CHAPTER CVI.

BRITISH TREATY; AFRICAN SQUADRON FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE

SLAVE TRADE; MR. BENTON'S SPEECH; EXTRACT.

The suppression of the African slave-trade is the second subject

included in the treaty; and here the regret renews itself at the

absence of all the customary lights upon the origin and progress

of treaty stipulations. No minutes of conference; no protocols; no

draughts or counterdraughts; no diplomatic notes; not a word of any

kind from one negotiator to the other. Nothing in relation to the

subject, in the shape of negotiation, is communicated to us. Even

the section of the correspondence entitled "_Suppression of the

slave-trade_"--even this section professedly devoted to the subject,

contains not a syllable upon it from the negotiators to each other,

or to their Governments; but opens and closes with communications

from American naval officers, evidently extracted from them by the

American negotiator, to justify the forthcoming of preconceived and

foregone conclusions. Never since the art of writing was invented

could there have been a treaty of such magnitude negotiated with

such total absence of necessary light upon the history of its

formation. Lamentable as is this defect of light upon the formation

of the treaty generally, it becomes particularly so at this point,

where a stipulation new, delicate, and embarrassing, has been

unexpectedly introduced, and falls upon us as abruptly as if it fell

from the clouds. In the absence of all appropriate information from

the negotiators themselves, I am driven to glean among the scanty

paragraphs of the President's message, and in the answers of the

naval officers to the Secretary's inquiries. Though silent as to the

origin and progress of the proposition for this novel alliance, they

still show the important particular of the motives which caused it.

Passing from the political consequences of this

entanglement--consequences which no human foresight can reach--I

come to the immediate and practical effects which lie within our

view, and which display the enormous inexpediency of the measure.

First: the expense in money--an item which would seem to be entitled

to some regard in the present deplorable state of the treasury--in

the present cry for retrenchment--and in the present heavy taxation

upon the comforts and necessaries of life. This expense for 80

guns will be about $750,000 per annum, exclusive of repairs and

loss of lives. I speak of the whole expense, as part of the naval

establishment of the United States, and not of the mere expense

of working the ships after they have gone to sea. Nine thousand

dollars per gun is about the expense of the establishment; 80 guns

would be $720,000 per annum, which is $3,600,000 for five years.

But the squadron is not limited to a maximum of 80 guns; that is

the minimum limit: it is to be 80 guns "at the least." And if the

party which granted these 80 shall continue in power, Great Britain

may find it as easy to double the number, as it was to obtain the

first eighty. Nor is the time limited to five years; it is only

determinable after that period by giving notice; a notice not to be

expected from those who made the treaty. At the least, then, the

moneyed expense is to be $3,600,000; if the present party continues

in power, it may double or treble that amount; and this, besides the

cost of the ships. Such is the moneyed expense. In ships, the wear

and tear of vessels must be great. We are to prepare, equip, and

maintain in service, on a coast 4,000 miles from home, the adequate

number of vessels to carry these 80 guns. It is not sufficient

to send the number there; they must be kept up and maintained in

service there; and this will require constant expenses to repair

injuries, supply losses and cover casualties. In the employment of

men, and the waste of life and health, the expenditure must be

large. Ten men and two officers to the gun, is the smallest estimate

that can be admitted. This would require a complement of 960 men.

Including all the necessary equipage of the ship, and above 1,000

persons will be constantly required. These are to be employed at a

vast distance from home; on a savage coast; in a perilous service;

on both sides of the equator; and in a climate which is death to

the white race. This waste of men--this wear and tear of life and

constitution--should stand for something in a Christian land, and

in this age of roaming philanthropy; unless, indeed, in excessive

love for the blacks, it is deemed meritorious to destroy the whites.

