of thirty-two Chalkidic Grecian cities besides, had spread abroad
everywhere the terror and majesty of Philip’s name. But he was
now exalted to a still higher pinnacle by the destruction of the
Phokians, the capture of Thermopylæ, and the sight of a permanent
Macedonian garrison, occupying from henceforward Nikæa and other
places commanding the pass.[922] He was extolled as restorer of the
Amphiktyonic assembly, and as avenging champion of the Delphian god,
against the sacrilegious Phokians. That he should have acquired
possession of an unassailable pass, dismissed the formidable
force of Phalækus, and become master of twenty-two Phokian cites,
all without striking a blow,—was accounted the most wonderful of
all his exploits. It strengthened more than ever the prestige of
his constant good fortune. Having been now, by the vote of the
Amphiktyons, invested with the right of Amphiktyonic suffrage
previously exercised by the Phokians, he acquired a new Hellenic
rank, with increased facilities for encroachment and predominance
in Hellenic affairs. Moreover, in the month of August 346 B. C.,
about two months after the surrender of Phokis to Philip, the season
recurring for celebrating the great Pythian festival, after the
usual interval of four years, the Amphiktyons conferred upon Philip
the signal honor of nominating him president to celebrate this
festival, in conjunction with the Thebans and Thessalians;[923] an
honorary preëminence, which ranked among the loftiest aspirations of
ambitious Grecian despots, and which Jason, of Pheræ, had prepared
to appropriate for himself twenty-four years before, at the moment
when he was assassinated.[924] It was in vain that the Athenians,
mortified and indignant at the unexpected prostration of their
hopes and the utter ruin of their allies, refused to send deputies
to the Amphiktyons,—affected even to disregard the assembly as
irregular,—and refrained from despatching their sacred legation as
usual, to sacrifice at the Pythian festival.[925] The Amphiktyonic
vote did not the less pass; without the concurrence, indeed, either
of Athens or of Sparta, yet with the hearty support not only of
Thebans and Thessalians, but also of Argeians, Messenians, Arcadians,
and all those who counted upon Philip as a probable auxiliary against
their dangerous Spartan neighbor.[926] And when envoys from Philip
and from the Thessalians arrived at Athens, notifying that he had
been invested with the Amphiktyonic suffrage, and inviting the
concurrence of Athens in his reception,—prudential considerations
obliged the Athenians, though against their feelings, to pass a
vote of concurrence. Even Demosthenes was afraid to break the
recent peace, however inglorious,—and to draw upon Athens a general
Amphiktyonic war, headed by the King of Macedon.[927]
[922] Demosth. ad Philipp. Epistolam, p. 153. Νικαίαν μὲν φρουρᾷ
κατέχων, etc.
[923] Diodor. xvi. 60. τιθέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Πυθίων
Φίλιππον μετὰ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θετταλῶν, διὰ τὸ ~Κορινθίους~
μετεσχηκέναι τοῖς Φωκεῦσι τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον παρανομίας.
The reason here assigned by Diodorus, why the Amphiktyons placed
the celebration of the Pythian festival in the hands of Philip,
cannot be understood. It may be true, as matter of fact, that the
Corinthians had allied themselves with the Phokians during the
Sacred War—though there is no other evidence of the fact except
this passage. But the Corinthians were never invested with any
authoritative character in reference to the _Pythian_ festival.
They were the recognized presidents of the _Isthmian_ festival. I
cannot but think that Diodorus has been misled by a confusion of
these two festivals one with the other.
[924] Xenoph. Hellen. vi.
[925] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 380-398. οὕτω δεινὰ καὶ σχέτλια
ἡγουμένων τοὺς ταλαιπώρους πάσχειν Φωκέας, ὥστε μήτε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς
βουλῆς θεωροὺς μήτε τοὺς θεσμοθέτας εἰς τὰ Πύθια πέμψαι, ἀλλ᾽
ἀποστῆναι τῆς πατρίου θεωρίας, etc. Demosth. De Pace, p. 60.
~τοὺς συνεληλυθότας τούτους καὶ φάσκοντας Ἀμφικτύονας εἶναι~, etc.
[926] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 68, 69.
[927] Demosth. De Pace, p. 60-63; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375.
In the latter passage, p. 375, Demosthenes accuses Æschines of
having been the only orator in the city who spoke in favor of the
proposition, there being a strong feeling in the assembly and in
the people against it. Demosthenes must have forgotten, or did
not wish to remember, his own harangue De Pace, delivered three
years before. In spite of the repugnance of the people, very
easy to understand, I conclude that the decree must have passed;
since, if it had been rejected, consequences must have arisen
which would have come to our knowledge.
Here then was a momentous political change doubly fatal to the
Hellenic world; first, in the new position of Philip both as master
of the keys of Greece and as recognized Amphiktyonic leader, with
means of direct access and influence even on the inmost cities of
Peloponnesus; next, in the lowered banner, and uncovered frontier, of
Athens, disgraced by the betrayal both of her Phokian allies and of
the general safety of Greece,—and recompensed only in so far as she
regained her captives.
How came the Athenians to sanction a peace at once dishonorable and
ruinous, yielding to Philip that important pass, the common rampart
of Attica and of Southern Greece, which he could never have carried
in war at the point of the sword? Doubtless, the explanation of
this proceeding is to be found, partly in the general state of the
Athenian mind; repugnance to military cost and effort,—sickness
and shame at their past war with Philip,—alarm from the prodigious
success of his arms,—and pressing anxiety to recover the captives
taken at Olynthus. But the feelings here noticed, powerful as they
were, would not have ended in such a peace, had they not been
seconded by the deliberate dishonesty of Æschines and a majority
of his colleagues; who deceived their countrymen with a tissue of
false assurances as to the purposes of Philip, and delayed their
proceedings on the second embassy in such a manner that he was
actually at Thermopylæ before the real danger of the pass was known
at Athens.
Making all just allowance for mistrust of Demosthenes as a witness,
there appears in the admissions of Æschines himself sufficient
evidence of corruption. His reply to Demosthenes, though successfully
meeting some collateral aggravations, seldom touches, and never
repels, the main articles of impeachment against himself. The
dilatory measures of the second embassy,—the postponement of
the oath-taking until Philip was within three days’ march of
Thermopylæ,—the keeping back of information about the danger of that
pass, until the Athenians were left without leisure for deliberating
on the conjuncture,—all these grave charges remain without denial
or justification. The refusal to depart at once on the second
embassy, and to go straight to Philip in Thrace for the protection
of Kersobleptes, is indeed explained, but in a manner which makes
the case rather worse than better. And the gravest matter of all—the
false assurances given to the Athenian public respecting Philip’s
purposes,—are plainly admitted by Æschines.[928]
[928] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37. Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀπαγγεῖλαι, ἀλλ᾽
ὑποσχέσθαι μέ φησίν.
Compare p. 43. c. 36. p. 46. c. 41. p. 52. c. 54—also p.
31-41—also the speech against Ktesiphon, p. 65. c. 30. ὡς τάχιστα
εἴσω Πυλῶν Φίλιππος παρῆλθε καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Φωκεῦσι πόλεις
~παραδόξως~ ἀναστάτους ἐποίησε, etc.
In regard to these public assurances given by Æschines about Philip’s
intentions, corrupt mendacity appears to me the only supposition
admissible. There is nothing, even in his own account, to explain
how he came to be beguiled into such flagrant misjudgment; while
the hypothesis of honest error is yet farther refuted by his own
subsequent conduct. “If (argues Demosthenes), Æschines had been
sincerely misled by Philip, so as to pledge his own veracity and
character to the truth of positive assurances given publicly before
his countrymen, respecting Philip’s designs,—then on finding that
the result belied him, and that he had fatally misled those whom he
undertook to guide, he would be smitten with compunction, and would
in particular abominate the name of Philip as one who had disgraced
him and made him an unconscious instrument of treachery. But the fact
has been totally otherwise; immediately after the peace, Æschines
visited Philip to share his triumph, and has been ever since his
avowed partisan and advocate.”[929] Such conduct is inconsistent
with the supposition of honest mistake, and goes to prove,—what the
proceedings of the second embassy all bear out,—that Æschines was
the hired agent of Philip for deliberately deceiving his countrymen
with gross falsehood. Even as reported by himself, the language of
Æschines betokens his ready surrender of Grecian freedom, and his
recognition of Philip as a master; for he gives not only his consent,
but his approbation, to the entry of Philip within Thermopylæ,[930]
only exhorting him, when he comes there, to act against Thebes and
in defence of the Bœotian cities. This, in an Athenian envoy, argues
a blindness little short of treason. The irreparable misfortune, both
for Athens and for free Greece generally, was to bring Philip within
Thermopylæ, with power sufficient to put down Thebes and reconstitute
Bœotia,—even if it could have been made sure that such would be the
first employment of his power. The same negotiator, who had begun
his mission by the preposterous flourish of calling upon Philip to
give up Amphipolis, ended by treacherously handing over to him a new
conquest which he could not otherwise have acquired. Thermopylæ,
betrayed once before by Ephialtes the Malian to Xerxes, was now
betrayed a second time by the Athenian envoys to an extra-Hellenic
power yet more formidable.
[929] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 373, 374. I translate the substance
of the argument, not the words.
[930] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. In rebutting the charge
against him of having betrayed the Phokians to Philip, Æschines
(Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47) dwells upon the circumstance, that none of
the Phokian exiles appeared to assist in the accusation, and that
some three or four Phokians and Bœotians (whom he calls by name)
were ready to appear as witnesses in his favor.
The reason, why none of them appeared against him, appears to
me sufficiently explained by Demosthenes. The Phokians were
in a state far too prostrate and terror-stricken to incur new
enmities, or to come forward as accusers of one of the Athenian
partisans of Philip, whose soldiers were in possession of their
country.
The reason why some of them appeared in his favor is also
explained by Æschines himself, when he states that he had pleaded
for them before the Amphiktyonic assembly, and had obtained
for them a mitigation of that extreme penalty which their most
violent enemies urged against them. To captives at the mercy of
their opponents, such an interference might well appear deserving
of gratitude; quite apart from the question, how far Æschines as
envoy, by his previous communications to the Athenian people, had
contributed to betray Thermopylæ and the Phokians to Philip.
