WAR WITH MEXICO: THE WAR DECLARED, AND AN INTRIGUE FOR PEACE
COMMENCED THE SAME DAY.
The state of war had been produced between the United States and
Mexico by the incorporation of Texas: hostilities between the two
countries were brought on by the advance of the American troops to
the left bank of the Lower Rio Grande--the Mexican troops being
on the opposite side. The left bank of the river being disputed
territory, and always in her possession, the Mexican government had
a right to consider this advance an aggression--and the more so
as field-works were thrown up, and cannon pointed at the Mexican
town of Matamoros on the opposite side of the river. The armies
being thus in presence, with anger in their bosoms and arms in
their hands, that took place which every body foresaw must take
place: collisions and hostilities. They did so; and early in May
the President sent in a message to the two Houses of Congress,
informing them that American blood had been spilt upon American
soil; and requesting Congress to recognize the existence of war,
as a fact, and to provide for its prosecution. It was, however, an
event determined upon before the spilling of that blood, and the
advance of the troops was a way of bringing it on. The President in
his message at the commencement of the session, after an enumeration
of Mexican wrongs, had distinctly intimated that he should have
recommended measures of redress if a minister had not been sent
to effect a peaceable settlement; but the minister having gone,
and not yet been heard from, "he should forbear recommending to
Congress such ulterior measures of redress for the wrongs and
injuries we have so long borne, as it would have been proper to
make had no such negotiation been instituted." This was a declared
postponement of war measures for a contingency which might quickly
happen; and did. Mr. Slidell, the minister, returned without having
been received, and denouncing war in his retiring despatch. The
contingency had therefore occurred on which the forbearance of the
President was to cease, and the ulterior measures to be recommended
which he had intimated. All this was independent of the spilt blood;
but that event producing a state of hostilities in fact, fired
the American blood, both in and out of Congress, and inflamed the
country for immediate war. Without that event it would have been
difficult--perhaps impossible--to have got Congress to vote it:
with it, the vote was almost unanimous. Duresse was plead by many
members--duresse in the necessity of aiding our own troops. In the
Senate only two senators voted against the measure, Mr. Thomas
Clayton of Delaware, and Mr. John Davis of Massachusetts. In the
House there were 14 negative votes: Messrs. John Quincy Adams,
George Ashmun, Henry Y. Cranston, Erastus D. Culver, Columbus
Delano, Joshua R. Giddings, Joseph Grinnell, Charles Hudson, Daniel
P. King, Joseph M. Root, Luther Severance, John Strohm, Daniel R.
Tilden and Joseph Vance. Mr. Calhoun spoke against the bill, but
did not vote upon it. He was sincerely opposed to the war, although
his conduct had produced it--always deluding himself, even while
creating the _status belli_, with the belief that money, and her
own weakness, would induce Mexico to submit, and yield to the
incorporation of Texas without forcible resistance: which would
certainly have been the case if the United States had proceeded
gently by negotiation. He had despatched a messenger, to offer a
douceur of ten millions of dollars at the time of signing the treaty
of annexation two years before, and he expected the means, repulsed
then, to be successful now when the incorporation should be effected
under an act of Congress. Had he remained in the cabinet to do which
he had not concealed his wish, his labors would have been earnestly
directed to that end; but his associates who had co-operated with
him in getting up the Texas question for the presidential election,
and to defeat Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Clay, had war in view as an
object within itself from the beginning: and these associates were
now in the cabinet, and he not--their power increased: his gone.
Claims upon Mexico, and speculations in Texas land and scrip, were
with them (the active managing part of the cabinet) an additional
motive, and required a war, or a treaty under the menace of war, or
at the end of war, to make these claims and speculations available.
Mr. Robert J. Walker had the reputation of being at the head of this
class.
Many members of Congress, of the same party with the administration,
were extremely averse to this war, and had interviews with the
administration, to see if it was inevitable, before it was declared.
They were found united for it, and also under the confident belief
that there would be no war--not another gun fired: and that in
"ninety" or "one hundred and twenty days," peace would be signed,
and all the objects gained. This was laid down as a certainty, and
the President himself declared that Congress would be "responsible
if they did not vote the declaration." Mr. Benton was struck with
this confident calculation, without knowing its basis; and with
these 90 and 120 days, the usual run of a country bill of exchange;
and which was now to become the run of the war. It was enigmatical,
and unintelligible, but eventually became comprehensible. Truth
was, an intrigue was laid for a peace before the war was declared!
and this intrigue was even part of the scheme for making the war.
It is impossible to conceive of an administration less warlike, or
more intriguing, than that of Mr. Polk. They were men of peace,
with objects to be accomplished by means of war; so that war was a
necessity and an indispensability to their purpose; but they wanted
no more of it than would answer their purposes. They wanted a small
war, just large enough to require a treaty of peace, and not large
enough to make military reputations, dangerous for the presidency.
