in complete orderliness and silence. No breath of wind ruffled the
surface of the sea, and every condition was favourable save for the
moon which, sinking behind the ships, may have silhouetted them
against its orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the shore.
A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for the
landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were not
at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows
having failed to maintain their exact direction, the actual point of
disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had
selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although
this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy
off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a
blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the force of
occupation has been much better defiladed from shell fire.
The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow
strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and
the south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep
ravine, with exceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a
north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small
but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore.
Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by
the seaward face of the spur, which forms the north-western side of
the ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer
except near the southern limit of the beach, where gentler slopes
give access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further inland lie in
a tangled knot the under-features of Sari Bair, separated by deep
ravines, which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp
spurs, covered with dense scrub, and falling away in many places in
precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the
mountain, from which they run north-west, west, south-west, and south
to the coast.
The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and
they were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about one
battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach. At this critical
moment the conduct of all ranks was most praiseworthy. Not a word was
spoken—everyone remained perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the
enemy’s fire, which sure enough opened, causing many casualties. The
moment the boats touched land the Australians’ turn had come. Like
lightning they leapt ashore, and each man as he did so went straight
as his bayonet at the enemy. So vigorous was the onslaught that the
Turks made no attempt to withstand it and fled from ridge to ridge
pursued by the Australian infantry.
This attack was carried out by the 3rd Australian Brigade, under
Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O. The 1st and 2nd
Brigades followed promptly, and were all disembarked by 2 P.M., by
which time 12,000 men and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery
had been landed. The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed
owing to the fact that the enemy’s heavy guns opened on the anchorage
and forced the transports, which had been subjected to continuous
shelling from his field guns, to stand farther out to sea.
The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending
any formed detachments post haste as they landed to the critical
point—all these led to confusion and mixing up of units. Eventually
the mixed crowd of fighting men, some advancing from the beach,
others falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified
into a semi-circular position with its right about a mile north of
Gaba Tepe and its left on the high ground over Fisherman’s Hut.
During this period parties of the 9th and 10th Battalions charged and
put out of action three of the enemy’s Krupp guns. During this period
also the disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed
by that of the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades
only).
* * * * *
[Sidenote: The Counter-Attack]
From 11 A.M. to 3 P.M. the enemy, now reinforced to a strength of
20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong
effort against the 3rd Brigade and the left of the 2nd Brigade. This
counter-attack was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help
of the guns of H.M. ships. Between 5 and 6.30 P.M. a third most
determined counter-attack was made against the 3rd Brigade, who held
their ground with more than equivalent stubbornness. During the night
again the Turks made constant attacks; but in spite of all the line
held firm. The troops had had practically no rest on the night of
the 24-25th; they had been fighting hard all day over most difficult
country, and they had been subjected to heavy shrapnel fire in the
open. Their casualties had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their
losses and in spite of their fatigue, the morning of the 26th found
them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever.
It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more
seriously. Several times our machine guns got on to them in close
formation, and the whole surrounding country is still strewn with
their dead of this date.
The reorganisation of units and formations was impossible during the
26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible
until a reorganisation could be effected, and it only remained to
entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for
bringing up ammunition, water and supplies to the ridges—in itself
a most difficult undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Naval
Division were sent up to reinforce the Army Corps on April 28 and 29.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: May 2]
On the night of May 2, a bold effort was made to seize a commanding
knoll in front of the centre of the line. The enemy’s enfilading
machine guns were too scientifically posted, and 800 men were lost
without advantage beyond the infliction of a corresponding loss
to the enemy. On May 4, an attempt to seize Kaba Tepe was also
unsuccessful, the barbed-wire here being something beyond belief. But
a number of minor operations were carried out, such as the taking of
a Turkish observing station, the strengthening of entrenchments, the
reorganisation of units, and the perfecting of communication with
the landing-place. Also a constant strain was placed upon some of
the best troops of the enemy, who, to the number of 24,000, were
constantly kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely, as the
Turkish sniper is no match for the Kangaroo shooter, even at his own
game.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: Two Brigades sent to Helles]
The many urgent calls for reinforcements made during the previous
critical fighting had forced me to disorganise and mix together
several of the formations in the southern group, to the extent
even of the French on our right having a British battalion holding
their own extremest right. For the purposes of the impending fight,
it became therefore necessary to create temporarily a Composite
Division, consisting of the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Infantry
Brigades (withdrawn for the purpose from the northern section)
together with a Naval Brigade formed of the Plymouth and Drake
Battalions. The 29th Division was reconstituted into four brigades,
i.e. the 88th and 87th Brigades, the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade
(T.F.), and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. The French Corps
Expéditionnaire was reinforced by the 2nd Naval Brigade, and the new
Composite Division formed my General Reserve.
