Æschines is by far the best witness for the proceedings at this

spring meeting of the Amphiktyons. He was not only present, but

the leading person concerned; if he makes a wrong statement,

it must be by design. But if the facts as stated by Æschines

are at all near the truth, it is hardly possible that the two

decrees cited in Demosthenes can have been the real decrees

passed by the Amphiktyons. The substance of what was resolved,

as given by Æschines, pp. 70, 71, is materially different from

the first decree quoted in the oration of Demosthenes, p. 278.

There is no mention, in the letter, of those vivid and prominent

circumstances—the summoning of all the Delphians, freemen and

slaves above sixteen years of age, with spades and mattocks—the

exclusion from the temple, and the cursing, of any city which did

not appear to take part.

The compiler of those decrees appears to have had only

Demosthenes before him, and to have known nothing of Æschines.

Of the violent proceedings of the Amphiktyons, both provoked and

described by Æschines, Demosthenes says nothing.

On the morning after this narrow escape, the president, a Thessalian

of Pharsalus, named Kottyphus, convoked a full Amphiktyonic Ekklesia;

that is, not merely the Amphiktyons proper, or the legates and

co-legates deputed from the various cities,—but also, along with

them, the promiscuous multitude present for purpose of sacrifice and

consultation of the oracle. Loud and indignant were the denunciations

pronounced in this meeting against the Amphissians; while Athens

was eulogized as having taken the lead in vindicating the rights

of Apollo. It was finally resolved that the Amphissians should be

punished as sinners against the god and the sacred domain, as well

as against the Amphiktyons personally; that the legates should now

go home, to consult each his respective city; and that as soon as

some positive resolution for executory measures could be obtained,

each should come to a special meeting, appointed at Thermopylæ for

a future day,—seemingly not far distant, and certainly prior to the

regular season of autumnal convocation.

Thus was the spark applied, and the flame kindled, of a second

Amphiktyonic war, between six and seven years after the conclusion

of the former in 346 B. C. What has been just recounted comes to us

from Æschines, himself the witness as well as the incendiary. We here

judge him, not from accusations preferred by his rival Demosthenes,

but from his own depositions; and from facts which he details not

simply without regret, but with a strong feeling of pride. It is

impossible to read them without becoming sensible of the profound

misfortune which had come over the Grecian world; since the unanimity

or dissidence of its component portions were now determined, not

by political congresses at Athens or Sparta, but by debates in the

religious convocation at Delphi and Thermopylæ. Here we have the

political sentiment of the Amphissian Lokrians,—their sympathy for

Thebes, and dislike to Athens,—dictating complaint and invective

against the Athenians on the allegation of impiety. Against every

one, it was commonly easy to find matter for such an allegation, if

parties were on the look-out for it; while defence was difficult,

and the fuel for kindling religious antipathy all at the command

of the accuser. Accordingly Æschines troubles himself little with

the defence, but plants himself at once on the vantage-ground of

the accuser, and retorts the like charge of impiety against the

Amphissians, on totally different allegations. By superior oratory,

as well as by the appeal to an ancient historical fact of a character

peculiarly terror-striking, he exasperates the Amphiktyons to a

pitch of religious ardor, in vindication of the god, such as to make

them disdain alike the suggestions either of social justice or of

political prudence. Demosthenes—giving credit to the Amphiktyons

for something like the equity of procedure, familiar to Athenian

ideas and practice—affirmed that no charge against Athens could have

been made before them by the Lokrians, because no charge would be

entertained without previous notice given to Athens. But Æschines,

when accusing the Lokrians,—on a matter of which he had given no

notice, and which it first crossed his mind to mention at the moment

when he made his speech[1038]—found these Amphiktyons so inflammable

in their religious antipathies, that they forthwith call out and head

the Delphian mob armed with pickaxes for demolition. To evoke, from a

far-gone and half-forgotten past, the memory of that fierce religious

feud, for the purpose of extruding established proprietors, friends

and defenders of the temple, from an occupancy wherein they rendered

essential service to the numerous visitors of Delphi—to execute this

purpose with brutal violence, creating the maximum of exasperation

in the sufferers, endangering the lives of the Amphiktyonic legates,

and raising another Sacred War pregnant with calamitous results—this

was an amount of mischief such as the bitterest enemy of Greece could

hardly have surpassed. The prior imputations of irreligion, thrown

out by the Lokrian orator against Athens, may have been futile and

malicious; but the retort of Æschines was far worse, extending as

well as embittering the poison of pious discord, and plunging the

Amphiktyonic assembly in a contest from which there was no exit

except by the sword of Philip.

[1038] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. ~ἐπῆλθε δ᾽ οὖν μοι ἐπὶ

τὴν γνώμην~ μνησθῆναι τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων περὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν ἱερὰν

ἀσεβείας, etc.

Some comments on this proceeding appeared requisite, partly because

it is the only distinct matter known to us, from an actual witness,

respecting the Amphiktyonic council—partly from its ruinous

consequences, which will presently appear. At first, indeed, these

consequences did not manifest themselves; and when Æschines returned

to Athens, he told his story to the satisfaction of the people. We

may presume that he reported the proceedings at the time in the same

manner as he stated them afterwards, in the oration now preserved.

The Athenians, indignant at the accusation brought by the Lokrians

against Athens, were disposed to take part in that movement of pious

enthusiasm which Æschines had kindled on the subject of Kirrha,

pursuant to the ancient oath sworn by their forefathers.[1039] So

forcibly was the religious point of view of this question thrust

upon the public mind, that the opposition of Demosthenes was hardly

listened to. He laid open at once the consequences of what had

happened, saying—“Æschines, you are bringing war into Attica—an

Amphiktyonic war.” But his predictions were cried down as allusions

or mere manifestations of party feeling against a rival.[1040]

Æschines denounced him openly as the hired agent of the impious

Lokrians;[1041] a charge sufficiently refuted by the conduct of these

Lokrians themselves, who are described by Æschines as gratuitously

insulting Athens.

[1039] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71. καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἡμῶν

ἀποδεξαμένου τοῦ δήμου, καὶ τῆς πόλεως πάσης προαιρουμένης

εὐσεβεῖν, etc. Οὐκ ἐᾷ (Demosthenes) μεμνῆσθαι τῶν ὅρκων, οὓς οἱ

πρόγονοι ὤμοσαν, οὐδὲ τῆς ἀρᾶς οὐδὲ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ μαντείας.

[1040] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 275.

[1041] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69-71.

But though the general feeling at Athens, immediately after the

return of Æschines, was favorable to his proceedings at Delphi, it

did not long continue so. Nor is the change difficult to understand.

The first mention of the old oath, and the original devastation

of Kirrha, sanctioned by the name and authority of Solon, would

naturally turn the Athenian mind into a strong feeling of pious

sentiment against the tenants of that accursed spot. But farther

information would tend to prove that the Lokrians were more sinned

against than sinning; that the occupation of Kirrha as a harbor

was a convenience to all Greeks, and most of all to the temple

itself; lastly, that the imputations said to have been cast by the

Lokrians upon Athens had either never been made at all (so we find

Demosthenes affirming), or were nothing worse than an unauthorized

burst of ill-temper from some rude individual.—Though Æschines had

obtained at first a vote of approbation for his proceedings, yet

when his proposition came to be made—that Athens should take part

in the special Amphiktyonic meeting convened for punishing the

Amphissians—the opposition of Demosthenes was found more effective.

Both the Senate, and the public assembly passed a resolution

peremptorily forbidding all interference on the part of Athens at

that special meeting. “The Hieromnemon and the Pylagoræ of Athens (so

the decree prescribed) shall take no part either in word or deed or

resolution, with the persons assembled at that special meeting. They

shall visit Delphi and Thermopylæ at the regular times fixed by our

forefathers.” This important decree marks the change of opinion at

Athens. Æschines indeed tells us, that it was only procured by crafty

manœuvre on the part of Demosthenes; being hurried through in a thin

assembly, at the close of business, when most citizens (and Æschines

among them) had gone away. But there is nothing to confirm such

insinuations; moreover Æschines, if he had still retained the public

sentiment in his favor, could easily have baffled the tricks of his

rival.[1042]

[1042] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.

The special meeting of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ accordingly took

place, at some time between the two regular periods of spring and

autumn. No legates attended from Athens—nor any from Thebes; a

fact made known to us by Æschines, and remarkable as evincing an

incipient tendency towards concurrence, such as had never existed

before, between these two important cities. The remaining legates

met, determined to levy a joint force for the purpose of punishing

the Amphissians, and chose the president Kottyphus general. According

to Æschines, this force was brought together, marched against the

Lokrians, and reduced them to submission, but granted to them

indulgent terms; requiring from them a fine to the Delphian god,

payable at stated intervals—sentencing some of the Lokrian leaders

to banishment as having instigated the encroachment on the sacred

domain—and recalling others who had opposed it. But the Lokrians (he

says), after the force had retired, broke faith, paid nothing, and

brought back all the guilty leaders. Demosthenes, on the contrary,

states, that Kottyphus summoned contingents from the various

Amphiktyonic states; but some never came at all, while those that did

come were lukewarm and inefficient; so that the purpose altogether

miscarried.[1043] The account of Demosthenes is the more probable of

the two: for we know from Æschines himself that neither Athens nor

Thebes took part in the proceeding, while Sparta had been excluded

from the Amphiktyonic council in 346 B. C. There remained therefore

only the secondary and smaller states. Of these, the Peloponnesians,

even if inclined, could not easily come, since they could neither

march by land through Bœotia, nor come with ease by sea while the

Amphissians were masters of the port of Kirrha; and the Thessalians

and their neighbors were not likely to take so intense an interest in

the enterprize as to carry it through without the rest. Moreover, the

party who were only waiting for a pretext to invite the interference

of Philip, would rather prefer to do nothing, in order to show how

impossible it was to act without him. Hence we may fairly assume

that what Æschines represents as indulgent terms granted to the

Lokrians and afterwards violated by them, was at best nothing more

than a temporary accommodation; concluded because Kottyphus could

not do anything—probably did not wish to do anything—without the

intervention of Philip.

[1043] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.

The next Pylæa, or the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons at

Thermopylæ, now arrived; yet the Lokrians were still unsubdued.

Kottyphus and his party now made the formal proposition to

invoke the aid of Philip. “If you do not consent (they told the

Amphiktyons[1044]), you must come forward personally in force,

subscribe ample funds, and fine all defaulters. Choose which you

prefer.” The determination of the Amphiktyons was taken to invoke

the interference of Philip; appointing him commander of the combined

force, and champion of the god, in the new Sacred War, as he had been

in the former.

[1044] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277, 278.

At the autumnal meeting[1045] where this fatal measure of calling

in Philip was adopted, legates from Athens were doubtless present

(Æschines among them), according to usual custom; for the decree of

Demosthenes had enacted that the usual custom should be followed,

though it had forbidden the presence of legates at the special or

extraordinary meeting. Æschines[1046] was not backward in advocating

the application to Philip; nor indeed could he take any other course,

consistently with what he had done at the preceding spring meeting.

He himself only laments that Athens suffered herself to be deterred,

by the corrupt suggestions of Demosthenes, from heading the crusade

against Amphissa, when the gods themselves had singled her out for

that pious duty.[1047] What part Thebes took in the nomination of

Philip, or whether her legates attended at the autumnal Amphiktyonic

meeting, we do not know. But it is to be remembered that one of the

twelve Amphiktyonic double suffrages now belonged to the Macedonians

themselves; while many of the remaining members had become dependent

on Macedonia—the Thessalians, Phthiot Achæans, Perrhæbians,

Dolopians, Magnetes, etc.[1048] It was probably not very difficult

for Kottyphus and Æschines to procure a vote investing Philip with

the command. Even those who were not favorable might dread the charge

of impiety if they opposed it.

[1045] The chronology of the events here recounted has been

differently conceived by different authors. According to my

view, the first motion raised by Æschines against the Amphissian

Lokrians, occurred in the spring meeting of the Amphiktyons at

Delphi in 339 B. C. (the year of the archon Theophrastus at

Athens); next, there was held a special or extraordinary meeting

of Amphiktyons, and a warlike manifestation against the Lokrians;

after which came the regular autumnal meeting at Thermopylæ (B.

C. 339—September—the year of the archon Lysimachides at Athens),

where the vote was passed to call in the military interference of

Philip.

This chronology does not, indeed, agree with the two so-called

decrees of the Amphiktyons, and with the documentary

statement—Ἄρχων Μνησιθείδης, Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ἕκτῃ ἐπὶ δέκα—which we

read as incorporated in the oration De Coronâ, p. 279. But I have

already stated that I think these documents spurious.

The archon Mnesitheides (like all the other archons named in

the documents recited in the oration De Coronâ) is a wrong

name, and cannot have been quoted from any genuine document.

