AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION: ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND
VICE-PRESIDENT: MR. BENTON'S PLAN.
Mr. Benton asked the leave for which he had given notice on
Wednesday, to bring in a joint resolution for the amendment of
the Constitution of the United States in relation to the election
of President and Vice-President, and prefaced his motion with an
exposition of the principle and details of the amendment which he
proposed to offer. This exposition, referring to a speech which
he had made in the year 1824, and reproducing it for the present
occasion, can only be analyzed in this brief notice.
Mr. B. said he found himself in a position to commence most of
his speeches with "_twenty years ago!_"--a commencement rather
equivocal, and liable to different interpretations in the minds
of different persons; for, while he might suppose himself to be
displaying sagacity and foresight, in finding a medicine for the
cure of the present disorders of the state in the remedies of
prevention which he had proposed long since, yet others might
understand him in a different character, and consider him as
belonging to the category of those who, in that long time, had
learned nothing, and had forgot nothing. So it might be now; for he
was endeavoring to revive a proposition which he had made exactly
twenty years before, and for the revival of which he deemed the
present time eminently propitious. The body politic was now sick;
and the patient, in his agony, might take the medicine as a cure,
which he refused, when well, to take as a prevention.
Mr. B. then proceeded to state the object and principle of his
amendment, which was, to dispense with all intermediate bodies
in the election of President and Vice-President, and to keep the
election wholly in the hands of the people; and to do this by giving
them a direct vote for the man of their choice, and holding a second
election between the two highest, in the event of a failure in the
first election to give a majority to any one. This was to do away
with the machinery of all intermediate bodies to guide, control,
or defeat the popular choice; whether a Congress caucus, or a
national convention, to dictate the selection of candidates; or a
body of electors to receive and deliver their votes; or a House of
Representatives to sanction or frustrate their choice.
Mr. B. spoke warmly and decidedly in favor of the principle of his
proposition, assuming it as a fundamental truth to which there was
no exception, _that liberty would be ruined by providing any kind
of substitute for popular election!_ asserting that all elections
would degenerate into fraud and violence, if any intermediate body
was established between the voters and the object of their choice,
and placed in a condition to be able to control, betray, or defeat
that choice. This fundamental truth he supported upon arguments,
drawn from the philosophy of government, and the nature of man,
and illustrated by examples taken from the history of all elective
governments which had ever existed. He showed that it was the law
of the few to disregard the will of the many, when they got power
into their hands; and that liberty had been destroyed wherever
intermediate bodies obtained the direction of the popular will. He
quoted a vast number of governments, both ancient and modern, as
illustrations of this truth; and referred to the period of direct
voting in Greece and in Rome, as the grand and glorious periods of
popular government, when the unfettered will of the people annually
brought forward the men of their own choice to administer their own
affairs, and when those people went on advancing from year to year,
and produced every thing great in arts and in arms--in public and in
private life--which then exalted them to the skies, and still makes
them fixed stars in the firmament of nations. He believed in the
capacity of the people for self-government, but they must have fair
play--fair play at the elections, on which all depended; and for
that purpose should be free from the control of any intermediate,
irresponsible body of men.
At present (he said), the will of the people was liable to be
frustrated in the election of their chief officers (and that
at no less than three different stages of the canvass), by the
intervention of small bodies of men between themselves and the
object of their choice. First, at the beginning of the process,
in the nomination or selection of candidates. A Congress caucus
formerly, and a national convention now govern and control that
nomination; and never fail, when they choose, to find pretexts for
substituting their own will for that of the people. Then a body
of electors, to receive and hold the electoral votes, and who, it
cannot be doubted, will soon be expert enough to find reasons for
a similar substitution. Then the House of Representatives may come
in at the conclusion, to do as they have done heretofore, and set
the will of the people at absolute defiance. The remedy for all
this is the direct vote, and a second election between the two
highest, if the first one failed. This would operate fairly and
rightfully. No matter how many candidates then appeared in the
field. If any one obtained a majority of the whole number of votes,
the popular principle was satisfied; the majority had prevailed,
and acquiescence was the part of the minority. If no one obtained
the majority, then the first election answered the purpose of a
nomination--a real nomination by the people; and a second election
between the two highest would give effect to the real will of the
people.
Mr. B. then exposed the details of his proposed amendment, as
contained in the joint resolution which he intended to offer. The
plan of election contained in that resolution, was the work of
eminent men--of Mr. Macon, Mr. Van Buren, Mr. Hugh L. White, Mr.
Findlay, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Dickerson, of New Jersey, Mr. Holmes,
Mr. Hayne, and Mr. R. M. Johnson, and was received with great
favor by the Senate and the country at the time it was reported.
Subsequent experience should make it still more acceptable, and
entitle its details to a careful and indulgent consideration from
the people, whose rights and welfare it is intended to preserve and
promote.
