CHAPTER XCVI.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT: PROGRESS OF ITS EXPENSE.

There is no part of the working of the government, at which that

part of the citizens who live upon their own industry should look

more closely, than into its expenditures. The progress of expense

in every branch of the public service should be their constant

care; and for that purpose retrospective views are necessary, and

comparisons between different periods. A preceding chapter has given

some view of this progress and comparison in the Navy Department:

the present one will make the same retrospect with respect to the

army, and on the same principles--that of taking the aggregate

expense of the department, and then seeing the effective force

produced, and the detailed cost of such force. Such comparative

view was well brought up by Mr. Calhoun for a period of twenty

years--1822 to 1842--in the debate on the naval appropriations; and

it furnishes instructive data for this examination. He said:

"I shall now pass to the military, with which I am more

familiar. I propose to confine my remarks almost entirely to

the army proper, including the Military Academy, in reference

to which the information is more full and minute. I exclude

the expenses incident to the Florida war, and the expenditures

for the ordnance, the engineer, the topographical, the Indian,

and the pension bureaus. Instead of 1823, for which there is

no official and exact statement of the expenses of the army,

I shall take 1821, for which there is one made by myself, as

Secretary of War, and for the minute correctness of which, I

can vouch. It is contained in a report made under a call of the

House of Representatives, and comprises a comparative statement

of the expenses of the army proper, for the years 1818, '19,

'20, and '21, respectively, and an estimate of the expense of

1823. It may be proper to add, which I can with confidence, that

the comparative expense of 1823, if it could be ascertained,

would be found to be not less favorable than 1821. It would

probably be something more so.

"With these remarks, I shall begin with a comparison, in the

first place, between 1821 and the estimate for the army proper

for this year. The average aggregate strength of the army in

the year 1821, including officers, professors, cadets, and

soldiers, was 8,109, and the proportion of officers, including

the professors of the Military Academy, to the soldiers,

including cadets, was 1 to 12 18-100, and the expenditure

$2,180,093 53, equal to $263 91 for each individual. The

estimate for the army proper for 1842, including the Military

Academy, is $4,453,370 16. The actual strength of the army,

according to the return accompanying the message at the opening

of the session, was 11,169. Assuming this to be the average

strength for this year, and adding for the average number of the

Academy, professors and cadets, 300, it will give within a very

small fraction $390 for each individual, making a difference

of $136 in favor of 1821. How far the increase of pay, and the

additional expense of two regiments of dragoons, compared to

other descriptions of troops, would justify this increase, I

am not prepared to say. In other respects, I should suppose,

there ought to be a decrease rather than an increase, as the

prices of clothing, provisions, forage, and other articles of

supply, as well as transportation, are, I presume, cheaper than

in 1821. The proportion of officers to soldiers I would suppose

to be less in 1842, than in 1821, and of course, as far as that

has influence, the expense of the former ought to be less per

man than the latter. With this brief and imperfect comparison

between the expense of 1821 and the estimates for this year,

I shall proceed to a more minute and full comparison between

the former and the year 1837. I select that year, because the

strength of the army, and the proportion of officers to men (a

very material point as it relates to the expenditure) are almost

exactly the same.

"On turning to document 165 (H. R., 2d sess., 26th Con.),

a letter will be found from the then Secretary of War (Mr.

Poinsett) giving a comparative statement, in detail, of the

expense of the army proper, including the Military Academy,

for the years 1837, '38, '39 and '40. The strength of the army

for the first of these years, including officers, professors,

cadets, and soldiers, was 8,107, being two less than in 1821.

The proportion of officers and professors, to the cadets

and soldiers, 11 46-100, being 72-100 more than 1821. The

expenditure for 1837, $3,308,011, being $1,127,918 more than

1821. The cost per man, including officers, professors, cadets,

and soldiers, was in 1837 $408 03, exceeding that of 1821 by

$144 12 per man. It appears by the letter of the Secretary,

that the expense per man rose in 1838 to $464 35; but it is

due to the head of the department, at the time, to say, that

it declined under his administration, the next year, to $381

65; and in the subsequent, to $380 63. There is no statement

for the year 1841; but as there has been a falling off in

prices, there ought to be a proportionate reduction in the cost,

especially during the present year, when there is a prospect of

so great a decline in almost every article which enters into the

consumption of the army. Assuming that the average strength

of the army will be kept equal to the return accompanying the

President's message, and that the expenditure of the year

should be reduced to the standard of 1821, the expense of the

army would not exceed $2,895,686, making a difference, compared

with the estimates, of $1,557,684; but that, from the increase

of pay, and the greater expense of the dragoons, cannot be

expected. Having no certain information how much the expenses

are necessarily increased from those causes, I am not prepared

to say what ought to be the actual reductions; but, unless the

increase of pay, and the increased cost because of the dragoons

are very great, it ought to be very considerable.

