REJECTION OF THE ANNEXATION TREATY: PROPOSAL OF MR. BENTON'S PLAN.
The treaty was supported by all the power of the administration;
but in vain. It was doomed to defeat, ignominious and entire, and
was rejected by a vote of two to one against it, when it would have
required a vote of two to one to have ratified it. The yeas were:
Messrs. Atchison, Bagby, Breese, Buchanan, Colquitt, Fulton,
Haywood, Henderson, Huger, Lewis, McDuffie, Semple, Sevier,
Sturgeon, Walker, Woodbury.--16.
The nays were:
Messrs. Allen, Archer, Atherton, Barrow, Bates, Bayard, Benton,
Berrien, Choate, Clayton, Crittenden, Dayton, Evans, Fairfield,
Foster, Francis, Huntington, Jarnagin, Johnson, Mangum, Merrick,
Miller, Morehead, Niles, Pearce, Phelps, Porter, Rives, Simmons,
Tallmadge, Tappan, Upham, White, Woodbridge, Wright.--35.
This vote was infinitely honorable to the Senate, and a severe
rebuke upon those who had the hardihood to plot the annexation of
Texas as an intrigue for the presidency, and to be consummated at
the expense of war with Mexico, insults to Great Britain, breach
of our own constitution, and the disgrace and shame of committing
an outrage upon a feeble neighboring power. But the annexation was
desirable in itself, and had been the unceasing effort of statesmen
from the time the province had been retroceded to Spain. The
treaty was a wrong and criminal way of doing a right thing. That
obstacle removed, and the public mind roused and attracted to the
subject, disinterested men who had no object but the public good,
took charge of the subject, and initiated measures to effect the
annexation in an honorable and constitutional manner. With this view
Mr. Benton brought into the Senate a bill authorizing and advising
the President to open negotiations with Mexico and Texas for the
adjustment of boundaries between them, and the annexation of the
latter to the United States. In support of his bill, he said:
"The return of Texas to our Union, and all the dismembered
territory of 1819 along with it, is as certain as that the Red
River and the Arkansas rise within our natural limits, and
flow into the Mississippi. I wish to get it back, and to get
it with peace and honor--at all events without unjust war,
unconstitutionally made, on weak and groundless pretexts. I wish
it to come back without sacrificing our trade even with Mexico,
so valuable to us on account of the large returns of specie
which it gave us, especially before the commencement of the
Texian revolution, the events of which have alienated Mexican
feeling from us, and reduced our specie imports from eleven
millions of dollars per annum to one million and a half. I wish
it to come back in a way to give as little dissatisfaction to
any part of the Union as possible; and I believe it is very
practicable to get it back without a shock to any part. The
difficulty now is in the aspect which has been put upon it as
a sectional, political, and slave question; as a movement of
the South against the North, and of the slaveholding States for
political supremacy. This is as unfounded in the true nature
of the question, as it is unwise and unfortunate in the design
which prompted it. The question is more Western than Southern,
and as much free as slave. The territory to be recovered extends
to the latitude of 38° in its north-east corner, and to latitude
42° in its north-west corner. One-half of it will lie in the
region not adapted to slave labor; and, of course when regained,
will be formed into non-slaveholding States. So far as slavery
is concerned, then, the question is neutralized: it is as much
free as slave; and it is greatly to be regretted--_regretted
by all the friends of the Union_--that a different aspect has
been given to it. I am southern by my birth--southern in my
affections, interests, and connections--and shall abide the
fate of the South in every thing in which she has right upon
her side. I am a slaveholder, and shall take the fate of other
slaveholders in every aggression upon that species of property,
and in every attempt to excite a San Domingo insurrection among
us. I have my eyes wide open to that danger, and fixed on the
laboratories of insurrection, both in Europe and America; but
I must see a real case of danger before I take the alarm. I am
against the cry of wolf, when there is no wolf. I will resist
the intrusive efforts of those whom it does not concern, to
abolish slavery among us; but I shall not engage in schemes for
its extension into regions where it was never known--into the
valley of the Rio del Norte, for example, and along a river of
two thousand miles in extent, where a slave's face was never
seen."
The whole body of the people, South and West, a majority of those in
the Middle States, and respectable portions of the Northern States,
were in favor of getting back Texas; and upon this large mass the
intriguers operated, having their feelings in their favor, and
exciting them by fears of abolition designs from Great Britain, and
the fear of losing Texas for ever, if not then obtained. Mr. Benton
deemed it just to discriminate this honest mass from the intriguers
who worked only in their own interest, and at any cost of war and
dishonor, and even disunion to our own country. Thus:
"A large movement is now going on for the annexation of Texas;
and I, who have viewed this movement from the beginning, believe
that I have analyzed it with a just and discriminating eye.
