LIBERATION OF SLAVES BELONGING TO AMERICAN CITIZENS IN BRITISH
COLONIAL PORTS.
Up to this time, and within a period of ten years, three instances
of this kind had occurred. First, that of the schooner Comet. This
vessel sailed from the District of Columbia in the year 1830,
destined for New Orleans, having, among other things, a number of
slaves on board. Her papers were regular, and the voyage in all
respects lawful. She was stranded on one of the false keys of the
Bahama Islands, opposite to the coast of Florida, and almost in
sight of our own shores. The persons on board, including the slaves,
were taken by the wreckers, against the remonstrance of the captain
and the owners of the slaves, into Nassau, New Providence--one
of the Bahama Islands; where the slaves were forcibly seized and
detained by the local authorities. The second was the case of the
Encomium. She sailed from Charleston in 1834, destined to New
Orleans, on a voyage lawful and regular, and was stranded near the
same place, and with the same fate with the Comet. She was carried
into Nassau, where the slaves were also seized and detained by the
local authorities. The slaves belonged to the Messrs. Waddell of
North Carolina, among the most respectable inhabitants of the State,
and on their way to Louisiana with a view to a permanent settlement
in that State. The third case was that of the Enterprize, sailing
from the District of Columbia in 1835, destined for Charleston,
South Carolina, on a lawful voyage, and with regular papers. She
was forced unavoidably, by stress of weather, into Port Hamilton,
Bermuda Island, where the slaves on board were forcibly seized
and detained by the local authorities. The owners of the slaves,
protesting in vain, at the time, and in every instance, against
this seizure of their property, afterwards applied to their own
government for redress; and after years of negotiation with Great
Britain, redress was obtained in the two first cases--the full
value of the slaves being delivered to the United States, to be
paid to the owners. This was accomplished during Mr. Van Buren's
administration, the negotiation having commenced under that of
President Jackson. Compensation in the case of the Enterprize had
been refused; and the reason given for the distinction in the cases,
was, that the two first happened during the time that slavery
existed in the British West India colonies--the latter after its
abolition there. All these were coasting voyages between one port
of the United States and another, and involved practical questions
of great interest to all the slave States. Mr. Calhoun brought the
question before the Senate in a set of resolutions which he drew up
for the occasion; and which were in these words:
"_Resolved_, That a ship or a vessel on the high seas, in time
of peace, engaged in a lawful voyage, is, according to the laws
of nations, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State to
which her flag belongs; as much so as if constituting a part of
its own domain.
"_Resolved_, That if such ship or vessel should be forced by
stress of weather, or other unavoidable cause, into the port
of a friendly power, she would, under the same laws, lose none
of the rights appertaining to her on the high seas; but, on
the contrary, she and her cargo and persons on board, with
their property, and all the rights belonging to their personal
relations, as established by the laws of the State to which they
belong, would be placed under the protection which the laws of
nations extend to the unfortunate under such circumstances.
"_Resolved_, That the brig Enterprize, which was forced
unavoidably by stress of weather into Port Hamilton, Bermuda
Island, while on a lawful voyage on the high seas from one port
of the Union to another, comes within the principles embraced in
the foregoing resolutions; and that the seizure and detention of
the negroes on board by the local authority of the island, was
an act in violation of the laws of nations, and highly unjust to
our own citizens to whom they belong."
It was in this latter case that Mr. Calhoun wished to obtain the
judgment of the Senate, and the point he had to argue was, whether
a municipal regulation of Great Britain could alter the law of
nations? Under that law she made indemnity for the slaves liberated
in the two first cases: under her own municipal law she denied it
in the latter case. The distinction taken by the British minister
was, that in the first cases, slavery existing in this British
colony and recognized by law, the persons coming in with their
slaves had a property in them which had been divested: in the latter
case that slavery being no longer recognized in this colony, there
was no property in them after their arrival; and consequently no
rights divested. Mr. Calhoun admitted that would be the case if the
entrance had been voluntary; but denied it where the entrance was
forced; as in this case. His argument was:
"I object not to the rule. If our citizens had no right to
their slaves, at any time after they entered the British
territory--that is, if the mere fact of entering extinguished
all right to them (for that is the amount of the rule)--they
could, of course, have no claim on the British government,
for the plain reason that the local authority, in seizing and
detaining the negroes, seized and detained what, by supposition,
did not belong to them. That is clear enough; but let us see
the application: it is given in a few words. He says: 'Now the
owners of the slaves on board the Enterprize never were lawfully
in possession of those slaves within the British territory;'
assigning for reason, 'that before the Enterprize arrived at
Bermuda, slavery had been abolished in the British empire'--an
assertion which I shall show, in a subsequent part of my
remarks, to be erroneous. From that, and that alone, he comes to
the conclusion, 'that the negroes on board the Enterprize had,
by entering within the British jurisdiction, acquired rights
which the local courts were bound to protect.' Such certainly
would have been the case if they had been brought in, or entered
voluntarily. He who enters voluntarily the territory of another
State, tacitly submits himself, with all his rights, to its
laws, and is as much bound to submit to them as its citizens or
subjects. No one denies that; but that is not the present case.
They entered not voluntarily, but from necessity; and the very
point at issue is, whether the British municipal laws could
divest their owners of property in their slaves on entering
British territory, in cases such as the Enterprize, when the
vessel has been forced into their territory by necessity,
through an act of Providence, to save the lives of those on
board. We deny they can, and maintain the opposite ground:--that
the law of nations in such cases interposes and protects the
vessel and those on board, with their rights, against the
municipal laws of the State, to which they have never submitted,
and to which it would be cruel and inhuman, as well as unjust,
to subject them. Such is clearly the point at issue between the
two governments; and it is not less clear, that it is the very
point assumed by the British negotiator in the controversy."
This is fair reasoning upon the law of the case, and certainly left
the law of nations in full force in favor of the American owners.
The equity of the case was also fully stated and the injury shown to
be of a practical kind, which self-protection required the United
States to prevent for the future. In this sense, Mr. Calhoun argued:
"To us this is not a mere abstract question, nor one simply
relating to the free use of the high seas. It comes nearer home.
It is one of free and safe passage from one port to another of
our Union; as much so to us, as a question touching the free
and safe use of the channels between England and Ireland on the
one side, and the opposite coast of the continent on the other,
would be to Great Britain. To understand its deep importance
to us, it must be borne in mind, that the island of Bermuda
lies but a short distance off our coast, and that the channel
between the Bahama islands and Florida is not less than two
hundred miles in length, and on an average not more than fifty
wide; and that through this long, narrow and difficult channel,
the immense trade between our ports on the Gulf of Mexico and
the Atlantic coast must pass, which, at no distant period,
will constitute more than half of the trade of the Union. The
principle set up by the British government, if carried out to
its full extent, would do much to close this all-important
channel, by rendering it too hazardous for use. She has only to
give an indefinite extension to the principle applied to the
case of the Enterprize, and the work would be done; and why
has she not as good a right to apply it to a cargo of sugar or
cotton, as to the slaves who produced it."
The resolutions were referred to the committee on foreign relations,
which reported them back with some slight alteration, not affecting
or impairing their force; and in that form they were unanimously
adopted by the Senate. Although there was no opposition to them, the
importance of the occasion justified a record of the vote: and they
were accordingly taken by yeas and nays--or rather, by yeas: for
there were no nays. This was one of the occasions on which the mind
loves to dwell, when, on a question purely sectional and Southern,
and wholly in the interest of slave property, there was no division
of sentiment in the American Senate.