The field of operations for this squadron is great; the term "coast

of Africa" having an immense application in the vocabulary of the

slave-trade. On the western coast of Africa, according to the

replies of the naval officers Bell and Paine, the trade is carried

on from Senegal to Cape Frio--a distance of 3,600 miles, following

its windings as the watching squadrons would have to go. But the

track of the slavers between Africa and America has to be watched,

as well as the immediate coast; and this embraces a space in the

ocean of 35 degrees on each side of the equator (say four thousand

miles), and covering the American coast from Cuba to Rio Janeiro;

so that the coast of Africa--the western coast alone--embraces a

diagram of the ocean of near 4,000 miles every way, having the

equator in the centre, and bounded east and west by the New and

the Old World. This is for the western coast only: the eastern is

nearly as large. The same naval officers say that a large trade

in negroes is carried on in the Mahometan countries bordering on

the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and in the Portuguese East India

colonies; and, what is worthy to be told, it is also carried on

in the British presidency of Bombay, and other British Asiatic

possessions. It is true, the officers say the American slavers are

not yet there; but go there they will, according to all the laws of

trading and hunting, the moment they are disturbed, or the trade

fails on the western coast. Wherever the trade exists, the combined

powers must follow it: for good is not to be done by halves, and

philanthropy is not to be circumscribed by coasts and latitudes.

Among all the strange features in the comedy of errors which has

ended in this treaty that of sending American ministers abroad, to

close the markets of the world against the slave-trade, is the most

striking. Not content with the expenses, loss of life, and political

entanglement of this alliance, we must electioneer for insults, and

send ministers abroad to receive, pocket, and bring them home.

In what circumstances do we undertake all this fine work? What

is our condition at home, while thus going abroad in search of

employment? We raise 1,000 men for foreign service, while reducing

our little army at home! We send ships to the coast of Africa, while

dismounting our dragoons on the frontiers of Missouri and Arkansas!

We protect Africa from slave-dealers, and abandon Florida to savage

butchery! We send cannon, shot, shells, powder, lead, bombs, and

balls, to Africa, while denying arms and ammunition to the young

men who go to Florida! We give food, clothes, pay, to the men who

go to Africa, and deny rations even to those who go to Florida! We

cry out for retrenchment, and scatter $3,600,000 at one broad cast

of the hand! We tax tea and coffee, and send the money to Africa!

We are borrowing and taxing, and striking paper money, and reducing

expenses at home, when engaging in this new and vast expense for the

defence of Africa! What madness and folly! Has Don Quixote come to

life, and placed himself at the head of our Government, and taken

the negroes of Africa, instead of the damsels of Spain, for the

objects of his chivalrous protection?

The slave-trade is diabolical and infamous; but Great Britain is not

the country to read us a lesson upon its atrocity, or to stimulate

our exertions to suppress it. The nation which, at the peace of

Utrecht, made the _asiento_--the slave contract--a condition of

peace, fighting on till she obtained it; the nation which entailed

African slavery upon us--which rejected our colonial statutes for

its suppression[4]--which has many, many ten millions, of white

subjects in Europe and in Asia in greater slavery of body and

mind, in more bodily misery and mental darkness, than any black

slaves in the United States;--such a nation has no right to cajole

or to dragoon us into alliances and expenses for the suppression

of slavery on the coast of Africa. We have done our part on that

subject. Considering the example and instruction we had from Great

Britain, we have done a wonderful part. The constitution of the

United States, mainly made by slaveholding States, authorized

Congress to put an end to the importation of slaves by a given day.

Anticipating the limited day by legislative action, the Congress

had the law ready to take effect on the day permitted by the

constitution. On the 1st day of January, 1808, Thomas Jefferson

being President of the United States, the importation of slaves

became unlawful and criminal. A subsequent act of Congress following

up the idea of Mr. Jefferson in his first draught of the Declaration

of Independence, qualified the crime as piratical, and delivered up

its pursuers to the sword of the law, and to the vengeance of the

world, as the enemies of the human race. Vessels of war cruising

on the coast of Africa, under our act of 1819, have been directed

to search our own vessels--to arrest the violators of the law,

and bring them in--the ships for confiscation, and the men for

punishment. This was doing enough--enough for a young country,

far remote in the New World, and whose policy is to avoid foreign

connections and entangling alliances. We did this voluntarily,

without instigation, and without supervision from abroad; and now

there can be no necessity for Great Britain to assume a superiority

over us in this particular, and bind us in treaty stipulations,

which destroy all the merit of a voluntary action. We have done

enough; and it is no part of our business to exalt still higher

the fanatical spirit of abolition, which is now become the

stalking-horse of nations and of political powers. Our country

contains many slaves, derived from Africa; and, while holding these,

it is neither politic nor decent to join the crusade of European

powers to put down the African slave-trade. From combinations of

powers against the present slave-takers, there is but a step to the

combination of the same powers against the present slaveholders;

and it is not for the United States to join in the first movement,

which leads to the second. "No entangling alliances" should be her

motto! And as for her part in preventing the foreign slave-trade,

it is sufficient that she prevents her own citizens, in her own

way, from engaging in it; and that she takes care to become neither

the instrument, nor the victim, of European combinations for its

suppression.

