THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.
Samuel Rice's regimental soldiering so far had been full of
excitement, and he had certainly borne his share of service abroad
and in the field. He had suffered considerably in health, and had
been invalided on more than one occasion, but his twenty-one years'
service had not been without reward, although, it may be remarked, he
himself appears to have thought little of his brevet or of his gold
medal. His letters of this time show that, like many another senior
regimental officer, he considered that he had had enough campaigning
to satisfy him for some years--if not for his lifetime,--and he
rejoiced in the idea of a lasting peace and the quiet of garrison
life at home. So convinced was he that a period of leisure and rest
was in store for him that, confirmed bachelor as he had hitherto
believed himself to be, he seized the opportunity to get married.
Yet, within a very few months, his dream vanished; for he was
suddenly called upon to leave his bride and go back to war.
Napoleon was once again the cause of all the trouble. When he
abdicated in April 1814, he was deported, as a state prisoner, to
the Island of Elba, in the Mediterranean; although, out of deference
to the feelings of so great a man, his sentence of imprisonment was
couched in the most polite terms: Elba was ceded to him, and there
he was permitted to reside, with a large retinue and a pension from
France. The nations of Europe hugged themselves with the hope that
they had settled the troubler for all time, but early in March
1815 they received a rude awakening; for Napoleon was not the man
to settle down quietly, at the age of forty-six, without making an
effort to retrieve his fallen fortunes and recover his lost throne;
and he astonished the world by escaping from Elba, and landing in the
south of France. Here he was received enthusiastically by the people,
and more especially by his old soldiers, who, again raising the cry
of _Vive l'Empereur!_ forthwith joined his standard and marched on
Paris, whereupon the Bourbon king fled, and Napoleon once more defied
all Europe.
By the Treaty of Paris (1814) Napoleon had agreed for himself and
his family to renounce the throne of France, and the allied Powers
had agreed to evacuate French territory. A congress then assembled
at Vienna to settle various weighty questions connected with the
rearrangement of frontiers, which Napoleon's high-handed conquests
had upset in all directions. How long this congress would have sat
it is impossible to say; no two Powers would come to terms on any
point put forward, and as time went on events moved towards an open
rupture between certain of the Powers. Napoleon's escape, however,
put an end to all differences, and the nations one and all determined
to combine against the common "enemy and disturber of the world." The
armies of some of the Powers had not retired far beyond the frontiers
of France, and these turned about and prepared for an immediate
invasion, while those at a distance began to move up.
Towards the close of 1813 Great Britain had sent an army, under
the command of Sir Thomas Graham, to the Netherlands (Holland and
Belgium), to assist the Prince of Orange in holding his own against
the French, and the bulk of that army, still remaining in these
countries after the peace of 1814, formed the nucleus of Wellington's
army of 1815, reinforcements being despatched rapidly from England.
On the 30th March, the 51st landed at Ostend. Lieut.-Colonel Rice
was in luck again, for he found himself in command of the regiment,
Colonel Mitchell having been appointed to the command of a brigade.
Travelling in barges on the canal, the regiment moved through Bruges
to Ghent, where it halted for a few days, and then marched to
Brussels, a week later moving into cantonments at Grammont.
The command of the Anglo-Dutch or Anglo-Belgian army was given to
Wellington, who soon assembled, in the Netherlands, some 100,000
troops. Acting in conjunction with him was the Army of the Lower
Rhine, consisting of Prussians and Saxons, under Blücher, numbering
another 100,000 or perhaps a little more. Next came the Austrians
and Bavarians (under Schweidnitz), who, to the number of 250,000,
were known as the Army of the Upper Rhine; while, away in rear,
170,000 Russians were moving up in reserve. Moreover, the Spaniards,
Portuguese, Swiss, Sardinians, Danes and Swedes, were all ready
to close in on France, in the event of their co-operation being
required. As a matter of fact, Wellington and Blücher hewed their
road to victory without the assistance of the others.
