OREGON JOINT OCCUPATION: NOTICE AUTHORIZED FOR TERMINATING
IT: BRITISH GOVERNMENT OFFERS THE LINE OF 49: QUANDARY OF THE
ADMINISTRATION: DEVICE: SENATE CONSULTED: TREATY MADE AND RATIFIED.
The abrogation of the article in the conventions of 1818 and
1828, for the joint occupation of the Columbia, was a measure
right in itself, indispensable in the actual condition of the
territory--colonies from two nations planting themselves upon it
together--and necessary to stimulate the conclusion of the treaty
which was to separate the possessions of the two countries. Every
consideration required the notice to be given, and Congress finally
voted it; but not without a struggle in each House, longer and more
determined than the disparity of the vote would indicate. In the
House of Representatives, the vote in its favor was 154--headed by
Mr. John Quincy Adams: the nays were 54. The resolution as adopted
by the House, then went to the Senate for its concurrence, where,
on the motion of Mr. Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland, it underwent a
very material alteration in form, without impairing its effect,
adopting a preamble containing the motives for the notice, and of
which the leading were to show that amicable settlement of the title
by negotiation was an object in view, and intended to be promoted
by a separation of interests between the parties. Thus amended, the
resolution was passed by a good majority--40 to 14. The yeas and
nays were:
Messrs. Archer, Ashley, Atherton, Bagby, Barrow, Benton,
Berrien, Calhoun, Cameron, Chalmers, John M. Clayton, Corwin,
Crittenden, Davis, Dayton, Dix, Greene, Haywood, Houston,
Huntington, Jarnagin, Johnson of Maryland, Johnson of Louisiana,
Lewis, McDuffie, Mangum, Miller, Morehead, Niles, Pearce,
Pennybacker, Phelps, Rusk, Sevier, Simmons, Speight, Turney,
Upham, Webster, Woodbridge.
The nays were:
Messrs. Allen, Atchison, Breese, Bright, Cass, Thomas Clayton,
Dickinson, Evans, Fairfield, Hannegan, Jenness, Semple,
Sturgeon, Westcott.
These nays were not all opposed to the notice itself, but to the
form it had adopted, and to the clause which left it discretional
with the President to give it when he should think proper. They
constituted the body of the extreme friends of Oregon, standing on
the Baltimore platform--"the whole of Oregon or none"--looking to
war as inevitable, and who certainly would have made it if their
course had been followed. In the House the Senate's amendment
was substantially adopted, and by an increased vote; and the
authority for terminating the joint occupancy--a great political
blunder in itself, and fraught with dangerous consequences--was
eventually given, but after the lapse of a quarter of a century,
and after bringing the two countries to the brink of hostilities.
The President acted at once upon the discretion which was given
him--caused the notice for the abrogation of the joint occupant
article to be immediately given to the British government--and
urged Congress to the adoption of the measures which were necessary
for the protection of the American citizens who had gone to the
territory.
The news of the broken off negotiations was received with regret in
Great Britain. Sir Robert Peel, with the frankness and integrity
which constitute the patriotic statesman, openly expressed his
regret in Parliament that the offer of 49, when made by the American
government, had not been accepted by the British government; and
it was evident that negotiations would be renewed. They were so:
and in a way to induce a speedy conclusion of the question--being
no less than a fair and open offer on the side of the British to
accept the line we had offered. The administration was in a quandary
(qu'en dirai-je? what shall I say to it?), at this unexpected offer.