The great mass of it is disinterested, patriotic, reasonable,
and moderate, and wishes to get back our lost territory, as
soon as it can be done with peace and honor. This large mass
is passive, and had just as lief have Texas next year as this
year. A small part of this movement is interested, and is the
active part, and is unreasonable, and violent, and must have
Texas during the present presidential election, or never. For
the former part--the great mass--I feel great respect, and wish
to give them reasons for my conduct: to the latter part it would
be lost labor in me to offer reasons. Political and interested
parties have no ears; they listen only to themselves, and run
their course upon their own calculations. All that I shall say
is, that the present movement, prostituted as it evidently is,
to selfish and sectional purposes, is injurious to the cause of
annexation, and must end in delaying its consummation. But it
will be delay only. Annexation is the natural and inevitable
order of events, and will come! and when it comes, be it sooner
or later, it will be for the national reasons stated in Mr.
Van Buren's instructions of 1829, and in the rational manner
indicated in his letter of 1844. It will come, because the
country to be received is geographically appurtenant to our
country, and politically, commercially, and socially connected
with our people, and with our institutions: and it will come,
not in the shape of a secret treaty between two Presidents, but
as a _legislative_ as well as an _executive_ measure--as the
act of two nations (the United States and Texas) and with the
consent of Mexico, if she is wise, or without her consent, upon
the lapse of her rights."
The wantonness of getting up a quarrel with Great Britain on this
subject, was thus exposed:
"Our administration, and especially the negotiator of this
treaty, has been endeavoring to pick a quarrel with England, and
upon the slave question. Senators have observed this, and have
remarked upon the improvidence of seeking a quarrel with a great
power on a weak point, and in which we should be in the wrong,
and have the sympathies of the world against us, and see divided
opinions at home; and doing this when we have several great
questions of real difficulty with that power, in any war growing
out of which we should have right on our side, good wishes from
other nations, and unity among ourselves. Senators have remarked
this, and set it down to the account of a great improvidence.
I look upon it, for my part, as a designed conclusion, and
as calculated to promote an ulterior scheme. The disunion of
these States is still desired by many, and the slave question
is viewed as the instrument to effect it; and in that point of
view, the multiplication of quarrels about slavery, both at home
and abroad, becomes a natural part of the disunion policy. Hence
the attempt to pick a quarrel with Great Britain for imputed
anti-slavery designs in Texas, and among ourselves, and all the
miserable correspondence to which that imputation has given
birth; and that by persons who, two years ago, were emulating
Great Britain in denunciation of the slave trade, and forming a
naval and diplomatic alliance with her for closing the markets
of the world against the introduction of slaves. Since then the
disunion scheme is revived; and this accounts for the change of
policy, and for the search after a quarrel upon a weak point,
which many thought so improvident."
The closing sentences of this paragraph refer to the article in the
Ashburton treaty which stipulated for a joint British and American
squadron to guard the coast of Africa from slave-trading vessels: a
stipulation which Mr. Calhoun and his friends supported, and which
showed him at that time to be against the propagation of slavery,
either in the United States or elsewhere. He had then rejoined the
democratic party, and expected to be taken up as the successor to
Mr. Van Buren; and, in that prospect of becoming President of the
whole Union, had suspended his design for a separation, and for a
new republic South, and was conciliating instead of irritating the
free States; and in which scheme of conciliation he went so far as
to give up all claim for reclamation for slaves liberated by the
British authorities in their passage from one port of the United
States to another, and even relinquished all opposition to the
practice. The danger of an alliance offensive and defensive between
Great Britain and Texas was still insisted upon by the President,
and an attempt made upon the public sensibilities to alarm the
country into immediate annexation as the means of avoiding that
danger. The folly of such an apprehension was shown by the interest
which Great Britain had in the commerce and friendship of Mexico,
compared to which that of Texas was nothing:
"The President expresses his continued belief in a declaration
previously made to the Senate, that an alliance, offensive and
defensive, is to be formed between Texas and Great Britain,
if the treaty is rejected. Well, the treaty is rejected! and
the formidable alliance is not heard of, and never will be.