The ruinous peace of 346 B. C. was thus brought upon Athens not
simply by mistaken impulses of her own, but also by the corruption of
Æschines and the major part of her envoys. Demosthenes had certainly
no hand in the result. He stood in decided opposition to the majority
of the envoys; a fact manifest as well from his own assurances, as
from the complaints vented against him, as a colleague insupportably
troublesome, by Æschines. Demosthenes affirms, too, that after
fruitless opposition to the policy of the majority, he tried to make
known their misconduct to his countrymen at home both by personal
return, and by letter; and that in both cases his attempts were
frustrated. Whether he did all that he could towards this object,
cannot be determined; but we find no proof of any short-coming. The
only point upon which Demosthenes appears open to censure, is, on
his omission to protest emphatically during the debates of the month
Elaphebolion at Athens, when the Phokians were first practically
excluded from the treaty. I discover no other fault established on
probable grounds against him, amidst the multifarious accusations,
chiefly personal and foreign to the main issue, preferred by his
opponent.
Respecting Philokrates—the actual mover, in the Athenian assembly, of
all the important resolutions tending to bring about this peace—we
learn that being impeached by Hyperides[931] not long afterwards,
he retired from Athens without standing trial, and was condemned
in his absence. Both he and Æschines (so Demosthenes asserts) had
received from Philip bribes and grants out of the spoils of Olynthus;
and Philokrates, especially, displayed his newly-acquired wealth
at Athens with impudent ostentation.[932] These are allegations in
themselves probable, though coming from a political rival. The peace,
having disappointed every one’s hopes, came speedily to be regarded
with shame and regret, of which Philokrates bore the brunt as its
chief author. Both Æschines and Demosthenes sought to cast upon each
other the imputation of confederacy with Philokrates.
[931] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 376.
[932] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375, 376, 377, 386
The pious feeling of Diodorus leads him to describe, with
peculiar seriousness, the divine judgments which fell on all
those concerned in despoiling the Delphian temple. Phalækus, with
his mercenaries out of Phokis, retired first into Peloponnesus;
from thence seeking to cross to Tarentum, he was forced back when
actually on shipboard by a mutiny of his soldiers, and passed
into Krete. Here he took service with the inhabitants of Knossus
against those of Lyktus. Over the latter he gained a victory,
and their city was only rescued from him by the unexpected
arrival of the Spartan king Archidamus. That prince, recently the
auxiliary of Phalækus in Phokis, was now on his way across the
sea towards Tarentum; near which city he was slain a few years
afterwards. Phalækus, repulsed from Lyktus, next laid siege to
Kydonia, and was bringing up engines to batter the walls, when
a storm of thunder and lightning arose, so violent, that his
engines “were burnt by the divine fire,”[933] and he himself with
several soldiers perished in trying to extinguish the flames.
His remaining army passed into Peloponnesus, where they embraced
the cause of some Eleian exiles against the government of Elis;
but were vanquished, compelled to surrender, and either sold
into slavery or put to death.[934] Even the wives of the Phokian
leaders, who had adorned themselves with some of the sacred
donatives out of the Delphian Temple, were visited with the like
extremity of suffering. And while the gods dealt thus rigorously
with the authors of the sacrilege, they exhibited favor no less
manifest towards their champion Philip, whom they exalted more
and more towards the pinnacle of honor and dominion.[935]
[933] Diodor. xvi. 63. ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου πυρὸς κατεφλέχθησαν, etc.
[934] Diodor. xvi. 61, 62, 63.
[935] Diodor. xvi. 64; Justin, viii. 2. “Dignum itaque qui a Diis
proximus habeatur, per quem Deorum majestas vindicata sit.”
Some of these mercenaries, however, who had been employed in
Phokis perished in Sicily in the service of Timoleon—as has been
already related.
CHAPTER XC.
FROM THE PEACE OF 346 B. C., TO THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEIA AND THE DEATH
OF PHILIP.
I have described in my last chapter the conclusion of the Sacred
War, and the reëstablishment of the Amphiktyonic assembly by Philip;
together with the dishonorable peace of 346 B. C., whereby Athens,
after a war, feeble in management and inglorious in result, was
betrayed by the treachery of her own envoys into the abandonment
of the pass of Thermopylæ;—a new sacrifice, not required by her
actual position, and more fatal to her future security than any
of the previous losses. This important pass, the key of Greece,
had now come into possession of Philip, who occupied it, together
with the Phokian territory, by a permanent garrison of his own
troops.[936] The Amphiktyonic assembly had become an instrument for
his exaltation. Both Thebans and Thessalians were devoted to his
interest; rejoicing in the ruin of their common enemies the Phokians,
without reflecting on the more formidable power now established on
their frontiers. Though the power of Thebes had been positively
increased by regaining Orchomenus and Koroneia, yet, comparatively
speaking, the new position of Philip brought upon her, as well as
upon Athens and the rest of Greece, a degradation and extraneous
mastery such as had never before been endured.[937]
[936] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 119.
[937] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62. νυνὶ δὲ Θηβαίοις πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὴν
χώραν κεκομίσθαι, κάλλιστα πέπρακται, πρὸς δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν,
αἴσχιστα, etc.
This new position of Philip, as champion of the Amphiktyonic
assembly, and within the line of common Grecian defence, was
profoundly felt by Demosthenes. A short time after the surrender of
Thermopylæ, when the Thessalian and Macedonian envoys had arrived
at Athens, announcing the recent determination of the Amphiktyons
to confer upon Philip the place in that assembly from whence the
Phokians had been just expelled, concurrence of Athens in this
vote was invited; but the Athenians, mortified and exasperated
at the recent turn of events, were hardly disposed to acquiesce.
Here we find Demosthenes taking the cautious side, and strongly
advising compliance. He insists upon the necessity of refraining
from any measure calculated to break the existing peace, however
deplorable may have been its conditions; and of giving no pretence
to the Amphiktyons for voting conjoint war against Athens, to be
executed by Philip.[938] These recommendations, prudent under the
circumstances, prove that Demosthenes, though dissatisfied with the
peace, was anxious to keep it now that it was made; and that if he
afterwards came to renew his exhortations to war, this was owing to
new encroachments and more menacing attitude on the part of Philip.
[938] Demosth. De Pace, p. 60, 61.
We have other evidences, besides the Demosthenic speech just cited,
to attest the effect of Philip’s new position on the Grecian mind.
Shortly after the peace, and before the breaking up of the Phokian
towns into villages had been fully carried into detail—Isokrates
published his letter addressed to Philip—the Oratio ad Philippum.
The purpose of this letter is, to invite Philip to reconcile the
four great cities of Greece—Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and Argos; to
put himself at the head of their united force, as well as of Greece
generally; and to invade Asia, for the purpose of overthrowing
the Persian empire, of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and of
providing new homes for the unsettled wanderers in Greece. The
remarkable point here is, that Isokrates puts the Hellenic world
under subordination and pupilage to Philip, renouncing all idea
of it as a self-sustaining and self-regulating system. He extols
Philip’s exploits, good fortune, and power, above all historical
parallels—treats him unequivocally as the chief of Greece—and only
exhorts him to make as good use of his power, as his ancestor
Herakles had made in early times.[939] He recommends him, by
impartial and conciliatory behavior towards all, to acquire for
himself the same devoted esteem among the Greeks as that which
now prevailed among his own Macedonian officers—or as that which
existed among the Lacedæmonians towards the Spartan kings.[940]
Great and melancholy indeed is the change which had come over the
old age of Isokrates, since he published the Panegyrical Oration
(380 B. C.—thirty-four years before) wherein he invokes a united
Pan-hellenic expedition against Asia, under the joint guidance of the
two Hellenic chiefs by land and sea—Sparta and Athens; and wherein he
indignantly denounces Sparta for having, at the peace of Antalkidas,
introduced for her own purposes a Persian rescript to impose laws on
the Grecian world. The prostration of Grecian dignity, serious as it
was, involved in the peace of Antalkidas, was far less disgraceful
than that recommended by Isokrates towards Philip—himself indeed
personally of Hellenic parentage, but a Macedonian or barbarian (as
Demosthenes[941] terms him) by power and position. As Æschines,
when employed in embassy from Athens to Philip, thought that his
principal duty consisted in trying to persuade him by eloquence
to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and put down Thebes—so Isokrates
relies upon his skilful pen to dispose the new chief to a good use
of imperial power—to make him protector of Greece, and conquerer of
Asia. If copious and elegant flattery could work such a miracle,
Isokrates might hope for success. But it is painful to note the
increasing subservience, on the part of estimable Athenian freemen
like Isokrates, to a foreign potentate; and the declining sentiment
of Hellenic independence and dignity, conspicuous after the peace of
346 B. C. in reference to Philip.
[939] Isokrates. Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 128-135.
[940] Isokrat. Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 91. ὅταν οὕτω διαθῆς τοὺς
Ἕλληνας, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς Λακεδαιμονίους τε πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν βασιλέας
ἔχοντας, τοὺς δ᾽ ἑταίρους τοὺς σοὺς πρὸς σὲ διακειμένους. Ἔστι δ᾽
οὐ χαλεπὸν τυχεῖν τούτων, ἢν ἐθελήσῃς κοινὸς ἅπασι γενέσθαι, etc.
[941] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 118.
