[Illustration: Anzac Cove]
[Illustration: Turks firing on the stranded destroyer “Louis” at
Suvla Bay
_Photograph by E. BROOKES, circulated on behalf of the Press Bureau;
supplied by Central News_]
Before a man of the reinforcements had arrived my mind was made up as
to their employment, and by means of a vigorous offensive from Anzac,
combined with a surprise landing to the north of it, I meant to try
and win through to Maidos, leaving behind me a well-protected line of
communications starting from the bay of Suvla.
[Sidenote: Reinforcements]
On the nights of August 4, 5, and 6, the reinforcing troops were
shipped into Anzac very silently at the darkest hours. Then,
still silently, they were tucked away from enemy aeroplanes or
observatories in their prepared hiding-places. The whole sea route
lay open to the view of the Turks upon Achi Baba’s summit and
Battleship Hill. Aeroplanes could count every tent and every ship
at Mudros or at Imbros. Within rifle fire of Anzac’s open beach
hostile riflemen were looking out across the Ægean no more than
twenty feet from our opposing lines. Every modern appliance of
telescope, telegraph, wireless was at the disposal of the enemy. Yet
the instructions worked out at General Headquarters in the minutest
detail (the result of conferences with the Royal Navy, which were
attended by Brigadier-General Skeen, of General Birdwood’s staff)
were such that the scheme was carried through without a hitch.
The troops now at the disposal of General Birdwood amounted in round
numbers to 37,000 rifles and seventy-two guns, with naval support
from two cruisers, four monitors, and two destroyers. Under the
scheme these troops were to be divided into two main portions. The
task of holding the existing Anzac position, and of making frontal
assaults therefrom, was assigned to the Australian Division (plus
the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades and two battalions of the 40th
Brigade); that of assaulting the Chunuk Bair ridge was entrusted to
the New Zealand and Australian Division (less the 1st and 3rd Light
Horse Brigades), to the 13th Division (less five battalions), and to
the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and to the Indian Mountain Artillery
Brigade. The 29th Brigade of the 10th Division (less one battalion)
and the 38th Brigade were held in reserve.
[Sidenote: The Assault on Lone Pine]
During August 4, 5, and 6, the works on the enemy’s left and centre
were subjected to a slow bombardment, and on the afternoon of August
6 an assault was made upon the formidable Lone Pine entrenchment. The
work consisted of a strong _point d’appui_ on the south-western end
of a plateau, where it confronted, at distances varying from 60 to
120 yards, the salient in the line of our trenches named by us the
Pimple. The entrenchment was evidently very strong; it was entangled
with wire, and provided with overhead cover.
The detailed scheme of attack was worked out with care and
forethought by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding 1st Australian
Division, and his thoroughness contributed, I consider, largely to
the success of the enterprise.
The action commenced at 4.30 P.M. with a continuous and heavy
bombardment of the Lone Pine and adjacent trenches, H.M.S.
_Bacchante_ assisting by searching the valleys to the north-east
and east, and the monitors by shelling the enemy’s batteries south
of Gaba Tepe. The assault had been entrusted to the 1st Australian
Brigade (Brigadier-General N. M. Smyth), and punctually at 5.30 P.M.
it was carried out by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Australian Battalions,
the 1st Battalion forming the brigade reserve.
Two lines left their trenches simultaneously, and were closely
followed up by a third. The rush across the open was a regular
race against death, which came in the shape of a hail of shell and
rifle bullets from front and from either flank. But the Australians
had firmly resolved to reach the enemy’s trenches, and in this
determination they became for the moment invincible. The barbed wire
entanglement was reached and was surmounted. Then came a terrible
moment, when it seemed as though it would be physically impossible
to penetrate into the trenches. The overhead cover of stout pine
beams resisted all individual efforts to move it, and the loopholes
continued to spit fire. Groups of our men then bodily lifted up the
beams and individual soldiers leaped down into the semi-darkened
galleries amongst the Turks. By 5.47 P.M. the 3rd and 4th Battalions
were well into the enemy’s vitals, and a few minutes later the
reserves of the 2nd Battalion advanced over their _parados_, and
driving out, killing, or capturing the occupants, made good the whole
of the trenches. The reserve companies of the 3rd and 4th Battalions
followed, and at 6.20 P.M. the 1st Battalion (in reserve) was
launched to consolidate the position.