"I found the expense of the army in 1818, including the

Military Academy, to be $3,702,495, at a cost of $451 57 per

man, including officers, professors, cadets, and soldiers, and

reduced it in 1821 to $2,180,098, at a cost of $263 91; and

making a difference between the two years, in the aggregate

expenses of the army, of $1,522,397, and $185 66 per man. There

was, it is true, a great fall in prices in the interval; but

allowing for that, by adding to the price of every article

entering into the supplies of the army, a sum sufficient to

raise it to the price of 1818, there was still a difference in

the cost per man of $163 95. This great reduction was effected

without stinting the service or diminishing the supplies, either

in quantity or quality. They were, on the contrary, increased

in both, especially the latter. It was effected through an

efficient organization of the staff, and the co-operation of

the able officers placed at the head of each of its divisions.

The cause of the great expense at the former period, was found

to be principally in the neglect of public property, and the

application of it to uses not warranted by law. There is less

scope, doubtless, for reformation in the army now. I cannot

doubt, however, but that the universal extravagance which

pervaded the country for so many years, and which increased so

greatly the expenses both of government and individuals, has

left much room for reform in this, as well as other branches of

the service."

This is an instructive period at which to look. In the year 1821,

when Mr. Calhoun was Secretary at War, the cost of each man in

the military service (officers and cadets included) was, in round

numbers, 264 dollars per man: in the year 1839, when Mr. Poinsett

was Secretary, and the Florida war on hand, the cost per man was

380 dollars: in the year 1842, the second year of Mr. Tyler's

administration, the Florida war still continuing, it was 390 dollars

per man: now, in 1855, it is about 1,000 dollars a man. Thus, the

cost of each man in the army has increased near three fold in the

short space of about one dozen years. The same result will be

shown by taking the view of these increased expenses in a different

form--that of aggregates of men and of cost. Thus, the aggregate

of the army in 1821 was 8,109 men, and the expense was $2,180,093:

in 1839 the aggregate of the army was about 8,000 men--the cost

$3,308,000: in 1842 the return of the army was 11,169--the

appropriation asked for, and obtained $4,453,370. Now, 1854, the

aggregate of the army is 10,342--the appropriations ten millions and

three quarters! that is to say, with nearly one thousand men less

than in 1842, the cost is upwards of six millions more. Such is the

progress of waste and extravagance in the army--fully keeping up

with that in the navy.

In a debate upon retrenchment at this session, Mr. Adams proposed to

apply the pruning knife at the right place--the army and navy: he

did not include the civil and diplomatic, which gave no sign at that

time of attaining its present enormous proportions, and confined

himself to the naval and military expenditure. After ridiculing the

picayune attempts at retrenchment by piddling at stationery and

tape, and messengers' pay, he pointed to the army and navy; and said:

"There you may retrench millions! in the expenses of Congress,

you retrench picayunes. You never will retrench for the benefit

of the people of this country, till you retrench the army and

navy twenty millions. And yet he had heard of bringing down the

expenditures of the government to twenty millions. Was this

great retrenchment to be effected by cutting off the paper of

members, by reducing the number of pages, and cutting down the

salaries of the door-keepers? How much could be retrenched in

that way? If there was to be any real retrenchment, it must

be in the army and navy. A sincere and honest determination

to reduce the expenses of the government, was the spirit of a

very large portion of the two parties in the House; and that

was a spirit in which the democracy had more merit than the

other party. He came here as an humble follower of those who

went for retrenchment; and, so help him God, so long as he kept

his seat here, he would continue to urge retrenchment in the

expenditures of the military and naval force. Well, what was the

corresponding action of the Executive on this subject? It was a

recommendation to increase the expenditures both for the army

and navy. They had estimates from the War and Navy Departments

of twenty millions. The additions proposed to the armed force,

as he observed yesterday, fifteen millions would not provide

for. Where was the spirit of retrenchment on the part of the

Executive, which Congress had a right to expect? How had he

met the spirit manifested by Congress for retrenchment of the

expenditures of the government? By words--words--and nothing

else but words."

A retrenchment, to be effectual, requires the President to

take the lead, as Mr. Jefferson did at the commencement of his

administration. A solitary member, or even several members acting

together, could do but little: but they should not on that account

forbear to "_cry aloud and spare not_." Their voice may wake up the

people, and lead to the election of a President who will be on the

side of republican economy, instead of royal extravagance. This

writer is not certain that 20 millions, on these two heads, could

have been retrenched at the time Mr. Adams spoke; but he is sure of

it now.

Thirty Years' View (Vol. 2 of 2) or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 · 第 96 / 202 章