It happens to take two to make a bargain; and the President
would seem to have left out both parties when he expressed his
belief, amounting almost to certainty, 'that instructions have
already been given by the Texian government to propose to the
government of Great Britain forthwith, on the failure (of the
treaty) to enter into a treaty of commerce, and an alliance
offensive and defensive. Alliance offensive and defensive,
between Great Britain and Texas! a true exemplification of that
famous alliance between the giant and the dwarf, of which we all
read at the age of seven years. But let us see. First, Texas is
to apply for this honor: and I, who know the people of Texas,
and know them to be American and republican, instead of British
and monarchical, know full well that they will apply for no such
dependent alliance; and, if they did, would show themselves
but little friendly to our country or its institutions. Next,
Great Britain is to enter into this alliance; and how stands
the account of profit and loss with her in such a contract for
common cause against the friends and foes of each other? An
alliance offensive and defensive, is a bargain to fight each
other's enemies--each in proportion to its strength. In such a
contract with Texas, Great Britain might receive a contingent
of one Texian soldier for her Afghanistan and Asiatic wars: on
the other hand she would lose the friendship of Mexico, and the
twenty millions of silver dollars which the government or the
merchants of Great Britain now annually draw from Mexico. Such
would be the effect of the alliance offensive and defensive
which our President so fully believes in--amounting, as he says
his belief does, to an almost entire certainty. Incredible
and absurd! The Mexican annual supply of silver dollars is
worth more to Great Britain than all the Texases in the world.
Besides the mercantile supply, the government itself is deeply
interested in this trade of silver dollars. Instead of drawing
gold from London to pay her vast establishments by sea and land
throughout the NEW WORLD, and in some parts of the Old--instead
of thus depleting herself of her bullion at home, she finds the
silver for these payments in the Mexican mines. A commissary
of purchases at $6,000 per annum, and a deputy at $4,000, are
incessantly employed in these purchases and shipments of silver;
and if interrupted, the Bank of England would pay the forfeit.
Does any one suppose that Great Britain, for the sake of the
Texian alliance, and the profit upon her small trade, would make
an enemy of Mexico? would give up twenty millions annually of
silver, deprive herself of her fountain of supply, and subject
her bank to the drains which the foreign service of her armies
and navies would require? The supposition is incredible: and I
say no more to this scare-crow alliance, in which the President
so fully believes."
The magnitude and importance of our young and growing trade with
Mexico--the certainty that her carrying trade would fall into our
hands, as her want of ports and ship timber would for ever prevent
her from having any marine--were presented as a reason why we should
cultivate peace with her.
"The legal state between the United States and Mexico is
that of war; and the legal consequence is the abrogation of
all treaties between the two powers, and the cessation of
all commercial intercourse. This is a trifle in the eyes of
the President; not sufficient to impede for an instant his
intrigue for the presidency, and the ulterior scheme for the
dissolution of the Union. But how is it in the eyes of the
country? Is it a trifle in the eyes of those whose eyes are
large enough to behold the extent of the Mexican commerce, and
whose hearts are patriotic enough to lament its loss? Look at
that commerce! The richest stream which the world beholds:
for, of exports, silver is its staple article; of imports, it
takes something of every thing, changed, to be sure, into the
form of fine goods and groceries: of navigation, it requires a
constant foreign supply; for Mexico neither has, nor can have,
a marine, either commercial or military. The want of ports
and timber deny her a marine now and for ever. This country,
exporting what we want--(hard money)--taking something of all
our exports--using our own ships to fetch and carry--lying at
our door--with many inland streams of trade besides the great
maritime stream of commerce--pouring the perennial product of
her innumerable mines into our paper-money country, and helping
us to be able to bear its depredations: this country, whose
trade was so important to us under every aspect, is treated
as a nullity by the American President, or rather, is treated
with systematic outrage; and even the treaty which secures us
her trade is disparagingly acknowledged with the contemptuous
prefix of mere!--a mere commercial treaty. So styles it the
appeal message. Now let us look to this commerce with our
nearest neighbor, depreciated and repudiated by our President:
let us see its origin, progress, and present state. Before the
independence of Mexico, that empire of mines had no foreign
trade: the mother country monopolized the whole. It was the
Spanish Hesperides, guarded with more than the fabulous dragon's
care. Mexican Independence was declared at Iguala, in the year
1821. In that year its trade with the United States began,
humbly to be sure, but with a rapid and an immense development.
In 1821, our exports to Mexico were about $100,000; our imports
about the double of that small sum. In the year 1835, the
year before the Texian revolution, our exports to the same
country (and that independent of Honduras, Campeachy, and the
Mosquito shore) amounted to $1,500,639; and that of direct
trade, without counting exportations from other countries. Our
imports were, for the same year, in merchandise, $5,614,819; of
which the whole, except about $200,000 worth, was carried in
American vessels. Our specie imports, for the same year, were
$8,343,181. This was the state of our Mexican trade (and that
without counting the inland branches of it), the year of the
commencement of the Texian revolution--an event which I then
viewed, as my speeches prove, under many aspects! And, with
every sympathy alive in favor of the Texians, and with the full
view of their return to our Union after a successful revolt, I
still wished to conciliate this natural event with the great
object of preserving our peaceful relations, and with them our
commercial, political, social, and moral position in regard to
Mexico, the second power of the New World after ourselves, and
the first of the Spanish branch of the great American family."