They felt that it was just, and that it ought to be accepted: at
the same time they had stood upon the platform of the Baltimore
convention--had helped to make it--had had the benefit of it in
the election; and were loth to show themselves inconsistent, or
ignorant. Besides the fifty-four forties were in commotion against
it. A specimen of their temper has been shown in Mr. Hannegan's
denunciation of the President. All the government newspapers--the
official organ at Washington City, and the five hundred democratic
papers throughout the Union which followed its lead, were all
vehement against it. Underhandedly they did what they could to allay
the storm which was raging--encouraging Mr. Haywood, Mr. Benton,
and others to speak; but the pride of consistency, and the fear of
reproach, kept them in the background, and even ostensibly in favor
of 54-40, while encouraging the events which would enable them
to settle on 49. Mr. Pakenham made his offer: it was not a case
for delay: and acceptance or rejection became inevitable. It was
accepted; and nothing remained but to put the treaty into form. A
device was necessary, and it was found in the early practice of the
government--that of the President asking the advice of the Senate
upon the articles of a treaty before the negotiation. Mr. Benton
proposed this course to Mr. Polk. He was pleased with it, but feared
its feasibility. The advice of the Senate would be his sufficient
shield: but could it be obtained? The chances seemed to be against
it. It was an up-hill business, requiring a vote of two-thirds:
it was a novelty, not practised since the time of Washington:
it was a submission to the whigs, with the risk of defeat; for
unless they stood by the President against the dominant division
of his own friends, the advice desired would not be given; and the
embarrassment of the administration would be greater than ever. In
this uneasy and uncertain state of mind, the President had many
conferences with Mr. Benton, the point of which was to know, beyond
the chance of mistake, how far he could rely upon the whig senators.
Mr. Benton talked with them all--with Webster, Archer, Berrien,
John M. Clayton, Crittenden, Corwin, Davis of Massachusetts,
Dayton, Greene of Rhode Island, Huntington of Connecticut, Reverdy
Johnson, Henry Johnson of Louisiana, Miller of New Jersey, Phelps,
Simmons, Upham, Woodbridge,--and saw fully that they intended to
act for their country, and not for their party: and reported to the
President that he would be safe in trusting to them--that their
united voice would be in favor of the advice, which, added to the
minority of the democracy, would make the two-thirds which were
requisite. The most auspicious mode of applying for this advice was
deemed to be the submission of a _projet_ of a treaty, presented by
the British minister, and to be laid before the Senate for their
opinion upon its acceptance. The _projet_ was accordingly received
by Mr. Buchanan, a message drawn up, and the desired advice was to
be asked the next day, 10th of June. A prey to anxiety as to the
conduct of the whigs, the mere absence of part of whom would defeat
the measure, the President sent for Mr. Benton the night before,
to get himself re-assured on that point. Mr. Benton was clear and
positive that they would be in their places, and would vote the
advice, and that the measure would be carried. The next day the
_projet_ of the treaty was sent in, and with it a message from the
President, asking the advice which he desired. It stated:--
"In the early periods of the government, the opinion and advice
of the Senate were often taken in advance upon important
questions of our foreign policy. General Washington repeatedly
consulted the Senate, and asked their previous advice upon
pending negotiations with foreign powers; and the Senate in
every instance responded to his call by giving their advice,
to which he always conformed his action. This practice, though
rarely resorted to in later times, was, in my judgment,
eminently wise, and may, on occasions of great importance, be
properly revived. The Senate are a branch of the treaty-making
power; and, by consulting them in advance of his own action
upon important measures of foreign policy which may ultimately
come before them for their consideration, the President secures
harmony of action between that body and himself. The Senate
are, moreover, a branch of the war-making power, and it may
be eminently proper for the Executive to take the opinion and
advice of that body in advance upon any great question which
may involve in its decision the issue of peace or war. On the
present occasion, the magnitude of the subject would induce me,
under any circumstances, to desire the previous advice of the
Senate; and that desire is increased by the recent debates and
proceedings in Congress, which render it, in my judgment, not
only respectful to the Senate, but necessary and proper, if not
indispensable, to insure harmonious action between that body and
the Executive. In conferring on the Executive the authority to
give the notice for the abrogation of the convention of 1827,
the Senate acted publicly so large a part, that a decision on
the proposal now made by the British government, without a
definite knowledge of the views of that body in reference to it,
might render the question still more complicated and difficult
of adjustment. For these reasons I invite the consideration of
the Senate to the proposal of the British government for the
settlement of the Oregon question, and ask their advice on the
subject."
