EXPENSES OF THE NAVY: MR. BENTON'S SPEECH: EXTRACTS.
I propose to recall to the recollection of the Senate the attempt
which was made in 1822--being seven years after the war--to limit
and fix a naval peace establishment; and to fix it at about
one-fourth of what is now proposed, and that that establishment
was rejected because it was too large. Going upon the plan of Mr.
Jefferson's act of 1806, it took the number of men and officers
for the limitation, discouraged absence on shore by reducing the
pay one-half and withholding rations; collected timber for future
building of vessels; and directed all to remain in port which
the public service did not require to go abroad. It provided for
one rear-admiral; five commodores; twenty-five captains; thirty
masters commandant; one hundred and ninety lieutenants; four
hundred midshipmen; thirty-five surgeons; forty-five surgeon's
mates: six chaplains; forty pursers; and three thousand five
hundred men and boys--in all a little over four thousand men. Yet
Congress refused to adopt this number. This shows what Congress
then thought of the size of a naval peace establishment. Mr. B. was
contemporary with that bill--supported it--knows the reason why it
was rejected--and that was, because Congress would not sanction so
large an establishment. To this decision there was a close adherence
for many years. In the year 1833--eleven years after that time,
and when the present senator from New Hampshire [Mr. WOODBURY] was
Secretary of the Navy, the naval establishment was but little above
the bill of 1822. It was about five thousand men, and cost about
four millions of dollars, and was proposed by that Secretary to be
kept at about that size. Here Mr. B. read several extracts from
Mr. Woodbury's report of 1833--the last which he made as Secretary
of the Navy--which verified these statements. Mr. B. then looked
to the naval establishment on the 1st of January, 1841, and showed
that the establishment had largely increased since Mr. Woodbury's
report, and was far beyond my calculation in 1822. The total number
of men, of all grades, in the service in 1841, was a little over
eight thousand; the total cost about six millions of dollars--being
double the amount and cost of the proposed peace establishment of
the United States in the year 1822, and nearly double the actual
establishment of 1833. Mr. B. then showed the additions made by
executive authority in 1841, and that the number of men was carried
up to upwards of eleven thousand, and the expense for 1842 was to
exceed eight millions of dollars! This (he said) was considered an
excessive increase; and the design now was to correct it, and carry
things back to what they were a year before. This was the design;
and this, so far from being destructive to the navy, was doing far
more for it than its most ardent friends proposed or hoped for a few
years before.
Mr. B. here exhibited a table showing the actual state of the navy,
in point of numbers, at the commencement of the years 1841 and 1842;
and showed that the increase in one year was nearly as great as it
had been in the previous twenty years; and that its totality at
the latter of these periods was between eleven and twelve thousand
men, all told. This is what the present administration has done
in one year--the first year of its existence: and it is only the
commencement of their plan--the first step in a long succession of
long steps. The further increases, still contemplated were great,
and were officially made known to the Congress, and the estimates
increased accordingly. To say nothing of what was in the Senate in
its executive capacity, Mr. B. would read a clause from the report
of the Senate's Committee on Naval Affairs, which showed the number
of vessels which the Secretary of the Navy proposed to have in
commission, and the consequent vast increase of men and money which
would be required. (The following is the extract from Mr. Bayard's
report):
"The second section of the act of Congress of the 21st April,
1806, expressly authorizes the President 'to keep in actual
service, in time of peace, so many of the frigates and other
public armed vessels of the United States, as in his judgment
the nature of the service may require.' In the exercise of this
discretion, the committee are informed by the Secretary of the
Navy that he proposes to employ a squadron in the Mediterranean,
consisting of two ships of the line, four frigates, and four
sloops and brigs--in all, ten vessels; another squadron on the
Brazil station, consisting, also, of two ships-of-the-line, four
frigates, and four sloops and brigs; which two squadrons will be
made from time to time to exchange their stations, and thus to
traverse the intermediate portion of the Atlantic. He proposes,
further, to employ a squadron in the Pacific, consisting of one
ship-of-the-line, two frigates, and four sloops; and a similar
squadron of one ship of the line, two frigates, and four sloops
in the East Indies; which squadrons, in like manner, exchanging
from time to time their stations, will traverse the intermediate
portion of the Pacific, giving countenance and protection to the
whale fishery in that ocean. He proposes, further, to employ
a fifth squadron, to be called the home squadron, consisting
of one ship-of-the-line, three frigates, and three sloops,
which, besides the duties which its name indicates, will have
devolved upon it the duties of the West India squadron, whose
cruising ground extended to the mouth of the Amazon, and as far
as the 30th degree of west longitude from London. He proposes,
additionally, to employ on the African coast one frigate and
four sloops and brigs--in all, five vessels; four steamers in
the Gulf of Mexico, and four steamers on the lakes. There will
thus be in commission seven ships-of-the-line, sixteen frigates,
twenty-three sloops and brigs, and eight steamers--in all,
fifty-four vessels."