Next, the first decree of the Amphiktyons is not in harmony

with the statement of Æschines, himself the great mover, of

what the Amphiktyons really did. Lastly, the second decree

plainly intimates that the person who composed the two decrees

conceived the nomination of Philip to have taken place in the

very same Amphiktyonic assembly as the first movement against

the Lokrians. The same words, ἐπὶ ἱερέως Κλειναγόρου, ἐαρινῆς

πυλαίας—prefixed to both decrees, must be understood to indicate

the same assembly. Mr. Clinton’s supposition that the first

decree was passed at the spring meeting of 339 B. C.—and the

second at the spring meeting of 338 B. C.—Kleinagoras being the

eponymus in both years—appears to me nowise probable. The special

purpose and value of an eponymus would disappear, if the same

person served in that capacity for two successive years. Boeckh

adopts the conjecture of Reiske, altering ἐαρινῆς πυλαίας in the

second decree into ὀπωρινῆς πυλαίας. This would bring the second

decree into better harmony with chronology; but there is nothing

in the state of the text to justify such an innovation. Böhnecke

(Forsch. p. 498-508) adopts a supposition yet more improbable.

He supposes that Æschines was chosen Pylagoras at the beginning

of the Attic year 340-339 B. C., and that he attended first at

Delphi at the _autumnal_ meeting of the Amphiktyons 340 B. C.;

that he there raised the violent storm which he himself describes

in his speech; and that he afterwards, at the subsequent spring

meeting, came both the two decrees which we now read in the

oration De Coronâ. But the first of these two decrees can

never have come _after_ the outrageous proceeding described by

Æschines. I will add, that in the form of decree, the president

Kottyphus is called an Arcadian; whereas Æschines designates him

as a _Pharsalian_.

[1046] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 278.

[1047] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 72 ... τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν

ἡγεμονίαν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡμῖν παραδεδωκότων, τῆς δὲ Δημοσθένους

δωροδοκίας ἐμποδὼν γεγενημένης.

[1048] See Isokrates, Orat. V. (Philipp.) s. 22. 23.

During the spring and summer of this year 339 B. C. (the interval

between the two Amphiktyonic meetings), Philip had been engaged

in his expedition against the Scythians, and in his battle, while

returning, against the Triballi, wherein he received the severe wound

already mentioned. His recovery from this wound was completed, when

the Amphiktyonic vote, conferring upon him the command, was passed.

He readily accepted a mission which his partisans, and probably

his bribes, had been mainly concerned in procuring. Immediately

collecting his forces, he marched southward through Thessaly and

Thermopylæ, proclaiming his purpose of avenging the Delphian god

upon the unholy Lokrians of Amphissa. The Amphiktyonic deputies,

and the Amphiktyonic contingents in greater or less numbers,

accompanied his march. In passing through Thermopylæ, he took Nikæa

(one of the towns most essential to the security of the pass) from

the Thebans, in whose hands it had remained since his conquest of

Phokis in 346 B. C., though with a Macedonian garrison sharing in

the occupation.[1049] Not being yet assured of the concurrence of

the Thebans in his farther projects, he thought it safer to consign

this important town to the Thessalians, who were thoroughly in his

dependence.

[1049] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. ἐπειδὴ Φίλιππος αὐτῶν

ἀφελόμενος Νίκαιαν Θετταλοῖς παρέδωκε, etc.

Compare Demosthen. ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 153. ὑποπτεύεται δὲ

ὑπὸ Θηβαίων Νίκαιαν μὲν φρουρᾷ κατέχων, etc.

His march from Thermopylæ whether to Delphi and Amphissa, or into

Bœotia, lay through Phokis. That unfortunate territory still

continued in the defenceless condition to which it had been condemned

by the Amphiktyonic sentence of 346 B. C., without a single fortified

town, occupied merely by small dispersed villages and by a population

scanty as well as poor. On reaching Elateia, once the principal

Phokian town, but now dismantled, Philip halted his army, and began

forthwith to reëstablish the walls, converting it into a strong place

for permanent military occupation. He at the same time occupied

Kytinium,[1050] the principal town in the little territory of Doris,

in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissus, situated

in the short mountain road from Thermopylæ to Amphissa.

[1050] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

The seizure of Elateia by Philip, coupled with his operations for

reconstituting it as a permanent military post, was an event of the

gravest moment, exciting surprise and uneasiness throughout a large

portion of the Grecian world. Hitherto he had proclaimed himself as

general acting under the Amphiktyonic vote of nomination, and as on

his march simply to vindicate the Delphian god against sacrilegious

Lokrians. Had such been his real purpose, however, he would have had

no occasion to halt at Elateia, much less to re-fortify and garrison

it. Accordingly it now became evident that he meant something

different—or at least something ulterior. He himself indeed no longer

affected to conceal his real purposes. Sending envoys to Thebes, he

announced that he had come to attack the Athenians, and earnestly

invited her coöperation as his ally, against enemies odious to her

as well as to himself. But if the Thebans, in spite of an excellent

opportunity to crush an ancient foe, should still determine to stand

aloof—he claimed of them at least a free passage through Bœotia, that

he might invade Attica with his own forces.[1051]

[1051] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 293-299. Justin, ix. 3, “diu

dissimulatum bellum Atheniensibus infert.” This expression is

correct in the sense, that Philip, who had hitherto pretended

to be on his march against Amphissa, disclosed his real purpose

to be against Athens at the moment when he seized Elateia.

Otherwise, he had been at open war with Athens, ever since the

sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus in the preceding year.

The relations between Athens and Thebes at this moment were

altogether unfriendly. There had indeed been no actual armed

conflict between them since the conclusion of the Sacred War in

346 B. C. Yet the old sentiment of enmity and jealousy, dating

from earlier days and aggravated during that war, still continued

unabated. To soften this reciprocal dislike, and to bring about

coöperation with Thebes, had always been the aim of some Athenian

politicians—Eubulus—Aristophon—and Demosthenes himself, whom Æschines

tries to discredit as having been complimented and corrupted by

the Thebans.[1052] Nevertheless, in spite of various visits and

embassies to Thebes, where a philo-Athenian minority also subsisted,

nothing had ever been accomplished.[1053] The enmity still remained,

and had been even artificially aggravated (if we are to believe

Demosthenes[1054]) during the six months which elapsed since the

breaking out of the Amphissian quarrel, by Æschines and the partisans

of Philip in both cities.

[1052] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47.

[1053] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 281.

[1054] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 276, 281, 284. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖσε

ἐπάνειμι, ὅτι τὸν ἐν Ἀμφίσσῃ πόλεμον τούτου (Æschines) μὲν

ποιήσαντος, συμπεραναμένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνέργων αὐτοῦ τὴν

πρὸς Θηβαίους ἐχθρὰν, συνέβη τὸν Φίλιππον ἐλθεῖν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς,

οὗπερ ἕνεκα τὰς πόλεις οὗτοι συνέκρουον, etc. Οὕτω μέχρι πόῤῥω

προήγαγον οὗτοι τὴν ἐχθράν.

The ill-will subsisting between Athens and Thebes at the moment when

Philip took possession of Elateia, was so acknowledged, that he had

good reason for looking upon confederacy of the two against him as

impossible.[1055] To enforce the request, that Thebes, already his

ally, would continue to act as such at this critical juncture, he

despatched thither envoys not merely Macedonian, but also Thessalian,

Dolopian, Phthiot Achæan, Ætolian, and Ænianes—the Amphiktyonic

allies who were now accompanying his march.[1056]

[1055] Demosth. De Coronâ—ἧκεν ἔχων (Philip) τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν

Ἐλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἔτι συμπνευσάντων ἂν

ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.

[1056] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

If such were the hopes, and the reasonable hopes, of Philip, we may

easily understand how intense was the alarm among the Athenians,

when they first heard of the occupation of Elateia. Should the

Thebans comply, Philip would be in three days on the frontier of

Attica; and from the sentiment understood as well as felt to be

prevalent, the Athenians could not but anticipate, that free passage,

and a Theban reinforcement besides, would be readily granted. Ten

years before, Demosthenes himself (in his first Olynthiac) had

asserted that the Thebans would gladly join Philip in an attack on

Attica.[1057] If such was then the alienation, it had been increasing

rather than diminishing ever since. As the march of Philip had

hitherto been not merely rapid, but also understood as directed

towards Delphi and Amphissa, the Athenians had made no preparations

for the defence of their frontier. Neither their families nor their

movable property had yet been carried within walls. Nevertheless

they had now to expect, within little more than forty-eight hours,

an invading army as formidable and desolating as any of those during

the Peloponnesian war, under a commander far abler than Archidamus or

Agis.[1058]

[1057] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16. Ἂν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ,

τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν; Θηβαῖοι; οἳ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν

εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσιν ἑτοίμως.

[1058] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304. ἡ γὰρ ἐμὴ πολιτεία, ἧς οὗτος

(Æschines) κατηγορεῖ, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ Θηβαίους μετὰ Φιλίππου

συνεμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν χώραν, ~ὃ πάντες ᾤοντο~, μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν

παραταξαμένους ἐκεῖνον κωλύειν ἐποίησεν, etc.

Though the general history of this important period can be made out

only in outline, we are fortunate enough to obtain from Demosthenes

a striking narrative, in some detail, of the proceedings at Athens

immediately after the news of the capture of Elateia by Philip. It

was evening when the messenger arrived, just at the time when the

prytanes (or senators of the presiding tribe) were at supper in their

official residence. Immediately breaking up their meal, some ran to

call the generals whose duty it was to convoke the public assembly,

with the trumpeter who gave public notice thereof; so that the Senate

and assembly were convoked for the next morning at daybreak. Others

bestirred themselves in clearing out the market-place, which was full

of booths and stands, for traders selling merchandize. They even

set fire to these booths, in their hurry to get the space clear.

Such was the excitement and terror throughout the city, that the

public assembly was crowded at the earliest dawn, even before the

Senate could go through their forms and present themselves for the

opening ceremonies. At length the Senate joined the assembly, and the

prytanes came forward to announce the news, producing the messenger

with his public deposition. The herald then proclaimed the usual

words—“Who wishes to speak?” Not a man came forward. He proclaimed it

again and again; yet still no one rose.

At length, after a considerable interval of silence, Demosthenes rose

to speak. He addressed himself to that alarming conviction which

beset the minds of all, though no one had yet given it utterance—that

the Thebans were in hearty sympathy with Philip. “Suffer not

yourselves (he said) to believe any such thing. If the fact had been

so, Philip would have been already on your frontier, without halting

at Elateia. He has a large body of partisans at Thebes, procured by

fraud and corruption; but he has not the whole city. There is yet

a considerable Theban party, adverse to him and favorable to you.

It is for the purpose of emboldening his own partisans in Thebes,

overawing his opponents, and thus extorting a positive declaration

from the city in his favor—that he is making display of his force at

Elateia. And in this he will succeed, unless you, Athenians, shall

exert yourselves vigorously and prudently in counteraction. If you,

acting on your old aversion towards Thebes, shall now hold aloof,

Philip’s partisans in the city will become all-powerful, so that the

whole Theban force will march along with him against Attica. For

your own security, you must shake off these old feelings, however

well-grounded—and stand forward for the protection of Thebes, as

being in greater danger than yourselves. March forth your entire

military strength to the frontier, and thus embolden your partisans

in Thebes, to speak out openly against their philippizing opponents

who rely upon the army at Elateia. Next, send ten envoys to Thebes;

giving them full powers, in conjunction with the generals, to call

in your military force whenever they think fit. Let your envoys

demand neither concessions nor conditions from the Thebans; let them

simply tender the full force of Athens to assist the Thebans in their

present straits. If the offer be accepted, you will have secured an

ally inestimable for your own safety, while acting with a generosity

worthy of Athens; if it be refused, the Thebans will have themselves

to blame, and you will at least stand unimpeached on the score of

honor as well as of policy.”[1059]

[1059] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 286, 287; Diodor. xvi. 84. I have

given the substance, in brief, of what Demosthenes represents

himself to have said.

The recommendation of Demosthenes, alike wise and generous,

was embodied in a decree and adopted by the Athenians without

opposition.[1060] Neither Æschines, nor any one else, said a word

against it. Demosthenes himself, being named chief of the ten envoys,

proceeded forthwith to Thebes; while the military force of Attica was

at the same time marched to the frontier.

[1060] This decree, or a document claiming to be such, is

given _verbatim_ in Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 289, 290. It

bears date on the 16th of the month Skirrophorion (June),

under the archonship of Nausikles. This archon is a wrong or

pseud-eponymous archon: and the document, to say nothing of its

verbosity, implies that Athens was now about to pass out of

pacific relations with Philip, and to begin war against him—which

is contrary to the real fact.

There also appear inserted, a few pages before, in the same

speech (p. 282), four other documents, purporting to relate to

the time immediately preceding the capture of Elateia by Philip.