This statement and expression of opinion were conformable to the
early practice of the government and the theory of the constitution,
which, in requiring the President to take the advice of the Senate
in the formation of treaties, would certainly imply a consultation
before they were made; and this interpretation had often been
asserted by members of the Senate. As an interpretation deemed right
in itself, and being deferential to the Senate, and being of good
example for the future, and of great immediate practical good in
taking the question of peace or war with Great Britain out of the
hands of an administration standing upon the creed of the Baltimore
convention, and putting it into the hands of the whigs to whom it
did not apply, and that part of the democracy which disregarded
it, this application of the President was most favorably received.
Still, however, dominated by the idea of consistency, the President
added a salvo for that sensitive point in the shape of a reservation
in behalf of his previous opinions, thus:
"My opinions and my action on the Oregon question were fully
made known to Congress in my annual message of the second
of December last; and the opinions therein expressed remain
unchanged."
With this reservation, and with a complete devolution of the
responsibility of the act upon the Senate, he proceeded to ask their
advice in these terms:
"Should the Senate, by the constitutional majority required for
the ratification of treaties, advise the acceptance of this
proposition, or advise it with such modifications as they may,
upon full deliberation, deem proper, I shall conform my action
to their advice. Should the Senate, however, decline by such
constitutional majority to give such advice, or to express an
opinion on the subject, I shall consider it my duty to reject
the offer."
It was clear, then, that the fact of treaty or no treaty depended
upon the Senate--that the whole responsibility was placed upon
it--that the issue of peace or war depended upon that body. Far from
shunning this responsibility, that body was glad to take it, and
gave the President a faithful support against himself, against his
cabinet, and against his peculiar friends. These friends struggled
hard, and exhausted parliamentary tactics to defeat the application,
and though a small minority, were formidable in a vote where each
one counted two against the opposite side. The first motion was
to refer the message to the Committee on Foreign Relations, where
the fifty-four forties were in the majority, and from whose action
delay and embarrassment might ensue. Failing in that motion, it was
moved to lay the message on the table. Failing again, it was moved
to postpone the consideration of the subject to the next week.
That motion being rejected, the consideration of the message was
commenced, and then succeeded a series of motions to amend and alter
the terms of the proposition as submitted. All these failed, and at
the end of two days the vote was taken and the advice given. The
yeas were:
"Messrs. Archer, Ashley, Bagby, Benton, Berrien, Calhoun,
Chalmers, Thomas Clayton, John M. Clayton, Colquitt, Davis,
Dayton, Dix, Evans, Greene, Haywood, Houston, Huntington,
Johnson of Maryland, Johnson of Louisiana, Lewis, McDuffie,
Mangum, Miller, Morehead, Niles, Pearce, Pennybacker, Phelps,
Rusk, Sevier, Simmons, Speight, Turney, Upham, Webster,
Woodbridge, Yulee."--38.
The nays:
"Messrs. Allen, Atherton, Breese, Cameron, Cass, Dickinson,
Fairfield, Hannegan, Jarnagin, Jenness, Semple, Sturgeon."--12.
The advice was in these words:
"_Resolved_ (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring),
That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby,
advised to accept the proposal of the British government,
accompanying his message to the Senate dated 10th June, 1846,
for a convention to settle boundaries, &c., between the United
States and Great Britain west of the Rocky or Stony mountains.
"_Ordered_, That the Secretary lay the said resolution before
the President of the United States."
Four days afterwards the treaty was sent in in due form, accompanied
by a message which still left its responsibility on the advising
Senate, thus:
"In accordance with the resolution of the Senate of the 12th
instant, that 'the President of the United States be, and
he is hereby, advised to accept the proposal of the British
government, accompanying his message to the Senate dated 10th
June, 1846, for a convention to settle boundaries, &c., between
the United States and Great Britain west of the Rocky or Stony
mountains,' a convention was concluded and signed on the 15th
instant, by the Secretary of State on the part of the United
States, and the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary
of her Britannic Majesty on the part of Great Britain. This
convention I now lay before the Senate for their consideration,
with a view to its ratification."
Two days more were consumed in efforts to amend or alter the treaty
in various of its provisions, all of which failing, the final vote
on its ratification was taken, and carried by an increased vote on
each side--41 to 14.
