Harney discharged his
task in a manner highly creditable to himself and satisfactory both to
the Indians and the government; and seven years were to elapse before
any further difficulty of a serious character should occur.
[Sidenote: SITUATION GROWING WORSE.]
[Sidenote: INTRIGUES OF THE HALF-BREEDS.]
But while the severe lesson of Ash Hollow, the frank counsel of General
Harney, and the presence of a military force at Fort Randall, kept
the tribes in comparative peace, the wrongs from which they suffered
continually increased, and their temper grew constantly worse. The
discovery of gold in Montana brought a multitude of emigrants to and
through this country, with the consequent destruction of game and
threats of roads and railroads and loss of lands. Events were fast
developing into a crisis, when the outbreak of the Civil War in the
United States gave the tribes their desired opportunity. The frontier
garrisons were depleted in order that the regular troops might be sent
south. New levies made up of the able-bodied citizens went away to
the war. The Indian was quick to see how this movement weakened the
frontier settlements. He was made to believe, by gross exaggeration,
that the situation of the Great Father in Washington was a desperate
one, that his capital was about to be taken and his power destroyed.
It has been asserted that the Confederates had emissaries among
the Indians, but there is no proof of any direct intrigue of this
character. Indirectly, however, they exercised a powerful influence
upon them. The people of the British possessions, like those of
the mother country, sympathized ardently with the South, and this
sympathy found effective expression in the intercourse of the British
half-breeds north of the boundary with the Indians south. These
half-breeds knew the border tribes perfectly, and had greater influence
with them than the whites, who were strangers to their customs and
the authors of their many wrongs. Selfish motives of trade combined
with national prejudice to stir up strife against the Americans and
to provide means for making that strife effective. The half-breeds
circulated freely south of the border, and the tracks of their carts
could be seen everywhere from the Red River of the North to the
Missouri River. They brought powder and balls, guns, rum, and regular
merchandise of trade, and their influence at this particular time
was decisive. Their territory, moreover, offered a sure asylum from
punishment for any outrages which the Indians might commit.[68]
[Sidenote: THE MINNESOTA MASSACRE.]
Trouble first broke out in 1862 among the Minnesota Indians, where the
evil conditions from which the tribes had been suffering had reached an
acute stage. Under the leadership of a noted Sioux chief, Little Crow,
the Indians in the valley of the Minnesota River above Mankato attacked
the settlement of New Ulm and others in that vicinity, on the 18th
of August, murdering and taking captive the inhabitants, destroying
property, and spreading consternation in every direction. In the course
of three days nearly a thousand persons were killed and two million
dollars’ worth of property destroyed.
The State and national governments sent instant relief; the outrages
were checked; the Indians were driven up the Minnesota Valley and
beaten in several battles; the captive whites were mostly released,
and a large number of hostiles engaged in the massacre were taken
prisoners. This work was done under the immediate leadership of General
H. H. Sibley, first Governor of Minnesota. The captured Indians were
tried by court martial, and a great number were condemned to death, but
this penalty was commuted by President Lincoln except in the cases of
thirty-eight, who were hanged at Mankato, December 26, 1862.
[Sidenote: AN INDIAN WAR.]
In the meanwhile the Indians under Little Crow, though checked and
driven back, were not conquered or discouraged. Their emissaries were
active among the tribes of the Missouri, who were aroused almost to
the point of war. The execution of the Indians at Mankato exasperated
Little Crow to a desperate pitch, and he vowed extermination of the
whites. It was clear that an Indian war was at hand, and the government
at once prepared for it. Its conduct was placed in the hands of General
John Pope, who had been relieved from his command of the Army of the
Potomac after the second Bull Run, and was now in command of the
Department of the Northwest, with headquarters at Milwaukee. General
Pope organized two expeditions, one under General Sibley, to move west
from Mankato against the Indians and drive them toward the Missouri,
and the other under General Sully, to move from Sioux City up the
Missouri and cut off their retreat. The plan was well conceived, but
the extreme low water in the Missouri in 1863 prevented General Sully
from receiving his supplies in time to carry out his part of the
programme.