1. A decree of the Athenians, dated in the month Elaphebolion

of the archon _Heropythus_. 2. Another decree, in the month

Munychion of the same _archon_. 3. An answer addressed by Philip

to the Athenians. 4. An answer addressed by Philip to the Thebans.

Here again, the archon called _Heropythus_ is a wrong and unknown

archon. Such manifest error of date would alone be enough to

preclude me from trusting the document as genuine. Droysen is

right, in my judgment, in rejecting all these five documents as

spurious. The answer of Philip to the Athenians is adapted to the

two decrees of the Athenians, and cannot be genuine if they are

spurious.

These decrees, too, like that dated in Skirrophorion, are not

consistent with the true relations between Athens and Philip.

They imply that she was at peace with him, and that hostilities

were first undertaken against him by her after his occupation of

Elateia; whereas open war had been prevailing between them for

more than a year, ever since the summer of 340 B. C., and the

maritime operations against him in the Propontis. That the war

was going on without interruption during all this period—that

Philip could not get near to Athens to strike a blow at her and

close the war, except by bringing the Thebans and Thessalians

into coöperation with him—and that for the attainment of this

last purpose, he caused the Amphissian war to be kindled, through

the corrupt agency of Æschines—is the express statement of

Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 275, 276. Hence I find it impossible

to believe in the authenticity either of the four documents here

quoted, or of this supposed very long decree of the Athenians, on

forming their alliance with Thebes, bearing date on the 16th of

the month Skirrophorion, and cited De Coronâ, p. 289. I will add,

that the two decrees which we read in p. 282, profess themselves

as having been passed in the months Elaphebolion and Munychion,

and bear the name of the archon _Heropythus_; while the decree

cited, p. 289, bears date the 16th of Skirrophorion, and the

name of a different archon, _Nausikles_. Now if the decrees

were genuine, the events which are described in both must have

happened under the same archon, at an interval of about six weeks

between the last day of Munychion and the 16th of Skirrophorion.

It is impossible to suppose an interval of one year and six weeks

between them.

It appears to me, on reading attentively the words of Demosthenes

himself, that the _falsarius_ or person who composed these four

first documents, has not properly conceived what it was that

Demosthenes caused to be read by the public secretary. The point

which Demosthenes is here making, is to show how ably he had

managed, and how well he had deserved of his country, by bringing

the Thebans into alliance with Athens immediately after Philip’s

capture of Elateia. For this purpose he dwells upon the bad state

of feeling between Athens and Thebes before that event, brought

about by the secret instigations of Philip through corrupt

partisans in both places. Now it is to illustrate this hostile

feeling _between Athens and Thebes_, that he causes the secretary

to read certain decrees and answers—ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἦτη ἤδη ~τὰ πρὸς

ἀλλήλους~, τουτωνὶ τῶν ψηφισμάτων ἀκούσαντες καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων

εἴσεσθε. Καί μοι λέγε ταῦτα λαβών.... (p. 282). The documents

here announced to be read do not bear upon the relations between

_Athens and Philip_ (which were those of active warfare, needing

no illustration)—but to the relation between _Athens and Thebes_.

There had plainly been interchanges of bickering and ungracious

feeling between the two cities, manifested in public decrees or

public answers to complaints or remonstrances. Instead of which,

the two Athenian decrees, which we now read as following, are

addressed, not to the Thebans, but to Philip; the first of them

does not mention Thebes at all; the second mentions Thebes only

to recite as a ground of complaint against Philip, that he was

trying to put the two cities at variance; and this too, among

other grounds of complaint, much more grave and imputing more

hostile purposes. Then follow two answers—which are not answers

between Athens and Thebes, as they ought to be—but answers from

Philip, the first to the Athenians, the second to the Thebans.

Neither the decrees, nor the answers, as they here stand, go

to illustrate the point at which Demosthenes is aiming—the bad

feeling and mutual provocations which had been exchanged a little

before between Athens and Thebes. Neither the one nor the other

justify the words of the orator immediately after the documents

have been read—Οὕτω διαθεὶς ὁ Φίλιππος τὰς πόλεις ~πρὸς ἀλλήλας

διὰ τούτων~ (through Æschines and his supporters), καὶ τούτοις

ἐπαρθεὶς τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν, ἧκεν ἔχων τὴν

δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἐλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἔτι

συμπνευσάντων ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.

Demosthenes describes Philip as acting upon Thebes and Athens

through the agency of corrupt citizens in each; the author of

these documents conceives Philip as acting by his own despatches.

The decree of the 16th Skirrophorion enacts, not only that

there shall be alliance with Thebes, but also that the right of

_intermarriage_ between the two cities shall be established. Now

at the moment when the decree was passed, the Thebans both had

been, and still were, on bad terms with Athens, so that it was

doubtful whether they would entertain or reject the proposition;

nay, the chances even were, that they would reject it and join

Philip. We can hardly believe it possible, that under such a

state of probabilities, the Athenians would go so far as to

pronounce for the establishment of _intermarriage_ between the

two cities.

At Thebes they found the envoys of Philip and his allies, and the

philippizing Thebans full of triumph; while the friends of Athens

were so dispirited, that the first letters of Demosthenes, sent

home immediately on reaching Thebes, were of a gloomy cast.[1061]

According to Grecian custom, the two opposing legations were heard

in turn before the Theban assembly. Amyntas and Klearchus were the

Macedonian envoys, together with the eloquent Byzantine Python, as

chief spokesman, and the Thessalians Daochus and Thrasylaus.[1062]

Having the first word, as established allies of Thebes, these orators

found it an easy theme to denounce Athens, and to support their case

by the general tenor of past history since the battle of Leuktra.

The Macedonian orator contrasted the perpetual hostility of Athens

with the valuable aid furnished to Thebes by Philip, when he rescued

her from the Phokians, and confirmed her ascendency over Bœotia.

“If (said the orator) Philip had stipulated, before he assisted

you against the Phokians, that you should grant him in return a

free passage against Attica, you would have gladly acceded. Will

you refuse it now, when he has rendered to you the service without

stipulation? Either let us pass through to Attica—or join our march;

whereby you will enrich yourself with the plunder of that country,

instead of being impoverished by having Bœotia as the seat of

war.”[1063]

[1061] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298.

[1062] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. Daochus and Thrasylaus are named

by Demosthenes as Thessalian partisans of Philip (Demosth. De

Coronâ, p. 324).

[1063] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298, 299. Aristot. Rhetoric. ii.

23; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 744; Diodor. xvi. 85.

All these topics were so thoroughly in harmony with the previous

sentiments of the Thebans, that they must have made a lively

impression. How Demosthenes replied to them, we are not permitted to

know. His powers of oratory must have been severely tasked; for the

preëstablished feeling was all adverse, and he had nothing to work

upon, except fear, on the part of Thebes, of too near contact with

the Macedonian arms—combined with her gratitude for the spontaneous

and unconditional tender of Athens. And even as to fears, the Thebans

had only to choose between admitting the Athenian army or that

of Philip; a choice in which all presumption was in favor of the

latter, as present ally and recent benefactor—against the former,

as standing rival and enemy. Such was the result anticipated by the

hopes of Philip as well as by the fears of Athens. Yet with all the

chances thus against him, Demosthenes carried his point in the Theban

assembly; determining them to accept the offered alliance of Athens

and to brave the hostility of Philip. He boasts with good reason, of

such a diplomatic and oratorical triumph;[1064] by which he not only

obtained a powerful ally against Philip, but also—a benefit yet more

important—rescued Attica from being overrun by a united Macedonian

and Theban army. Justly does the contemporary historian Theopompus

extol the unrivalled eloquence whereby Demosthenes kindled in the

bosoms of the Thebans a generous flame of Pan-hellenic patriotism.

But it was not simply by superior eloquence[1065]—though that

doubtless was an essential condition—that his triumph at Thebes was

achieved. It was still more owing to the wise and generous offer

which he carried with him, and which he had himself prevailed on the

Athenians to make—of unconditional alliance without any references

to the jealousies and animosities of the past, and on terms even

favorable to Thebes, as being mere exposed than Athens in the war

against Philip.[1066]

[1064] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304-307. εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ~μετέγνωσαν~

εὐθέως, ὡς ταῦτ᾽ εἶδον, οἱ Θηβαῖοι, καὶ μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐγένοντο, etc.

[1065] Theopompus, Frag. 239, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18.

[1066] We may here trust the more fully the boasts made by

Demosthenes of his own statesmanship and oratory, since we

possess the comments of Æschines, and therefore know the worst

that can be said by an unfriendly critic. Æschines (adv. Ktesiph.

p. 73, 74) says that the Thebans were induced to join Athens, not

by the oratory of Demosthenes, but by the fear of Philip’s near

approach, and by their displeasure in consequence of having Nikæa

taken from them. Demosthenes says in fact the same. Doubtless

the ablest orator must be furnished with some suitable points to

work up in his pleadings. But the orators on the other side would

find in the history of the past a far more copious collection

of matters, capable of being appealed to as causes of antipathy

against Athens, and of favour to Philip; and against this

superior case Demosthenes had to contend.

The answer brought back by Demosthenes was cheering. The important

alliance, combining Athens and Thebes in defensive war against

Philip, had been successfully brought about. The Athenian army,

already mustered in Attica, was invited into Bœotia, and marched to

Thebes without delay. While a portion of them joined the Theban force

at the northern frontier of Bœotia to resist the approach of Philip,

the rest were left in quarters at Thebes. And Demosthenes extols not

only the kindness with which they were received in private houses,

but also their correct and orderly behavior amidst the families and

properties of the Thebans; not a single complaint being preferred

against them.[1067] The antipathy and jealousy between the two cities

seemed effaced in cordial coöperation against the common enemy. Of

the cost of the joint operations, on land and sea, two-thirds were

undertaken by Athens. The command was shared equally between the

allies; and the centre of operations was constituted at Thebes.[1068]

[1067] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 299, 300.

[1068] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74.

In this as well as in other ways, the dangerous vicinity of Philip,

giving increased ascendency to Demosthenes, impressed upon the

counsels of Athens a vigor long unknown. The orator prevailed

upon his countrymen to suspend the expenditure going on upon the

improvement of their docks and the construction of a new arsenal,

in order that more money might be devoted to military operations.

He also carried a farther point which he had long aimed at

accomplishing by indirect means, but always in vain; the conversion

of the Theoric Fund to military purposes.[1069] So preponderant was

the impression of danger at Athens, that Demosthenes was now able to

propose this motion directly, and with success. Of course, he must

first have moved to suspend the standing enactment, whereby it was

made penal even to submit the motion.

[1069] Philochorus Frag. 135, ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum,

p. 742.

To Philip, meanwhile, the new alliance was a severe disappointment

and a serious obstacle. Having calculated on the continued adhesion

of Thebes, to which he conceived himself entitled as a return

for benefits conferred—and having been doubtless assured by his

partisans in the city that they could promise him Theban coöperation

against Athens, as soon as he should appear on the frontier with

an overawing army—he was disconcerted at the sudden junction of

these two powerful cities, unexpected alike by friends and enemies.

Henceforward we shall find him hating Thebes, as guilty of desertion

and ingratitude, worse than Athens, his manifest enemy.[1070] But

having failed in inducing the Thebans to follow his lead against

Athens, he thought it expedient again to resume his profession of

acting on behalf of the Delphian god against Amphissa,—and to write

to his allies in Peloponnesus to come and join him, for this specific

purpose. His letters were pressing, often repeated, and implying

much embarrassment, according to Demosthenes.[1071] As far as we can

judge they do not seem to have produced much effect; nor was it easy

for the Peloponnesians to join Philip—either by land, while Bœotia

was hostile—or by sea while the Amphissians held Kirrha, and the

Athenians had a superior navy.

[1070] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. Æschines remarks the

fact—but perverts the inferences deducible from it.

[1071] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 279. Δὸς δή μοι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν,

ἥν, ὡς οὐχ ὑπήκουον οἱ Θηβαῖοι, πέμπει πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ

συμμάχους ὁ Φίλιππος, ἵν᾽ εἴδητε καὶ ἐκ ταύτης σαφῶς ὅτι τὴν

μὲν ἀληθῆ πρόφασιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ ταῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ

τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἀπεκρύπτετο, κοινὰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς

Ἀμφικτύοσι δόξαντα ποιεῖν προσεποιεῖτο, etc.

Then follows a letter, purporting to be written by Philip to

the Peloponnesians. I concur with Droysen in mistrusting its

authenticity. I do not rest any statements on its evidence.