This is the report of the committee. This is what we are further
to expect. Five great squadrons, headed by ships of the line; and
one of them that famous home squadron hatched into existence at
the extra session one year ago, and which is the ridicule of all
except those who live at home upon it, enjoying the emoluments of
service without any service to perform. Look at it. Examine the
plan in its parts, and see the enormity of its proportions. Two
ships-of-the-line, four frigates, and four sloops and brigs for
the Mediterranean--a sea as free from danger to our commerce as
is the Chesapeake Bay. Why, sir, our Secretary is from the land
of Decatur, and must have heard of that commander, and how with
three little frigates, one sloop, and a few brigs and schooners,
he humbled Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis, and put an end to their
depredations on American ships and commerce. He must have heard
of Lord Exmouth, who, with less force than he proposes to send
to the Mediterranean, went there and crushed the fortifications
of Algiers, and took the bond of the pirates never to trouble a
Christian again. And he must have heard of the French, who, since
1830, are the owners of Algiers. Certainly the Mediterranean is
as free from danger to-day as is the Chesapeake Bay; and yet our
Secretary proposes to send two ships-of-the-line, four frigates,
and four sloops to that safe sea, to keep holiday there for three
years. Another squadron of the same magnitude is to go to Brazil,
where a frigate and a sloop would be the extent that any emergency
could require, and more than has ever been required yet. The same
of the Pacific Ocean, where Porter sailed in triumph during the
war with one little frigate; and a squadron to the East Indies,
where no power has any navy, and where our sloops and brigs would
dominate without impediment. In all fifty-four men-of-war! Seven
ships-of-the-line, sixteen frigates, twenty-three sloops and brigs,
and eight steamers. And all this under Jefferson's act of 1806, when
there was not a ship-of-the-line, nor a large frigate, nor twenty
vessels of all sorts, and part of them to remain in port--only the
number going forth that would require nine hundred and twenty-five
men to man them! just about the complement of one of these seven
ships-of-the-line. Does not presidential discretion want regulating
when such things as these can be done under the act of 1806? Has
any one calculated the amount of this increase, and counted up the
amount of men and money which it will cost? The report does not,
and, in that respect, is essentially deficient. It ought to be
counted, and Mr. B. would attempt it. He acknowledged the difficulty
of such an undertaking; how easy it was for a speaker--and
especially such a speaker as he was--to get into a fog when he got
into masses of millions, and so bewilder others as well as himself.
To avoid this, details must be avoided, and results made plain by
simplifying the elements of calculation. He would endeavor to do
so, by taking a few plain data, in this case--the data correct in
themselves, and the results, therefore, mathematically demonstrated.
He would take the guns and the men--show what we had now, and what
we proposed to have; and what was the cost of each gun afloat,
and the number of men to work it. The number of guns we now have
afloat is nine hundred and thirty-seven; the number of men between
eleven and twelve thousand; and the estimated cost for the whole,
a fraction over eight millions of dollars. This would give about
twelve men and about nine thousand dollars to each gun. [Mr. BAYARD
asked how could these nine thousand dollars a gun be made out?] Mr.