[Sidenote: EXPEDITION OF GENERAL SIBLEY.]
Sibley’s expedition left Camp Pope in the Minnesota Valley June 16,
1863, and two days later that of General Sully left Sioux City.
Sibley’s route lay up the Minnesota to its source, thence by way of
Lake Traverse to the Cheyenne River of North Dakota, and up that stream
toward Devil’s Lake, where the Indians were supposed to be. Learning
that they had left that region and had gone toward the Missouri,
General Sibley changed his march to the southwest, and pursued the
retreating enemy with great vigor. He came upon them and fought three
battles within a week--Big Mound, July 24; Dead Buffalo Lake, July 26;
and Stony Lake, July 28. The Indians were defeated in all three fights,
and then crossed the Missouri River just below where Bismarck, N. D.,
now stands. General Sibley reached that stream on July 29, and here his
expedition ended. Two days later his command set out on its homeward
march.[69]
At this time General Sully was at Fort Pierre. The transportation of
his supplies had delayed him, and it was not until the 14th of August
that he started from that point on his march north. He went up the
east bank of the Missouri, with a great deal of vexatious delay, and
finally reached the scene of Sibley’s third fight just a month after it
had taken place. The Indians, meanwhile, far from being conquered or
dispirited, had recrossed the river and were on their way back to the
grazing grounds on the Coteau of the Missouri. Some of them harassed
the homeward-bound column of General Sibley. Sully pursued them to the
northeast and overtook and fought them at Whitestone Hill, some thirty
miles south and slightly west of Jamestown, N. D. The Indians were
badly defeated, many of them were killed, and a large amount of their
property was destroyed. Sully then returned to the Missouri and built a
new post, Fort Sully, on the left bank of the river, opposite the head
of Farm Island, midway between Fort Pierre and Fort George. With this
work the campaign of 1863 came to an end.
[Sidenote: CAMPAIGN INDECISIVE.]
The movements of troops in this campaign and the force of Indians
engaged were the largest yet known in the history of the United
States. The number of warriors was estimated at over six thousand,
while the troops under Sibley and Sully numbered about four thousand.
The campaign, however, was not conclusive. Although the Indians had
been defeated with severe loss in every engagement, they were still
unsubdued, and retained their defiant attitude during the following
winter. Accordingly another campaign was planned for the summer of
1864. General Sully was placed in charge with a cavalry force of about
2500 men.
[Sidenote: SULLY’S CAMPAIGN OF 1864.]
General Sully’s first move was to build a post near the mouth of
the Cannon Ball River--Fort Rice, forty miles below where Bismarck
now stands, and on the other side of the river. The Indians being
reported as near the source of Heart River, General Sully concluded
to continue his march in search of them, whether found or not, until
he should reach the Yellowstone River. He took with him only the
necessary rations for the march and sent his steamboats with supplies
and materials for a new post around to meet him at the Brasseau Houses
on the Yellowstone, fifty miles above the mouth of that stream.
Accompanying Sully’s march to the Yellowstone was an emigrant train of
about 125 people bound for the mines of Montana.
Sully’s route lay up the Cannon Ball River nearly to its source, and
thence across to the head waters of Heart River. Here the General
packed his train and left it with the emigrants under a strong guard,
and himself and command, in light marching order, struck out for Knife
River, where the Indians were reported encamped. He found them as
expected. They were defiant and eager for battle, and an engagement
immediately followed. The Indians were badly defeated, a large number
being killed, and all of their property destroyed. This was the battle
of Tahkahokuty, or Killdeer Mountain, and was fought July 28, 1864.
[Sidenote: THE ARMY REACHES THE YELLOWSTONE.]