[4] He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating

its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a

distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them

into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in

their transportation thither. This piratical warfare--the opprobrium

of _infidel_ powers--is the warfare of the Christian king of Great

Britain, determined to keep open a market where _men_ should be

bought and sold. He has prostituted his negative for suppressing

every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable

commerce; and, that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact

of distinguished dye, he is now exciting the very people to rise

in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has

deprived them, by murdering the people on whom he has obtruded them;

thus paying off former crimes committed against the _liberties_

of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against

the _lives_ of another.--[_Original draught of the Declaration of

Independence, as drawn by Mr. Jefferson, and before it was altered

by the committee._]

The eighth and ninth articles of the treaty bind us to this naval

alliance with Great Britain. By these articles we stipulate to keep

a squadron of at least 80 guns on the coast of Africa for five

years for the suppression of this trade--with a further stipulation

to keep it up until one or the other party shall give notice of a

design to retire from it. This is the insidious way of getting an

onerous measure saddled upon the country. Short-sighted people are

fascinated with the idea of being able to get rid of the burden

when they please; but such burdens are always found to be the most

interminable. In this case Great Britain will never give the notice:

our government will not without a congressional recommendation, and

it will be found difficult to unite the two Houses in a request. The

stipulation may be considered permanent under the delusion of a five

years' limit, and an optional continuance.

The papers communicated do not show at whose instance these articles

were inserted; and the absence of all minutes of conferences leaves

us at a loss to trace their origin and progress in the hands of

the negotiators. The little that is seen would indicate its origin

to be wholly American; evidence _aliunde_ proves it to be wholly

British; and that our Secretary-negotiator was only doing the work

of the British minister in assuming the ostensible paternity of

the articles. In the papers communicated, there is not a syllable

upon the subject from Lord Ashburton. His finger is not seen in

the affair. Mr. Webster appears as sole mover and conductor of the

proposition. In his letter of the 30th of April to Captains Bell and

Paine of the United States navy, he first approaches the subject,

and opens it with a series of questions on the African slave-trade.

This draws forth the answers which I have already shown. This is

the commencement of the business. And here we are struck with the

curious fact, that this letter of inquiry, laying the foundation

for a novel and extraordinary article in the treaty, bears date

44 days before the first written communication from the British

to the American negotiator! and 47 days before the first written

communication from Mr. Webster to Lord Ashburton! It would seem that

much was done by word of mouth before pen was put to paper; and that

in this most essential part of the negotiations, pen was not put

to paper at all, from one negotiator to the other, throughout the

whole affair. Lord Ashburton's name is never found in connection

with the subject! Mr. Webster's only in the notes of inquiry to

the American naval officers. Even in these he does not mention the

treaty, nor allude to the negotiation, nor indicate the purpose

for which information was sought! So that this most extraordinary

article is without a clew to its history, and stands in the treaty

as if it had fallen from the clouds, and chanced to lodge there!

Even the President's message, which undertakes to account for the

article, and to justify it, is silent on the point, though laboring

through a mass of ambiguities and obscurities, evidently calculated

to raise the inference that it originated with us. From the papers

communicated, it is an American proposition, of which the British

negotiator knew nothing until he signed the treaty. That is the

first place where his name is seen in conjunction with it, or seen

in a place to authorize the belief that he knew of it. Yet, it is

certainly a British proposition; it is certainly a British article.

Since the year 1806 Great Britain has been endeavoring to get the

United States into some sort of arrangement for co-operation in the

suppression of the African slave-trade. It was slightly attempted in

Mr. Jefferson's time--again at Ghent; but the warning-voice of the

Father of his country--_no entangling alliances_--saved us on each

occasion. Now we are yoked--yoked in with the British on the coast

of Africa; and when we can get free from it, no mortal can foresee.

Thirty Years' View (Vol. 2 of 2) or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 · 第 106 / 202 章