Had Wellington had his way, he would have moved into France and
assumed the offensive before Napoleon should have time to reorganise
his army, but for political and other reasons this was found to be
impossible, and April and May were spent in making arrangements for
the defence of Belgium; for it was judged that Napoleon would strike
at Brussels as soon as possible. He himself would have preferred to
have bided his time, but he was forced into immediate action by the
knowledge that, if he were to delay, he would be overwhelmed by the
Austrians and Russians. He despised the army of Wellington, and he
thought little of the British commander, against whom, however, he
had never as yet been pitted. For these reasons he was not long in
making up his mind to invade Belgium.
Meanwhile Wellington and Blücher had disposed their armies so as to
watch the approaches to the Belgian capital, and by the beginning of
June the general situation was as follows: At Brussels Wellington
had his headquarters, and kept Cole's and Picton's divisions in
reserve. In front, _i.e._, towards the south, Hill's corps was on the
right, stretching from the Scheldt up to about Ath; and the Prince
of Orange's corps at Mons, Enghien, and Nivelles, prolonged the line
to the left; while the Dutch and Belgian cavalry, covering these two
corps, were posted well out in front, and Lord Uxbridge's British
cavalry was kept in rear, about Grammont. To the left again came the
Prussians, with the headquarters of their corps at Charleroi, Namur,
Ciney, and Liège. So that the whole line covered a front of about one
hundred miles, and was, roughly speaking, forty to fifty miles to the
south of Brussels.
The 51st was in the 4th British Brigade (Mitchell), belonging to the
4th Division (Colville), in Hill's corps, and the regiment remained
in its cantonments at Grammont until the morning of the 16th June.
How little was known up to this time of the coming campaign is
vouched for by a letter which Colonel Rice wrote at Grammont on the
9th June, but which was not posted till the 13th. He wrote as if the
army generally had no idea of any immediate fighting taking place.
"We are at present quiet," he said; "all a matter of conjecture as
to what is to be done. The Great Duke knows, but we poor devils know
nothing."
But at this time even the Great Duke himself did not know what was
going on at any great distance beyond his outposts. Up to the 12th
June he had not heard that the French were actually moving towards
the Belgian frontier, though he may have suspected it; and so badly
served was he by his intelligence officers (who, it is only fair to
say, were themselves kept in ignorance of events by the Prussian
staff), that it was not until the afternoon of the 15th that he was
able to decide whether Napoleon intended to advance on Brussels
in one column, by the direct road _viâ_ Charleroi, or whether he
would divide his force so as to send a portion of it by the western
route through Mons and Hal. Meanwhile Napoleon, with his customary
energy, had matured his plans rapidly, and had pushed forward his
several corps towards the frontier; so that, when he himself left
Paris on the 12th June, he had made up his mind that he would cross
into Belgium on the 15th, and be in possession of Brussels shortly
afterwards, having defeated Blücher's Prussians and Wellington's
British and allied troops. He concentrated rapidly, and on the night
of the 14th nearly the whole of his army was in bivouac close up to
the Prussian outposts. At dawn on the 15th he saw the first item on
his programme carried out, the French forcing back the Prussians,
occupying Charleroi, and advancing northwards towards Quatre Bras.
At 3 P.M. that day Wellington was apprised of these movements, but
so certain was he of the soundness of his dispositions that he
feared nothing. Learning that no French troops were moving in the
direction of Mons, he knew that his right flank was safe, so at
5 P.M. he issued orders for a general concentration of his force
towards Quatre Bras--the point where the Nivelles-Ligny road crossed
the road from Charleroi to Brussels--and at 10 P.M. he supplemented
these orders by detailed instructions as to routes and objectives.
Then he attended the famous ball given by the Duchess of Richmond in
Brussels, whereat a great many British officers were present, though
all had been warned that they were to leave early and join their
regiments marching to the front. Straight from the festive scene,
therefore, many rode all night to overtake the troops only as they
were becoming engaged with the enemy.