Sully then returned to his camp on Heart River, and, under the guidance
of a single Indian, who, of all those with him, professed to know a
passable route, started on the perilous undertaking of carrying a wagon
train through the Bad Lands to the Yellowstone River. The route was
west to the Little Missouri, where it turned sharply to the northwest
and struck the Yellowstone about fifteen miles below the Brasseau
Houses. This point was reached on the 12th of August, and fortunately
the supply steamers were close at hand to relieve the necessities of
the troops. This was the first expedition across the Bad Lands of North
Dakota, and was accomplished at the cost of great labor and suffering.
The command crossed the Yellowstone and then marched to the Missouri
River opposite Fort Union. This stream was forded with much peril, and
the troops then returned to Fort Rice along the north shore. Garrisons
were left at Forts Union and Berthold, but the contemplated post on the
Yellowstone could not be built, owing to the wrecking of one of the
steamers with most of the material on board.
Thus the military forces of the United States were advanced in
permanent occupation to the mouth of the Yellowstone River. Only twice
before had the uniform of the American soldier been so far up the
Missouri--in 1805–06, when the Lewis and Clark expedition passed this
point, and in 1825, when General Atkinson took his command to a point
about a hundred miles farther up. Neither of these earlier visits
contemplated permanent occupation.
[Sidenote: SIGNS OF WEAKENING.]
By this time the Indians began to realize the magnitude of the power
they were contending with, and to show signs of weakening. No extensive
campaign was found necessary along the river for a number of years,
although many of the Indians continued hostile and committed numerous
depredations. The termination of the Civil War, with complete victory
for the government, and the release of so many soldiers from Southern
fields who could now be sent to the frontier, all tended to make the
Indians proceed in their schemes of war with greater caution and
hesitation. Could the evils of our Indian system have been corrected
the tribes might readily have been brought to terms of “lasting peace,”
which was so confidently predicted at the time by Indian agents and
even by some military officers.
In this matter of the military conquest of the Missouri Valley, as in
that treated in the last chapter, it is not possible, with our present
space, to follow in detail the course of events during the next twelve
years. The army made some new advances every year, not only in the
Missouri Valley, but throughout the entire West. Campaigns, battles,
and some appalling massacres occurred, and the soldiers became as
familiar with the country and as expert in savage methods of warfare as
the Indian himself. Finally, in 1875–77, came the last act in the great
tragedy, by which the power of the Sioux nation was broken and their
career as an independent people brought to an end.
[Sidenote: NON-TREATY SIOUX.]
Great efforts had been made for several years to reduce the Sioux
tribes, by peaceable methods, to life on the reservations. Several
government commissions were sent to them, and one in particular, of
which General Sherman was a member, went into the whole matter with
the greatest possible care. Most of the Sioux were finally located on
the reservations and appeared to be peaceably disposed. But there were
some exceptions, estimated to number not more than six or eight hundred
warriors, who had persistently refused from the first to recognize in
any way the treaties or other arrangements with the government. The
agents had failed to get them to quiet down on the reservations, and
they continued to roam over the country as of old, subsisting upon the
fruits of the chase. They were uncompromisingly hostile to the whites
and their Indian allies, and committed outrages without number upon
both. Finally the Indian Department served notice upon them that unless
they settled down on the reservations before January 31, 1876, they
would be turned over to the military authorities and be dealt with by
force. The Indians paid no attention to this ultimatum, and their case
was accordingly placed in the hands of the army.
[Sidenote: CAMPAIGN OF 1876.]
An effort was made to reach these Indians by a winter campaign, but
after one attempt, which ended in a battle of no decisive results, the
scheme was abandoned, because the excessive cold made it impossible
to conduct operations in that shelterless country. General Sheridan,
who was charged with the conduct of this important business, thereupon
planned a campaign which was to be carried out as soon as the season
would permit. He determined upon a concentric movement by which bodies
of troops from widely separated localities should move upon a given
section where it was believed that the hostile band would be found.