Never were men at the head of a government less imbued with military
spirit, or more addicted to intrigue. How to manage the war was
the puzzle. Defeat would be ruin: to conquer vicariously, would
be dangerous. Another mode must be fallen upon; and that seemed
to have been devised before the declaration was resolved upon,
and to have been relied upon for its immediate termination--for
its conclusion within the 90 and the 120 days which had been so
confidently fixed for its term. This was nothing less than the
restoration of the exiled Santa Anna to power, and the purchase of
a peace from him. The date of the conception of this plan is not
known: the execution of it commenced on the day of the declaration
of war. It was intended to be secret, both for the honor of the
United States, the success of the movement, and the safety of Santa
Anna; but it leaked out: and the ostentation of Captain Slidell
Mackenzie in giving all possible _eclat_ to his secret mission,
put the report on the winds, and sent it flying over the country.
At first it was denied, and early in July the Daily Union (the
government paper) gave it a formal and authoritative contradiction.
Referring to the current reports that paper said:
"We deem it our duty to state in the most positive terms,
that our government has no sort of connection with any scheme
of Santa Anna for the revolution of Mexico, or for any sort
of purpose. Some three months ago some adventurer was in
Washington, who wished to obtain their countenance and aid in
some scheme or other connected with Santa Anna. They declined
all sort of connection, co-operation, or participation in any
effort for the purpose. The government of this country declines
all such intrigues or bargains. They have made war openly in
the face of the world. They mean to prosecute it with all their
vigor. They mean to force Mexico to do us justice at the point
of the sword. This, then, is their design--this is their plan;
and it is worthy of a bold, high-minded, and energetic people."
The only part of this publication that retains a surviving interest,
is that which states that, some three months before that time
(which would have been a month before the war was declared), some
adventurer was in Washington who wished to obtain the government
countenance to some scheme connected with Santa Anna. As for the
rest, and all the denial, it was soon superseded by events--by the
actual return of Santa Anna through our fleet, and upon an American
passport! and open landing at Vera Cruz. Further denial became
impossible: justification was the only course: and the President
essayed it in his next annual message. Thus:
"Before that time (the day of the declaration of the war) there
were symptoms of a revolution in Mexico, favored, as it was
understood to be, by the more liberal party, and especially
by those who were opposed to foreign interference and to the
monarchical government. Santa Anna was then in exile in Havana,
having been expelled from power and banished from his country
by a revolution which occurred in December, 1844; but it was
known that he had still a considerable party in his favor in
Mexico. It was also equally well known, that no vigilance which
could be exerted by our squadron would, in all probability,
have prevented him from effecting a landing somewhere on the
extensive gulf coast of Mexico, if he desired to return to his
county. He had openly professed an entire change of policy;
had expressed his regret that he had subverted the federal
constitution of 1824, and avowed that he was now in favor of
its restoration. He had publicly declared his hostility, in the
strongest terms, to the establishment of a monarchy, and to
European interference in the affairs of his country. Information
to this effect had been received, from sources believed to be
reliable, at the date of the recognition of the existence of
the war by Congress, and was afterwards fully confirmed by the
receipt of the despatch of our consul in the city of Mexico,
with the accompanying documents, which are herewith transmitted.
Besides, it was reasonable to suppose that he must see the
ruinous consequences to Mexico of a war with the United States,
and that it would be his interest to favor peace. It was under
these circumstances and upon these considerations that it was
deemed expedient not to obstruct his return to Mexico, should
he attempt to do so. Our object was the restoration of peace;
and with that view, no reason was perceived why we should take
part with Paredes, and aid him, by means of our blockade, in
preventing the return of his rival to Mexico. On the contrary,
it was believed that the intestine divisions which ordinary
sagacity could not but anticipate as the fruit of Santa Anna's
return to Mexico, and his contest with Paredes, might strongly
tend to produce a disposition with both parties to restore and
preserve peace with the United States. Paredes was a soldier by
profession, and a monarchist in principle. He had but recently
before been successful in a military revolution, by which he had
obtained power. He was the sworn enemy of the United States,
with which he had involved his country in the existing war.
Santa Anna had been expelled from power by the army, was known
to be in open hostility to Paredes, and publicly pledged against
foreign intervention and the restoration of monarchy in Mexico.
In view of these facts and circumstances, it was, that, when
orders were issued to the commander of our naval forces in the
Gulf, on the thirteenth day of May last, the day on which the
existence of the war was recognized by Congress, to place the
coasts of Mexico under blockade, he was directed not to obstruct
the passage of Santa Anna to Mexico, should he attempt to
return."