The detail of the plan is to divide the States into districts;
the people to vote direct in each district for the candidate they
prefer; the candidate having the highest vote for President to
receive the vote of the district for such office, and to count
one. If any candidate receives the majority of the whole number
of districts, such person to be elected; if no one receives such
majority, the election to be held over again between the two
highest. To afford time for these double elections, when they
become necessary, the first one is proposed to be held in the month
of August--at a time to which many of the State elections now
conform, and to which all may be made to conform--and to be held
on the same days throughout the Union. To receive the returns of
such elections, the Congress is required to be in session, on the
years of such elections, in the month of October; and if a second
election becomes necessary, it will be held in December. Two days
are proposed for the first election, because most of the State
elections continue two days: one day alone is allowed for the second
election, it being a brief issue between two candidates. To provide
for the possibility of remote and most improbable contingencies,
that of an equality of votes between the two candidates--a thing
which _cannot_ occur where the whole number of votes is odd, and
is utterly improbable when they are even--and to keep the election
from the House of Representatives, while preserving the principle
which should prevail in elections by the House of Representatives,
it is provided that the candidate, in the case of such equality,
having the majority of votes in the majority of the States, shall
be the person elected President. To provide against the possibility
of another almost impossible contingency (that of more than two
candidates having the highest, and, of course, the same number
of votes in the first election, by an equality of votes between
several), the proposed amendment is so worded as to let all--that
is, all having the two highest number of votes--go before the people
at the second election.
Such are the details for the election of President: they are the
same for that of Vice-President, with the single exception that,
when the first election should have been effective for the election
of President, and not so for Vice-President, then, to save the
trouble of a second election for the secondary office only, the
present provision of the constitution should prevail, and the Senate
choose between the two highest.
Having made this exposition of the _principle_ and of the _details_
of the plan he proposed, Mr. B. went on to speak at large in favor
of its efficacy and practicability in preserving the rights of the
people, maintaining the purity of elections, preventing intrigue,
fraud, and treachery, either in guiding or defeating the choice
of the people and securing to our free institutions a chance for a
prolonged and virtuous existence.
Mr. B. said he had never attended a nominating caucus or convention,
and never intended to attend one. He had seen the last Congress
caucus in 1824, and never wished to see another, or hear of another;
he had seen the national convention of 1844, and never wished to see
another. He should support the nominations of the last convention;
but hoped to see such conventions rendered unnecessary, before the
recurrence of another presidential election.
Mr. B. after an extended argument, concluded with an appeal to the
Senate to favor his proposition, and send it to the country. His
only object at present was to lay it before the country: the session
was too far advanced to expect action upon it. There were two modes
to amend the constitution--one by Congress proposing, and two-thirds
of the State legislatures adopting, the amendment; the other by a
national convention called by Congress for the purpose. Mr. B. began
with the first mode: he might end with the second.
Disclaiming every thing temporary or invidious in this attempt
to amend the constitution in an important point--referring
to his labors twenty years ago for the elucidation of his
motives--despising all pursuit after office, high or low--detesting
all circumvention, intrigue, and management--anxious to restore our
elections to their pristine purity and dignity--and believing the
whole body of the people to be the only safe and pure authority
for the selection as well as election of the first officers of the
republic,--he confidently submitted his proposition to the Senate
and the people, and asked for it the indulgent consideration which
was due to the gravity and the magnitude of the subject.
Mr. B. then offered his amendment, which was unanimously received,
and ordered to be printed.
The following is the copy of this important proposition:
"_Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds
of both Houses concurring_, That the following amendment to
the constitution of the United States be proposed to the
legislatures of the several States, which, when ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the States, shall be valid to
all intents and purposes as part of the constitution:
"That, hereafter, the President and Vice-President of the
United States shall be chosen by the people of the respective
States, in the manner following: Each State shall be divided,
by the legislature thereof, into districts, equal in number to
the whole number of senators and representatives to which such
State may be entitled in the Congress of the United States;
the said districts to be composed of contiguous territory,
and to contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of
persons, entitled to be represented under the constitution,
and to be laid off, for the first time, immediately after
the ratification of this amendment, and afterwards, at the
session of the legislature next ensuing the apportionment of
representatives by the Congress of the United States; that,
on the first Thursday in August, in the year 1848, and on the
same day every fourth year thereafter, the citizens of each
State who possess the qualifications requisite for electors of
the most numerous branch of the State legislatures, shall meet
within their respective districts, and vote for a President
and Vice-President of the United States, one of whom at least
shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves;
and the person receiving the greatest number of votes for
President, and the one receiving the greatest number of votes
for Vice-President in each district, shall be holden to have
received one vote; which fact shall be immediately certified
by the governor of the State, to each of the senators in
Congress from such State, and to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Congress
of the United States shall be in session on the second Monday
in October, in the year 1848, and on the same day on every
fourth year thereafter; and the President of the Senate, in
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, shall
open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted.
The person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be President, if such number be equal to a majority of
the whole number of votes given; but if no person have such
majority, then a second election shall be held on the first
Thursday in the month of December then next ensuing, between
the persons having the two highest numbers for the office of
President; which second election shall be conducted, the result
certified, and the votes counted, in the same manner as in the
first; and the person having the greatest number of votes for
President, shall be President. But, if two or more persons shall
have received the greatest, and an equal number of votes, at the
second election, then the person who shall have received the
greatest number of votes in the greatest number of States, shall
be President. The person having the greatest number of votes for
Vice-President, at the first election, shall be Vice-President,
if such number be equal to a majority of the whole number of
votes given: and, if no person have such majority, then a second
election shall take place between the persons having the two
highest numbers on the same day that the second election is
held for President; and the person having the highest number of
votes for Vice-President, shall be Vice-President. But if there
should happen to be an equality of votes between the persons so
voted for at the second election, then the person having the
greatest number of votes in the greatest number of States, shall
be Vice-President. But when a second election shall be necessary
in the case of Vice-President, and not necessary in the case
of President, then the Senate shall choose a Vice-President
from the persons having the two highest numbers in the first
election, as is now prescribed in the constitution."