At daybreak on the 16th the 51st (with Mitchell's brigade) left
Grammont for Braine le Comte, where, after a weary march, it halted
for the night in pouring rain. During the march the sounds of guns
were distinctly heard in the distance, yet no one in the regiment
knew what was taking place, or the whereabouts of the enemy. But not
far away stirring events had been in progress. At 11 A.M. Wellington,
riding from Brussels, had reached the position which his advanced
troops were taking up at Quatre Bras, though by that time only some
7000 Dutch and Belgians, under the Prince of Orange, had arrived.
Fortunately, however, Napoleon appeared to be directing all his
energies against Blücher's 80,000 Prussians, in the neighbourhood
of Ligny, and Wellington rode across to confer with the Prussian
Field-Marshal, eventually agreeing to go to his assistance at 4 P.M.,
if not himself attacked.
Wellington then returned to Quatre Bras, and within a couple of hours
realised that the Prussians would have to look after themselves; for
Napoleon, aiming at a double victory, sent Ney against Wellington
early in the afternoon, and the battle which raged around Quatre Bras
for the remainder of the day only ended in a victory for Wellington
by the timely arrival of the reserves from Brussels. Blücher, in the
meanwhile, had been severely handled by Napoleon, who, after a bloody
conflict of nearly six hours, succeeded in breaking the centre of the
Prussian line and driving the defeated army from the field. But of
the forced retreat of his Prussian allies from Ligny Wellington heard
nothing definite until next morning, when he learned that Blücher had
retired upon Wavre.
No sooner did Wellington become aware of the Prussian retreat than
he decided to fall back from Quatre Bras to the position at Waterloo
which he had had in his mind all along, and at about 10 A.M. on the
17th June he sent word to Blücher that he would fight at Waterloo
if a Prussian corps would join him there. He then issued orders for
the retirement from Quatre Bras, and sent instructions to Prince
Frederic's Dutch-Belgians and such troops of the 4th Division as were
at Braine le Comte or on the road to Nivelles to assemble at the
former of these two places and await orders, while all other troops
were to retire at once to Waterloo. Now it happened that Mitchell's
brigade alone of the 4th Division, marching early from Braine le
Comte, had reached Nivelles before the order arrived, and thus
avoided sharing in the ill-luck which befell the remainder of the
division--viz., being posted on the flank at Tubize, near Hal, while
the great victory of the 18th June was being won.[81] Mitchell,
therefore, paraded his brigade with the 2nd Division, already at
Nivelles; and at noon the 51st was marching north by the Brussels
road.
The march of the afternoon was hot and dusty, and was made all the
more disagreeable by the road frequently becoming blocked by troops,
guns, wagons, and ambulances withdrawing from Quatre Bras. The
prospects of a fight, however, kept the men going, and the sight of
some French columns in motion during the afternoon put new life into
them. It was evident that an engagement could not be long delayed,
and many imagined that it would take place before nightfall. Towards
evening Mitchell marched his brigade on to that part of the position
allotted to it--on the extreme right near Braine la Leud, and there
the 51st and the other regiments of the brigade bivouacked. In all
directions troops could be seen moving into position; and though
darkness was approaching it still seemed as if the fight could not be
postponed till the morrow. Masses of French troops were visible at no
great distance, and a few British guns were already opening fire on
some of the enemy's infantry, while parties of cavalry were briskly
engaged in more than one part of the field.
But the night closed in without matters going further, and it was a
night not easily forgotten by those who slept out in it. Rain fell in
torrents, so that the bivouacs became a sea of mud, and the soldiers,
lying out in the open, were drenched to the skin. When at length day
broke and the heavy rain ceased, the situation became fully apparent,
and no doubt remained as to the severity of the coming struggle. Less
than a mile separated the two great armies, drawn up and facing one
another. Between them lay a shallow valley, some two or three miles
in length, and averaging half a mile in width, the sides sloping
gently, but being everywhere uneven and undulating. The trend of the
valley was east and west, and Wellington's army occupied the northern
crest and ground in rear, slightly in advance of the village of Mont
St Jean; while the French were in position on the southern crest.
From south to north, and dividing each position into two almost equal
parts, ran the great paved causeway from Charleroi to Brussels. Such
was the field whereon was fought the memorable battle of Waterloo, so
named from the village a little in rear of Mont St Jean; and within
that cramped area there were at one time engaged no fewer than one
hundred and eighty thousand combatants.