[Sidenote: Counter-attack at Lone Pine]
At once the Turks made it plain, as they have never ceased to do
since, that they had no intention of acquiescing in the capture
of this capital work. At 7.0 P.M. a determined and violent
counter-attack began.
For seven hours these counter-attacks continued. All this time
consolidation was being attempted, although the presence of so many
Turkish prisoners hampered movement and constituted an actual danger.
In beating off these desperate counter-attacks very heavy casualties
were suffered by the Australians. Part of the 12th Battalion, the
reserve of the 3rd Brigade, had therefore to be thrown into the mêlée.
Twelve hours later, on the 7th, another effort was made by the enemy,
being resumed at midnight and proceeding intermittently till dawn. At
an early period of this last counter-attack the 4th Battalion were
forced by bombs to relinquish a portion of a trench, but later on,
led by their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel McNaghten, they
killed every Turk who had got in.
At 5 A.M. on August 9, the enemy made a sudden attempt to storm
from the east and south-east after a feint of fire attack from the
north. The 7th Battalion bore the brunt of the shock, and handled the
attack so vigorously that by 7.45 A.M. there were clear signs of
demoralisation in the enemy’s ranks. But although this marked the
end of counter-attacks on the large scale, the bombing and sniping
continued, though in less volume, throughout this day and night, and
lasted till August 12, when it at last became manifest that we had
gained complete ascendancy.
Thus was Lone Pine taken and held. The Turks were in great force
and very full of fight, yet one weak Australian brigade, numbering
at the outset but 2,000 rifles, and supported only by two weak
battalions, carried the work under the eyes of a whole enemy
division. The irresistible dash and daring of officers and men in
the initial charge were a glory to Australia. In one corner eight
Turks and six Australians were found lying as they had bayoneted one
another. To make room for the fighting men, the dead were ranged in
rows on either side of the gangway. After the first violence of the
counter-attacks had abated, 1,000 corpses—our own and Turkish—were
dragged out from the trenches.
The Lone Pine attack drew all the local enemy reserves towards it,
and may be held, more than any other cause, to have been the reason
that the Suvla Bay landing was so lightly opposed. Our captures in
this feat of arms amounted to 134 prisoners, seven machine-guns, and
a large quantity of ammunition and equipment.
[Sidenote: The Nek, Baby 700 and German Officer’s Trench Attacked]
Other frontal attacks from the existing Anzac positions were not so
fortunate. They included an attack upon the work known as German
Officer’s Trench, on the extreme right of our line, at midnight on
August 6-7, also assaults on the Nek and Baby 700 trenches opposite
the centre of our line, delivered at 4.30 A.M. on the 7th. The 2nd
Australian Brigade did all that men could do; the Light Horse only
accepted their repulse after losing three-fourths of that devoted
band who so bravely sallied forth. All that day, as the result of
these most gallant attacks, Turkish reserves on Battleship Hill were
being held back to meet any dangerous development along the front
of the old Anzac line, and so were not available to meet our main
enterprise, which I will now endeavour to describe.
[Sidenote: The Main Push]
The first step in the real push—the step which above all others was
to count—was the night attack on the summits of the Sari Bair ridge.
It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high
main ridge with two columns of troops, but, seeing the nature of the
ground and the dispositions of the enemy, the effort had to be made
by stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary
operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real
prospect of success. The two assaulting columns, which were to work
up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded
by two covering columns. One of these was to capture the enemy’s
positions commanding the foothills, first to open the mouths of the
ravines, secondly to cover the right flank of another covering force
whilst it marched along the beach. The other covering column was to
strike far out to the north until, from a hill called Damakjelik
Bair, it could at the same time facilitate the landing of the 9th
Corps at Nibrunesi Point, and guard the left flank of the column
assaulting Sari Bair from any forces of the enemy which might be
assembled in the Anafarta valley.