During the three days (May 6/8th) our troops were destined to be
very severely tried. They were about to attack a series of positions
scientifically selected in advance which, although not yet joined up
into one line of entrenchment, were already strengthened by works on
their more important tactical features.
[After recounting the heavy fighting by which the 29th Division made
its advance on May 6 and 7, the dispatch continues:]
The troops were now worn out; the new lines needed consolidating, and
it was certain that fresh reinforcements were reaching the Turks.
Balancing the actual state of my own troops against the probable
condition of the Turks, I decided to call upon the men to make one
more push before the new enemy forces could get into touch with their
surroundings.
Orders were therefore issued to dig in at sundown on the line gained,
to maintain that line against counter-attack, and to prepare to
advance again next morning. The Lancashire Fusilier Brigade was
withdrawn into reserve, and its place on the left was taken by the
Brigade of New Zealanders.
General Headquarters were shifted to an entrenchment on a hill in
rear of the left of our line. Under my plan for the fresh attack,
the New Zealand Brigade was to advance through the line held
during the night by the 88th Brigade and press on towards Krithia.
Simultaneously, the 87th Brigade was to threaten the works on the
west of the ravine, whilst endeavouring, by means of parties of
scouts and volunteers, to steal patches of ground from the areas
dominated by the German machine-guns.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: Battle of Krithia]
At 10.15 A.M. heavy fire from ships and batteries was opened on the
whole front, and at 10.30 A.M. the New Zealand Brigade began to move,
meeting with strenuous opposition from the enemy, who had received
his reinforcements. Supported by the fire of the batteries and the
machine-guns of the 88th Brigade, they pushed forward on the right
and advanced their centre beyond the fir trees, but could make little
further progress. By 1.30 P.M. about 200 yards had been gained beyond
the previously most advanced trenches of the 88th Brigade.
At this hour the French Corps reported they could not advance up the
crest of the spur west of Kereves Dere till further progress was made
by the British.
At 4 P.M. I gave orders that the whole line, reinforced by the 2nd
Australian Brigade, would fix bayonets, slope arms, and move on
Krithia precisely at 5.30 P.M.
At 5.15 P.M. the ships’ guns and our heavy artillery bombarded the
enemy’s position for a quarter of an hour, and at 5.30 P.M. the field
guns opened a hot shrapnel fire to cover the infantry advance.
The co-operation of artillery and infantry in this attack was
perfect, the timing of the movement being carried out with great
precision. Some of the companies of the New Zealand regiments did not
get their orders in time, but acting on their own initiative they
pushed on as soon as the heavy howitzers ceased firing, thus making
the whole advance simultaneous.
The steady advance of the British could be followed by the sparkle
of their bayonets until the long lines entered the smoke clouds.
The French at first made no move, then, their drums beating and
bugles sounding the charge, they suddenly darted forward in a swarm
of skirmishers, which seemed in one moment to cover the whole
southern face of the ridge of the Kereves Dere. Against these the
Turkish gunners now turned their heaviest pieces, and as the leading
groups stormed the first Turkish redoubt the ink-black bursts of
high-explosive shells blotted out both assailants and assailed. The
trial was too severe for the Senegalese tirailleurs. They recoiled.
They were rallied. Another rush forward, another repulse, and then
a small supporting column of French soldiers was seen silhouetted
against the sky as they charged upwards along the crest of the ridge
of the Kereves Dere, whilst elsewhere it grew so dark that the whole
of the battlefield became a blank.
Not until next morning did any reliable details come to hand of what
had happened. The New Zealanders’ firing line had marched over the
cunningly concealed enemy’s machine-guns without seeing them, and
these, re-opening on our supports as they came up, caused them heavy
losses. But the first line pressed on and arrived within a few yards
of the Turkish trenches which had been holding up our advance beyond
the fir wood. There they dug themselves in.
The Australian Brigade had advanced through the Composite Brigade,
and, in spite of heavy losses from shrapnel, machine-gun, and rifle
fire, had progressed from 300 to 400 yards.
The determined valour shown by these two brigades, the New Zealand
Brigade, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, and the 2nd
Australian Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General the Hon.
J. W. McCay, are worthy of particular praise. Their losses were
correspondingly heavy, but in spite of fierce counter-attacks by
numerous fresh troops they stuck to what they had won with admirable
tenacity.
On the extreme left the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R.
Marshall, made a final and especially gallant effort to advance
across the smooth, bullet-swept area between the ravine and the
sea, but once more the enemy machine-guns thinned the ranks of the
leading companies of the South Wales Borderers, and again there was
nothing for it but to give ground. But when night closed in, the men
of the 87th Brigade of their own accord asked to be led forward, and
achieved progress to the extent of just about 200 yards. During the
darkness the British troops everywhere entrenched themselves on the
line gained. On the right the French column, last seen as it grew
dark, had stormed and still held the redoubt round which the fighting
had centred.
