THE SLAVERY AGITATION: DISUNION: KEY TO MR. CALHOUN'S POLICY:
FORCING THE ISSUE: MODE OF FORCING IT.
In the course of this year, and some months after the submission
of his resolutions in the Senate denying the right of Congress to
abolish slavery in a territory, Mr. Calhoun wrote a letter to a
member of the Alabama Legislature, which furnishes the key to unlock
his whole system of policy in relation to the slavery agitation,
and its designs, from his first taking up the business in Congress
in the year 1835, down to the date of the letter; and thereafter.
The letter was in reply to one asking his opinion "_as to the
steps which should be taken_" to guard the rights of the South;
and was written in a feeling of personal confidence to a person
in a condition to take steps; and which he has since published to
counteract the belief that Mr. Calhoun was seeking the dissolution
of the Union. The letter disavows such a design, and at the same
time proves it--recommends forcing the issue between the North and
the South, and lays down the manner in which it should be done. It
opens with this paragraph:
"I am much gratified with the tone and views of your letter,
and concur entirely in the opinion you express, that instead
of shunning, we ought to court the issue with the North on the
slavery question. I would even go one step further, and add
that it is our duty--due to ourselves, to the Union, and our
political institutions, to _force_ the issue on the North.
We are now stronger relatively than we shall be hereafter,
politically and morally. Unless we bring on the issue, delay
to us will be dangerous indeed. It is the true policy of those
enemies who seek our destruction. Its effects are, and have
been, and will be to weaken us politically and morally, and to
strengthen them. Such has been my opinion from the first. Had
the South, or even my own State backed me, I would have _forced_
the issue on the North in 1835, when the spirit of abolitionism
first developed itself to any considerable extent. It is a true
maxim, to meet danger on the frontier, in politics as well as
war. Thus thinking, I am of the impression, that if the South
act as it ought, the Wilmot Proviso, instead of proving to
be the means of successfully assailing us and our peculiar
institution, may be made the occasion of successfully asserting
our equality and rights, by enabling us to _force_ the issue on
the North. Something of the kind was indispensable to rouse and
unite the South. On the contrary, if we should not meet it as we
ought, I fear, greatly fear, our doom will be fixed. It would
prove that we either have not the sense or spirit to defend
ourselves and our institutions."
The phrase "forcing the issue" is here used too often, and for a
purpose too obvious, to need remark. The reference to his movement
in 1835 confirms all that was said of that movement at the time
by senators from both sections of the Union, and which has been
related in chapter 131 of the first volume of this View. At that
time Mr. Calhoun characterized his movement as defensive--as done in
a spirit of self-defence: it was then characterized by senators as
aggressive and offensive: and it is now declared in this letter to
have been so. He was then openly told that he was playing into the
hands of the abolitionists, and giving them a champion to contend
with, and the elevated theatre of the American Senate for the
dissemination of their doctrines, and the production of agitation
and sectional division. All that is now admitted, with a lamentation
that the South, and not even his own State, would stand by him then
in forcing the issue. So that chance was lost. Another was now
presented. The Wilmot Proviso, so much deprecated in public, is
privately saluted as a fortunate event, giving another chance for
forcing the issue. The letter proceeds:
"But in making up the issue, we must look far beyond the
proviso. It is but one of many acts of aggression, and, in my
opinion, by no means the most dangerous or degrading, though
more striking and palpable."
In looking beyond the proviso (the nature of which has been
explained in a preceding chapter) Mr. Calhoun took up the recent
act of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, repealing the slave
sojournment law within her limits, and obstructing the recovery of
fugitive slaves--saying:
"I regard the recent act of Pennsylvania, and laws of that
description, passed by other States, intended to prevent or
embarrass the reclamation of fugitive slaves, or to liberate
our domestics when travelling with them in non-slaveholding
States, as unconstitutional. Insulting as it is, it is even
more dangerous. I go further, and hold that if we have a right
to hold our slaves, we have a right to hold them in peace and
quiet, and that the toleration, in the non-slaveholding States,
of the establishment of societies and presses, and the delivery
of lectures, with the express intention of calling in question
our right to our slaves, and of seducing and abducting them
from the service of their masters, and finally overthrowing the
institution itself, as not only a violation of international
laws, but also of the Federal compact. I hold, also, that we
cannot acquiesce in such wrongs, without the certain destruction
of the relation of master and slave, and without the ruin of the
South."
The acts of Pennsylvania here referred to are justly complained
of, but with the omission to tell that these injurious acts were
the fruit of his own agitation policy, and in his own line of
forcing issues; and that the repeal of the sojournment law, which
had subsisted since the year 1780, and the obstruction of the
fugitive slave act, which had been enforced since 1793, only took
place twelve years after he had commenced slavery agitation in the
South, and were legitimate consequences of that agitation, and of
the design to force the issue with the North. The next sentence
of the letter reverts to the Wilmot Proviso, and is of momentous
consequence as showing that Mr. Calhoun, with all his public
professions in favor of compromise and conciliation, was secretly
opposed to any compromise or adjustment, and actually considered the
defeat of the proviso as a misfortune to the South. Thus:
"With this impression, I would regard any compromise or
adjustment of the proviso, or even its defeat, without meeting
the danger in its whole length and breadth, as very unfortunate
for us. It would lull us to sleep again, without removing the
danger, or materially diminishing it."
So that, while this proviso was, publicly, the Pandora's box which
filled the Union with evil, and while it was to Mr. Calhoun and his
friends the theme of endless deprecation, it was secretly cherished
as a means of keeping up discord, and forcing the issue between
the North and the South. Mr. Calhoun then proceeds to the serious
question of disunion, and of the manner in which the issue could be
forced.