The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of
Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New
Zealand and Australian Division. The two covering and the two
assaulting columns were organised as follows:
Right Covering Column, under Brigadier-General A. H. Russell.—New
Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment,
the Maori Contingent and New Zealand Field Troop.
Right Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—New
Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section),
one Company New Zealand Engineers.
Left Covering Column, under Brigadier-General J. H.
Travers.—Headquarters 40th Brigade, half the 72nd Field Company, 4th
Battalion South Wales Borderers, and 5th Battalion Wiltshire Regiment.
Left Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General (now Major-General)
H. V. Cox.—29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry
Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New
Zealand Engineers.
Divisional Reserve.—6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment and 8th
Battalion Welsh Regiment (Pioneers) at Chailak Dere, and the 39th
Infantry Brigade and half 72nd Field Company at Aghyl Dere.
[Sidenote: In the Foothills]
The right covering column had to clear the Turks off from their right
flank positions upon Old No. 3 Post and Table Top.
Old No. 3 Post connected with Table Top by a razor back. Working
parties had done their best with unstinted material to convert this
commanding point into an impregnable redoubt. Two lines of fire
trench, very heavily entangled, protected its southern face.
Table Top is a steep-sided, flat-topped hill, close on 400 feet
above sea level. The sides of the hill are mostly sheer and quite
impracticable.
Amongst other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by H.M.S.
_Colne_, had long and carefully been educating the Turks how they
should lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by
simple force of arms. Every night, exactly at 9 P.M., H.M.S. _Colne_
threw the beams of her searchlight on to the redoubt, and opened fire
upon it for exactly ten minutes. Then, after a ten minutes’ interval,
came a second illumination and bombardment, commencing always at 9.20
and ending precisely at 9.30 P.M.
The idea was that, after successive nights of such practice, the
enemy would get into the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint
to clear out until the shelling was at an end. But on the eventful
night of the 6th, the sound of their footsteps drowned by the loud
cannonade, unseen as they crept along in that darkest shadow which
fringes a searchlight’s beam—came the right covering column. At 9.30
the light switched off, and instantly our men poured out of the
scrub jungle and into the redoubt. By 11 P.M. the whole series of
surrounding entrenchments were ours!
The remainder of the right covering column carried on with their
attack upon Bauchop’s Hill and the Chailak Dere. By 10 P.M. the
northernmost point, with its machine-gun, was captured, and by 1
o’clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop’s Hill, a maze of ridge
and ravine, everywhere entrenched, was fairly in our hands.
The attack along the Chailak Dere was not so cleanly carried
out—made, indeed, just about as ugly a start as any enemy could
wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the little column
of stormers found themselves held up by a barbed-wire erection of
unexampled height, depth, and solidity, which completely closed
the only practicable entrance to the ravine. Here that splendid
body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest
and their best, but in the end, when things were beginning to seem
desperate, a passage was forced through the stubborn obstacle with
most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of New
Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who showed themselves
worthy descendants of the warriors of the Gate Pah. Thus was the
mouth of the Chailak Dere opened in time to admit of the unopposed
entry of the right assaulting column.
[Sidenote: Table Top]
Simultaneously the attack on Table Top had been launched under cover
of a heavy bombardment from H.M.S. _Colne_. No general on peace
manœuvres would ask troops to attempt so breakneck an enterprise.
The angle of Table Top’s ascent is recognised in our regulations as
“impracticable for infantry.” But neither Turks nor angles of ascent
were destined to stop Russell or his New Zealanders that night. The
scarped heights were scaled, the plateau was carried by midnight.
With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering force was at
an end. Its attacks had been made with the bayonet and bomb only;
magazines were empty by order; hardly a rifle shot had been fired.
Some 150 prisoners were captured as well as many rifles and much
equipment, ammunition and stores. No words can do justice to the
achievement of Brigadier-General Russell and his men. There are
exploits which must be seen to be realised.
The right assaulting column had entered the two southerly
ravines—Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere—by midnight. At 1.30 A.M.
began a hotly-contested fight for the trenches on the lower part of
Rhododendron Spur, whilst the Chailak Dere column pressed steadily up
the valley against the enemy.
