CHAPTER CLXV.

PAUSE IN THE WAR: SEDENTARY TACTICS: "MASTERLY INACTIVITY."

Arriving at Washington before the commencement of the session

of '46-'47, Mr. Benton was requested by the President to look

over the draught of his proposed message to Congress (then in

manuscript), and to make the remarks upon it which he might think

it required; and in writing. Mr. Benton did so, and found a part

to which he objected, and thought ought to be omitted. It was a

recommendation to Congress to cease the active prosecution of the

war, to occupy the conquered part of the country (General Taylor

had then taken Monterey) with troops in forts and stations, and to

pass an act establishing a temporary government in the occupied

part; and to retain the possession until the peace was made. This

recommendation, and the argument in support of it, spread over

four pages of the message--from 101 to 105. Mr. Benton objected to

the whole plan, and answered to it in an equal, or greater number

of pages, and to the entire conviction and satisfaction of the

President. 1. The sedentary occupation was objected to as being

entirely contrary to the temper of the American people, which was

active, and required continual "going ahead" until their work was

finished. 2. It was a mode of warfare suited to the Spanish temper,

which loved procrastination, and could beat the world at it, and

had sat-out the Moors seven hundred years in the South of Spain

and the Visigoths three hundred years in the north of it; and

would certainly out-sit us in Mexico. 3. That he could govern the

conquered country under the laws of nations, without applying to

Congress, to be worried upon the details of the act, and rousing the

question of annexation by conquest, and that beyond the Rio Grande;

for the proposed line was to cover Monterey, and to run east and

west entirely across the country. These objections, pursued through

their illustrations, were entirely convincing to the President, and

he frankly gave up the sedentary project.

But it was a project which had been passed upon in the cabinet, and

not only adopted but began to be executed. The Secretary at War,

Mr. Marcy, had officially refused to accept proffered volunteers

from the governors of several States, saying to them--"_A sufficient

amount of force for the prosecution of the war had already been

called into service:_" and a premium of two dollars a head had been

offered to all persons who could bring in a recruit to the regular

army--the regulars being the reliance for the sedentary occupation.

The cabinet adhered to their policy. The President convoked them

again, and had Mr. Benton present to enforce his objections; but

without much effect. The abandonment of the sedentary policy

required the adoption of an active one, and for that purpose the

immediate calling out of ten regiments of volunteers had been

recommended by Mr. Benton; and this call would result at once

from the abandonment of the sedentary scheme. Here the pride of

consistency came in to play its part. The Secretary at War said he

had just refused to accept any more volunteers, and informed the

governors of two States that the government had troops enough to

prosecute the war; and urged that it would be contradictory now to

call out ten regiments. The majority of the cabinet sided with him;

but the President retained Mr. Benton to a private interview--talked

the subject all over--and finally came to the resolution to act

for himself, regardless of the opposition of the major part of his

cabinet. It was then in the night, and the President said he would

send the order to the Secretary at War in the morning to call out

the ten regiments--which he did: but the Secretary, higgling to the

last, got one regiment abated: so that nine instead of ten were

called out: but these nine were enough. They enabled Scott to go to

Mexico, and Taylor to conquer at Buena Vista, and to finish the war

victoriously.

A comic mistake grew out of this change in the President's message,

which caused the ridicule of the sedentary line to be fastened on

Mr. Calhoun--who in fact had counselled it. When the message was

read in the Senate, Mr. Westcott, of Florida, believing it remained

as it had been drawn up, and induced by Mr. Calhoun, with whose

views he was acquainted, made some motion upon it, significant of

approbatory action. Mr. Benton asked for the reading of the part

of the message referred to. Mr. Westcott searched, but could not

find it: Mr. Calhoun did the same. Neither could find the passage.

Inquiring and despairing looks were exchanged: and the search for

the present was adjourned. Of course it was never found. Afterwards

Mr. Westcott said to Mr. Benton that the President had deceived

Mr. Calhoun--had told him that the sedentary line was recommended

in the message, when it was not. Mr. Benton told him there was no

deception--that the recommendation was in the message when he said

so, but had been taken out (and he explained how) and replaced by

an urgent recommendation for a vigorous prosecution of the war.

But the secret was kept for the time. The administration stood

before the country vehement for war, and loaded with applause for

their spirit. Mr. Calhoun remained mystified, and adhered to the

line, and incurred the censure of opposing the administration

which he professed to support. He brought forward his plan in all

its detail--the line marked out--the number of forts and stations

necessary--and the number of troops necessary to garrison them:

and spoke often, and earnestly in its support: but to no purpose.

His plan was entirely rejected, nor did I ever hear of any one

of the cabinet offering to share with him in the ridicule which

he brought upon himself for advocating a plan so preposterous in

itself, and so utterly unsuited to the temper of our people. It was

in this debate, and in support of this sedentary occupation that

Mr. Calhoun characterized that proposed inaction as "_a masterly

inactivity_:" a fine expression of the Earl of Chatham--and which

Mr. Calhoun had previously used in the Oregon debate in recommending

us to do nothing there, and leave it to time to perfect our title.

Seven years afterwards the establishment of a boundary between the

United States and Mexico was attempted by treaty in the latitude

of this proposed line of occupation--a circumstance,--one of the

circumstances,--which proves that Mr. Calhoun's plans and spirit

survive him.

In all that passed between the President and Mr. Benton about this

line, there was no suspicion on the part of either of any design

to make it permanent; nor did any thing to that effect appear in

Mr. Calhoun's speeches in favor of it; but the design was developed

at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace, and has

since been attempted by treaty; and is a design which evidently

connects itself with, what is called, _preserving the equilibrium

of the States_ (free and slave) by adding on territory for slave

States--and to increase the Southern margin for the "UNITED STATES

SOUTH," in the event of a separation of the two classes of States.

Thirty Years' View (Vol. 2 of 2) or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 · 第 166 / 202 章