From Isokrates as well as from Demosthenes, we thus obtain evidence
of the imposing and intimidating effect of Philip’s name in
Greece after the peace of 346 B. C. Ochus, the Persian king, was
at this time embarrassed by unsubdued revolt among his subjects;
which Isokrates urges as one motive for Philip to attack him. Not
only Egypt, but also Phenicia and Cyprus, were in revolt against
the Persian king. One expedition (if not two) on a large scale,
undertaken by him for the purpose of reconquering Egypt, had been
disgracefully repulsed, in consequence of the ability of the
generals (Diophantus an Athenian and Lamius a Spartan) who commanded
the Grecian mercenaries in the service of the Egyptian prince
Nektanebus.[942] About the time of the peace of 346 B. C. in Greece,
however, Ochus appears to have renewed with better success his
attack on Cyprus, Phenicia, and Egypt. To reconquer Cyprus, he put
in requisition the force of the Karian prince Idrieus (brother and
successor of Mausolus and Artemisia), at this time not only the most
powerful prince in Asia Minor, but also master of the Grecian islands
Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, probably by means of an internal oligarchy
in each, who ruled in his interest and through his soldiers.[943]
Idrieus sent to Cyprus a force of forty triremes and eight thousand
mercenary troops, under the command of the Athenian Phokion and of
Evagoras, an exiled member of the dynasty reigning at Salamis in the
island. After a long siege of Salamis itself, which was held against
the Persian king by Protagoras, probably another member of the same
dynasty—and after extensive operations throughout the rest of this
rich island, affording copious plunder to the soldiers, so as to
attract numerous volunteers from the mainland—all Cyprus was again
brought under the Persian authority.[944]
[942] Isokrates, Or. v. Philipp. s. 118; Diodor. xv. 40, 44, 48.
Diodorus alludes three several times to this repulse of Ochus
from Egypt. Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libert. p. 193.
Trogus mentioned three different expeditions of Ochus against
Egypt (Argument. ad Justin. lib. x).
[943] Isokrates, Or. v. Philipp. s. 102. Ἰδριέα γε τὸν
εὐπορώτατον ~τῶν νῦν~ περὶ τὴν ἤπειρον, etc.
Demosth. De Pace, p. 63. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐῶμεν—καὶ τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς ~νήσους~
καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, etc. An oration delivered
in the latter half of 346 B. C. after the peace.
Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libertat. p. 121, an oration four years
earlier.
[944] Diodor. xvi. 42-46. In the Inscription No. 87. of Boeckh’s
Corpus Inscriptt., we find a decree passed by the Athenians
recognizing friendship and hospitality with the Sidonian prince
Strato—from whom they seem to have received a donation of ten
talents. The note of date in this decree is not preserved; but M.
Boeckh conceives it to date between Olympiad 101-104.
The Phenicians had revolted from Ochus at the same time as the
Cypriots, and in concert with Nektanebus prince of Egypt, from whom
they received a reinforcement of four thousand Greek mercenaries
under Mentor the Rhodian. Of the three great Phenician cities,
Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus—each a separate political community, but
administering their common affairs at a joint town called Tripolis,
composed of three separate walled circuits, a furlong apart from each
other—Sidon was at once the oldest, the richest, and the greatest
sufferer from Persian oppression. Hence the Sidonian population,
with their prince Tennes, stood foremost in the revolt against
Ochus, employing their great wealth in hiring soldiers, preparing
arms, and accumulating every means of defence. In the first outbreak
they expelled the Persian garrison, seized and punished some of
the principal officers, and destroyed the adjoining palace and
park reserved for the satrap or king. Having farther defeated the
neighboring satraps of Kilikia and Syria, they strengthened the
defences of the city by triple ditches, heightened walls, and a
fleet of one hundred triremes and quinqueremes. Incensed at these
proceedings, Ochus marched with an immense force from Babylon.
But his means of corruption served him better than his arms. The
Sidonian prince Tennes, in combination with Mentor, entered into
private bargain with him, betrayed to him first one hundred of the
principal citizens, and next placed the Persian army in possession of
the city-walls. Ochus, having slain the hundred citizens surrendered
to him, together with five hundred more who came to him with boughs
of supplication, intimated his purpose of taking signal revenge on
the Sidonians generally; who took the desperate resolution, first
of burning their fleet that no one might escape—next, of shutting
themselves up with their families, and setting fire each man to his
own house. In this deplorable conflagration forty thousand persons
are said to have perished; and such was the wealth destroyed, that
the privilege of searching the ruins was purchased for a large sum of
money. Instead of rewarding the traitor Tennes, Ochus concluded the
tragedy by putting him to death.[945]
[945] Diodor. xvi. 42, 43, 45. “Occisis optimatibus Sidona cepit
Ochus” (Trogus, Argum. ad Justin. lib x).
Flushed with this unexpected success, Ochus marched with an immense
force against Egypt. He had in his army ten thousand Greeks; six
thousand by requisition from the Greek cities in Asia Minor; three
thousand by request from Argos; and one thousand from Thebes.[946] To
Athens and Sparta, he had sent a like request, but had received from
both a courteous refusal. His army, Greek and Asiatic, the largest
which Persia had sent forth for many years, was distributed into
three divisions, each commanded by one Greek and one Persian general;
one of the three divisions was confided to Mentor and the eunuch
Bagoas, the two ablest servants of the Persian king. The Egyptian
prince Nektanebus, having been long aware of the impending attack,
had also assembled a numerous force: no less than twenty thousand
mercenary Greeks, with a far larger body of Egyptians and Libyans.
He had also taken special care to put the eastern branch of the
Nile, with the fortress of Pelusium at its mouth, in a full state of
defence. But these ample means of defence were rendered unavailing,
partly by his own unskilfulness and incompetence, partly by the
ability and cunning of Mentor and Bagoas. Nektanebus was obliged
to retire into Ethiopia; all Egypt fell, with little resistance,
into the hands of the Persians; the fortified places capitulated—the
temples were pillaged, with an immense booty to the victors—and
even the sacred archives of the temples were carried off, to be
afterwards resold to the priests for an additional sum of money. The
wealthy territory of Egypt again became a Persian province, under the
satrap Pherendates; while Ochus returned to Babylon, with a large
increase both of dominion and of reputation. The Greek mercenaries
were dismissed to return home, with an ample harvest both of pay
and plunder.[947] They constituted in fact the principal element of
force on both sides; some Greeks enabled the Persian king to subdue
revolters,[948] while others lent their strength to the revolters
against him.
[946] Diodor. xvi. 47; Isokrates, Or. xii. Panathenaic. s. 171.
[947] Diodor. xvi. 47-51. Ley, Fata et Conditio, Ægypti sub Regno
Persarum, p. 25, 26.
[948] Isokrates, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 149. καὶ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους
τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς βασιλέως συγκαταστρεφόμεθα, etc.
By this reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, Ochus relieved himself
from that contempt into which he had fallen through the failure of
his former expedition,[949] and even exalted the Persian empire in
force and credit to a point nearly as high as it had ever occupied
before. The Rhodian Mentor, and the Persian Bagoas, both of whom had
distinguished themselves in the Egyptian campaign, became from this
time among his most effective officers. Bagoas accompanied Ochus
into the interior provinces, retaining his full confidence; while
Mentor, rewarded with a sum of 100 talents, and loaded with Egyptian
plunder, was invested with the satrapy of the Asiatic seaboard.[950]
He here got together a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, with
whom he rendered signal service to the Persian king. Though the whole
coast was understood to belong to the Persian empire, yet there were
many separate strong towns and positions, held by chiefs who had
their own military force; neither paying tribute nor obeying orders.
Among these chiefs, one of the most conspicuous was Hermeias, who
resided in the stronghold of Atarneus (on the mainland opposite
to Lesbos), but had in pay many troops and kept garrisons in many
neighboring places. Though partially disabled by accidental injury in
childhood,[951] Hermeias was a man of singular energy and ability,
and had conquered for himself this dominion. But what has contributed
most to his celebrity, is, that he was the attached friend and
admirer of Aristotle; who passed three years with him at Atarneus,
after the death of Plato in 348-347 B. C.—and who has commemorated
his merits in a noble ode. By treachery and false promises, Mentor
seduced Hermeias into an interview, seized his person, and employed
his signet-ring to send counterfeit orders whereby he became master
of Atarneus and all the remaining places held by Hermeias. Thus,
by successful perfidy, Mentor reduced the most vigorous of the
independent chiefs on the Asiatic coast; after which, by successive
conquests of the same kind, he at length brought the whole coast
effectively under Persian dominion.[952]
[949] Isokrates, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 117, 121, 160. Diodorus
places the successful expeditions of Ochus against Phenicia and
Egypt during the three years between 351-348 B. C. (Diodor. xvi.
40-52). In my judgment, they were not executed until after the
conclusion of the peace between Philip and Athens in March 346
B. C.; they were probably brought to a close in the two summers
of 346-345 B. C. The Discourse or Letter of Isokrates to Philip
appears better evidence on this point of chronology, than the
assertion of Diodorus. The Discourse of Isokrates was published
shortly after the peace of March 346 B. C., and addressed to a
prince perfectly well informed of all the public events of his
time. One of the main arguments used by Isokrates to induce
Philip to attack the Persian empire, is the weakness of Ochus
in consequence of Egypt and Phenicia being still in revolt and
unsubdued—and the contempt into which Ochus had fallen from
having tried to reconquer Egypt and having been ignominiously
repulsed—ἀπῆλθεν ἐκεῖθεν (Ochus) οὐ μόνον ἡττηθεὶς ἀλλὰ καὶ
καταγελασθεὶς, καὶ δόξας οὔτε βασιλεύειν οὔτε στρατηγεῖν ἄξιος
εἶναι (s. 188) ... οὕτω σφόδρα μεμισημένος καὶ καταπεφρονημένος
ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν βασιλευσάντων (s. 160).
The reconquest of Egypt by Ochus, with an immense army and a
large number of Greeks engaged on both sides, must have been one
of the most impressive events of the age. Diodorus may perhaps
have confounded the date of the _first_ expedition, wherein Ochus
failed, with that of the _second_, wherein he succeeded.
[950] Diodor. xvi. 50-52.
[951] Strabo, xvi. p. 610. Suidas v. Aristotelis—θλιβίας ἐκ
παιδός.
[952] Diodorus places the appointment of Mentor to the satrapy of
the Asiatic coast, and his seizure of Hermeias, in Olymp. 107,
4 (349-348 B. C.), immediately after the successful invasion of
Egypt.
But this date cannot be correct, since Aristotle visited Hermeias
at Atarneus after the death of Plato, and passed three years
with him—from the archonship of Theophilus (348-347 B. C. Olymp.
108, 1), in which year Plato died—to the archonship of Eubulus
(345-344 B. C. Olymp. 108, 4) (Vita Aristotelis ap. Dionys.