It is not proposed to treat here of the battle of Waterloo
in detail--a task to which numerous bulky volumes have been
devoted,--but in describing the small part played in the fight by
Lieut.-Colonel Sam Rice and his regiment, it will be necessary at
any rate to sum up the situation at various times, in order to make
the narrative complete. Still it may be said at once that the bulk
of Mitchell's brigade kept to the one part of the field throughout
the day, at times gaining ground, at times forced back, yet ever
awaiting attack in the vicinity of Hougoumont. The brigade was weak
in numbers, mustering no more than 1800 bayonets, of which the 51st
supplied 540. The duty allotted to Mitchell was an important one,
since Wellington considered it probable that Napoleon would attempt
to turn his right flank and push through to Brussels by way of the
road through Hal, and it was for that reason that he had detached the
Dutch-Belgians and part of the 4th Division (numbering in all some
18,000 men) to the neighbourhood of Hal. These troops were some five
miles from the field of battle, and at the outset Mitchell's brigade
was called upon to hold in check any determined movement of the enemy
in this direction until fresh dispositions could be made.
Wellington had taken up a strong defensive position, with most of
his troops drawn back below the actual crest, and with his reserves
well concealed by the folds of the ground. Napoleon, on the other
hand, deigned to little concealment, and sought to break down his
opponents' defences by sheer weight of numbers. At a little before
noon the fight commenced, Napoleon sending forward his brother,
Prince Jerome, against the advanced post of Hougoumont, which, as
the key of the position, was strongly held by the Allies. At the
same time an artillery duel opened all along the line, and a tempest
of shot and shell raged across the valley; but the defenders of
Hougoumont, reinforced by the whole of Byng's British Guards,
resisted every onslaught of the French columns, even though parties
of the enemy established themselves close up to the buildings and set
them on fire. Almost continuously during the afternoon the attacks
on this vital point went on, and so numerous at times were the
assailants that they were able to overlap it and threaten the right
of the Allies' main line. Here Mitchell's men came into action, and
assisted in forcing back the assailants.
Early in the day Mitchell had advanced several companies, for the
purpose of closing the gap between Hougoumont and Braine la Leud,
and one company of the 51st was posted close to an abatis which had
been placed across the main road a little in rear of the entrance to
the avenue of Hougoumont. Four other companies of the regiment were
extended farther to the right, along the hollow way leading to Braine
la Leud, with instructions to engage the enemy's skirmishers as they
advanced, and then to endeavour to harass with heavy musket fire the
solid columns following their skirmishers. As had been expected, the
French columns came on, covered by skirmishers, but so advantageous
was the ground over which they advanced, and so high the standing
corn through which they moved, that the companies of the 51st
could not observe their approach until they were almost upon them.
Then, rising, the British soldiers poured in their fire at forty
paces, and, cheering wildly, dashed forward at the charge. And the
impetuous onslaught had the desired effect, for the enemy, although
supported by cavalry, were beaten back. The four companies of the
51st were then ordered to retire some two hundred yards, and rejoin
the regiment.
While this was in progress, Napoleon was busy making preparations for
his grand assault, designed to break the left centre of the British
position. For this great effort, seventy-four guns were moved up, so
as to bring their fire to bear, at a range of less than half a mile,
on the Allies; and Marshal Ney was placed in command of 18,000 men
in four columns, supported by Kellerman's cavalry division. Napoleon
hoped that this combined attack would be final and decisive; that,
having captured the advanced post of La Haie Sainte, the columns
would be able to sweep onwards to Mont St Jean, cut off Wellington
from Brussels as well as from the Prussians coming from the direction
of Wavre, and thus make victory complete. At 1 P.M. Ney's masses of
columns moved down into the valley, and passed the seventy-four guns,
which immediately opened fire over their heads, and caused havoc in
the ranks of the Allies. Three of the columns pressed forward towards
the Allies' centre, while the third moved away north-east, with the
intention of driving in the left flank. Whether by design or by
accident, Ney's principal attack was directed against the portion of
the front line held by Bylandt's brigade of Dutch and Belgians, and
no sooner did the French skirmishers, covering the advance of the
columns, begin to make use of their muskets than panic seized their
adversaries, who turned and fled in disorder. Then was Wellington's
forethought, as well as the wisdom of his dispositions, apparent, for
doubting the loyalty of the Dutch-Belgians, he had been careful to
support them everywhere by British brigades, and here, close in rear,
stood Picton's division, ready to take the place of the disloyal or
cowardly Dutch-Belgians.