BENTON replied. By counting every thing that was necessary to give
you the use of the gun--every thing incident to its use--every thing
belonging to the whole naval establishment. The end, design, and
effect of the whole establishment, was to give you the use of the
gun. That was all that was wanted. But, to get it, an establishment
had to be kept up of vast extent and variety--of shops and yards on
land, as well as ships at sea--of salaries and pensions, as well as
powder and balls. Every expense is counted, and that gives the cost
per gun. Mr. B. said he would now analyze the gentleman's report,
and see what addition these five squadrons would make to the expense
of the naval establishment. The first point was, to find the number
of guns which they were to bear, and which was the element in the
calculation that would lead to the results sought for. Recurring
to the gentleman's report, and taking the number of each class of
vessels, and the number of guns which each would carry, and the
results would be:
7 ships-of-the-line, rating 74, but carrying
80 guns, 560
16 frigates, 44 guns each, 704
13 sloops, 20 guns each, 260
10 brigs, 10 guns each, 100
8 steamers, 10 guns each, 80
------
1,704
Here (said Mr. B.) is an aggregate of 1,704 guns, which, at $9,000
each gun, would give $15,336,000, as the sum which the Treasury
would have to pay for a naval establishment which would give us
the use of that number. Deduct the difference between the 937,
the present number of guns, and this 1,704, and you have 767 for
the increased number of guns, which, at $9,000 each, will give
$6,903,000 for the increased cost in money. This was the moneyed
result of the increase. Now take the personal increase--that is to
say, the increased number of men which the five squadrons would
require. Taking ten men and two officers to the gun--in all,
twelve--and the increased number of men and officers required for
767 guns would be 8,204. Add these to the 11,000 or 12,000 now in
service, and you have close upon 20,000 men for the naval peace
establishment of 1843, costing about fifteen millions and a half of
dollars.
But I am asked, and in a way to question my computation, how I
get at these nine thousand dollars cost for each gun afloat?
I answer--by a simple and obvious process. I take the whole
annual cost of the navy department, and then see how many guns
we have afloat. The object is to get guns afloat, and the whole
establishment is subordinate and incidental to that object. Not
only the gun itself, the ship which carries it, and the men who
work it, are to be taken into the account, but the docks and
navy-yards at home, the hospitals and pensions, the marines and
guards--every thing, in fact, which constituted the expense of
the naval establishment. The whole is employed, or incurred, to
produce the result--which is, so many guns at sea to be fired upon
the enemy. The whole is incurred for the sake of the guns, and
therefore all must be counted. Going by this rule (said Mr. B.),
it would be easily shown that his statement of yesterday was about
correct--rather under than over; and this could be seen by making
a brief and plain sum in arithmetic. We have the number of guns
afloat, and the estimated expense for the year: the guns 936; the
estimate for the year is $8,705,579. Now, divide this amount by the
number of guns, and the result is a little upwards of $9,200 to each
one. This proves the correctness of the statement made yesterday;
it proves it for the present year, which is the one in controversy.
The result will be about the same for several previous years. Mr. B.
said he had looked over the years 1841 and 1838, and found this to
be the result: in 1841, the guns were 747, and the expense of the
naval establishment $6,196,516. Divide the money by the guns, and
you have a little upwards of $8,300. In 1838, the guns were 670, and
the expense $5,980,971. This will give a little upwards of $8,900
to the gun. The average of the whole three years will be just about
$9,000.
Thus, the senator from New Hampshire [Mr. WOODBURY] and himself were
correct in their statement, and the figures proved it. At the same
time, the senator from Delaware [Mr. BAYARD] is undoubtedly correct
in taking a small number of guns, and saying they may be added
without incurring an expense of more than three or four thousand
dollars. Small additions may be made, without incurring any thing
but the expense of the gun itself, and the men who work it. But
that is not the question here. The question is to almost double the
number; it is to carry up 937 to 1,700. Here is an increase intended
by the Secretary of the Navy of near 800 guns--perhaps quite 800,
if the seventy-fours carry ninety guns, as intimated by the senator
[Mr. BAYARD] this day. These seven or eight hundred guns could not
be added without ships to carry them, and all the expense on land
which is incident to the construction of these ships. These seven or
eight hundred additional guns would require seven or eight thousand
men, and a great many officers. Ten men and two officers to the gun
is the estimate. The present establishment is near that rate, and
the increase must be in the same proportion. The present number
of men in the navy, exclusive of officers, is 9,784: which is a
fraction over ten to the gun. The number of officers now in service
(midshipmen, surgeons, &c., included) is near 1,300, besides the
list of nominations not yet confirmed. This is in the proportion
of nearly one and a half to a gun. Apply the whole to the intended
increase--the increase which the report of the committee discloses
to us--and you will have close upon 17,000 men and 2,000 officers
for the peace establishment of the navy--in all, near 20,000 men!