Hal. Epist. ad Ammæum, c. 5; Scriptt. Biographici, p. 397, ed.
Westermann); Diogen. Laert. v. 7.
Here is another reason confirming the remark made in my former
note, that Diodorus has placed the conquest of Egypt by Ochus
three or four years too early; since the appointment of Mentor
to the satrapy of the Asiatic coast follows naturally and
immediately after the distinguished part which he had taken in
the conquest of Egypt.
The seizure of Hermeias by Mentor must probably have taken place
about 343 B. C. The stay of Aristotle with Hermeias will probably
have occupied the three years between 347 and 344 B. C.
Respecting the chronology of these events, Mr. Clinton follows
Diodorus; Böhnecke dissents from him—rightly, in my judgment
(Forschungen, p. 460-734, note). Böhnecke seems to think that
the person mentioned in Demosth. Philipp. iv. (p. 139, 140) as
having been seized and carried up prisoner to the king of Persia,
accused of plotting with Philip measures of hostility against the
latter—is Hermeias. This is not in itself improbable, but the
authority of the commentator Ulpian seems hardly sufficient to
warrant us in positively asserting the identity.
It is remarkable that Diodorus makes no mention of the peace of
346 B. C. between Philip and the Athenians.
The peace between Philip and the Athenians lasted without any formal
renunciation on either side for more than six years; from March
346 B. C. to beyond Midsummer 340 B. C. But though never formally
renounced during that interval, it became gradually more and more
violated in practice by both parties. To furnish a consecutive
history of the events of these few years, is beyond our power. We
have nothing to guide us but a few orations of Demosthenes;[953]
which, while conveying a lively idea of the feeling of the time,
touch, by way of allusion, and as materials for reasoning, upon some
few facts; yet hardly enabling us to string together those facts into
an historical series. A brief sketch of the general tendencies of
this period is all that we can venture upon.
[953]
Delivered in
Demosthenes, Philippic ii. B. C. 344-343
—— De Halonneso, not genuine B. C. 343-342
—— De Falsâ Legatione _ib._
Æschines, De Falsâ Legatione _ib._
Demosthenes, De Chersoneso B. C. 342-341
—— Philipp. iii. _ib._
—— Philipp. iv. B. C. 341-340
—— ad Philipp. Epist. B. C. 340-339
Philip was the great aggressor of the age. The movement everywhere,
in or near Greece, began with him, and with those parties in the
various cities, who acted on his instigation and looked up to him for
support. We hear of his direct intervention, or of the effects of
his exciting suggestions, everywhere; in Peloponnesus, at Ambrakia
and Leukas, in Eubœa, and in Thrace. The inhabitants of Megalopolis,
Messênê, and Argos, were soliciting his presence in Peloponnesus, and
his active coöperation against Sparta. Philip intimated a purpose
of going there himself, and sent in the mean time soldiers and
money, with a formal injunction to Sparta that she must renounce all
pretension to Messênê.[954] He established a footing in Elis,[955]
by furnishing troops to an oligarchical faction, and enabling them
to become masters of the government, after a violent revolution.
Connected probably with this intervention in Elis, was his capture
of the three Eleian colonies, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elateia, on
the coast of the Epirotic Kassopia, near the Gulf of Ambrakia. He
made over these three towns to his brother-in-law Alexander, whom
he exalted to be prince of the Epirotic Molossians[956]—deposing
the reigning prince Arrhybas. He farther attacked the two principal
Grecian cities in that region, Ambrakia and Leukas; but here he
appears to have failed.[957] Detachments of his troops showed
themselves near Megara and Eretria, to the aid of philippizing
parties in these cities and to the serious alarm of the Athenians.
Philip established more firmly his dominion over Thessaly,
distributing the country into four divisions, and planting a garrison
in Pheræ, the city most disaffected to him.[958] We also read,
that he again overran and subdued the Illyrian, Dardanian, and
Pæonian tribes on his northern and western boundary; capturing many
of their towns, and bringing back much spoil; and that he defeated
the Thracian prince Kersobleptes, to the great satisfaction of the
Greek cities on and near the Hellespont.[959] He is said farther
to have redistributed the population of Macedonia, transferring
inhabitants from one town to another according as he desired to favor
or discourage residence—to the great misery and suffering of the
families so removed.[960]
[954] Demosth. De Pace, p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 69.
[955] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 424; Pausan. iv. 28, 3.
[956] Justin, viii. 6. Diodorus states that Alexander did not
become prince until after the death of Arrhybas (xvi. 72).
[957] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p.
424-435; Philippic iii. p. 117-120; Philippic iv. p. 133.
As these enterprises of Philip against Ambrakia and Leukas are
not noticed in the second Philippic, but only in orations of
later date, we may perhaps presume that they did not take place
till after Olymp. 109, 1 = B. C. 344-343. But this is not a very
certain inference.
[958] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 424, 436; Philipp. iii. 117,
118. iv. p. 133; De Coronâ, p. 324; Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso,
p. 84.
Compare Harpokration v. Δεκαδαρχία.
[959] Diodor. xvi. 69, 71.
[960] Justin, viii. 5, 6. “Reversus in regnum, ut pecora pastores
nunc in hybernos, nunc in æstivos saltus trajiciunt—sic ille
populos et urbes, ut illi vel replenda vel derelinquenda quæquæ
loca videbantur, ad libidinem suam transfert. Miseranda ubique
facies et similis excidio erat,” etc. Compare Livy, xl. 3, where
similar proceedings of Philip son of Demetrius (B. C. 182) are
described.
Such was the exuberant activity of Philip, felt everywhere from the
coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian sea and the Corinthian
Gulf. Every year his power increased; while the cities of the Grecian
world remained passive, uncombined, and without recognizing any
one of their own number as leader. The philippizing factions were
everywhere rising in arms or conspiring to seize the governments for
their own account under Philip’s auspices; while those who clung
to free and popular Hellenism were discouraged and thrown on the
defensive.[961]
[961] See a striking passage in the fourth Philippic of
Demosthenes, p. 132.
It was Philip’s policy to avoid or postpone any breach of peace with
Athens; the only power under whom Grecian combination against him was
practicable. But a politician like Demosthenes foresaw clearly enough
the coming absorption of the Grecian world, Athens included, into the
dominion of Macedonia, unless some means could be found of reviving
among its members a spirit of vigorous and united defence. In or
before the year 344 B. C., we find this orator again coming forward
in the Athenian assembly, persuading his countrymen to send a mission
into Peloponnesus, and going himself among the envoys.[962] He
addressed both to the Messenians and Argeians emphatic remonstrances
on their devotion to Philip; reminding them that from excessive fear
and antipathy towards Sparta, they were betraying to him their own
freedom, as well as that of all their Hellenic brethren.[963] Though
heard with approbation, he does not flatter himself with having
worked any practical change in their views.[964] But it appears
that envoys reached Athens (in 344-343 B. C.), to whom some answer
was required, and it is in suggesting that answer that Demosthenes
delivers his second Philippic. He denounces Philip anew, as an
aggressor stretching his power on every side, violating the peace
with Athens, and preparing ruin for the Grecian world.[965] Without
advising immediate war, he calls on the Athenians to keep watch and
ward, and to organize defensive alliance among the Greeks generally.
[962] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.
[963] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 71, 72. Demosthenes himself
reports to the Athenian assembly (in 344-343 B. C.) what he had
said to the Messenians and Argeians.
[964] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 72.
[965] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 66-72. Who these envoys were, or
from whence they came, does not appear from the oration. Libanius
in his Argument says that they had come jointly from Philip, from
the Argeians, and from the Messenians. Dionysius Hal. (ad Ammæum,
p. 737) states that they came out of Peloponnesus.
I cannot bring myself to believe, on the authority of Libanius,
that there were any envoys present from Philip. The tenor of the
discourse appears to contradict that supposition.
The activity of Athens, unfortunately, was shown in nothing but
words; to set off against the vigorous deeds of Philip. But they
were words of Demosthenes, the force of which was felt by Philip’s
partisans in Greece, and occasioned such annoyance to Philip
himself that he sent to Athens more than once envoys and letters of
remonstrance. His envoy, an eloquent Byzantine named Python,[966]
addressed the Athenian assembly with much success, complaining of
the calumnies of the orators against Philip—asserting emphatically
that Philip was animated with the best sentiments towards Athens,
and desired only to have an opportunity of rendering service to
her—and offering to review and amend the terms of the late peace.
Such general assurances of friendship, given with eloquence and
emphasis, produced considerable effect in the Athenian assembly, as
they had done from the mouth of Æschines during the discussions on
the peace. The proposal of Python was taken up by the Athenians, and
two amendments were proposed. 1. Instead of the existing words of the
peace—“that each party should have what they actually had”—it was
moved to substitute this phrase—“That each party should have their
own.”[967] 2. That not merely the allies of Athens and of Philip,
but also all the other Greeks, should be included in the peace; That
all of them should remain free and autonomous; That if any of them
were attacked, the parties to the treaty on both sides would lend
them armed assistance forthwith. 3. That Philip should be required to
make restitution of those places, Doriskus, Serreium, etc., which he
had captured from Kersobleptes after the day when peace was sworn at
Athens.
[966] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 82. Winiewski (Comment
Histor. in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 140) thinks that the embassy
of Python to Athens is the very embassy to which the second
Philippic of Demosthenes provides or introduces a reply. I agree
with Böhnecke in regarding this supposition as improbable.
[967] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. Περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰρήνης,
ἢν ~ἔδοσαν ἡμῖν οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου πεμφθέντες
ἐπανορθώσασθαι, ὅτι ἐπηνωρθωσάμεθα~, ὃ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις
ὁμολογεῖται δίκαιον εἶναι, ~ἑκατέρους ἔχειν τὰ ἑαυτῶν~,
ἀμφισβητεῖ (Philip) μὴ δεδωκέναι, μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταῦτ᾽
εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, etc.
Compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 398.