[The 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade and New Zealand Infantry
Brigade were for three days in the trenches they had dug, but on the
completion of the push towards Krithia were retransferred to Anzac.
The history of Anzac during the next three months is told in the
following extracts:]
[Sidenote: Quinn’s Post]
Turning now to where the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps were
perched upon the cliffs of Sari Bair, I must begin by explaining that
their rôle at this stage of the operations was—first, to keep open
a door leading to the vitals of the Turkish position; secondly, to
hold up as large a body as possible of the enemy in front of them,
so as to lessen the strain at Cape Helles. Anzac, in fact, was cast
to play second fiddle to Cape Helles, a part out of harmony with the
daredevil spirit animating those warriors from the South, and so it
has come about that, as your Lordship will now see, the defensive of
the Australians and New Zealanders has always tended to take on the
character of an attack.
The line held during the period under review by the Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps formed a rough semi-circle inland from the
beach of Anzac Cove, with a diameter of about 1,100 yards. The
firing line is everywhere close to the enemy’s trenches, and in all
sections of the position sapping, counter-sapping, and bomb attacks
have been incessant. The shelling both of the trenches and beaches
has been impartial and liberal. As many as 1,400 shells have fallen
on Anzac within the hour, and these of all calibres, from 11 inches
to field shrapnel. Around Quinn’s Post, both above and below ground,
the contest has been particularly severe. This section of the line
is situated on the circumference of the Anzac semi-circle at the
farthest point from its diameter. Here our fire trenches are mere
ledges on the brink of a sheer precipice falling 200 feet into the
valley below. The enemy’s trenches are only a few feet distant.
[Illustration: April 25, 1915. Destroyers taking Troops to Shore]
[Illustration: April 25, 1915. Troops Landing: a Cruiser Firing on
Gaba Tepe]
[Illustration: Gen. Bridges’ First Headquarters
(The General can just be seen in the shade of the dug-out)]
_Photographs by C. E. W. BEAN_
[Illustration: The Height of Russell’s Top]
[Illustration: The Turkish Trenches at Lone Pine shortly after the
Fight]
_Photographs by C. E. W. BEAN_
[Illustration:
_Photograph by Printing Section, R.E._
Table Top
Showing Headquarters of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade]
On May 9 a night assault was delivered on the enemy’s trenches in
front of Quinn’s Post. The trenches were carried at the point of the
bayonet. At dawn on May 10 a strong counter-attack forced our troops
to fall back on Quinn’s Post.
On the night of May 14-15 a sortie was made from Quinn’s Post with
the object of filling in Turkish trenches in which bomb-throwers
were active. The sortie, which cost us some 70 casualties, was not
successful.
On May 14, Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood was slightly
wounded, but I am glad to say he was not obliged to relinquish the
command of his corps.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: Death of Gen. Bridges]
On May 15 I deeply regret to say Major-General W. T. Bridges,
commanding the Australian Division, received a severe wound, which
proved fatal a few days later. Sincere and single-minded in his
devotion to Australia and to duty, his loss still stands out even
amidst the hundreds of other brave officers who have gone.
[General Bridges was succeeded by Major-General H. B. Walker. The
1st Australian Division was also commanded by Major-General J. G.
Legge, who afterwards organised and commanded the 2nd Australian
Division.]
[Sidenote: May 19]
On May 18 Anzac was subjected to a heavy bombardment from large
calibre guns and howitzers. At midnight of the 18th-19th the most
violent rifle and machine-gun fire yet experienced broke out along
the front. Slackening from 3 A.M. to 4 A.M. it then broke out again,
and a heavy Turkish column assaulted the left of No. 2 section.
This assault was beaten off with loss. Another attack was delivered
before daylight on the centre of this section; it was repeated
four times and repulsed each time with very serious losses to the
enemy. Simultaneously a heavy attack was delivered on the north-east
salient of No. 4 section, which was repulsed and followed up, but
the pressing of the counter-attack was prevented by shrapnel.
Attacks were also delivered on Quinn’s Post, Courtney’s Post, and
along the front of our right section. At about 5 A.M. the battle was
fairly joined, and a furious cannonade was begun by a large number
of enemy guns, including 12-inch and 9.2-inch, and other artillery
that had not till then opened. By 9.30 A.M. the Turks were pressing
hard against the left of Courtney’s and the right of Quinn’s Post.
At 10 A.M. this attack, unable to face fire from the right, swung
round to the left, where it was severely handled by our guns and the
machine-guns of our left section. By 11 A.M. the enemy, who were
crowded together in the trenches beyond Quinn’s Post, were giving way
under their heavy losses.
According to prisoners’ reports 30,000 troops, including five fresh
regiments, were used against us. General Liman von Sanders was
himself in command.
The enemy’s casualties were heavy, as may be judged from the fact
that over 3,000 dead were lying in the open in view of our trenches.