"This brings up the question, how can it be so met, _without
resorting to the dissolution of the Union_? I say without its
dissolution, for, in my opinion, a high and sacred regard for
the constitution, as well as the dictates of wisdom, make it
our duty in this case, as well as all others, not to resort to,
or even to look to that extreme remedy, until all others have
failed, and then only in defence of our liberty and safety.
There is, in my opinion, but one way in which it can be met; and
that is the one indicated in my letter to Mr. ----, and to which
you allude in yours to me, viz., by retaliation. Why I think so,
I shall now proceed to explain."
Then follows an argument to justify retaliation, by representing the
constitution as containing provisions, he calls them stipulations,
some in favor of the slaveholding, and some in favor of the
non-slaveholding States, and the breach of any of which, on one
side, authorizes a retaliation on the other; and then declaring that
Pennsylvania, and other States, have violated the provision in favor
of the slave States in obstructing the recovery of fugitive slaves,
he proceeds to explain his remedy--saying:
"There is and can be but one remedy short of disunion, and
that is to retaliate on our part, by refusing to fulfil the
stipulations in their favor, or such as we may select, as
the most efficient. Among these, the right of their ships
and commerce to enter and depart from our ports is the most
effectual, and can be enforced. That the refusal on their part
would justify us to refuse to fulfil on our part those in their
favor, is too clear to admit of argument. That it would be
effectual in compelling them to fulfil those in our favor can
hardly be doubted, when the immense profit they make by trade
and navigation out of us is regarded; and also the advantages we
would derive from the direct trade it would establish between
the rest of the world and our ports."
Retaliation by closing the ports of the State against the commerce
of the offending State: and this called a constitutional remedy,
and a remedy short of disunion. It is, on the contrary, a flagrant
breach of the constitution, and disunion itself, and that at the
very point which caused the Union to be formed. Every one acquainted
with the history of the formation of the federal constitution, knows
that it grew out of the single question of commerce--the necessity
of its regulation between the States to prevent them from harassing
each other, and with foreign nations to prevent State rivalries
for foreign trade. To stop the trade with any State is, therefore,
to break the Union with that State; and to give any advantage to
a foreign nation over a State, would be to break the constitution
again in the fundamental article of its formation; and this is what
the retaliatory remedy of commercial non-intercourse arrives at--a
double breach of the constitution--one to the prejudice of sister
States, the other in favor of foreign nations. For immediately
upon this retaliation upon a State, and as a consequence of it, a
great foreign trade is to grow up with all the world. The letter
proceeds with further instructions upon the manner of executing the
retaliation:
"My impression is, that it should be restricted to _sea-going_
vessels, which would leave open the trade of the valley of the
Mississippi to New Orleans by river, and to the other Southern
cities by railroad; and tend thereby to detach the North-western
from the North-eastern States."
This discloses a further feature in the plan of forcing the issue.
The North-eastern States were to be excluded from Southern maritime
commerce: the North-western States were to be admitted to it by
railroad, and also allowed to reach New Orleans by the Mississippi
River. And this discrimination in favor of the North-western States
was for the purpose of detaching them from the North-east. Detach is
the word. And that word signifies to separate, disengage, disunite,
part from: so that the scheme of disunion contemplated the inclusion
of the North-western States in the Southern division. The State of
Missouri was one of the principal of these States, and great efforts
were made to gain her over, and to beat down Senator Benton who was
an obstacle to that design. The letter concludes by pointing out the
only difficulty in the execution of this plan, and showing how to
surmount it.
"There is but one practical difficulty in the way; and that
is, to give it force, it will require the co-operation of all
the slave-holding States lying on the Atlantic Gulf. Without
that, it would be ineffective. To get that is the great point,
and for that purpose a convention of the Southern States is
indispensable. Let that be called, and let it adopt measures
to bring about the co-operation, and I would underwrite for
the rest. The non-slaveholding States would be compelled to
observe the stipulations of the constitution in our favor, or
abandon their trade with us, or to take measures to coerce us,
which would throw on them the responsibility of dissolving
the Union. Which they would choose, I do not think doubtful.
Their unbounded avarice would, in the end, control them. Let
a convention be called--let it recommend to the slaveholding
States to take the course advised, giving, say one year's
notice, before the acts of the several States should go into
effect, and the issue would fairly be made up, and our safety
and triumph certain."
This the only difficulty--the want of a co-operation of all the
Southern Atlantic States; and to surmount that, the indispensability
of a convention of the Southern States is fully declared. This
was going back to the starting point--to the year 1835--when Mr.
Calhoun first took up the slavery agitation in the Senate, and when
a convention of the slaveholding States was as much demanded then as
now, and that twelve years before the Wilmot Proviso--twelve years
before the Pennsylvania unfriendly legislation--twelve years before
the insult and outrage to the South, in not permitting them to carry
their local laws with them to the territories, for the protection of
their slave property. A call of a Southern convention was as much
demanded then as now; and such conventions often actually attained:
but without accomplishing the object of the prime mover. No step
could be got to be taken in those conventions towards dividing and
sectionalizing the States, and after a vain reliance upon them
for seventeen years, a new method has been fallen upon: and this
confidential letter from Mr. Calhoun to a member of the Alabama
legislature of 1847, has come to light, to furnish the key which
unlocks his whole system of slavery agitation which he commenced
in the year 1835. That system was to force issues upon the North
under the pretext of self-defence, and to sectionalize the South,
preparatory to disunion, through the instrumentality of sectional
conventions, composed wholly of delegates from the slaveholding
States. Failing in that scheme of accomplishing the purpose, a new
one was fallen upon, which will disclose itself in its proper place.