The first amendment appears to have been moved by a citizen named
Hegesippus, a strenuous anti-philippizing politician, supporting
the same views as Demosthenes. Python, with the other envoys of
Philip, present in the assembly, either accepted these amendments,
or at least did not protest against them. He partook of the
public hospitality of the city as upon an understanding mutually
settled.[968] Hegesippus with other Athenians was sent to Macedonia
to procure the ratification of Philip; who admitted the justice of
the second amendment, offered arbitration respecting the third, but
refused to ratify the first—disavowing both the general proposition,
and the subsequent acceptance of his envoys at Athens.[969] Moreover
he displayed great harshness in the reception of Hegesippus and his
colleagues; banishing from Macedonia the Athenian poet Xenokleides,
for having shown hospitality towards them.[970] The original treaty,
therefore, remained unaltered.
[968] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. See Ulpian ad Demosth.
Fals. Leg. p. 364.
[969] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 84, 85. ἀμφισβητεῖ μὴ
δεδωκέναι (Philip contends that he never tendered the terms of
peace for amendment) μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταῦτ᾽ εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς
... Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα (the second amendment) ὁμολογῶν ἐν τῇ
ἐπιστολῇ, ὡς ἀκούετε, δίκαιόν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, etc.
[970] Hegesippus was much denounced by the philippizing orators
at Athens (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 364). His embassy to Philip
has been treated by some authors as enforcing a “grossly
sophistical construction of an article in the peace,” which
Philip justly resented. But in my judgment it was no construction
of the original treaty, nor was there any sophistry on the part
of Athens. It was an amended clause, presented by the Athenians
in place of the original. They never affirmed that the amended
clause meant the same thing as the clause prior to amendment. On
the contrary, they imply that the meaning is _not_ the same—and
it is on that ground that they submit the amended form of words.
Hegesippus and his colleagues had gone to Macedonia, not simply to
present for Philip’s acceptance the two amendments just indicated,
but also to demand from him the restoration of the little island
of Halonnesus (near Skiathos), which he had taken since the peace.
Philip denied that the island belonged to the Athenians, or that they
had any right to make such a demand; affirming that he had taken it,
not from them, but from a pirate named Sostratus, who was endangering
the navigation of the neighboring sea—and that it now belonged
to him. If the Athenians disputed this, he offered to submit the
question to arbitration; to _restore_ the island to Athens, should
the arbitrators decide against him—or to _give_ it to her, even
should they decide in his favor.[971]
[971] Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 77, and the
Epistola Philippi, p. 162. The former says, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς τοιούτους λόγους, ~ὅτε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπρεσβεύσαμεν~, ὡς λῃστὰς
ἀφελόμενος ταύτην τὴν νῆσον κτήσαιτο, καὶ προσήκειν αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ
εἶναι.
Philip’s letter agrees as to the main facts.
Since we know that Philip treated Hegesippus and the other envoys
with peculiar harshness, it is probable that the diplomatic argument
between them, about Halonnesus as well as about other matters, was
conducted with angry feeling on both sides. Hence an island, in
itself small and insignificant, became the subject of prolonged
altercation for two or three years. When Hegesippus and Demosthenes
maintained that Philip had wronged the Athenians about Halonnesus,
and that it could only be received from him in restitution of
rightful Athenian ownership, not as a gift _proprio motu_—Æschines
and others treated the question with derision, as a controversy about
syllables.[972] “Philip (they said) offers to give us Halonnesus. Let
us take it, and set the question at rest. What need to care whether
he _gives it_ to us, or _gives it back_ to us?” The comic writers
made various jests on the same verbal distinction, as though it
were a mere silly subtlety. But though party-orators and wits might
here find a point to turn or a sarcasm to place, it is certain that
well-conducted diplomacy, modern as well as ancient, has been always
careful to note the distinction as important. The question here had
no reference to capture during war, but during peace. No modern
diplomatist will accept restitution of what has been unlawfully
taken, if he is called upon to recognize it as gratuitous cession
from the captor. The plea of Philip—that he had taken the island, not
from Athens, but from the pirate Sostratus—was not a valid excuse,
assuming that the island really belonged to Athens. If Sostratus had
committed piratical damage, Philip ought to have applied to Athens
for redress, which he evidently did not do. It was only in case of
redress being refused, that he could be entitled to right himself by
force; and even then, it may be doubted whether his taking of the
island could give him any right to it against Athens. The Athenians
refused his proposition of arbitration; partly because they were
satisfied of their own right to the island—partly because they were
jealous of admitting Philip to any recognized right of interference
with their insular ascendency.[973]
[972] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 65. c. 30. περὶ συλλαβῶν
διαφερόμενος, etc.
[973] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 78-80.
Halonnesus remained under garrison by Philip, forming one among many
topics of angry communication by letters and by envoys, between
him and Athens—until at length (seemingly about 341 B. C.) the
inhabitants of the neighboring island of Peparêthus retook it and
carried off his garrison. Upon this proceeding, Philip addressed
several remonstrances, both to the Peparethians and to the Athenians.
Obtaining no redress, he attacked Peparêthus and took severe revenge
upon the inhabitants. The Athenians then ordered their admiral to
make reprisals upon him, so that the war, though not yet actually
declared, was approaching nearer and nearer towards renewal.[974]
[974] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 162. The oration of
Pseudo-Demosthenes De Halonneso is a discourse addressed to the
people on one of these epistolary communications of Philip,
brought by some envoys who had also addressed the people _vivâ
voce_. The letter of Philip adverted to several other topics
besides, but that of Halonnesus came first.
But it was not only in Halonnesus that Athens found herself beset by
Philip and the philippizing factions. Even her own frontier on the
side towards Bœotia now required constant watching, since the Thebans
had been relieved from their Phokian enemies; so that she was obliged
to keep garrisons of hoplites at Drymus and Panaktum.[975] In Megara
an insurgent party under Perilaus had laid plans for seizing the city
through the aid of a body of Philip’s troops, which could easily be
sent from the Macedonian army now occupying Phokis, by sea to Pegæ,
the Megarian post on the Krissæan Gulf. Apprized of this conspiracy,
the Megarian government solicited aid from Athens. Phokion,
conducting the Athenian hoplites to Megara with the utmost celerity,
assured the safety of the city, and at the same time reëstablished
the Long Walls to Nisæa, so as to render it always accessible to
Athenians by sea.[976] In Eubœa, the cities of Oreus and Eretria
fell into the hands of the philippizing leaders, and became hostile
to Athens. In Oreus, the greater part of the citizens were persuaded
to second the views of Philip’s chief adherent, Philistides; who
prevailed on them to silence the remonstrances, and imprison the
person, of the opposing leader Euphræus, as a disturber of the
public peace. Philistides then, watching his opportunity, procured
the introduction of a body of Macedonian troops, by means of whom
he assured to himself the rule of the city as Philip’s instrument;
while Euphræus, agonized with grief and alarm, slew himself in
prison. At Eretria, Kleitarchus with others carried on the like
conspiracy. Having expelled their principal opponents, and refused
admission to Athenian envoys, they procured a thousand Macedonian
troops under Hipponikus; they thus mastered Eretria itself, and
destroyed the fortified seaport called Porthmus, in order to break
the easy communication with Athens. Oreus and Eretria are represented
by Demosthenes as suffering miserable oppression under these two
despots, Philistides and Kleitarchus.[977] On the other hand,
Chalkis, the chief city in Eubœa, appears to have been still free,
and leaning to Athens rather than to Philip, under the predominant
influence of a leading citizen named Kallias.
[975] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 446. I take these words to denote,
not any one particular outmarch to these places, but a standing
guard kept there, since the exposure of the northern frontier of
Attica after the peace. For the great importance of Panaktum, as
a frontier position between Athens and Thebes, see Thucydides, v.
35, 36, 39.
[976] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 435, 446, 448; Philippic iv. p.
133; De Coronâ, p. 324; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.
[977] The general state of things, as here given, at Oreus and
Eretria, existed at the time when Demosthenes delivered his two
orations—the third Philippic and the oration on the Chersonese;
in the late spring and summer of 341 B. C.—De Chersoneso, p. 98,
99, 104; Philipp. iii. p. 112, 115, 125, 126.
... δουλεύουσί γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ στρεβλούμενοι (the people of
Eretria under Kleitarchus, p. 128).
At this time, it appears, Philip was personally occupied with
operations in Thrace; where he passed at least eleven months and
probably more,[978] leaving the management of affairs in Eubœa to his
commanders in Phokis and Thessaly. He was now seemingly preparing
his schemes for mastering the important outlets from the Euxine into
the Ægean—the Bosphorus and Hellespont—and the Greek cities on those
coasts. Upon these straits depended the main supply of imported corn
for Athens and a large part of the Grecian world; and hence the great
value of the Athenian possession of the Chersonese.
[978] Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 99.
Respecting this peninsula, angry disputes now arose. To protect
her settlers there established, Athens had sent Diopeithes with a
body of mercenaries—unprovided with pay, however, and left to levy
contributions where they could; while Philip had taken under his
protection and garrisoned Kardia—a city situated within the peninsula
near its isthmus, but ill-disposed to Athens, asserting independence,
and admitted at the peace of 346 B. C., by Æschines and the Athenian
envoys, as an ally of Philip to take part in the peace-oaths.[979]
In conjunction with the Kardians, Philip had appropriated and
distributed lands which the Athenian settlers affirmed to be theirs;
and when they complained, he insisted that they should deal with
Kardia as an independent city, by reference to arbitration.[980] This
they refused, though their envoy Æschines had recognized Kardia as an
independent ally of Philip when the peace was sworn.
[979] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p 677. De Fals. Leg. p. 396; De
Chersoneso, p. 104, 105.
[980] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87.
Here was a state of conflicting pretensions, out of which hostilities
were sure to grow. The Macedonian troops overran the Chersonese,
while Diopeithes on his side made excursions out of the peninsula,
invading portions of Thrace subject to Philip; who sent letters of
remonstrance to Athens.[981] While thus complaining at Athens, Philip
was at the same time pushing his conquests in Thrace against the
Thracian princes Kersobleptes, Teres, and Sitalkes,[982] upon whom
the honorary grant of Athenian citizenship had been conferred.
[981] Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 93; Pseudo-Demosth. De
Halonneso, p. 87; Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 161.