Political and social considerations, and a regard for the character
of republican government, were also urged as solid reasons for
effecting the annexation of Texas without an outbreak or collision
with Mexico:
"Mr. President, I have presented you considerations, founded
in the relations of commerce and good neighborhood, for
preserving not merely peace, but good-will with Mexico. We
are the first--she the second power of the New World. We
stand at the head of the Anglo-Saxon--she at the head of the
South-European race--but we all come from the same branch of the
human family--the white branch--which, taking its rise in the
Caucasian Mountains, and circling Europe by the north and by
the south, sent their vanguards to people the two Americas--to
redeem them from the savage and the heathen, and to bring them
within the pale of the European systems. The independence of
these vanguards from their metropolitan ancestors, was in
the natural order of human events; and the precedence of the
Anglo-Saxon branch in this assertion of a natural right, was
the privilege and prerogative of their descent and education.
The descendants of the English became independent first;
those of the Spaniards followed; and, from the first dawn of
their national existences, were greeted with applause, and
saluted with the affection of brothers. They, on their part,
showed a deference and an affection for us fraternal and
affecting. Though speaking a different language, professing
a different religion, bred in a different system of laws and
of government, and guarded from all communication with us for
centuries, yet they instantly took us for their model, framed
their constitutions upon ours, and spread the great elements
of old English liberty--elections, legislatures, juries,
habeas corpus, face-to-face trials, no arrests but on special
warrants!--spread all these essentials of liberty from the
ancient capital of Montezuma to the end of the South American
continent. This was honorable to us, and we felt it; it was
beneficial to them, and we wished to cement the friendship they
had proffered, and to perpetuate among them the institutions
they had adopted. Conciliation, arising from justice and
fairness, was our only instrument of persuasion; and it was used
by all, and with perfect effect. Every administration--all the
people--followed the same course; and, until this day--until
the present administration--there has not been one to insult or
to injure a new State of the South. Now it is done. Systematic
insult has been practised; spoliation of two thousand miles
of incontestable territory, over and above Texas, has been
attempted; outrage to the perpetration of clandestine war,
and lying in wait to attack the innocent by land and water,
has been committed: and on whom? The second power of the New
World after ourselves--the head of the Spanish branch--and the
people in whose treatment at our hands the rest may read their
own. Descended from the proud and brave Castilian--as proud
and as brave now as in the time of Charles the Fifth, when
Spain gave law to nations, and threatened Europe with universal
domination--these young nations are not to be outraged with
impunity. Broken and dispersed, the Spanish family has lost
much of its power, but nothing of its pride, its courage, its
chivalry, and its sensitiveness to insult.
"The head of the powers of the New World--deferred to as a
model by all--the position of the United States was grand,
and its vocation noble. It was called to the high task of
uniting the American nations in the bonds of brotherhood, and
in the social and political systems which cherish and sustain
liberty. They are all republics, and she the elder sister;
and it was her business to preserve harmony, friendship, and
concord in a family of republics, occupying the whole extent
of the New World. Every interest connected with the welfare
of the human race required this duty at our hands. Liberty,
religion, commerce, science, the liberal and the useful arts,
all required it; and, until now, we had acted up to the grandeur
of our position, and the nobleness of our vocation. A sad
descent is now made; but the decision of the Senate arrests the
plunge, and gives time to the nation to recover its place, and
its character, and again to appear as the elder sister, the
friendly head, and the model power of the cordon of republics
which stretch from the north to the south, throughout the two
Americas. The day will come when the rejection of this treaty
will stand, uncontestedly, amongst the wisest and most patriotic
acts of the American Senate.
"The bill which I have offered, Mr. President, is the true
way to obtain Texas. It conciliates every interest at home
and abroad, and makes sure of the accomplishment of its
object. Offence to Mexico, and consequent loss of her trade
and friendship, is provided against. If deaf to reason, the
annexation would eventually come without her consent, but not
without having conciliated her feelings by showing her a proper
respect. The treaty only provided difficulties--difficulties
at home and abroad--war and loss of trade with Mexico--slavery
controversies, and dissolution of the Union at home. When the
time came for admitting new States under the treaty, had it been
ratified, then came the tug of war. The correspondence presented
it wholly as a slave question. As such it would be canvassed
at the elections; and here numerical strength was against us.