The left covering column, under Brigadier-General Travers, after
marching along the beach to No. 3 Outpost, resumed its northerly
advance as soon as the attack on Bauchop’s Hill had developed.
Every trench encountered was instantly rushed by the Borderers,
until, having reached the predetermined spot, the whole column was
unhesitatingly launched at Damakjelik Bair. By 1.30 A.M. the whole of
the hill was occupied, thus safeguarding the left rear of the whole
of the Anzac attack.
[Sidenote: On the Far Left]
The left assaulting column crossed the Chailak Dere at 12.30 A.M.,
and entered the Aghyl Dere at the heels of the left covering column.
The surprise, on this side, was complete. Two Turkish officers were
caught in their pyjamas; enemy arms and ammunition were scattered in
every direction.
The grand attack was now in full swing, but the country gave new
sensations in cliff climbing even to officers and men who had
graduated over the goat tracks of Anzac. The darkness of the night,
the density of the scrub, hands and knees progress up the spurs,
sheer physical fatigue, exhaustion of the spirit caused by repeated
hairbreadth escapes from the hail of random bullets—all these
combined to take the edge off the energies of our troops. At last,
after advancing some distance up the Aghyl Dere, the column split up
into two parts. The 4th Australian Brigade struggled, fighting hard
as they went, up to the north of the northern fork of the Aghyl Dere,
making for Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). The 29th Indian Infantry
Brigade scrambled up the southern fork of the Aghyl Dere and the
spurs north of it to the attack of a portion of the Sari Bair ridge
known as Hill Q.
THE LEFT OF ANZAC
[Illustration: left landscape picture]
[Illustration: right landscape picture]
This photograph shows the spurs of the main range into which the
Anzac attack was pushed on the night of August 6
THE HEART OF ANZAC
[Illustration: left heart picture]
[Illustration: right heart picture]
This photograph shows the head of Shrapnel Gully (Monarch Valley).
All the trenches on the distant ridge are Turkish
_Photographs by Printing Section, R.E._
Dawn broke and the crest line was not yet in our hands, although,
considering all things, the left assaulting column had made a
marvellous advance. The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade was on the
line of the Asma Dere (the next ravine north of the Aghyl Dere)
and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade held the ridge west of the
Farm below Chunuk Bair and along the spurs to the north-east. The
enemy had been flung back from ridge to ridge; an excellent line
for the renewal of the attack had been secured, and (except for the
exhaustion of the troops) the auspices were propitious.
Turning to the right assaulting column, one battalion, the Canterbury
Infantry Battalion, clambered slowly up the Sazli Beit Dere. The
remainder of the force, led by the Otago Battalion, wound their way
amongst the pitfalls and forced their passage through the scrub of
the Chailak Dere, where fierce opposition forced them ere long to
deploy. Here, too, the hopeless country was the main hindrance,
and it was not until 5.45 A.M. that the bulk of the column joined
the Canterbury Battalion on the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur.
Eventually they entrenched on the top of Rhododendron Spur, a quarter
of a mile short of Chunuk Bair—i.e. of victory.
[Sidenote: End of August 7th]
At 9.30 A.M. the two assaulting columns pressed forward whilst our
guns pounded the enemy moving along the Battleship Hill spurs. But in
spite of all their efforts their increasing exhaustion as opposed to
the gathering strength of the enemy’s fresh troops began to tell—they
had shot their bolt. So all day they clung to what they had captured
and strove to make ready for the night. All had suffered heavily and
all were very tired.
So ended the first phase of the fighting for the Chunuk Bair ridge.
Our aims had not fully been attained, and the help we had hoped for
from Suvla had not been forthcoming. Yet I fully endorse the words of
General Birdwood when he says: “The troops had performed a feat which
is without parallel.”
Great kudos is due to Major-Generals Godley and Shaw for their
arrangements; to Generals Russell, Johnston, Cox, and Travers for
their leading; but most of all, as every one of these officers will
gladly admit, to the rank and file for their fighting. Nor may I
omit to add that the true destroyer spirit with which H.M.S. _Colne_
(Commander Claude Seymour, R.N.) and H.M.S. _Chelmer_ (Commander Hugh
T. England, R.N.) backed us up will live in the grateful memories of
the Army.