The Macedonian month Löus does not appear to coincide with the

Attic Boëdromion; nor is it probable that Philip in writing to

Peloponnesians, would allude at all to Attic months. Various

subsequent letters written by Philip to the Peloponnesians, and

intimating much embarrassment, are alluded to by Demosthenes

further on—Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵας τότ᾽ ἠφίει φωνὰς ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ ἐν οἵαις

ἦν ταραχαῖς ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἐκείνου μαθήσεσθε ὧν

εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἔπεμπεν (p. 301, 302). Demosthenes causes the

letters to be read publicly, but no letters appear _verbatim_.

War was now carried on, in Phokis and on the frontiers of Bœotia,

during the autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. The Athenians and

Thebans not only maintained their ground against Philip, but even

gained some advantages over him; especially in two engagements—called

the battle on the river, and the winter-battle—of which Demosthenes

finds room to boast, and which called forth manifestations of

rejoicing and sacrifice, when made known at Athens.[1072] To

Demosthenes himself, as the chief adviser of the Theban alliance, a

wreath of gold was proposed by Demomeles and Hyperides, and decreed

by the people; and though a citizen named Diondas impeached the mover

for an illegal decree, yet he did not even obtain the fifth part of

the suffrages of the Dikastery, and therefore became liable to the

fine of one thousand drachms.[1073] Demosthenes was crowned with

public proclamation at the Dionysiac festival of March 338 B. C.[1074]

[1072] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 300.

[1073] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 302; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator., p.

848.

[1074] That Demosthenes was crowned at the Dionysiac festival

(March 338 B. C.) is contended by Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 534,

535); upon grounds which seem sufficient, against the opinion of

Boeckh and Winiewski (Comment. ad Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250),

who think that he was not crowned until the Panathenaic festival,

in the ensuing July.

But the most memorable step taken by the Athenians and Thebans,

in this joint war against Philip, was that of reconstituting the

Phokians as an independent and self-defending section of the Hellenic

name. On the part of the Thebans, hitherto the bitterest enemies

of the Phokians, this proceeding evinced adoption of an improved

and generous policy, worthy of the Pan-hellenic cause in which they

had now embarked. In 346 B. C., the Phokians had been conquered

and ruined by the arms of Philip, under condemnation pronounced by

the Amphiktyons. Their cities had all been dismantled, and their

population distributed in villages, impoverished, or driven into

exile. These exiles, many of whom were at Athens, now returned, and

the Phokian population were aided by the Athenians and Thebans in

reoccupying and securing their towns.[1075] Some indeed of these

towns were so small, such as Parapotamii[1076] and others, that

it was thought inexpedient to reconstitute them. Their population

was transferred to the others, as a means of increased strength.

Ambrysus, in the south-western portion of Phokis, was refortified

by the Athenians and Thebans with peculiar care and solidity. It

was surrounded with a double circle of wall of the black stone of

the country; each wall being fifteen feet high and nearly six feet

in thickness, with an interval of six feet between the two.[1077]

These walls were seen, five centuries afterwards, by the traveller

Pausanias, who numbers them among the most solid defensive structures

in the ancient world.[1078] Ambrysus was valuable to the Athenians

and Thebans as a military position for the defence of Bœotia,

inasmuch as it lay on that rough southerly road near the sea, which

the Lacedæmonian king Kleombrotus[1079] had forced when he marched

from Phokis to the position of Leuktra; eluding Epaminondas and

the main Theban force, who were posted to resist him on the more

frequented road by Koroneia. Moreover, by occupying the south-western

parts of Phokis on the Corinthian Gulf, they prevented the arrival of

reinforcements to Philip by sea out of Peloponnesus.

[1075] Pausanias, x. 3, 2.

[1076] Pausanias, x. 33, 4.

[1077] Pausanias, x. 36, 2.

[1078] Pausanias, iv. 31, 5. He places the fortifications of

Ambrysus in a class with those of Byzantium and Rhodes.

[1079] Pausan. ix. 13, 2; Diodor. xv. 53; Xenoph. Hell. vi. 4, 3.

The war in Phokis, prosecuted seemingly upon a large scale and with

much activity, between Philip and his allies on one side, and the

Athenians and Thebans with their allies on the other—ended with

the fatal battle of Chæroneia, fought in August 338 B. C.; having

continued about ten months from the time when Philip, after being

named general at the Amphiktyonic assembly (about the autumnal

equinox), marched southward and occupied Elateia.[1080] But

respecting the intermediate events, we are unfortunately without

distinct information. We pick up only a few hints and allusions which

do not enable us to understand what passed. We cannot make out either

the auxiliaries engaged, or the total numbers in the field, on either

side. Demosthenes boasts of having procured for Athens as allies,

the Eubœans, Achæans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leukadians,

and Korkyræans—arraying along with the Athenian soldiers not less

than fifteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry;[1081] and

pecuniary contributions besides, to no inconsiderable amount, for the

payment of mercenary troops. Whether all these troops fought either

in Phokis or at Chæroneia, we cannot determine; we verify the Achæans

and the Corinthians.[1082] As far as we can trust Demosthenes, the

autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. was a season of advantages gained

by the Athenians and Thebans over Philip, and of rejoicing in their

two cities; not without much embarrassment to Philip, testified by

his urgent requisitions of aid from his Peloponnesian allies, with

which they did not comply. Demosthenes was the war-minister of the

day, exercising greater influence than the generals—deliberating

at Thebes in concert with the Bœotarchs—advising and swaying the

Theban public assembly as well as the Athenian—and probably in

mission to other cities also, for the purpose of pressing military

efforts.[1083] The crown bestowed upon him at the Dionysiac festival

(March 338 B. C.) marks the pinnacle of his glory and the meridian of

his hopes, when there seemed a fair chance of successfully resisting

the Macedonian invasion.

[1080] The chronology of this period has caused much perplexity,

and has been differently arranged by different authors. But

it will be found that all the difficulties and controversies

regarding it have arisen from resting on the spurious decrees

embodied in the speech of Demosthenes De Coronâ, as if they were

so much genuine history. Mr. Clinton, in his Fasti Hellenici,

cites these decrees as if they were parts of Demosthenes himself.

When we once put aside these documents, the general statements

both of Demosthenes and Æschines, though they are not precise or

specific, will appear perfectly clear and consistent respecting

the chronology of the period.

That the battle of Chæroneia took place on the 7th of the Attic

month Metageitnion (August) B. C. 338 (the second month of the

archon Chærondas at Athens)—is affirmed by Plutarch (Camill. c.

19) and generally admitted.

The time when Philip first occupied Elateia has been stated

by Mr. Clinton and most authors as the preceding month of

Skirrophorion, fifty days or thereabouts earlier. But this

rests exclusively on the evidence of the pretended decree, for

alliance between Athens and Thebes, which appears in Demosthenes

De Coronâ, p. 289. Even those who defend the authenticity of the

decree, can hardly confide in the truth of the month-date, when

the name of the archon Nausikles is confessedly wrong. To me

neither this document, nor the other so-called Athenian decrees

professing to bear date in Munychion and Elaphebolion (p. 282),

carry any evidence whatever.

The general statements both of Demosthenes and Æschines, indicate

the appointment of Philip as Amphiktyonic general to have been

made in the autumnal convocation of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ.

Shortly after this appointment, Philip marched his army into

Greece with the professed purpose of acting upon it. In this

march he came upon Elateia and began to fortify it; probably

about the month of October 339 B. C. The Athenians, Thebans,

and other Greeks, carried on the war against him in Phokis for

about ten months, until the battle of Chæroneia. That this war

must have lasted as long as ten months, we may see by the facts

mentioned in my last page—the reëstablishment of the Phokians

and their towns, and especially the elaborate fortification

of Ambrysus. Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 533) points out justly

(though I do not agree with his general arrangement of the events

of the war) that this restoration of the Phokian towns implies

a considerable interval between the occupation of Elateia and

the battle of Chæroneia. We have also two battles gained against

Philip, one of them a μάχη χειμερινὴ, which perfectly suits with

this arrangement.

[1081] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 306; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 17. In

the decree of the Athenian people (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p.

850) passed after the death of Demosthenes, granting various

honors and a statue to his memory—it is recorded that he brought

in by his persuasions not only the allies enumerated in the text,

but also the Lokrians and the Messenians; and that he procured

from the allies a total contribution of above five hundred

talents. The Messenians, however, certainly did not fight at

Chæroneia; nor is it correct to say that Demosthenes induced the

Amphissian Lokrians to become allies of Athens.

[1082] Strabo, ix. p. 414; Pausanias, vii. 6, 3.

[1083] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 48. Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p.

74) puts these same facts—the great personal ascendency of

Demosthenes at this period—in an invidious point of view.

Philip had calculated on the positive aid of Thebes; at the very

worst, upon her neutrality between him and Athens. That she would

cordially join Athens, neither he nor any one else imagined; nor

could so improbable a result have been brought about, had not the

game of Athens been played with unusual decision and judgment by

Demosthenes. Accordingly, when opposed by the unexpected junction

of the Theban and Athenian force, it is not wonderful that Philip

should have been at first repulsed. Such disadvantages would hardly

indeed drive him to send instant propositions of peace;[1084] but

they would admonish him to bring up fresh forces, and to renew his

invasion during the ensuing spring and summer with means adequate to

the known resistance. It seems probable that the full strength of the

Macedonian army, now brought to a high excellence of organization

after the continued improvements of his twenty years’ reign—would

be marched into Phokis during the summer of 338 B. C., to put down

the most formidable combination of enemies that Philip had ever

encountered. His youthful son Alexander, now eighteen years of age,

came along with them.

[1084] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. ὥστε εὐθὺς ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι

δεόμενον εἰρήνης, etc.

It is possible that Philip may have tried to disunite the enemies

assembled against him, by separate propositions addressed to some

of them.

It is among the accusations urged by Æschines against Demosthenes,

that in levying mercenary troops, he wrongfully took the public money

to pay men who never appeared; and farther, that he placed at the

disposal of the Amphissians a large body of ten thousand mercenary

troops, thus withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Bœotian

army; whereby Philip was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries

separately, while the entire force, if kept together, could never

have been defeated. Æschines affirms that he himself strenuously

opposed this separation of forces, the consequences of which were

disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause.[1085] It would

appear that Philip attacked and took Amphissa. We read of his having

deceived the Athenians and Thebans by a false despatch intended to be

intercepted; so as to induce them to abandon their guard of the road

which led to that place.[1086] The sacred domain was restored, and

the Amphissians, or at least such of them as had taken a leading part

against Delphi, were banished.[1087]

[1085] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74. Deinarchus mentions a Theban

named Proxenus, whom he calls a traitor, as having commanded

these mercenary troops at Amphissa (Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p.

99).

[1086] Polyænus, iv. 2, 8.

[1087] We gather this from the edict issued by Polysperchon some

years afterwards (Diodor. xviii. 56).

It was on the seventh day of the month Metageitnion (the second month

of the Attic year, corresponding nearly to August) that the allied

Grecian army met Philip near Chæroneia; the last Bœotian town on

the frontiers of Phokis. He seems to have been now strong enough to

attempt to force his way into Bœotia, and is said to have drawn down

the allies from a strong position into the plain, by laying waste

the neighboring fields.[1088] His numbers are stated by Diodorus at

thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse; he doubtless had with

him Thessalians and other allies from Northern Greece; but not a

single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to him,

the total is not known.[1089] We can therefore make no comparison

as to numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in

organization is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents

were those of Athens, under Lysikles and Chares—and of Thebes,

commanded by Theagenes; there were, besides, Phokians, Achæans, and

Corinthians—probably also Eubœans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians,

Messenians, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, took no part in the

war.[1090] All of them had doubtless been solicited on both sides;

by Demosthenes as well as by the partisans of Philip. But jealousy

and fear of Sparta led the last four states rather to look towards

Philip as a protector against her—though on this occasion they took

no positive part.

[1088] Polyænus, iv. 2, 14.

[1089] Diodorus affirms that Philip’s army was superior in

number; Justin states the reverse (Diodor. xvi. 85; Justin, ix.

3).

[1090] Pausanias, iv. 2, 82; v. 4, 5; viii. 6, 1.

The command of the army was shared between the Athenians and

Thebans, and its movements determined by the joint decision of

their statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of

Demosthenes at least ensured to them sound and patriotic counsel

powerfully set forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit

for an emergency so grave and terrible. It was the sad fortune

of Greece, that at this crisis of her liberty, when everything

was staked on the issue of the campaign, neither an Epaminondas

nor an Iphikrates was at hand. Phokion was absent as commander of

the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the Ægean.[1091] Portents

were said to have occurred—oracles, and prophecies, were in

circulation—calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenes,

animated by the sight of so numerous an army hearty and combined in

defence of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the

same indifference[1092] as Epaminondas had shown before the battle

of Leuktra, and accused the Delphian priestess of philippizing.