A large proportion of these losses were due to our artillery fire.
Our casualties amounted to about 100 killed and 500 wounded,
including nine officers wounded.
The next four days were chiefly remarkable for the carrying through
of the negotiations for the suspension of arms, which actually took
place on May 24. The negotiations resulted in a suspension of arms
from 7.30 A.M. to 4.30 P.M. on May 24. The procedure laid down for
this suspension of arms was, I am glad to inform your Lordship,
correctly observed on both sides.
The burial of the dead was finished about 3 P.M. Some 3,000 Turkish
dead were removed or buried in the area between the opposing lines.
The whole of these were killed on or since May 18. Many bodies of men
killed earlier were also buried.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: Quinn’s Again]
From May 28 till June 5 the fighting seemed to concentrate itself
around Quinn’s Post. Three enemy galleries had been detected there,
and work on them stopped by counter-mines, which killed twenty Turks
and injured thirty. One gallery had however, been overlooked, and
at 3.30 A.M. on May 29 a mine was sprung in or near the centre of
Quinn’s Post. The explosion was followed by a very heavy bomb attack,
before which our left centre subsection fell back, letting in a
storming party of Turks. This isolated one subsection on the left
from the two other subsections on the right.
At 5.30 A.M. our counter-attack was launched, and by 6 A.M. the
position had been retaken with the bayonet by the 15th Australian
Infantry Battalion, led by Major Quinn, who was unfortunately killed.
All the enemy in the trench were killed or captured.
On May 30 preparations were made in Quinn’s Post to attack and
destroy two enemy saps, the heads of which had reached within five
yards of our fire trench. Two storming parties of thirty-five men
went forward at 1 P.M., cleared the sap heads and penetrated into the
trenches beyond, but they were gradually driven back by bombs, of
which the enemy seemed to have an unlimited supply.
During May 31 close fighting continued in front of Quinn’s Post.
On June 1, an hour after dark, two sappers of the New Zealand
Engineers courageously crept out and laid a charge of gun-cotton
against a timber and sandbag bomb-proof. The structure was completely
demolished.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: The Demonstrations]
On June 4 three separate enterprises were carried out by the
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. These were undertaken in
compliance with an order which I had issued that the enemy’s
attention should be distracted during an attack I was about to
deliver in the southern zone.
First a demonstration in the direction of Kaba Tepe, the Navy
co-operating by bombarding the Turkish trenches.
At Quinn’s Post an assault was delivered at 11 P.M. A party of sixty
men, accompanied by a bomb-throwing party on either flank, stormed
the enemy’s trench. In the assault many Turks were bayoneted and
twenty-eight captured. At 6.30 A.M. the trench had to be abandoned.
On June 5 a sortie was made by two officers and 100 men of the
1st Australian Infantry, the objective being the destruction of a
machine-gun in a trench (known as German Officer’s Trench). The
darkness of the trench and its overhead cover prevented the use of
the bayonet, but some damage was done by shooting down over the
parapet. The aim of this gallant assault being attained, the party
withdrew in good order with their wounded. Casualties in all were
thirty-six.
[Sidenote: “Enver’s Attack”]
On the night of June 29-30 the Turks, acting, as we afterwards
ascertained, under the direct personal order of Enver Pasha to
drive us all into the sea, made a big attack on the Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps, principally on that portion of the line
which was under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley. From
midnight till 1.30 A.M. a fire of musketry and guns of greatest
intensity was poured upon our trenches. A heavy column then advanced
to the assault, and was completely crumpled up by the musketry and
machine-guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse. An hour later another
grand attack took place against our left and left centre, and was
equally cut to pieces by our artillery and rifle fire. The enemy’s
casualties may be judged by the fact that in areas directly exposed
to view between 400 and 500 were actually seen to fall.
[Sidenote: Suvla and Sari Bair—The Great Battle of August]
From the very first I had hoped that by landing a force under the
heights of Sari Bair we should be able to strangle the Turkish
communications to the southwards, whether by land or sea, and so
clear the Narrows for the Fleet. Owing to the enemy’s superiority,
both in numbers and in position; owing to under-estimates of the
strength of the original entrenchments prepared and sited under
German direction; owing to the constant dwindling of the units of my
force through wastage; owing also to the intricacy and difficulty of
the terrain, these hopes had not hitherto borne fruit. But they were
well founded. So much at least had clearly enough been demonstrated
by the desperate and costly nature of the Turkish attacks. The
Australians and New Zealanders had rooted themselves in very near to
the vitals of the enemy. By their tenacity and courage they still
held open the doorway from which one strong thrust forward might give
us command of the Narrows.
[Illustration:
_Photograph by Printing Section, R.E._
Sniper’s Nest (held by the Turks), from which part of the North Beach
is clearly visible. The white tents on the point are on North Beach]