If the new States were not admitted with slaves, they would
not come in at all. Then Southern States might say they would
stand out with them: and then came the crisis! So obviously
did the treaty mode of acquisition, and the correspondence,
lead to this result, that it may be assumed to have been their
object; and thus a near period arranged for the dissolution of
our Union. Happily, these dire consequences are averted, for
the present; and the bill I have brought in provides the way of
obviating them for ever, and, at the same time, making sure of
the annexation."
This bill, by referring the question of annexation to the
legislative and executive authorities combined, gave the right turn
to the public mind, and led to the measure which was adopted by
Congress at the ensuing session, and marred by Mr. Tyler's assuming
to execute it in the expiring moments of his administration, when,
forestalling his successor, he rejected the clause for peaceful
negotiations, and rushed forward the part of the act which, taken
alone, involved war with Mexico.
During the whole continuance of these debates in the Senate, the
lobbies of the chamber were crowded with speculators in Texas scrip
and lands, and with holders of Mexican claims, all working for the
ratification of the treaty, which would bring with it an increase
of value to their property, and war with Mexico, to be followed
by a treaty providing for their demands. They also infested the
Department of State, the presidential mansion, all the public
places, and kept the newspapers in their interest filled with
abuse and false accusations against the senators who stood between
themselves and their prey. They were countenanced by the politicians
whose objects were purely political in getting Texas, as well as
by those who were in sympathy or complicity with their schemes.
Persons employed by the government were known to be in the ranks of
these speculators; and, to uncover them to the public, Mr. Benton
submitted this resolution:
"_Resolved_, That the Committee on Foreign Affairs be instructed
to inquire whether any provisions are necessary in providing
for the annexation of Texas, to protect the United States from
speculating operations in Texas lands or scrip, and whether
any persons employed by the government are connected with such
speculations."
The resolve was not adopted, as it was well foreseen would be the
case, there being always in every public body, a large infusion of
gentle tempered men, averse to any strong measure, and who usually
cast the balance between contending parties. The motion, however,
had the effect of fixing public attention the more earnestly upon
these operators; and its fate did not prevent the mover from
offering other resolves of a kindred character. It had been well
known that Mr. Calhoun's letter of slave statistics to Mr. Pakenham,
as a cause for making the treaty of annexation, had been written
after the treaty had been concluded and signed by the negotiators;
and this fact was clearly deducible from the whole proceeding, as
well as otherwise known to some. There was enough to satisfy close
observers; but the mass want the proof, or an offer to prove; and
for their benefit, Mr. Benton moved:
"Also, that said committee be instructed to inquire whether the
Texas treaty was commenced or agreed upon before the receipt of
Lord Aberdeen's despatch of December 26, 1843, to Mr. Pakenham,
communicated to our government in February, 1844."
This motion shared the fate of the former; but did not prevent a
similar movement on another point. It will be remembered that this
sudden commencement in the summer of 1843, was motived exclusively
upon the communication of a British abolition plot in Texas,
contained in a private letter from a citizen of Maryland in London,
an "_extract_" from which had been sent to the Senate to justify the
"_self-defence_" measures in the immediate annexation of Texas. The
writer of that letter had been ascertained, and it lent no credit to
the information conveyed. It had also been ascertained that he had
been paid, and largely, out of the public Treasury, for that voyage
to London--which authorized the belief that he had been sent for
what had been found. An extract of the letter only had been sent to
the Senate: a view of the whole was desired by the Senate in such
an important case--and was asked for--but not obtained. Mr. Upshur
was dead, and the President, in his answer, had supposed it had been
taken away among his private papers--a very violent supposition
after the letter had been made the foundation for a most important
public proceeding. Even if so carried, it should have been pursued,
and reclaimed, and made an archive in the Department: and this, not
having been done by the President, was proposed to be done by the
Senate; and this motion submitted:
"Also, that it be instructed to obtain, if possible, the
'_private letter_' from London, quoted in Mr. Upshur's first
despatch on the Texas negotiation, and supposed by the President
to have been carried away among his private papers; and to
ascertain the name of the writer of said letter."
To facilitate all these inquiries an additional resolve proposed
to clothe the committee with authority to send for persons and
papers--to take testimony under oath--and to extend their inquiries
into all subjects which should connect themselves with selfish,
or criminal motives for the acquisition of Texas. And all these
inquiries, though repulsed in the Senate, had their effect upon the
public mind, already well imbued with suspicions and beliefs of
sinister proceedings, marked with an exaggerated demonstration of
zeal for the public good.