Although barely recovered from the effects of their recent fighting
at Quatre Bras, Picton's 3000 gallant men responded to the call, and
advanced in two thin lines to meet the 12,000 Frenchmen, already
flushed with victory. Nearer the columns approached, and the British
lines halted to receive them. Then, when within a few yards, Ney
ordered his columns to deploy into line, Picton, taking advantage of
the momentary check, delivered a withering volley and then charged in
with the bayonet. The head of the leading French column was hurled
back in confusion, and the 3000 British soldiers flung themselves
upon the disorganised 12,000 Frenchmen, before they could recover
from their first surprise. Picton was shot dead as he led the charge,
but his gallant action had saved the situation, and it remained for
the cavalry to complete Ney's discomfiture in this part of the field,
charging the broken infantry, overthrowing the cavalry, and putting
the seventy-four guns out of action for the remainder of the day.
Thus ended the second phase of the great battle, and so far Napoleon
had made no headway. Yet he was by no means disheartened, and,
ordering all his remaining guns into action, he pounded the British
line from a distance, while he prepared for his next assault. At
4 P.M. began another phase of the fight, when Wellington's right
wing was assailed by squadron after squadron of Cuirassiers, fresh
bodies of infantry moving at the same time against La Haie Sainte
and Hougoumont. The charges of the French cavalry were magnificent,
but the squares in which Wellington had rapidly formed his troops
resisted all the enemy's efforts to break them. The British guns
also stood firm, firing grape at the charging horsemen, until they
arrived within forty yards, when, discharging a salvo, the gunners
quitted their guns for the time being and fell back to the shelter
of the infantry squares. Four times did the French cavalry charge
home, using some 12,000 men for the purpose; yet were they able to
do no more than to ride round and between the squares, which, being
arranged chequerwise, met them with bristling bayonets and a rattling
musketry fire in all directions, throwing them into disorder and
obliging the greater number to draw off, with heavy losses in killed,
wounded, and prisoners.
It was just before this that the company of the 51st, still posted
near the abatis on the Nivelles road, was able to do some execution.
A party of Cuirassiers, captured by the British cavalry after riding
into the position, broke away from their escort and endeavoured to
make their way back to their own lines. Galloping down the Nivelles
road, hotly pursued by the escort, they first came under fire of
a detachment of the 51st, out in front of the regiment; but from
this fire they suffered little, as it became masked by the pursuing
British dragoons. The sound of the firing in his rear, however,
attracted the attention of Captain Ross, commanding the 51st company
near the abatis, and he soon became aware of the approach of the
fugitives, who, ignorant of the fact that the road was blocked, came
on at full speed. Then Ross turned his men about, and, opening fire,
emptied many saddles. "Eight of the Cuirassiers," says Siborne,
the historian, "and twelve of their horses, were killed, and the
remainder, about sixty, taken or dispersed."
The greater part of Napoleon's famous heavy cavalry was now _hors de
combat_, and had effected little, except that perhaps their several
charges had helped Donzelot's infantry to gain a footing in the
vicinity of La Haie Sainte, and thus enabled them, a little later, to
capture that post. This success to be of any value Napoleon realised
would have to be followed up forthwith, for he was already aware that
the Prussians from Wavre were approaching his right flank. It was
past seven o'clock in the evening, and there was no time to lose;
consequently, Napoleon bestirred himself, and prepared for his final
grand assault on Wellington's position. The capture of La Haie Sainte
proved of great value to the Frenchmen, for Donzelot's men were able
to prevent, with their musketry fire, the British gunners in their
front from fighting their guns. French guns were then brought up to
the post, and at a range of less than a hundred yards, poured grape
into the ranks of the Allies. Napoleon felt confident that victory
was within his grasp; his grand reserve--his veterans of the Old
Guard--still remained at hand, fresh and ready for a supreme effort,
and he determined that they should make that effort. Placing Ney in
command of the two massive columns of infantry, he ordered them to
take a line between La Haie Sainte and Hougoumont, and assail the
position. As his beloved veterans passed him on the way to the front,
he sat on his white horse with outstretched arm, pointing in the
direction which the attack was to take, and the cheers which came
from the old soldiers convinced him that if it were possible at this
juncture for any troops to break down Wellington's defences, then his
Imperial Guard would do it.