and this, independent of those employed on land, and the 2,000
mechanics and laborers who are usually at our navy-yards. Now, these
men and officers cost money: two hundred and twenty-six dollars
per annum per man, and eight hundred and fifty dollars per annum
per officer, was the average cost in 1833, as stated in the report
of the then Secretary of the Navy, the present senator from New
Hampshire [Mr. WOODBURY]. What it is now, Mr. B. did not know, but
knew it was greater for the officers now, than it was then. But one
thing he did know--and that was, that a naval peace establishment of
the magnitude disclosed in the committee's report (six squadrons, 54
vessels, 1,700 guns, 17,000 men, and 2,000 or 3,000 officers) would
break down the whole navy of the United States.
Mr. B. said we had just had a presidential election carried on a
_hue-and-cry_ against extravagance, and a _hurrah_ for a change,
and a promise to carry on the government for thirteen millions of
dollars; and here were fifteen and a half millions for one branch
of the service! and those who oppose it are to be stigmatized as
architects of ruin, and enemies of the navy; and a _hue-and-cry_
raised against them for the opposition. He said we had just voted
a set of resolutions [Mr. CLAY'S] to limit the expenses of the
government to twenty-two millions; and yet here are two-thirds of
that sum proposed for one branch of the service--a branch which,
under General Jackson's administration, cost about four millions,
and was intended to be limited to about that amount. This was the
economy--the retrenchment--the saving of the people's money, which
was promised before the election!
Mr. B. would not go into points so well stated by the senator from
New Hampshire [Mr. WOODBURY] on yesterday, that our present peace
naval establishment exceeds the cost of the war establishment during
the late war; that we pay far more money, and get much fewer guns
and men than the British do for the same money. He would omit the
tables which he had on hand to prove these important points, and
would go on to say that it was an obligation of imperious duty on
Congress to arrest the present state of things; to turn back the
establishment to what it was a year ago; and to go to work at the
next session of Congress to regulate the United States naval peace
establishment by law. When that bill came up, a great question
would have to be decided--the question of a navy for defence, or
for offence! When that question came on, he would give his opinion
upon it, and his reasons for that opinion. A navy of some degree,
and of some kind, all seemed to be agreed upon; but what it is to
be--whether to defend our homes, or carry war abroad--is a question
yet to be decided, and on which the wisdom and the patriotism of
the country would be called into requisition. He would only say,
at present, that coasts and cities could be defended without great
fleets at sea. The history of continental Europe was full of the
proofs. England, with her thousand ships, could do nothing after
Europe was ready for her, during the late wars of the French
revolution. He did not speak of attacks in time of peace, like
Copenhagen, but of Cadiz and Teneriffe in 1797, and Boulogne and
Flushing in 1804, where Nelson, with all his skill and personal
daring, and with vast fleets, was able to make no impression.
Mr. B. said the navy was popular, and had many friends and
champions; but there was such a thing as killing by kindness. He
had watched the progress of events for some time, and said to his
friends (for he made no speeches about it) that the navy was in
danger--that the expense of it was growing too fast--that there
would be reaction and revulsion. And he now said that, unless things
were checked, and moderate counsels prevailed, and law substituted
for executive discretion (or indiscretion, as the case might be),
the time might not be distant when this brilliant arm of our defence
should become as unpopular as it was in the time of the elder Mr.
Adams.