[982] Epistol. Philipp. _l. c._
The complaints of Philip, and the speeches of his partisans at
Athens, raised a strong feeling against Diopeithes at Athens, so that
the people seemed disposed to recall and punish him. It is against
this step that Demosthenes protests in his speech on the Chersonese.
Both that speech, and his third Philippic were delivered in 341-340
B. C.; seemingly in the last half of 341 B. C. In both, he resumes
that energetic and uncompromising tone of hostility towards Philip,
which had characterized the first Philippic and the Olynthiacs.
He calls upon his countrymen not only to sustain Diopeithes, but
also to renew the war vigorously against Philip in every other way.
Philip (he says), while pretending in words to keep the peace, had
long ago broken it by his acts, and by aggressions in numberless
quarters. If Athens chose to imitate him by keeping the peace in
name, let her do so; but at any rate, let her imitate him also by
prosecuting a strenuous war in reality.[983] Chersonesus, the ancient
possession of Athens, could be protected only by encouraging and
reinforcing Diopeithes; Byzantium also was sure to become the next
object of Philip’s attack, and ought to be preserved, as essential
to the interests of Athens, though hitherto the Byzantines had been
disaffected towards her. But even these interests, important as
they were, must be viewed only as parts of a still more important
whole. The Hellenic world altogether was in imminent danger;[984]
overridden by Philip’s prodigious military force; torn in pieces
by local factions leaning upon his support; and sinking every day
into degradation more irrecoverable. There was no hope of rescue
for the Hellenic name except from the energetic and well-directed
military action of Athens. She must stand forth in all her might
and resolution; her citizens must serve in person, pay direct taxes
readily, and forego for the time their festival-fund; when they had
thus shown themselves ready to bear the real pinch and hardship of
the contest, then let them send round envoys to invoke the aid of
other Greeks against the common enemy.[985]
[983] Philippic iii. p. 112.
[984] Philippic iii. p. 118, 119.
[985] Philippic iii. p. 129, 130.
Such, in its general tone, is the striking harangue known as the
third Philippic. It appears that the Athenians were now coming round
more into harmony with Demosthenes than they had ever been before.
They perceived,—what the orator had long ago pointed out,—that
Philip went on pushing from one acquisition to another, and became
only the more dangerous in proportion as others were quiescent. They
were really alarmed for the safety of the two important positions
of the Hellespont and Bosphorus. From this time to the battle of
Chæroneia, the positive influence of Demosthenes in determining
the proceedings of his countrymen, becomes very considerable. He
had already been employed several times as envoy,—to Peloponnesus
(344-343 B. C.), to Ambrakia, Leukas, Korkyra, the Illyrians,
and Thessaly. He now moved, first a mission of envoys to Eubœa,
where a plan of operations was probably concerted with Kallias
and the Chalkidians,—and subsequently, the despatch of a military
force to the same island, against Oreus and Eretria.[986] This
expedition, commanded by Phokion, was successful. Oreus and Eretria
were liberated; Kleitarchus and Philistides, with the Macedonian
troops, were expelled from the island, though both in vain tried to
propitiate Athens.[987] Kallias, also, with the Chalkidians of Eubœa,
and the Megarians, contributed as auxiliaries to this success.[988]
On his proposition, supported by Demosthenes, the attendance and
tribute from deputies of the Euboic cities to the synod at Athens,
were renounced; and in place of it was constituted an Euboic synod,
sitting at Chalkis; independent of, yet allied with, Athens.[989]
In this Euboic synod Kallias was the leading man; forward both
as a partisan of Athens and as an enemy of Philip. He pushed his
attack beyond the limits of Eubœa to the Gulf of Pagasæ, from whence
probably came the Macedonian troops who had formed the garrison
of Oreus under Philistides. He here captured several of the towns
allied with or garrisoned by Philip; together with various Macedonian
vessels, the crews of which he sold as slaves. For these successes
the Athenians awarded to him a public vote of thanks.[990] He also
employed himself (during the autumn and winter of 341-340 B. C.)
in travelling as missionary throughout Peloponnesus, to organize a
confederacy against Philip. In that mission he strenuously urged the
cities to send deputies to a congress at Athens, in the ensuing month
Anthesterion (February), 340 B. C. But though he made flattering
announcement at Athens of concurrence and support promised to him,
the projected congress came to nothing.[991]
[986] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.
[987] Diodor. xvi. 74.
[988] Stephanus Byz. v. Ὠρεός.
[989] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68. Æschines greatly
stigmatizes Demosthenes for having deprived the Athenian synod of
these important members. But the Eubœan members certainly had not
been productive of any good to Athens by their attendance, real
or nominal, at her synod, for some years past. The formation of a
free Euboic synod probably afforded the best chance of ensuring
real harmony between the island and Athens.
Æschines gives here a long detail of allegations, about the
corrupt intrigues between Demosthenes and Kallias at Athens. Many
of these allegations are impossible to reconcile with what we
know of the course of history at the time. We must recollect that
Æschines makes the statement eleven years after the events.
[990] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159.
[991] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. _l. c._ Æschines here specifies the
month, but not the year. It appears to me that Anthesterion, 340
B. C. (Olymp. 109, 4) is the most likely date; though Böhnecke
and others place it a year earlier.
While the important success in Eubœa relieved Athens from anxiety
on that side, Demosthenes was sent as envoy to the Chersonese and
to Byzantium. He would doubtless encourage Diopeithes, and may
perhaps have carried to him some reinforcements. But his services
were principally useful at Byzantium. That city had long been badly
disposed towards Athens,—from recollections of the Social War, and
from jealousy about the dues on corn-ships passing the Bosphorus;
moreover, it had been for some time in alliance with Philip; who was
now exerting all his efforts to prevail on the Byzantines to join
him in active warfare against Athens. So effectively did Demosthenes
employ his eloquence, at Byzantium, that he frustrated this purpose,
overcame the unfriendly sentiment of the citizens, and brought them
to see how much it concerned both their interest and their safety
to combine with Athens in resisting the farther preponderance of
Philip. The Byzantines, together with their allies and neighbors
the Perinthians, contracted alliance with Athens. Demosthenes takes
just pride in having achieved for his countrymen this success as
a statesman and diplomatist, in spite of adverse probabilities.
Had Philip been able to obtain the active coöperation of Byzantium
and Perinthus, he would have become master of the corn-supply, and
probably of the Hellespont also, so that war in those regions would
have become almost impracticable for Athens.[992]
[992] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 254, 304, 308. βουλόμενος τῆς
σιτοπομπίας κύριος γενέσθαι (Philip), παρελθὼν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης
Βυζαντίους συμμάχους ὄντας αὑτῷ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠξίου συμπολεμεῖν
τὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον, etc.
ἡ μὲν ἐμὴ πολίτεια ... ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἔχειν
Φίλιππον, λαβόντα Βυζάντιον, συμπολεμεῖν τοὺς Βυζαντίους μεθ᾽
ἡμῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἐποίησεν) ... Τίς ὁ κωλύσας τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον
ἀλλοτριωθῆναι κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους; (p. 255.)
Compare Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 90.
That Demosthenes foresaw, several months earlier, the plans
of Philip upon Byzantium, is evident from the orations De
Chersoneso, p. 93-106, and Philippic iii. p. 115.
As this unexpected revolution in the policy of Byzantium was
eminently advantageous to Athens, so it was proportionally mortifying
to Philip; who resented it so much, that he shortly afterwards
commenced the siege of Perinthus by land and sea,[993] a little
before midsummer 340 B. C. He brought up his fleet through the
Hellespont into the Propontis, and protected it in its passage,
against the attack of the Athenians in the Chersonese,[994] by
causing his land-force to traverse and lay waste that peninsula.
This was a violation of Athenian territory, adding one more to the
already accumulated causes of war. At the same time, it appears
that he now let loose his cruisers against the Athenian merchantmen,
many of which he captured and appropriated. These captures, together
with the incursions on the Chersonese, served as last additional
provocations, working up the minds of the Athenians to a positive
declaration of war.[995] Shortly after midsummer 340 B. C., at the
beginning of the archonship of Theophrastus, they passed a formal
decree[996] to remove the column on which the peace of 346 B. C.
stood recorded, and to renew the war openly and explicitly against
Philip. It seems probable that this was done while Demosthenes
was still absent on his mission at the Hellespont and Bosphorus;
for he expressly states that none of the decrees immediately
bringing on hostilities were moved by him, but all of them by other
citizens;[997] a statement which we may reasonably believe, since he
would be rather proud than ashamed of such an initiative.
[993] Diodor. xvi. 74.
[994] Epistola Philippi ap. Demosth. p. 163.
[995] That these were the two last causes which immediately
preceded and determined the declaration of war, we may see by
Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 249—Καὶ μὴν τὴν εἰρήνην γ᾽ ἐκεῖνος
ἔλυσε τὰ πλοῖα λαβὼν, οὐχ ἡ πόλις, etc.
Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ φανερῶς ἤδη τὰ πλοῖα ἐσεσύλητο, Χεῤῥόνησος ἐπορθεῖτο,
ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐπορεύεθ᾽ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκέτ᾽ ἐν ἀμφισβητησίμῳ τὰ
πράγματα ἦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνειστήκει πόλεμος, etc. (p. 274.)
[996] Philochorus, Frag. 135. ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum,
p. 738-741; Diodorus, xvi. 77. The citation given by Dionysius
out of Philochorus is on one point not quite accurate. It states
that Demosthenes moved the decisive resolution for declaring war;
whereas Demosthenes himself tells us that none of the motions at
this juncture were made by him (De Coronâ, p. 250).
[997] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250. It will be seen that I take
no notice of the two decrees of the Athenians, and the letter
of Philip, embodied in the oration De Coronâ, p. 249, 250,
251. I have already stated that all the documents which we
read as attached to this oration are so tainted either with
manifest error or with causes of doubt, that I cannot cite them
as authorities in this history, wherever they stand alone.