Nay, so confident was he in the result (according to the statement

of Æschines), that when Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared

to offer terms of peace, and the Bœotarchs inclined to accept

them—Demosthenes alone stood out, denouncing as a traitor any one

who should broach the proposition of peace,[1093] and boasting that

if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the Athenians desired

nothing better than a free passage through Bœotia to attack Philip

single-handed. This is advanced as an accusation by Æschines;

who however himself furnishes the justification of his rival, by

intimating that the Bœotarchs were so eager for peace, that they

proposed, even before the negotiations had begun, to send home the

Athenian soldiers into Attica, in order that deliberations might

be taken concerning the peace. We can hardly be surprised that

Demosthenes “became out of his mind”[1094] (such is the expression of

Æschines) on hearing a proposition so fraught with imprudence. Philip

would have gained his point even without a battle, if, by holding

out the lure of negotiation for peace, he could have prevailed upon

the allied army to disperse. To have united the full force of Athens

and Thebes, with other subordinate states, in the same ranks and

for the same purpose, was a rare good fortune, not likely to be

reproduced, should it once slip away. And if Demosthenes, by warm or

even passionate remonstrance, prevented such premature dispersion, he

rendered the valuable service of ensuring to Grecian liberty a full

trial of strength under circumstances not unpromising; and at the

very worst, a catastrophe worthy and honorable.

[1091] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

[1092] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 19, 20; Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.

[1093] Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 74, 75.

[1094] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 75. Ὡς δ᾽ οὐ προσεῖχον αὐτῷ

(Δημοσθένει) οἱ ἄρχοντες οἱ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς

στρατιώτας τοὺς ὑμετέρους πάλιν ἀνέστρεψαν ἐξεληλυθότας, ἵνα

βουλεύσαισθε περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐνταῦθα παντάπασιν ἔκφρων ἐγένετο,

etc.

It is, seemingly, this disposition on the part of Philip to open

negotiations which is alluded to by Plutarch as having been

(Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16) favorably received by Phokion.

In the field of battle near Chæroneia, Philip himself commanded a

chosen body of troops on the wing opposed to the Athenians, while his

youthful son, Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded

against the Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the

battle, we are scarcely permitted to know anything. It is said to

have been so obstinately contested, that for some time the result

was doubtful. The Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion

of the Theban phalanx, exhausted all their strength and energy in an

unavailing attempt to bear down the stronger phalanx and multiplied

pikes opposed to them. The youthful Alexander[1095] here first

displayed his great military energy and ability. After a long and

murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were all overpowered and

perished in their ranks,[1096] while the Theban phalanx was broken

and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided

conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been

so impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army;

insomuch that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, “Let us

pursue them even to Macedonia.”[1097] It is farther said that Philip

on his side simulated a retreat, for the purpose of inducing them

to pursue and to break their order. We read another statement, more

likely to be true—that the Athenian hoplites, though full of energy

at the first shock, could not endure fatigue and prolonged struggle

like the trained veterans in the opposite ranks.[1098] Having

steadily repelled them for a considerable time, Philip became emulous

on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled his efforts; so

as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was thus put to

flight with severe loss.[1099]

[1095] Diodor. xvi. 85. Alexander himself, after his vast

conquests in Asia and shortly before his death, alludes briefly

to his own presence at Chæroneia, in a speech delivered to his

army (Arrian, vii. 9, 5).

[1096] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18.

[1097] Polyænus, iv. 2, 2. He mentions Stratokles as the Athenian

general from whom this exclamation came. We know from Æschines

(adv. Ktesiph. p. 74) that Stratokles was general of the Athenian

troops at or near Thebes shortly after the alliance with the

Thebans was formed. But it seems that Chares and Lysikles

commanded at Chæroneia. It is possible, therefore, that the

anecdote reported by Polyænus may refer to one of the earlier

battles fought, before that of Chæroneia.

[1098] Polyænus, iv. 2, 7; Frontinus.

[1099] Diodor. xvi. 85, 86.

The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organized by Philip, was sixteen

deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at

Leuktra. It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete

training, in its front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior

to the Sacred Band, who formed the Theban front rank. But its great

superiority was in the length of the Macedonian pike or sarissa—in

the number of these weapons which projected in front of the foremost

soldiers—and the long practice of the men to manage this impenetrable

array of pikes in an efficient manner. The value of Philip’s improved

phalanx was attested by his victory at Chæroneia.

But the victory was not gained by the phalanx alone. The military

organization of Philip comprised an aggregate of many sorts of troops

besides the phalanx; the body-guards, horse as well as foot—the

hypaspistæ, or light hoplites—the light cavalry, bowmen, slingers,

etc. When we read the military operations of Alexander, three years

afterwards, in the very first year of his reign, before he could have

made any addition of his own to the force inherited from Philip;

and when we see with what efficiency all these various descriptions

of troops are employed in the field;[1100] we may feel assured that

Philip both had them near him and employed them at the battle of

Chæroneia.

[1100] Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 2, 3, 10.

One thousand Athenian citizens perished in this disastrous field;

two thousand more fell into the hands of Philip as prisoners.[1101]

The Theban loss is said also to have been terrible, as well as

the Achæan.[1102] But we do not know the numbers; nor have we any

statement of the Macedonian loss. Demosthenes, himself present in

the ranks of the hoplites, shared in the flight of his defeated

countrymen. He is accused by his political enemies of having behaved

with extreme and disgraceful cowardice; but we see plainly from the

continued confidence and respect shown to him by the general body

of his countrymen, that they cannot have credited the imputation.

The two Athenian generals Chares and Lysikles, both escaped from the

field. The latter was afterwards publicly accused at Athens by the

orator Lykurgus—a citizen highly respected for his integrity and

diligence in the management of the finances, and severe in arraigning

political delinquents. Lysikles was condemned to death by the

Dikastery.[1103] What there was to distinguish his conduct from that

of his colleague Chares—who certainly was not condemned, and is not

even stated to have been accused—we do not know. The memory of the

Theban general Theagenes[1104] also, though he fell in the battle,

was assailed by charges of treason.

[1101] This is the statement of the contemporary orators

(Demades, Frag. p. 179) Lykurgus (ap. Diodor. xvi. 85; adv.

Leokratem, p. 236. c. 36) and Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p. 314).

The latter does not specify the number of prisoners, though he

states the slain at one thousand. Compare Pausanias, vii. 10, 2.

[1102] Pausanias, vii. 6, 3.

[1103] Diodor. xvi. 88.

[1104] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 12; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 99.

Compare the Pseudo-Demosthenic Oratio Funebr. p. 1395.

Unspeakable was the agony at Athens, on the report of this disaster,

with a multitude of citizens as yet unknown left on the field

or prisoners, and a victorious enemy within three or four days’

march of the city. The whole population, even old men, women, and

children, were spread about the streets in all the violence of

grief and terror, interchanging effusions of distress and sympathy,

and questioning every fugitive as he arrived about the safety of

their relatives in the battle.[1105] The flower of the citizens of

military age had been engaged; and before the extent of loss had been

ascertained, it was feared that none except the elders would be left

to defend the city. At length the definite loss became known: severe

indeed and terrible—yet not a total shipwreck, like that of the army

of Nikias in Sicily.

[1105] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 164, 166. c. 11; Deinarchus

cont. Demosth. p. 99.

As on that trying occasion, so now: amidst all the distress and

alarm, it was not in the Athenian character to despair. The mass of

citizens hastened unbidden to form a public assembly,[1106] wherein

the most energetic resolutions were taken for defence. Decrees were

passed enjoining every one to carry his family and property out of

the open country of Attica into the various strongholds; directing

the body of the senators, who by general rule were exempt from

military service, to march down in arms to Peiræus, and put that

harbor in condition to stand a siege; placing every man without

exception at the disposal of the generals, as a soldier for defence,

and imposing the penalties of treason on every one who fled;[1107]

enfranchising all slaves fit for bearing arms, granting the

citizenship to metics under the same circumstances, and restoring

to the full privilege of citizens those who had been disfranchised

by judicial sentence.[1108] This last-mentioned decree was proposed

by Hyperides; but several others were moved by Demosthenes, who,

notwithstanding the late misfortune of the Athenian arms, was

listened to with undiminished respect and confidence. The general

measures requisite for strengthening the walls, opening ditches,

distributing military posts and constructing earthwork, were decreed

on his motion; and he seems to have been named member of a special

Board for superintending the fortifications.[1109] Not only he, but

also most of the conspicuous citizens and habitual speakers in the

assembly, came forward with large private contributions to meet the

pressing wants of the moment.[1110] Every man in the city lent a hand

to make good the defective points in the fortification. Materials

were obtained by felling the trees near the city, and even by taking

stones from the adjacent sepulchres[1111]—as had been done after

the Persian war when the walls were built under the contrivance of

Themistokles.[1112] The temples were stripped of the arms suspended

within them, for the purpose of equipping unarmed citizens.[1113] By

such earnest and unanimous efforts, the defences of the city and of

Peiræus were soon materially improved. At sea Athens had nothing to

fear. Her powerful naval force was untouched, and her superiority to

Philip on that element incontestable. Envoys were sent to Trœzen,

Epidaurus, Andros, Keos, and other places, to solicit aid, and

collect money; in one or other of which embassies Demosthenes served,

after he had provided for the immediate exigencies of defence.[1114]

[1106] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 146. Γεγενημένης γὰρ τῆς ἐν

Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχης, καὶ συνδραμόντων ἁπάντων ὑμῶν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν,

ἐψηφίσατο ὁ δῆμος, παῖδας μὲν καὶ γυναῖκας ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν εἰς τὰ

τείχη κατακομίζειν, etc.

[1107] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 177. c. 13.

[1108] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 170. c. 11. ἥνιχ᾽ ὁρᾷν ἦν

τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ

ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δὲ ἀτίμους ἐντίμους. The orator causes

this decree, proposed by Hyperides, to be read publicly by the

secretary, in court.

Compare Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 849. and Demosth. cont.

Aristog. p. 803.

[1109] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 309; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p.

100.

[1110] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 329; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p.

100; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 851.

[1111] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 172. c. 11; Æschines adv.

Ktesiph. p. 87.

[1112] Thucyd. i. 93.

[1113] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. _l. c._

[1114] Lykurgus (adv. Leokrat. p. 171 c. 11) mentions these

embassies; Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. p. 100) affirms that

Demosthenes provided for himself an escape from the city as an

envoy—αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν πρεσβευτὴν κατασκεύασας, ἵν᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως

ἀποδραίη, etc. Compare Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 76.

The two hostile orators treat such temporary absence of

Demosthenes on the embassy to obtain aid, as if it were a

cowardly desertion of his post. This is a construction altogether

unjust.

What was the immediate result of these applications to other cities,

we do not know. But the effect produced upon some of these Ægean

islands by the reported prostration of Athens, is remarkable. An

Athenian citizen named Leokrates, instead of staying at Athens to

join in the defence, listened only to a disgraceful timidity,[1115]

and fled forthwith from Peiræus with his family and property. He

hastened to Rhodes, where he circulated the false news that Athens

was already taken and the Peiræus under siege. Immediately on hearing

this intelligence, and believing it to be true, the Rhodians with

their triremes began a cruise to seize the merchant-vessels at

sea.[1116] Hence we learn, indirectly, that the Athenian naval power

constituted the standing protection for these merchant vessels;

insomuch that so soon as that protection was removed, armed cruisers

began to prey upon them from various islands in the Ægean.

[1115] Leokrates was not the only Athenian who fled, or tried to

flee. Another was seized in the attempt (according to Æschines)

and condemned to death by the Council of Areopagus (Æschines

adv. Ktesiph. p. 89). A member of the Areopagus itself, named

Autolykus (the same probably who is mentioned with peculiar

respect by Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 12), sent away his family

for safety; Lykurgus afterwards impeached him for it, and he was

condemned by the Dikastery (Harpokration v. Αὐτόλυκος).

[1116] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 149. Οὕτω δὲ σφόδρα ταῦτ᾽

ἐπίστευσαν οἱ Ῥόδιοι, ὥστε τριήρεις πληρώσαντες τὰ πλοῖα κατῆγον,

etc.