Down the slope in front of La Belle Alliance, into the shallow
valley marched these 10,000 warriors, headed by the drummers beating
the _pas de charge_.[82] Then, as they began to ascend towards the
British position, they pushed forward a cloud of skirmishers, who,
joining hands with those of Donzelot, opened a heavy fire. The two
columns, advancing to the attack in close order, were now seen to
be heading straight for that part of the line held by Maitland's
brigade of Guards. On the right of Maitland, Adam's brigade had been
moved up, so as to prolong the line as far as the northern enclosure
of Hougoumont, to the right rear of which, again, stood Mitchell's
brigade, in support of the gallant garrison of the château.
Barely four hundred yards separated the head of the leading French
column from the British position, when Sir John Colborne, commanding
the 52nd, of Adam's brigade, swiftly realised the situation. Acting
on his own initiative, he gave the order to his regiment to advance
in quick time towards the flank of the attacking columns, and the
long red line moved forward in perfect order. Then suddenly he
wheeled his whole line up, so as to face the flank of the columns,
and threw out a company of skirmishers with orders to open fire
on the Imperial Guard. The Frenchmen, thus challenged, halted and
replied, and by so doing brought destruction upon themselves, for
Colborne's line was ready for them. The ranks closed up; the bugles
rang out; and with one mighty roar from the regiment, eight hundred
British bayonets bore down on the veterans of France. But the latter
did not stand to receive the charge; the sudden onslaught appalled
them; the leading battalions broke and fled to the rear, and in their
flight carried with them the whole of the Imperial Guard--the flower
of the French army, and Napoleon's last hope. No time was given to
them to re-form, for the remainder of Adam's brigade and Maitland's
Guards opened fire upon them from the higher ground as they fled; and
Wellington, with the light of victory in his eyes, ordered a general
advance towards La Belle Alliance, where Napoleon and Ney could be
seen rallying their men for a last stand.
But when, as the sun fast approached the horizon, Blücher's Prussians
were observed to be moving in rapidly from the east and north-east,
the French knew that the squares into which they had been hastily
formed would be powerless to stem the tide of the advancing hosts.
One man alone amongst them all remained resolute. Napoleon even then
refused to acknowledge himself beaten, and enjoined on his soldiers
to stand firm, and, if necessary, die by his side on the field. His
generals, however, saw that all hope had gone, and begged their
emperor to make good his escape while there was yet time. Then, as
the squares gave way and melted into the great mass of fugitives
pressing south, Soult and the others rode off with their mighty
leader--away from his last field of battle. In Wellington, the
"Sepoy-General" at whom he had scoffed, Napoleon had met his match.
The pursuit did not slacken for an instant, and Wellington led on
his victorious troops as far as Rossomme, when, assured that victory
was complete and that the Prussians were following on the heels of
the flying Frenchmen, he drew rein, and in the moonlight rode back
towards Waterloo. At Genappe he met Marshal Blücher; and, amidst the
cheers of those around them, the two great warriors gripped hands, as
they congratulated each other on the brilliant result of the battle.
Then it was arranged that the Prussians should continue the pursuit;
while the British army, worn out by nine hours' hard fighting,
bivouacked on the actual battlefield.