Accordingly, I take no account either of the supposed siege of
Selymbria, mentioned in Philip’s pretended letter, but mentioned
nowhere else—nor of the twenty Athenian ships captured by the
Macedonian admiral Amyntas, and afterwards restored by Philip on
the remonstrance of the Athenians, mentioned in the pretended
Athenian decree moved by Eubulus. Neither Demosthenes, nor
Philochorus, nor Diodorus, nor Justin, says anything about the
siege of Selymbria, though all of them allude to the attacks
on Byzantium and Perinthus. I do not believe that the siege of
Selymbria ever occurred. Moreover, Athenian vessels captured, but
afterwards restored by Philip on remonstrance from the Athenians,
can hardly have been the actual cause of war.
The pretended decrees and letter do not fit the passage of
Demosthenes to which they are attached.
About the same time, as it would appear, Philip on his side,
addressed a manifesto and declaration of war to the Athenians.
In this paper he enumerated many wrongs done by them to him, and
still remaining unredressed in spite of formal remonstrance; for
which wrongs he announced his intention of taking a just revenge by
open hostilities.[998] He adverted to the seizure, on Macedonian
soil, of Nikias his herald carrying despatches; the Athenians (he
alleged) had detained this herald as prisoner for ten months and
had read the despatches publicly in their assembly. He complained
that Athens had encouraged the inhabitants of Thasos, in harboring
triremes from Byzantium and privateers from other quarters, to
the annoyance of Macedonian commerce. He dwelt on the aggressive
proceedings of Diopeithes in Thrace, and of Kallias in the Gulf of
Pagasæ. He denounced the application made by Athens to the Persians
for aid against him, as a departure from Hellenic patriotism, and
from the Athenian maxims of aforetime. He alluded to the unbecoming
intervention of Athens in defence of the Thracian princes Teres
and Kersobleptes, neither of them among the sworn partners in the
peace, against him; to the protection conferred by Athens on the
inhabitants of Peparethus, whom he had punished for hostilities
against his garrison in Halonnesus; to the danger incurred by his
fleet in sailing up the Hellespont, from the hostilities of the
Athenian settlers in the Chersonese, who had coöperated with his
enemies the Byzantines, and had rendered it necessary for him to
guard the ships by marching a land-force through the Chersonese. He
vindicated his own proceedings in aiding his allies the inhabitants
of Kardia, complaining that the Athenians had refused to submit their
differences with that city to an equitable arbitration. He repelled
the Athenian pretensions of right to Amphipolis, asserting his own
better right to the place, on all grounds. He insisted especially
on the offensive behavior of the Athenians, in refusing, when he
had sent envoys conjointly with all his allies, to “conclude a just
convention on behalf of the Greeks generally”—“Had you acceded to
this proposition (he said), you might have placed out of danger all
those who really suspected my purposes, or you might have exposed
me publicly as the most worthless of men. It was to the interest of
your people to accede, but not to the interest of your orators. To
them—as those affirm who know your government best—peace is war,
and war, peace; for they always make money at the expense of your
generals, either as accusers or as defenders; moreover by reviling in
the public assembly your leading citizens at home, and other men of
eminence abroad, they acquire with the multitude credit for popular
dispositions. It would be easy for me, by the most trifling presents,
to silence their invectives and make them trumpet my praises. But
I should be ashamed of appearing to purchase your good-will from
_them_.[999]”
[998] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 165. This Epistle of
Philip to the Athenians appears here inserted among the orations
of Demosthenes. Some critics reject it as spurious; but I
see no sufficient ground for such an opinion. Whether it be
the composition of Philip himself, or of some Greek employed
in Philip’s cabinet, is a point which we have no means of
determining.
The oration of Demosthenes which is said to be delivered in reply
to this letter of Philip (Orat. xi), is, in my judgment, wrongly
described. Not only it has no peculiar bearing on the points
contained in the letter—but it must also be two or three months
later in date, since it mentions the aid sent by the Persian
satraps to Perinthus, and the raising of the siege of that city
by Philip (p. 153).
[999] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159, 164; compare
Isokrates. Or. v. (Philip.) s. 82.
It is of little moment to verify or appreciate the particular
complaints here set forth, even if we had adequate information for
the purpose. Under the feeling which had prevailed during the last
two years between the Athenians and Philip, we cannot doubt that many
detached acts of a hostile character had been committed on their
side as well as on his. Philip’s allegation—that he had repeatedly
proposed to them amicable adjustment of differences—whether true or
not, is little to the purpose. It was greatly to his interest to keep
Athens at peace and tranquil, while he established his ascendency
everywhere else, and accumulated a power for ultimate employment
such as she would be unable to resist. The Athenians had at length
been made to feel, that farther acquiescence in these proceedings
would only ensure to them the amount of favor tendered by Polyphemus
to Odysseus—that they should be devoured last. But the lecture
which he thinks fit to administer both to them and to their popular
orators, is little better than insulting derision. It is strange to
read encomiums on peace—as if it were indisputably advantageous to
the Athenian public, and as if recommendations of war originated only
with venal and calumnious orators for their own profit—pronounced by
the greatest aggressor and conqueror of his age, whose whole life was
passed in war and in the elaborate organization of great military
force; and addressed to a people whose leading infirmity then was,
an aversion almost unconquerable to the personal hardships and
pecuniary sacrifices of effective war. This passage of the manifesto
may probably be intended as a theme for Æschines and the other
philippizing partisans in the Athenian assembly.
War was now an avowed fact on both sides. At the instigation of
Demosthenes and others, the Athenians decreed to equip a naval force,
which was sent under Chares to the Hellespont and Propontis.
Meanwhile Philip brought up to the siege of Perinthus an army of
thirty thousand men, and a stock of engines and projectiles such
as had never before been seen.[1000] His attack on this place was
remarkable not only for great bravery and perseverance on both sides,
but also for the extended scale of the military operations.[1001]
Perinthus was strong and defensible; situated on a promontory
terminating in abrupt cliffs southward towards the Propontis,
unassailable from seaward, but sloping, though with a steep declivity
towards the land, with which it was joined by an isthmus of not more
than a furlong in breadth. Across this isthmus stretched the outer
wall, behind which were seen the houses of the town, lofty, strongly
built, and rising one above the other in terraces up the ascent of
the promontory. Philip pressed the place with repeated assaults on
the outer wall; battering it with rams, undermining it by sap, and
rolling up movable towers said to be one hundred and twenty feet in
height (higher even than the towers of the Perinthian wall), so as to
chase away the defenders by missiles, and to attempt an assault by
boarding-planks hand to hand. The Perinthians, defending themselves
with energetic valor, repelled him for a long time from the outer
wall. At length the besieging engines, with the reiterated attacks of
Macedonian soldiers animated by Philip’s promises, overpowered this
wall, and drove them back into the town. It was found, however, that
the town itself supplied a new defensible position to its citizens.
The lower range of houses, united by strong barricades across the
streets, enabled the Perinthians still to hold out. In spite of
all their efforts, however, the town would have shared the fate of
Olynthus, had they not been sustained by effective foreign aid. Not
only did their Byzantine kinsmen exhaust themselves to furnish every
sort of assistance by sea, but also the Athenian fleet, and Persian
satraps on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, coöperated. A body of
Grecian mercenaries under Apollodorus, sent across from Asia by the
Phrygian satrap Arsites, together with ample supplies of stores by
sea, placed Perinthus in condition to defy the besiegers.[1002]
[1000] How much improvement Philip had made in engines for siege,
as a part of his general military organization—is attested in
a curious passage of a later author on mechanics. Athenæus, De
Machinis ap. Auctor. Mathem. Veter. p. 3, ed. Paris.—ἐπίδοσιν δὲ
ἔλαβεν ἡ τοαιύτη μηχανοποιΐα ἅπασα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διονυσίου τοῦ
Σικελιώτου τυραννίδα, κατά τε τὴν Φιλίππου τοῦ Ἀμύντου βασίλειαν,
ὅτε ἐπολιόρκει Βυζαντίους Φίλιππος. Εὐημέρει δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τέχνῃ
Πολύειδος ὁ Θεσσαλὸς, οὗ οἱ μαθηταὶ συνεστρατεύοντο Ἀλεξάνδρῷ.
Respecting the engines employed by Dionysius of Syracuse, see
Diodor. xiv. 42, 48, 50.
[1001] Diodor. xvi. 74-76; Plutarch, Vit. Alexandri, c. 70; also
Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 215, and De Fortunâ Alexan. p. 339.
[1002] Demosth. ad Philip. Epistol. p. 153; Diodor. xvi. 75;
Pausanias, i. 29, 7.
After a siege which can hardly have lasted less than three months,
Philip found all his efforts against Perinthus baffled. He then
changed his plan, withdrew a portion of his forces, and suddenly
appeared before Byzantium. The walls were strong, but inadequately
manned and prepared; much of the Byzantine force being in service
at Perinthus. Among several vigorous attacks, Philip contrived to
effect a surprise on a dark and stormy night, which was very near
succeeding. The Byzantines defended themselves bravely, and even
defeated his fleet; but they too were rescued chiefly by foreign aid.
The Athenians—now acting under the inspirations of Demosthenes, who
exhorted them to bury in a generous oblivion all their past grounds
of offence against Byzantium—sent a still more powerful fleet to the
rescue, under the vigorous guidance of Phokion[1003] instead of the
loose and rapacious Chares. Moreover the danger of Byzantium called
forth strenuous efforts from the chief islanders of the Ægean—Chians,
Rhodians, Koans, etc., to whom it was highly important that Philip
should not become master of the great passage for imported corn into
the Grecian seas. The large combined fleet thus assembled was fully
sufficient to protect Byzantium.[1004] Compelled to abandon the siege
of that city as well as of Perinthus, Philip was farther baffled in
an attack on the Chersonese. Phokion not only maintained against him
the full security of the Propontis and its adjoining straits, but
also gained various advantages over him both by land and sea.[1005]
[1003] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p.
848-851. To this fleet of Phokion, Demosthenes contributed the
outfit of a trireme, while the orator Hyperides sailed with
the fleet as trierarch. See Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische
Seewesen, p. 441, 442, 498. From that source the obscure
chronology of the period now before us derives some light;
since it becomes certain that the expedition of Chares began
during the archonship of Nichomaclides; that is, in the year
_before_ Midsummer 340 B. C.; while the expedition of Phokion and
Kephisophon began in the year following—_after_ Midsummer 340 B. C.