Such were the precautions taken at Athens after this fatal day. But

Athens lay at a distance of three or four days’ march from the field

of Chæroneia; while Thebes, being much nearer, bore the first attack

of Philip. Of the behavior of that prince after his victory, we have

contradictory statements. According to one account, he indulged in

the most insulting and licentious exultation on the field of battle,

jesting especially on the oratory and motions of Demosthenes; a

temper, from which he was brought round by the courageous reproof of

Demades, then his prisoner as one of the Athenian hoplites.[1117] At

first he even refused to grant permission to inter the slain, when

the herald came from Lebadeia to make the customary demand.[1118]

According to another account, the demeanor of Philip towards the

defeated Athenians was gentle and forbearing.[1119] However the fact

may have stood as to his first manifestations, it is certain that

his positive measures were harsh towards Thebes and lenient towards

Athens. He sold the Theban captives into slavery; he is said also

to have exacted a price for the liberty granted to bury the Theban

slain—which liberty, according to Grecian custom, was never refused

and certainly never sold, by the victor. Whether Thebes made any

farther resistance, or stood a siege, we do not know. But presently

the city fell into Philip’s power, who put to death several of the

leading citizens, banished others, and confiscated the property of

both. A council of Three Hundred—composed of philippizing Thebans,

for the most part just recalled from exile—was invested with the

government of the city, and with powers of life and death over every

one.[1120] The state of Thebes became much the same as it had been

when the Spartan Phœbidas, in concert with the Theban party headed

by Leontiades, surprised the Kadmeia. A Macedonian garrison was

now placed in the Kadmeia, as a Spartan garrison had been placed

then. Supported by this garrison, the philippizing Thebans were

uncontrolled masters of the city; with full power, and no reluctance,

to gratify their political antipathies. At the same time, Philip

restored the minor Bœotian towns—Orchomenus, and Platæa, probably

also Thespiæ and Koroneia—to the condition of free communities

instead of subjection to Thebes.[1121]

[1117] Diodor. xvi. 87. The story respecting Demades is told

somewhat differently in Sextus Empiricus adv. Grammaticos, p. 281.

[1118] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator, p. 849.

[1119] Justin, ix. 4; Polybius, v. 10; Theopomp. Frag. 262. See

the note of Wichers ad Theopompi Fragmenta, p. 259.

[1120] Justin, ix. 4. Dienarch. cont. Demosth. s. 20. p. 92.

[1121] Pausanias, iv. 25, 5; ix. 1, 3.

At Athens also, the philippizing orators raised their voices

loudly and confidently, denouncing Demosthenes and his policy.

New speakers,[1122] who would hardly have come forward before,

were now put up against him. The accusations however altogether

failed; the people continued to trust him, omitting no measure of

defence which he suggested. Æschines, who had before disclaimed all

connection with Philip, now altered his tone, and made boast of the

ties of friendship and hospitality subsisting between that prince

and himself.[1123] He tendered his services to go as envoy to the

Macedonian camp; whither he appears to have been sent, doubtless with

others, perhaps with Xenokrates and Phokion.[1124] Among them was

Demades also, having been just released from his captivity. Either by

the persuasions of Demades, or by a change in his own dispositions,

Philip had now become inclined to treat with Athens on favorable

terms. The bodies of the slain Athenians were burned by the victors,

and their ashes collected to be carried to Athens; though the formal

application of the herald to the same effect, had been previously

refused.[1125] Æschines (according to the assertion of Demosthenes)

took part as a sympathizing guest in the banquet and festivities

whereby Philip celebrated his triumph over Grecian liberty.[1126] At

length Demades with the other envoys returned to Athens, reporting

the consent of Philip to conclude peace, to give back the numerous

prisoners in his hands, and also to transfer Oropus from the Thebans

to Athens.

[1122] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 310. οὐ δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν τό γε πρῶτον,

ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ὧν μάλισθ᾽ ὑπελάμβανον ἀγνοήσεσθαι, etc.

So the enemies of Alkibiades put up against him in the assembly

speakers of affected candor and impartiality—ἄλλους ῥήτορας

ἐνιέντες, etc. Thucyd. vi. 29.

[1123] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 319, 320.

[1124] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 319. ὃς εὐθέως μετὰ τὴν μάχην

πρεσβευτὴς ἐπορεύου πρὸς Φίλιππον, etc. Compare Plutarch,

Phokion, c. 16. Diogen. Laert. iv. 5. in his Life of the

Philosopher Xenokrates.

[1125] Demades, Fragment. Orat. p. 179. χιλίων ταφὴ Ἀθηναίων

μαρτυρεῖ μοι, κηδευθεῖσα ταῖς τῶν ἐναντίων χερσὶν, ἃς ἀντὶ

πολεμίων φιλίας ἐποίησα τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν. Ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστὰς τοῖς

πράγμασιν ἔγραψα τὴν εἰρήνην· ὁμολογῶ. Ἔγραψα καὶ Φιλίππῳ τιμάς·

οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι· δισχιλίους γὰρ αἰχμαλώτους ἄνευ λύτρων καὶ χίλια

πολιτῶν σώματα χωρὶς κήρυκος, καὶ τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ἄνευ πρεσβείας λαβὼν

ὑμῖν, ταῦτ᾽ ἔγραψα. See also Suidas v. Δημάδης.

[1126] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 321.

Demades proposed the conclusion of peace to the Athenian assembly,

by whom it was readily decreed. To escape invasion and siege by

the Macedonian army, was doubtless an unspeakable relief; while

the recovery of the two thousand prisoners without ransom, was an

acquisition of great importance, not merely to the city collectively,

but to the sympathies of numerous relatives. Lastly, to regain

Oropus—a possession which they had once enjoyed, and for which

they had long wrangled with the Thebans—was a farther cause of

satisfaction. Such conditions were doubtless acceptable at Athens.

But there was a submission to be made on the other side, which to the

contemporaries of Perikles would have seemed intolerable, even as

the price of averted invasion or recovered captives. The Athenians

were required to acknowledge the exaltation of Philip to the headship

of the Grecian world, and to promote the like acknowledgment by all

other Greeks, in a congress to be speedily convened. They were to

renounce all pretensions of headship, not only for themselves, but

for every other Grecian state; to recognize not Sparta or Thebes,

but the king of Macedon, as Pan-hellenic chief; to acquiesce in the

transition of Greece from the position of a free, self-determining,

political aggregate, into a provincial dependency of the kings of

Pella and Ægæ. It is not easy to conceive a more terrible shock

to that traditional sentiment of pride and patriotism, inherited

from forefathers, who, after repelling and worsting the Persians,

had first organized the maritime Greeks into a confederacy running

parallel with and supplementary to the non-maritime Greeks allied

with Sparta; thus keeping out foreign dominion and casting the

Grecian world into a system founded on native sympathies and free

government. Such traditional sentiment, though it no longer governed

the character of the Athenians or impressed upon them motives of

action, had still a strong hold upon their imagination and memory,

where it had been constantly kept alive by the eloquence of

Demosthenes and others. The peace of Demades, recognizing Philip as

chief of Greece, was a renunciation of all this proud historical

past, and the acceptance of a new and degraded position, for Athens

as well as for Greece generally.

Polybius praises the generosity of Philip in granting such favorable

terms, and even affirms, not very accurately, that he secured thereby

the steady gratitude and attachment of the Athenians.[1127] But

Philip would have gained nothing by killing his prisoners; not to

mention that he would have provoked an implacable spirit of revenge

among the Athenians. By selling his prisoners for slaves he would

have gained something, but by the use actually made of them he

gained more. The recognition of his Hellenic supremacy by Athens

was the capital step for the prosecution of his objects. It ensured

him against dissentients among the remaining Grecian states, whose

adhesion had not yet been made certain, and who might possibly have

stood out against a proposition so novel and so anti-Hellenic, had

Athens set them the example. Moreover, if Philip had not purchased

the recognition of Athens in this way, he might have failed in trying

to extort it by force. For though, being master of the field, he

could lay waste Attica with impunity, and even establish a permanent

fortress in it like Dekeleia—yet the fleet of Athens was as strong

as ever, and her preponderance at sea irresistible. Under these

circumstances, Athens and Peiræus might have been defended against

him, as Byzantium and Perinthus had been, two years before; the

Athenian fleet might have obstructed his operations in many ways;

and the siege of Athens might have called forth a burst of Hellenic

sympathy, such as to embarrass his farther progress. Thebes—an inland

city, hated by the other Bœotian cities—was prostrated by the battle

of Chæroneia, and left without any means of successful defence. But

the same blow was not absolutely mortal to Athens, united in her

population throughout all the area of Attica, and superior at sea.

We may see therefore, that—with such difficulties before him if he

pushed the Athenians to despair—Philip acted wisely in employing

his victory and his prisoners to procure her recognition of his

headship. His political game was well-played, now as always; but to

the praise of generosity bestowed by Polybius, he has little claim.

[1127] Polybius, v. 10; xvii. 14; Diodor. Fragm. lib. xxxii.

Besides the recognition of Philip as chief of Greece, the Athenians,

on the motion of Demades, passed various honorary and complimentary

votes in his favor; of what precise nature we do not know.[1128]

Immediate relief from danger, with the restoration of two thousand

captive citizens, were sufficient to render the peace popular at

the first moment; moreover, the Athenians, as if conscious of

failing resolution and strength, were now entering upon that career

of flattery to powerful kings, which we shall hereafter find them

pushing to disgraceful extravagance. It was probably during the

prevalence of this sentiment, which did not long continue, that the

youthful Alexander of Macedon, accompanied by Antipater, paid a visit

to Athens.[1129]

[1128] Demades, Frag. p. 179. ἔγραψα καὶ Φιλίππῳ τιμὰς, οὐκ

ἀρνοῦμαι, etc. Compare Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 2, 3—καὶ πλείονα ἔτι

τῶν Φιλίππῳ δοθέντων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς τιμὴν ξυγχωρῆσαι, etc., and

Clemens Alex. Admonit. ad Gent. p. 36 B. τὸν Μακεδόνα Φίλιππον ἐν

Κυνοσάργει νομοθετοῦντες προσκυνεῖν, etc.

[1129] Justin, ix. 4.

Meanwhile the respect enjoyed by Demosthenes among his countrymen was

noway lessened. Though his political opponents thought the season

favorable for bringing many impeachments against him, none of them

proved successful: and when the time came for electing a public

orator to deliver the funeral discourse at the obsequies celebrated

for the slain at Chæroneia—he was invested with that solemn duty,

not only in preference to Æschines, who was put up in competition,

but also to Demades the recent mover of the peace[1130]—and honored

with strong marks of esteem and sympathy from the surviving

relatives of these gallant citizens. Moreover it farther appears

that Demosthenes was continued in an important financial post as one

of the joint managers of the Theôric Fund, and as member of a Board

for purchasing corn; he was also continued, or shortly afterwards

re-appointed, superintendent of the walls and defences of the city.

The orator Hyperides, the political coadjutor of Demosthenes, was

impeached by Aristogeiton under the Graphê Paranomon, for his illegal

and unconstitutional decree (proposed under the immediate terror

of the defeat at Chæroneia), to grant manumission to the slaves,

citizenship to metics, and restoration of citizenship to those

who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. The occurrence

of peace had removed all necessity for acting upon this decree;

nevertheless an impeachment was entered and brought against its

mover. Hyperides, unable to deny its illegality, placed his defence

on the true and obvious ground—“The Macedonian arms (he said)

darkened my vision. It was not I who moved the decree; it was the

battle of Chæroneia.”[1131] The substantive defence was admitted by

the Dikastery; while the bold oratorical turn attracted notice from

rhetorical critics.

[1130] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 310-320.

[1131] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 849.

Having thus subjugated and garrisoned Thebes—having reconstituted the

anti-Theban cities in Bœotia—having constrained Athens to submission

and dependent alliance—and having established a garrison in Ambrakia,

at the same time mastering Akarnania, and banishing the leading

Akarnanians who were opposed to him—Philip next proceeded to carry

his arms into Peloponnesus. He found little positive resistance

anywhere, except in the territory of Sparta. The Corinthians,

Argeians, Messenians, Eleians, and many Arcadians, all submitted to

his dominion; some even courted his alliance, from fear and antipathy

against Sparta. Philip invaded Laconia with an army too powerful for

the Spartans to resist in the field. He laid waste the country, and

took some detached posts; but he did not take, nor do we know that

he even attacked, Sparta itself. The Spartans could not resist; yet

would they neither submit, nor ask for peace. It appears that Philip

cut down their territory and narrowed their boundaries on all the

three sides; towards Argos, Messênê, and Megalopolis.[1132] We have

no precise account of the details of his proceedings; but it is clear

that he did just what seemed to him good, and that the governments of

all the Peloponnesian cities came into the hands of his partisans.

Sparta was the only city which stood out against him; maintaining her

ancient freedom and dignity, under circumstances of feebleness and

humiliation, with more unshaken resolution than Athens.

[1132] Polybius, ix. 28, 33, xvii. 14; Tacitus, Annal. iv. 43;

Strabo, viii. p. 361; Pausanias, ii. 20, 1. viii. 7, 4. viii. 27,

8. From Diodorus xvii. 3, we see how much this adhesion to Philip

was obtained under the pressure of necessity.