The 51st and the 14th lay on their arms for the night in the wood
of Hougoumont; the 23rd, having taken part in the general advance,
bivouacked near La Belle Alliance; and next morning Mitchell's three
regiments, having united again, marched to Nivelles, where they
halted for a day to get rations, and were congratulated, in special
orders issued by Lord Hill and by Sir Charles Colville, on the part
that they had played in "the glorious and for ever memorable battle
of the 18th June." For their share in this victory both Colonel
Mitchell and Lieutenant-Colonel Rice were appointed Companions of the
Bath. Thus once again fortune smiled on Samuel Rice, who, until the
autumn of 1813, had considered himself the most unlucky of officers.
A stroke of luck, as has been shown, gave him the temporary command
of the 51st at the battle of the Nivelle, the Peninsular Gold Medal,
and a brevet lieutenant-colonelcy; by luck he obtained the temporary
command of the regiment at Waterloo, the Waterloo Medal, and the
C.B., as well as the sum of £433, being a field-officer's share of
the prize-money granted by Parliament to the victorious army. And
by pure and simple luck alone did the 51st take part in the great
battle, instead of being at Tubize with the rest of the 4th Division.
Moreover, all this led subsequently to Colonel Rice receiving the
further honour of being appointed a Knight of Hanover. Yet there
are some who maintain that there is no such thing as luck. Without
it, Colonel Rice would have missed four decorations--in an age when
decorations were not freely given; and without it, he would have gone
to his grave unrewarded for his many campaigns, for the Silver Medal
for the Peninsular War was not granted until eight years after his
death. The services rendered by himself and his regiment at Waterloo
may not have been very remarkable, though it is certain that they did
all that was required of them.
Some years afterwards, when Captain William Siborne was constructing
his famous model of Waterloo, now in the Museum of the R.U.S.
Institution, Colonel Rice, among other survivors of the battle,
was requested to describe the movements of the regiment which he
commanded on that eventful day. His reply[83] was characteristic of
the man: he claimed no honour or glory for himself, but he set forth
the bald facts:--
"The 51st Regiment was in the Corps of the Army immediately under
Lord Hill--brigaded with the 14th and 23rd, under the command of
Colonel Mitchell, being a Light Corps, and standing at the head of
the column upon its first formation at the crest of the position.
Companies were in succession ordered in front, and occupied ground
to the right of the Nivelles road, pretty nearly in line with the
Hougoumont farm. Lastly, the remaining companies under my command
descended and took possession of a favourable rising ground,
covered with thick brushwood, and very defensible against any
sudden attack of cavalry. Here we remained posted, waiting orders.
"Late in the day, I forget the hour, an aide-de-camp from Lord Hill
came down with an order to keep _this ground_ to the _last_, as he
was withdrawing his whole force to the left, and that I must not
expect _any support_. Consequently I prepared myself to render as
defensible as possible the post committed to my charge.
"Being so separated from the army, you will perceive we bore no
decided part in the action, and were but holding ground during the
great movements. The French had a line of cavalry--vedettes--in
our front; and to their rear, at a considerable distance, I
could perceive a body of lancers, who no doubt were waiting some
favourable moment to advance.
"Situated as I was, I could see but little of what was going on to
my left, except the charge of the French cuirassiers, on the left
of Hougoumont farm, on the position. After being foiled in this
attempt against the squares, a considerable body passed down the
Nivelles road, on which there was an _abatis_. I was so placed as
to perceive this, and gave my parties in advance orders to fire,
for being so much in their rear, I could not well distinguish
friend from foe. The fire was successful, though some few
miraculously cleared the _abatis_. I mention this merely to show
our ground more than anything else.
"What I have offered I fear you will not consider very
satisfactory, but you must remember we were not connected during
any part of the memorable day with any of the principal movements.
In fact, I have considered my regiment as a picket detached from
the main body, throwing out skirmishers and supports, according to
my own view, and in covering a certain space of ground.
"I have been frequently questioned respecting the battle of
Waterloo and movements, and my reply has invariably been that I was
so situated as to have but a partial view of the field, and not
engaged in the great conflict that was raging to my left. In fact,
I may say that I was stationary throughout the day, and the only
order I received was the one I have already mentioned.--I beg, &c.,
S. RICE,
_Colonel late 51st Regiment_."