So that the return of Santa Anna, and his restoration to power, and
his expected friendship, were part of the means relied upon for
obtaining peace from the beginning--from the day of the declaration
of war, and consequently before the declaration, and obviously as
an inducement to it. This knowledge, subsequently obtained, enabled
Mr. Benton (to whom the words had been spoken) to comprehend the
reliance which was placed on the termination of the war in ninety
or one hundred and twenty days. It was the arrangement with Santa
Anna! we to put him back in Mexico, and he to make peace with us;
of course an agreeable peace. But Santa Anna was not a man to
promise any thing, whether intending to fulfill it or not, without
receiving a consideration; and in this case some million of dollars
was the sum required--not for himself, of course, but to enable him
to promote the peace at home. This explains the application made
to Congress by the President before the end of its session--before
the adjournment of the body which had declared the war--for an
appropriation of two millions as a means of terminating it. On the
4th of August a confidential message was communicated to the Senate,
informing them that he had made fresh overtures to Mexico for
negotiation of a treaty of peace, and asking for an appropriation
of two millions to enable him to treat with the better prospect
of success, and even to pay the money when the treaty should be
ratified in Mexico, without waiting for its ratification by our own
Senate. After stating the overture, and the object, the message went
on to say:
"Under these circumstances, and considering the exhausted and
distracted condition of the Mexican republic, it might become
necessary, in order to restore peace, that I should have it in
my power to advance a portion of the consideration money for any
cession of territory which may be made. The Mexican government
might not be willing to wait for the payment of the whole until
the treaty could be ratified by the Senate, and an appropriation
to carry it into effect be made by Congress; and the necessity
for such a delay might defeat the object altogether. I would,
therefore, suggest whether it might not be wise for Congress
to appropriate a sum such as they might consider adequate for
this purpose, to be paid, if necessary, immediately upon the
ratification of the treaty by Mexico."
A similar communication was made to the House on the 8th day of
the month (August), and the dates become material, as connecting
the requested appropriation with the return of Santa Anna, and his
restoration to power. The dates are all in a cluster--Santa Anna
landing at Vera Cruz on the 8th of August, and arriving at the
capital on the 15th--the President's messages informing the Senate
that he had made overtures for peace, and asking the appropriations
to promote it, being dated on the 4th and the 8th of the same month.
The fact was, it was known at what time Santa Anna was to leave
Havana for Mexico, and the overture was made, and the appropriations
asked, just at the proper time to meet him. The appropriation was
not voted by Congress, and at the next session the application for
it was renewed, increased to three millions--the same to which Mr.
Wilmot offered that _proviso_ which Mr. Calhoun privately hugged to
his bosom as a fortunate event for the South, while publicly holding
it up as the greatest of outrages, and just cause for a separation
of the slave and the free States.
An intrigue for peace, through the restored Santa Anna, was then
a part of the war with Mexico from the beginning. They were
simultaneous concoctions. They were twins. The war was made to get
the peace. Ninety to one-hundred and twenty days was to be the limit
of the life of the war, and that pacifically all the while, and to
be terminated by a good treaty of indemnities and acquisitions. It
is probably the first time in the history of nations that a secret
intrigue for peace was part and parcel of an open declaration of
war! the first time that a war was commenced upon an agreement to
finish it in so many days! and that the terms of its conclusion were
settled before its commencement. It was certainly a most unmilitary
conception: and infinitely silly, as the event proved. Santa Anna,
restored by our means, and again in power, only thought of himself,
and how to make Mexico his own, after getting back. He took the
high military road. He roused the war spirit of the country,
raised armies, placed himself at their head, issued animating
proclamations; and displayed the most exaggerated hatred to the
United States--the more so, perhaps, to cover up the secret of his
return. He gave the United States a year of bloody and costly work!
many thousands killed--many more dead of disease--many ten millions
of money expended. Buena Vista, Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Churubusco,
Chepultepec, were the fruit of his return! honorable to the American
arms, but costly in blood and money. To the Mexicans his return was
not less inauspicious: for, true to his old instincts, he became the
tyrant of his country--ruled by fraud, force, and bribes--crushed
the liberal party--exiled or shot liberal men--became intolerable--and
put the nation to the horrors of another civil war to expel him
again, and again: but not finally until he had got another milking
from the best cow that ever was in his pen--more money from the
United States. It was all the natural consequence of trusting such
a man: the natural consequence of beginning war upon an intrigue
with him. But what must history say of the policy and morality of
such doings? The butcher of the American prisoners at Goliad, San
Patricio, the Old Mission and the Alamo; the destroyer of republican
government at home; the military dictator aspiring to permanent
supreme power: this man to be restored to power by the United
States, for the purpose of fulfilling speculating and indemnity
calculations on which a war was begun.