Philip next proceeded to convene a congress of Grecian cities at

Corinth. He here announced himself as resolved on an expedition

against the Persian king, for the purpose both of liberating the

Asiatic Greeks, and avenging the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. The

general vote of the congress nominated him leader of the united

Greeks for this purpose, and decreed a Grecian force to join him,

to be formed of contingents furnished by the various cities. The

total of the force promised is stated only by Justin, who gives it

at two hundred thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse; an army

which Greece certainly could not have furnished, and which we can

hardly believe to have been even promised.[1133] The Spartans stood

aloof from the congress, continuing to refuse all recognition of

the headship of Philip. The Athenians attended and concurred in the

vote; which was in fact the next step to carry out the peace made

by Demades. They were required to furnish a well-equipped fleet

to serve under Philip; and they were at the same time divested of

their dignity of chiefs of a maritime confederacy, the islands being

enrolled as maritime dependencies of Philip, instead of continuing

to send deputies to a synod meeting at Athens.[1134] It appears that

Samos was still recognized as belonging to them[1135]—or at least

such portion of the island as was occupied by the numerous Athenian

kleruchs or out-settlers, first established in the island after the

conquest by Timotheus in 365 B. C., and afterwards reinforced. For

several years afterwards, the naval force in the dockyards of Athens

still continued large and powerful; but her maritime ascendency

henceforward disappears.

[1133] Justin, ix. 5.

[1134] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16; Pausanias, i. 25, 3. Τὸ γὰρ

ἀτύχημα τὸ ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ ἅπασι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἦρξε κακοῦ, καὶ οὐχ

ἥκιστα δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς ὑπεριδόντας, καὶ ὅσοι μετὰ Μακεδόνων

ἐτάχθησαν. Τὰς μὲν δὴ πολλὰς Φίλιππος τῶν πόλεων εἷλεν. Ἀθηναίοις

δὲ λόγῳ συνθέμενος, ἔργῳ σφᾶς μάλιστα ἐκάκωσε, νήσους τε

ἀφελόμενος καὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ναυτικὰ παύσας ἀρχῆς.

[1135] Diodor. xviii. 56. Σάμον δὲ δίδομεν Ἀθηναίοις, ἐπειδὴ καὶ

Φίλιππος ἔδωκεν ὁ πατήρ. Compare Plutarch, Alexand. c. 28.

The Athenians, deeply mortified by such humiliation, were reminded

by Phokion that it was a necessary result of the peace which they

had accepted on the motion of Demades, and that it was now too late

to murmur.[1136] We cannot wonder at their feelings. Together with

the other free cities of Greece, they were enrolled as contributory

appendages of the king of Macedon; a revolution, to them more galling

than to the rest, since they passed at once, not merely from simple

autonomy, but from a condition of superior dignity, into the common

dependence. Athens had only to sanction the scheme dictated by

Philip and to furnish her quota towards the execution. Moreover,

this scheme—the invasion of Persia—had ceased to be an object of

genuine aspiration throughout the Grecian world. The Great King,

no longer inspiring terror to Greece collectively, might now be

regarded as likely to lend protection against Macedonian oppression.

To emancipate the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion would be

in itself an enterprise grateful to Grecian feeling, though all

such wishes must have been gradually dying out since the peace of

Antalkidas. But emancipation, accomplished by Philip, would be only

a transfer of the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion to his. The

synod of Corinth served no purpose except to harness the Greeks to

his car, for a distant enterprise lucrative to his soldiers and

suited to his insatiable ambition.

[1136] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

It was in 337 B. C. that this Persian expedition was concerted and

resolved. During that year preparations were made of sufficient

magnitude to exhaust the finances of Philip;[1137] who was at the

same time engaged in military operations, and fought a severe battle

against the Illyrian king Pleurias.[1138] In the spring of 336 B.

C., a portion of the Macedonian army under Parmenio and Attalus, was

sent across to Asia to commence military operations; Philip himself

intending speedily to follow.[1139]

[1137] Arrian, vii. 9, 5.

[1138] Diodor. xvi. 93.

[1139] Justin, ix. 5; Diodor. xvi. 91.

Such however was not the fate reserved for him. Not long before,

he had taken the resolution of repudiating, on the allegation of

infidelity, his wife Olympias; who is said to have become repugnant

to him, from the furious and savage impulses of her character.

He had successively married several wives, the last of whom was

Kleopatra, niece of the Macedonian Attalus. It was at her instance

that he is said to have repudiated Olympias; who retired to her

brother Alexander of Epirus.[1140] This step provoked violent

dissensions among the partisans of the two queens, and even between

Philip and his son Alexander, who expressed a strong resentment

at the repudiation of his mother. Amidst the intoxication of the

marriage banquet, Attalus proposed a toast and prayer, that there

might speedily appear a legitimate son, from Philip and Kleopatra,

to succeed to the Macedonian throne. Upon which Alexander exclaimed

in wrath—“Do you then proclaim _me_ as a bastard?”—at the same time

hurling a goblet at him. Incensed at this proceeding, Philip started

up, drew his sword, and made furiously at his son; but fell to the

ground from passion and intoxication. This accident alone preserved

the life of Alexander; who retorted—“Here is a man, preparing to

cross from Europe into Asia—who yet cannot step surely from one

couch to another.[1141]” After this violent quarrel the father and

son separated. Alexander conducted his mother into Epirus, and then

went himself to the Illyrian king. Some months afterwards, at the

instance of the Corinthian Demaratus, Philip sent for him back, and

became reconciled to him; but another cause of displeasure soon

arose, because Alexander had opened a negotiation for marriage with

the daughter of the satrap of Karia. Rejecting such an alliance

as unworthy, Philip sharply reproved his son, and banished from

Macedonia several courtiers whom he suspected as intimate with

Alexander;[1142] while the friends of Attalus stood high in favor.

[1140] Athenæus, xiii. p. 557; Justin, ix. 7.

[1141] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 9; Justin, ix. 7; Diodor. xvi. 91-93.

[1142] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 10; Arrian, iii. 6, 5.

Such were the animosities distracting the court and family of Philip.

A son had just been born to him from his new wife Kleopatra.[1143]

His expedition against Persia, resolved and prepared during the

preceding year, had been actually commenced; Parmenio and Attalus

having been sent across to Asia with the first division, to be

followed presently by himself with the remaining army. But Philip

foresaw that during his absence danger might arise from the furious

Olympias, bitterly exasperated by the recent events, and instigating

her brother Alexander king of Epirus, with whom she was now residing.

Philip indeed held a Macedonian garrison in Ambrakia,[1144] the chief

Grecian city on the Epirotic border; and he had also contributed much

to establish Alexander as prince. But he now deemed it essential to

conciliate him still farther, by a special tie of alliance; giving to

him in marriage Kleopatra, his daughter by Olympias.[1145] For this

marriage, celebrated at Ægæ in Macedonia in August 336 B. C., Philip

provided festivals of the utmost cost and splendor, commemorating

at the same time the recent birth of his son by Kleopatra.[1146]

Banquets, munificent presents, gymnastic and musical matches, tragic

exhibitions,[1147] among which Neoptolemus the actor performed in

the tragedy of Kinyras, etc. with every species of attraction known

to the age—were accumulated, in order to reconcile the dissentient

parties in Macedonia, and to render the effect imposing on the

minds of the Greeks; who, from every city, sent deputies for

congratulation. Statues of the twelve great gods, admirably executed,

were carried in solemn procession into the theatre; immediately after

them, the statue of Philip himself as a thirteenth god.[1148]

[1143] Pausanias (viii. 7, 5) mentions a son born to Philip by

Kleopatra; Diodorus (xvii. 2) also notices a son. Justin in one

place (ix. 7) mentions a daughter, and in another place (xi. 2)

a son named Caranus. Satyrus (ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 557) states

that a daughter named Eurôpê was born to him by Kleopatra.

It appears that the son was born only a short time before the

last festival and the assassination of Philip, But I incline to

think that the marriage with Kleopatra may well have taken place

two years or more before that event, and that there may have been

a daughter born before the son. Certainly Justin distinguishes

the two, stating that the daughter was killed by order of

Olympias, and the son by that of Alexander (ix. 7; xi. 2).

Arrian (iii. 6, 5) seems to mean _Kleopatra_ the wife of Philip,

though he speaks of Eurydikê.

[1144] Diodor. xvii. 3.

[1145] This Kleopatra—daughter of Philip, sister of Alexander the

Great, and bearing the same name as Philip’s last wife—was thus

niece of the Epirotic Alexander, her husband. Alliances of that

degree of kindred were then neither disreputable nor unfrequent.

[1146] Diodor. xvii. 2.

[1147] Josephus, Antiq. xix. 1, 13; Suetonius, Caligula, c. 57.

See Mr. Clinton’s Appendix (4) on the Kings of Macedonia. Fast.

Hellen. p. 230, note.

[1148] Diodor. xvi. 92.

Amidst this festive multitude, however, there were not wanting

discontented partisans of Olympias and Alexander, to both of whom the

young queen with her new-born child threatened a formidable rivalry.

There was also a malcontent yet more dangerous—Pausanias, one of the

royal body-guards, a noble youth born in the district called Orestis

in Upper Macedonia; who, from causes of offence peculiar to himself,

nourished a deadly hatred against Philip. The provocation which he

had received is one which we can neither conveniently transcribe,

nor indeed accurately make out, amidst discrepancies of statement.

It was Attalus, the uncle of the new queen Kleopatra, who had given

the provocation, by inflicting upon Pausanias an outrage of the

most brutal and revolting character. Even for so monstrous an act,

no regular justice could be had in Macedonia, against a powerful

man. Pausanias complained to Philip in person. According to one

account, Philip put aside the complaint with evasions, and even

treated it with ridicule; according to another account, he expressed

his displeasure at the act, and tried to console Pausanias by

pecuniary presents. But he granted neither redress nor satisfaction

to the sentiment of an outraged man.[1149] Accordingly Pausanias

determined to take revenge for himself. Instead of revenging himself

on Attalus—who indeed was out of his reach, being at the head of the

Macedonian troops in Asia—his wrath fixed upon Philip himself, by

whom the demand for redress had been refused. It appears that this

turn of sentiment, diverting the appetite for revenge away from the

real criminal, was not wholly spontaneous on the part of Pausanias,

but was artfully instigated by various party conspirators who wished

to destroy Philip. The enemies of Attalus and queen Kleopatra (who

herself is said to have treated Pausanias with insult[1150])—being of

course also partisans of Olympias and Alexander—were well disposed

to make use of the maddened Pausanias as an instrument, and to

direct his exasperation against the king. He had poured forth his

complaints both to Olympias and to Alexander; the former is said to

have worked him up vehemently against her late husband—and even the

latter repeated to him a verse out of Euripides, wherein the fierce

Medea, deserted by her husband Jason who had married the daughter of

the Corinthian king Kreon, vows to include in her revenge the king

himself, together with her husband and his new wife.[1151] That the

vindictive Olympias would positively spur on Pausanias to assassinate

Philip, is highly probable. Respecting Alexander, though he also

was accused, there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a similar

assertion; but that some among his partisans—men eager to consult

his feelings and to ensure his succession—lent their encouragements,

appears tolerably well established. A Greek sophist named Hermokrates

is also said to have contributed to the deed, though seemingly

without intention, by his conversation; and the Persian king (an

improbable report) by his gold.[1152]

[1149] Aristot. Polit. v. 8. 10. Ἡ Φιλίππου (ἐπίθεσις) ὑπὸ

Παυσανίου, διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἄτταλον, etc.

Justin, ix. 6; Diodor. xvi. 93.

[1150] Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

[1151] Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

[1152] Arrian, Exp. Alex. ii. 14, 10.

Unconscious of the plot, Philip was about to enter the theatre,

already crowded with spectators. As he approached the door, clothed

in a white robe, he felt so exalted with impressions of his own

dignity, and so confident in the admiring sympathy of the surrounding

multitude, that he advanced both unarmed and unprotected, directing

his guards to hold back. At this moment Pausanias, standing near with

a Gallic sword concealed under his garment, rushed upon him, thrust

the weapon through his body, and killed him. Having accomplished

his purpose, the assassin immediately ran off, and tried to reach

the gates, where he had previously caused horses to be stationed.

Being strong and active, he might have succeeded in effecting

his escape—like most of the assassins of Jason of Pheræ[1153]

under circumstances very similar—had not his foot stumbled amidst

some vine-stocks. The guards and friends of Philip were at first

paralyzed with astonishment and consternation. At length however some

hastened to assist the dying king; while others rushed in pursuit

of Pausanias. Leonnatus and Perdikkas overtook him and slew him

immediately.[1154]

[1153] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 32.

[1154] Diodor. xvi. 94; Justin, ix. 7; Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

In what way, or to what extent, the accomplices of Pausanias lent

him aid, we are not permitted to know. It is possible that they

may have posted themselves artfully so as to obstruct pursuit,

and favor his chance of escape; which would appear extremely

small, after a deed of such unmeasured audacity. Three only of the

reputed accomplices are known to us by name—three brothers from

the Lynkestian district of Upper Macedonia—Alexander, Heromenes,

and Arrhibæus, sons of Æropus;[1155] but it seems that there were

others besides. The Lynkestian Alexander—whose father-in-law

Antipater was one of the most conspicuous and confidential officers

in the service of Philip—belonged to a good family in Macedonia,

perhaps even descendants from the ancient family of the princes of

Lynkestis.[1156] It was he, who, immediately after Pausanias had

assassinated Philip, hastened to salute the prince Alexander as king,

helped him to put on his armor, and marched as one of his guards to

take possession of the regal palace.[1157]

[1155] Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 25, 1.