YEAS.--"Messrs. Archer, Ashley, Bagby, Barrow, Benton, Berrien,
Calhoun, Chalmers, Thomas Clayton, John M. Clayton, Colquitt,
Corwin, Crittenden, Davis, Dayton, Dix, Evans, Greene, Haywood,
Houston, Huntington, Johnson of Maryland, Henry Johnson of
Louisiana, Lewis, McDuffie, Mangum, Miller, Morehead, Niles,
Pearce, Pennybacker, Phelps, Rusk, Sevier, Simmons, Speight,
Turney, Upham, Webster, Woodbridge, Yulee.
NAYS.--"Messrs. Allen, Atchison, Atherton, Breese, Bright,
Cameron, Cass, Dickinson, Fairfield, Hannegan, Jenness, Semple,
Sturgeon, Westcott."
An anomaly was presented in the progress of this question--that of
the daily attack, by all the government papers, upon the senators
who were accomplishing the wishes of the President. The organ at
Washington, conducted by Mr. Ritchie, was incessant and unmeasured
in these attacks, especially on Mr. Benton, whose place in the
party, and his geographical position in the West, gave him the
privilege of being considered the leader of the forty-nines, and
therefore the most obnoxious. It was a new thing under the sun
to see the senator daily assailed, in the government papers, for
carrying into effect the wishes of the government--to see him
attacked in the morning for what the President was hurrying him
to do the night before. His course was equally independent of the
wishes of the government, and the abuse of its papers. He had
studied the Oregon question for twenty-five years--had his mind
made up upon it--and should have acted according to his convictions
without regard to support or resistance from any quarter.--The issue
was an instructive commentary upon the improvidence of these party
platforms, adopted for an electioneering campaign, made into a party
watch-word, often fraught with great mischief to the country, and
often founded in ignorance or disregard of the public welfare. This
Oregon platform was eminently of that character. It was a party
platform for the campaign: its architects knew but little of the
geography of the north-west coast, or of its diplomatic history.
They had never heard of the line of the treaty of Utrecht, and
denied its existence: they had never heard of the multiplied offers
of our government to settle upon that line, and treated the offer
now as a novelty and an abandonment of our rights: they had never
heard that their 54-40 was no line on the continent, but only a
point on an island on the coast, fixed by the Emperor Paul as the
southern limit of the charter granted by him to the Russian Fur
Company: had never heard of Frazer's River and New Caledonia, which
lay between Oregon and their indisputable line, and ignored the
existence of that river and province. The pride of consistency made
them adhere to these errors; and a desire to destroy Mr. Benton
for not joining in the _hurrahs_ for the "whole of Oregon, or
none," and for the "immediate annexation of Texas without regard to
consequences," lent additional force to the attacks upon him. The
conduct of the whigs was patriotic in preferring their country to
their party--in preventing a war with Great Britain--and in saving
the administration from itself and its friends. Great Britain acted
magnanimously, and was worthily represented by her minister,
Mr. (now Sir Richard) Pakenham. Her adoption and renewal of our
own offer, settled the last remaining controversy between the
countries--left them in a condition which they had not seen since
the peace of 1783--without any thing to quarrel about, and with a
mutuality of interest in the preservation of peace which promised a
long continuance of peace. But, alas, Great Britain is to the United
States now what Spain was for centuries to her--the raw-head and
bloody-bones which inspires terror and rage. During these centuries
a ministry, or a public man that was losing ground at home, had only
to raise a cry of some insult, aggression, or evil design on the
part of Spain to have Great Britain in arms against her. And so it
is in the United States at present, putting Great Britain in the
place of Spain, and ourselves in hers. We have periodical returns
of complaints against her, each to perish when it has served its
turn, and to be succeeded by another, evanescent as itself. Thus
far, no war has been made; but politicians have gained reputations;
newspapers have taken fire; stocks have vacillated, to the profit
of jobbers; great expense incurred for national defence in ships
and forts, when there is nothing to defend against: and if there
was, the electric telegraph and the steam car would do the work with
little expense either of time or money.