[Sidenote: The Second Attack]
In the course of this afternoon (August 7th) reconnaissances of Sari
Bair were carried out and the troops were got into shape for a fresh
advance in three columns, to take place in the early morning.
The columns were composed as follows:
Right Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—26th Indian Mountain
Battery (less one section), Auckland Mounted Rifles, New Zealand
Infantry Brigade, two battalions 13th Division, and the Maori
Contingent.
Centre and Left Columns, Major-General H. V. Cox.—21st Indian
Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th
Infantry Brigade (less one battalion), with 6th Battalion South
Lancashire Regiment attached, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade.
The right column was to climb up the Chunuk Bair ridge; the left
column was to make for the prolongation of the ridge north-east to
Koja Chemen Tepe, the topmost peak of the range.
The attack was timed for 4.15 A.M. At the first faint glimmer of
dawn observers saw figures moving against the sky-line of Chunuk
Bair. Were they our own men, or were they the Turks? Telescopes were
anxiously adjusted; the light grew stronger; men were seen climbing
up from our side of the ridge; they _were_ our own fellows—the
topmost summit was ours!
[Sidenote: Chunuk Bair Gained]
On the right, General Johnston’s column, headed by the Wellington
Battalion and supported by the 7th Battalion Gloucestershire
Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the 8th Welsh
Pioneers, and the Maori Contingent, the whole most gallantly led
by Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Malone, had raced one another up
the steep. Nothing could check them. On they went, until, with
a last determined rush, they fixed themselves firmly on the
south-western slopes and crest of the main knoll known as the height
of Chunuk Bair. With deep regret I have to add that the brave
Lieutenant-Colonel Malone fell mortally wounded as he was marking out
the line to be held.
In the centre the 39th Infantry Brigade and the 29th Indian Brigade
moved along the gullies leading up to the Sari Bair ridge. So
murderous was the enemy’s fire that little progress could be made,
though some ground was gained on the spurs to the north-east of the
Farm.
On the left the 4th Australian Brigade advanced from the Asmak
Dere against the lower slopes of Abdul Rahman Bair (a spur running
due north from Koja Chemen Tepe) with the intention of wheeling
to its right and advancing up the spur. Cunningly placed Turkish
machine-guns and a strong entrenched body of infantry were ready for
this move, and the brigade were unable to get on. At last, on the
approach of heavy columns of the enemy, the Australians, virtually
surrounded, and having already suffered losses of over 1,000, were
withdrawn to their original position.
In the afternoon the battle slackened, excepting always at Lone Pine,
where the enemy were still coming on in mass, and being mown down by
our fire. Elsewhere the troops were busy digging and getting up water
and food, no child’s play, with their wretched lines of communication
running within musketry range of the enemy.
At 4.30 A.M. on August 9th, the Chunuk Bair ridge and Hill Q were
heavily shelled. At 5.16 A.M. this tremendous bombardment was to be
switched off on to the flanks and reverse slopes of the heights.
The columns for the renewed attack were composed as follows:
No. 1 Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—26th Indian
Mountain Battery (less one section), the Auckland and Wellington
Mounted Rifles Regiments, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and two
battalions of the 13th Division.
No. 2 Column, Major-General H. V. Cox.—21st Indian Mountain Battery
(less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Brigade (less the
7th Gloucesters, relieved), with the 6th Battalion South Lancashire
Regiment attached, and the Indian Infantry Brigade.
No. 3 Column, Brigadier-General A. H. Baldwin, commanding 38th
Infantry Brigade.—Two battalions each from the 38th and 29th Brigades
and one from the 40th Brigade.
General Baldwin’s column had assembled in the Chailak Dere, and was
moving up towards General Johnston’s headquarters. But in spite of
all precautions, the darkness, the rough scrub-covered country, its
sheer steepness, so delayed the column that Baldwin, owing to the
darkness and the awful country, lost his way—through no fault of his
own.
[Sidenote: The Gurkhas on Top]