[1156] Justin, xii. 14; Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 5, with the note

of Mützell.

[1157] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2. “Soli Alexandro

Lyncistarum fratri pepercit, servans in eo auspicium dignitatis

suæ; nam regem eum primus salutaverat.”

This “prima vox”[1158] was not simply an omen or presage to Alexander

of empire to come, but essentially serviceable to him as a real

determining cause or condition. The succession to the Macedonian

throne was often disturbed by feud or bloodshed among the members

of the regal family; and under the latter circumstances of Philip’s

reign, such disturbance was peculiarly probable. He had been on

bad terms with Alexander, and on still worse terms with Olympias.

While banishing persons attached to Alexander, he had lent his ear

to Attalus with the partisans of the new queen Kleopatra. Had these

latter got the first start after the assassination, they would have

organized an opposition to Alexander in favor of the infant prince;

which opposition might have had some chances of success, since they

had been in favor with the deceased king, and were therefore in

possession of many important posts. But the deed of Pausanias took

them unprepared, and for the moment paralyzed them; while, before

they could recover or take concert, one of the accomplices of the

assassin ran to put Alexander in motion without delay. A decisive

initiatory movement from him and his friends, at this critical

juncture, determined waverers and forestalled opposition. We need not

wonder therefore that Alexander, when king, testified extraordinary

gratitude and esteem for his Lynkestian namesake; not simply

exempting him from the punishment of death inflicted on the other

accomplices, but also promoting him to great honors and important

military commands. Neither Alexander and Olympias on the one side,

nor Attalus and Kleopatra on the other, were personally safe, except

by acquiring the succession. It was one of the earliest proceedings

of Alexander to send over a special officer to Asia, for the purpose

of bringing home Attalus prisoner, or of putting him to death; the

last of which was done, seemingly through the coöperation of Parmenio

(who was in joint command with Attalus) and his son Philotas.[1159]

The unfortunate Kleopatra and her child were both put to death

shortly afterwards.[1160] Other persons also were slain, of whom I

shall speak farther in describing the reign of Alexander.

[1158] Tacitus, Hist. ii. 80. “Dum quæritur tempus locusque,

quodque in re tali difficillimum est, _prima vox_; dum animo

spes, timor, ratio, casus observantur; egressum cubiculo

Vespasianum, pauci milites solito adsistentes ordine,

_Imperatorem_ salutavere. Tum cæteri accurrere, _Cæsarem_, et

_Augustum_, et omnia principatus vocabula cumulare: mens a metu

ad fortunam transierat.”

[1159] Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 3; Diodorus, xvii. 2, 5. Compare

Justin, xi. 5.

[1160] Justin, ix. 7; xi. 2. Pausanias, viii. 7, 5; Plutarch,

Alex. c. 10.

According to Pausanias, Olympias caused Kleopatra and her infant

boy to perish by a horrible death; being roasted or baked on a

brazen vessel surrounded by fire. According to Justin, Olympias

first slew the daughter of Kleopatra on her mother’s bosom, and

then caused Kleopatra herself to be hanged; while Alexander

put to death Caranus, the infant son of Kleopatra. Plutarch

says nothing about this; but states that the cruel treatment of

Kleopatra was inflicted by order of Olympias during the absence

of Alexander, and that he was much displeased at it. The main

fact, that Kleopatra and her infant child were despatched by

violence, seems not open to reasonable doubt; though we cannot

verify the details.

We could have wished to learn from some person actually present,

the immediate effect produced upon the great miscellaneous crowd in

the theatre, when the sudden murder of Philip first became known.

Among the Greeks present, there were doubtless many who welcomed it

with silent satisfaction, as seeming to reopen for them the door of

freedom. One person alone dared to manifest satisfaction; and that

one was Olympias.[1161]

[1161] After the solemn funeral of Philip, Olympias took down

and burned the body of Pausanias (which had been crucified),

providing for him a sepulchral monument and an annual ceremony of

commemoration. Justin, ix. 7.

Thus perished the destroyer of freedom and independence in the

Hellenic world, at the age of forty-six or forty-seven, after a reign

of twenty-three years.[1162] Our information about him is signally

defective. Neither his means, nor his plans, nor the difficulties

which he overcame, nor his interior government, are known to us with

exactness or upon contemporary historical authority. But the great

results of his reign, and the main lines of his character, stand

out incontestably. At his accession, the Macedonian kingdom was a

narrow territory round Pella, excluded partially, by independent and

powerful Grecian cities, even from the neighboring sea-coast. At his

death, Macedonian ascendency was established from the coasts of the

Propontis to those of the Ionian Sea, and the Ambrakian, Messenian,

and Saronic Gulfs. Within these boundaries, all the cities recognized

the supremacy of Philip; except only Sparta, and mountaineers like

the Ætolians and others, defended by a rugged home. Good fortune had

waited on Philip’s steps, with a few rare interruptions;[1163] but

it was good fortune crowning the efforts of a rare talent, political

and military. Indeed the restless ambition, the indefatigable

personal activity and endurance, and the adventurous courage, of

Philip, were such as, in a king, suffice almost of themselves to

guarantee success, even with abilities much inferior to his. That

among the causes of Philip’s conquests, one was corruption, employed

abundantly to foment discord and purchase partisans among neighbors

and enemies—that with winning and agreeable manners, he combined

recklessness in false promises, deceit and extortion even towards

allies, and unscrupulous perjury when it suited his purpose—this

we find affirmed, and there is no reason for disbelieving it.[1164]

Such dissolving forces smoothed the way for an efficient and

admirable army, organized, and usually commanded, by himself. Its

organization adopted and enlarged the best processes of scientific

warfare employed by Epaminondas and Iphikrates.[1165] Begun as well

as completed by Philip, and bequeathed as an engine ready-made for

the conquests of Alexander, it constitutes an epoch in military

history. But the more we extol the genius of Philip as a conqueror,

formed for successful encroachment and aggrandizement at the expense

of all his neighbors—the less can we find room for that mildness and

moderation which some authors discover in his character. If, on some

occasions of his life, such attributes may fairly be recognized, we

have to set against them the destruction of the thirty-two Greek

cities in Chalkidikê and the wholesale transportation of reluctant

and miserable families from one inhabitancy to another.

[1162] Justin (ix. 3) calls Philip forty-seven years of age;

Pausanias (viii. 7, 4) speaks of him as forty-six. See Mr.

Clinton’s Fast. Hellen. Appen. 4. p. 227.

[1163] Theopompus, Frag. 265. ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 77. καὶ

εὐτυχῆσαι πάντα Φίλιππον. Compare Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 24.

[1164] Theopomp. Frag. 249; Theopompus ap. Polybium, viii. 11.

ἀδικώτατον δὲ καὶ κακοπραγμονέστατον περὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων καὶ

συμμάχων κατασκευὰς, πλείστας δὲ πόλεις ἐξηνδραποδισμένον καὶ

πεπραξικοπηκότα μετὰ δόλου καὶ βίας, etc.

Justin, ix. 8. Pausanias, vii. 7, 3; vii. 10, 4; viii. 7, 4.

Diodor. xvi. 54.

The language of Pausanias about Philip, after doing justice to

his great conquests and exploits, is very strong—ὅς γε καὶ ὅρκους

θεῶν κατεπάτησεν ἀεὶ, καὶ σπονδὰς ἐπὶ πάντι ἐψεύσατο, πίστιν τε

ἠτίμασε μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων, etc. By such conduct, according to

Pausanias, Philip brought the divine wrath both upon himself and

upon his race, which became extinct with the next generation.

[1165] A striking passage occurs, too long to cite, in the third

Philippic of Demosthenes (p. 123-124) attesting the marvellous

stride made by Philip in the art and means of effective warfare.

Besides his skill as a general and a politician, Philip was no mean

proficient in the Grecian accomplishments of rhetoric and letters.

The testimony of Æschines as to his effective powers of speaking,

though requiring some allowance, is not to be rejected. Isokrates

addresses him as a friend of letters and philosophy; a reputation

which his choice of Aristotle as instructor of his son Alexander,

tends to bear out. Yet in Philip, as in the two Dionysii of Syracuse

and other despots, these tastes were not found inconsistent either

with the crimes of ambition, or the licenses of inordinate appetite.

The contemporary historian Theopompus, a warm admirer of Philip’s

genius, stigmatizes not only the perfidy, of his public dealings, but

also the drunkenness, gambling, and excesses of all kinds in which

he indulged—encouraging the like in those around him. His Macedonian

and Grecian body-guard, eight hundred in number, was a troop in which

no decent man could live; distinguished indeed for military bravery

and aptitude, but sated with plunder, and stained with such shameless

treachery, sanguinary rapacity, and unbridled lust, as befitted only

Centaurs and Læstrygons.[1166] The number of Philip’s mistresses and

wives was almost on an Oriental scale;[1167] and the dissensions thus

introduced into his court through his offspring by different mothers,

were fraught with mischievous consequences.

[1166] Theopomp. Frag. 249. Ἁπλῶς δ᾽ εἰπεῖν ... ἡγοῦμαι τοιαῦτα

θηρία γεγονέναι, καὶ τοιοῦτον τοὺς φίλους καὶ τους ἑταίρους

Φιλίππου προσαγορευθέντας, οἵους οὔτε τοὺς Κενταύρους τοὺς τὸ

Πήλιον κατασχόντας, οὔτε τοὺς Λαιστρυγόνας τοὺς Λεοντῖνον πεδίον

οἰκήσαντας, οὔτ’ ἄλλους οὐδ᾽ ὁποίους.

Compare Athenæ. iv. p. 166, 167; vi. p. 260, 261. Demosthen.

Olynth. ii. p. 23.

Polybius (viii. 11) censures Theopompus for self-contradiction,

in ascribing to Philip both unprincipled means and intemperate

habits, and yet extolling his ability and energy as a king. But

I see no contradiction between the two. The love of enjoyment

was not suffered to stand in the way of Philip’s military and

political schemes, either in himself or his officers. The

master-passion overpowered all appetites; but when that passion

did not require effort, intemperance was the habitual relaxation.

Polybius neither produces any sufficient facts, nor cites any

contemporary authority, to refute Theopompus.

It is to be observed that the statements of Theopompus,

respecting both the public and private conduct of Philip, are as

disparaging as anything in Demosthenes.

[1167] Satyrus ap. Athenæ. xiii. p. 557. Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἀεὶ κατὰ

πόλεμον ἐγάμει, etc.

In appreciating the genius of Philip, we have to appreciate also

the parties to whom he stood opposed. His good fortune was nowhere

more conspicuous than in the fact, that he fell upon those days of

disunion and backwardness in Greece (indicated in the last sentence

of Xenophon’s Hellenica) when there was neither leading city

prepared to keep watch, nor leading general to take command, nor

citizen-soldiers willing and ready to endure the hardships of steady

service. Philip combated no opponents like Epaminondas, or Agesilaus,

or Iphikrates. How different might have been his career, had

Epaminondas survived the victory of Mantineia, gained only two years

before Philip’s accession! To oppose Philip, there needed a man like

himself, competent not only to advise and project, but to command in

person, to stimulate the zeal of citizen-soldiers, and to set the

example of braving danger and fatigue. Unfortunately for Greece, no

such leader stood forward. In counsel and speech Demosthenes sufficed

for the emergency. Twice before the battle of Chæroneia—at Byzantium

and at Thebes—did he signally frustrate Philip’s combinations. But he

was not formed to take the lead in action, nor was there any one near

him to supply the defect. In the field, Philip encountered only that

“public inefficiency,” at Athens and elsewhere in Greece, of which

even Æschines complains;[1168] and to this decay of Grecian energy,

not less than to his own distinguished attributes, the unparalleled

success of his reign was owing. We shall find during the reign of

his son Alexander (to be described in our next volume) the like

genius and vigor exhibited on a still larger scale, and achieving

still more wonderful results; while the once stirring politics of

Greece, after one feeble effort, sink yet lower, into the nullity of

a subject-province.

[1168] Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 26. εἶτα τί θαυμάζομεν ~τὴν

κοινὴν~ ἀπραξίαν, τοιούτων ῥητόρων ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ δήμου γνώμας

ἐπιγραφομένων;

Æschines would ascribe this public inefficiency—which many

admitted and deplored, though few except Demosthenes persevered

in contending against it—to the fact that men of scandalous

private lives (like Timarchus) were permitted, against the law,

to move decrees in the public assembly. Compare Æschines, Fals.

Leg. p. 37.