General Crook was to start from Fort Fetterman, on the Platte, and
move north; General Terry from Fort Abraham Lincoln, on the Missouri,
and move west; and General Gibbon from Fort Ellis, in western Montana,
and move east. The point of rendezvous was to be in the Yellowstone
Valley near the mouth of the Powder River, or wherever in that vicinity
further development might indicate. General Crook left Fort Fetterman
May 29 with about 1000 men; General Terry left Fort Lincoln May 17 with
about 1000 men, sending his supplies around into the Yellowstone by
steamboat. General Gibbon, with 450 men, left Fort Ellis on the 1st of
April, crossed over to the Yellowstone, and marched down the left bank
of that stream.
[Sidenote: ERRONEOUS ESTIMATES.]
Up to this time all obtainable evidence indicated that the hostile
Indians did not number more than 800 warriors. As a matter of fact,
discontented Indians from nearly all the surrounding Sioux and Cheyenne
agencies had for some time past been leaving the reservations and going
to the hostiles, until the latter had gathered a force of not less than
2500 men. It was against this force, more than three times as large as
was supposed, that the joint movement of Generals Terry, Crook, and
Gibbon was directed.
General Crook was the first to encounter the Indians. He met and fought
them on the head of the Rosebud River June 17, and although the Indians
withdrew, the battle was indecisive, and the great number of the
Indians, as disclosed by the fight, induced General Crook not to take
the risk of going further. He withdrew to the valley of Goose Creek and
sent for re-enforcements.
Generals Terry and Gibbon met about fifteen miles below the mouth of
the Tongue River on the 9th of June, and their combined forces formed
a junction at the mouth of the Rosebud on the 21st of that month. Here
the plan of operations against the Indians was agreed upon. Nothing
was known of Crook’s whereabouts, nor of his recent fight, but it was
pretty well established, from various scouting parties, that the Indian
village was in the valley of the Little Big Horn, from seventy-five to
ninety miles distant. It was decided that General Custer, with the 7th
Cavalry, should proceed up the Rosebud until he should strike a large
Indian trail which had been discovered a few days before, and should
then follow it to the Little Big Horn, feeling well to the south to
prevent the escape of the Indians. General Gibbon, whose column General
Terry accompanied, was to ascend the Yellowstone to the mouth of the
Big Horn, and that stream to the mouth of the Little Big Horn, where
it was expected to arrive not later than the 26th, and where it should
come into touch with Custer.
[Sidenote: THE CUSTER MASSACRE.]
In carrying out his part of the programme, General Custer moved more
rapidly than his instructions contemplated, so rapidly, in fact, that
he would have arrived at the appointed rendezvous, had his march not
been interrupted, an entire day in advance of that fixed for the
arrival of General Gibbon. The result was that his command came upon
the Indian village on the morning of the 25th while advancing in
three separate columns not within supporting distance of each other.
Custer’s column was surrounded and annihilated to a man. The other two
detachments, under Major Reno and Captain Benteen, effected a junction
and intrenched themselves on the river bluff of the Little Big Horn,
where they withstood for nearly thirty hours the terrific siege by the
Indians, who were confident and exultant from their late victory over
Custer. The total loss to Custer’s command was about 270 men. General
Gibbon’s column reached the scene of the battle on the 27th, the
Indians withdrawing upon their approach.
[Sidenote: MILITARY PROBLEM SOLVED.]
This was the crowning tragedy of the long Sioux wars, which had been
waged at intervals for upward of twenty years. Although a great
disaster to the whites, it marked the downfall of the Indian power.
The various bands into which the hostile force scattered after the
Custer massacre were relentlessly pursued until all were driven into
the reservations or beyond the British line. Once on the reservations
they were disarmed and dismounted, so as to cripple them from further
resistance. Another year was consumed in this work, and the military
posts were further extended into the Indian country; but by the end of
1877 the military problem in our Indian affairs was practically solved.