See some anecdotes respecting this siege of Byzantium by Philip,
collected from later authors (Dionysius Byzantinus, Hesychius
Milesius, and others) by the diligence of Böhnecke—Forschungen,
p. 470 _seqq._
[1004] Diodor. xvi. 77: Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 17.
[1005] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14.
These operations probably occupied the last six months of 340 B. C.
They constituted the most important success gained by Athens, and the
most serious reverse experienced by Philip, since the commencement of
war between them. Coming as they did immediately after the liberation
of Eubœa in the previous year, they materially improved the position
of Athens against Philip. Phokion and his fleet not only saved the
citizens of Byzantium from all the misery of a capture by Macedonian
soldiers, but checked privateering, and protected the trade-ships
so efficaciously, that corn became unusually abundant and cheap both
at Athens and throughout Greece:[1006] and Demosthenes, as statesman
and diplomatist, enjoyed the credit of having converted Eubœa into
a friendly and covering neighbor for Athens, instead of being a
shelter for Philip’s marauding cruisers—as well as of bringing round
Byzantium from the Macedonian alliance to that of Athens, and thus
preventing both the Hellespont and the corn-trade from passing into
Philip’s hands.[1007] The warmest votes of thanks, together with
wreaths in token of gratitude, were decreed to Athens by the public
assemblies of Byzantium, Perinthus, and the various towns of the
Chersonese;[1008] while the Athenian public assembly also decreed
and publicly proclaimed a similar vote of thanks and admiration to
Demosthenes. The decree, moved by Aristonikus, was so unanimously
popular at the time, that neither Æschines nor any of the other
enemies of Demosthenes thought it safe to impeach the mover.[1009]
[1006] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255; Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p.
350.
[1007] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 305, 306, 307: comp. p. 253. μετὰ
ταῦτα δὲ τοὺς ἀποστόλους πάντας ἀπέστειλα, καθ᾽ οὓς Χεῤῥόνησος
ἐσώθη, καὶ Βυζάντιον καὶ πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι, etc.
[1008] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255, 257. That these votes of
thanks were passed, is authenticated by the words of the oration
itself. Documents are inserted in the oration, purporting to be
the decree of the Byzantines and Perinthians, and that of the
Chersonesite cities. I do not venture to cite these as genuine,
considering how many of the other documents annexed to this
oration are decidedly spurious.
[1009] Demosth. p. 253. Aristonikus is again mentioned, p.
302. A document appears, p. 253, purporting to be the vote
of the Athenians to thank and crown Demosthenes, proposed by
Aristonikus. The name of the Athenian archon is wrong, as in all
the other documents embodied in this oration, where the name of
an Athenian archon appears.
In the recent military operations, on so large a scale, against
Byzantium and Perinthus, Philip had found himself in conflict not
merely with Athens, but also with Chians, Rhodians and others; an
unusually large muster of confederate Greeks. To break up this
confederacy, he found it convenient to propose peace, and to abandon
his designs against Byzantium and Perinthus—the point on which
the alarm of the confederates chiefly turned. By withdrawing his
forces from the Propontis, he was enabled to conclude peace with
the Byzantines and most of the maritime Greeks who had joined in
relieving them. The combination against him was thus dissolved,
though with Athens[1010] and her more intimate allies his naval war
still continued. While he multiplied cruisers and privateers to make
up by prizes his heavy outlay during the late sieges, he undertook
with his land-force an enterprize, during the spring of 339 B. C.,
against the Scythian king Atheas; whose country, between Mount Hæmus
and the Danube, he invaded with success, bringing away as spoil a
multitude of youthful slaves of both sexes, as well as cattle. On
his return however across Mount Hæmus, he was attacked on a sudden
by the Thracian tribe Triballi, and sustained a defeat; losing all
his accompanying captives, and being badly wounded through the
thigh.[1011] This expedition and its consequences occupied Philip
during the spring and summer of 339 B. C.
[1010] Diodorus (xvi. 77) mentions this peace; stating that
Philip raised the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, and made
peace πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους.
Wesseling (ad loc.) and Weiske (De Hyperbolê, ii. p. 41) both
doubt the reality of this peace. Neither Böhnecke nor Winiewski
recognize it. Mr. Clinton admits it in a note to his Appendix 16.
p. 292; though he does not insert it in his column of events in
the tables.
I perfectly concur with these authors in dissenting from
Diodorus, so far as _Athens_ is concerned. The supposition that
peace was concluded between Philip and Athens at this time is
distinctly negatived by the language of Demosthenes (De Coronâ,
p. 275, 276); indirectly also by Æschines. Both from Demosthenes
and from Philochorus it appeals sufficiently clear, in my
judgment, that the war between Philip and the Athenians went on
without interruption from the summer of 340 B. C., to the battle
of Chæroneia, in August 338.
But I see no reason for disbelieving Diodorus, in so far as he
states that Philip made peace with the other Greeks—Byzantines,
Perinthians, Chians, Rhodians, etc.
[1011] Justin, ix. 2, 3. Æschines alludes to this expedition
against the Scythians during the spring of the archon
Theophrastus, or 339 B. C. (Æschin. cont. Ktesiph. p. 71).
Meanwhile the naval war of Athens against Philip was more effectively
carried on, and her marine better organized, than ever it had been
before. This was chiefly owing to an important reform proposed and
carried by Demosthenes, immediately on the declaration of war against
Philip in the summer of 340 B. C. Enjoying as he did, now after long
public experience, the increased confidence of his fellow-citizens,
and being named superintendent of the navy,[1012] he employed his
influence not only in procuring energetic interference both as to
Eubœa and Byzantium, but also in correcting deep-seated abuses which
nullified the efficiency of the Athenian marine department.
[1012] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 85. c. 80. ἐπιστάτης τοῦ
ναυτικοῦ.
The law of Periander (adopted in 357 B. C.) had distributed the
burthen of the trierarchy among the twelve hundred richest citizens
on the taxable property-schedule, arranged in twenty fractions called
Symmories, of sixty persons each. Among these men, the three hundred
richest, standing distinguished, as leaders of the Symmories, were
invested with the direction and enforcement of all that concerned
their collective agency and duties. The purpose of this law had
been to transfer the cost of trierarchy—a sum of about forty, fifty
or sixty minæ for each trireme, defraying more or less of the
outfit—which had originally been borne by a single rich man as his
turn came round, and afterwards by two rich men in conjunction—to
a partnership more or less numerous, consisting of five, six, or
even fifteen or sixteen members of the same symmory. The number of
such partners varied according to the number of triremes required
by the state to be fitted out in any one year. If only few triremes
were required, sixteen contributors might be allotted to defray
collectively the trierarchic cost of each: if on the other hand many
triremes were needed, a less number of partners, perhaps no more
than five or six, could be allotted to each—since the total number
of citizens whose turn it was to be assessed in that particular year
was fixed. The assessment upon each partner was of course heavier,
in proportion as the number of partners assigned to a trireme was
smaller. Each member of the partnership, whether it consisted of
five, of six, or of sixteen, contributed in equal proportion towards
the cost.[1013] The richer members of the partnership thus paid no
greater sum than the poorer; and sometimes even evaded any payment
of their own, by contracting with some one to discharge the duties
of the post, on condition of a total sum not greater than that which
they had themselves collected from these poorer members.
[1013] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 260-262. ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς
ἡγεμόσι τῶν συμμοριῶν) ἐκ μὲν τῶν προτέρων νόμων συνεκκαίδεκα
λειτουργεῖν—αὐτοῖς μὲν μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀναλίσκουσιν, τοὺς δ᾽
ἀπόρους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιτρίβουσιν ... ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ νόμου τὸ
γιγνόμενον κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἕκαστον τιθέναι· καὶ δυοῖν ἐφάνη
τριήραρχος ὁ τῆς μιᾶς ἕκτος καὶ δέκατος πρότερον συντελής· οὐδὲ
γὰρ τριηράρχους ἔτι ὠνόμαζον ἑαυτοὺς, ἀλλὰ συντελεῖς.
The trierarchy, and the trierarchic symmories, at Athens, are
subjects not perfectly known; the best expositions respecting
them are to be found in Boeckh’s Public Economy of Athens (b. iv.
ch. 11-13), and in his other work, Urkunden über das Attische
Seewesen (ch. xi. xii. xiii.); besides Parreidt, De Symmoriis,
part ii. p. 22, seq.
The fragment of Hyperides (cited by Harpokration v. Συμμορία)
alluding to the trierarchic reform of Demosthenes, though briefly
and obscurely, is an interesting confirmation of the oration De
Coronâ.
According to Demosthenes, the poorer members of these trierarchic
symmories were sometimes pressed down almost to ruin by the sums
demanded; so that they complained bitterly, and even planted
themselves in the characteristic attitude of suppliants at Munychia
or elsewhere in the city. When their liabilities to the state were
not furnished in time, they became subject to imprisonment by the
officers superintending the outfit of the armament In addition to
such private hardship, there arose great public mischief from the
money not being at once forthcoming; the armament being delayed in
its departure, and forced to leave Peiræus either in bad condition or
without its full numbers. Hence arose in great part, the ill-success
of Athens in her maritime enterprises against Philip, before the
peace of 346 B. C.[1014]
[1014] There is a point in the earlier oration of Demosthenes
De Symmoriis, illustrating the grievance which he now reformed.
That grievance consisted, for one main portion, in the fact,
that the richest citizen in a trierarchic partnership paid a
sum no greater (sometimes even less) than the poorest. Now it
is remarkable that this unfair apportionment of charge might
have occurred, and is noway guarded against, in the symmories as
proposed by Demosthenes himself. His symmories, each comprising
sixty persons or one-twentieth of the total active twelve
hundred, are directed to divide themselves into five fractions
of twelve persons each, or a hundredth of the twelve hundred.
Each group of twelve is to comprise the richest alongside of
the poorest members of the sixty (ἀνταναπληροῦντας πρὸς τὸν
εὐπορώτατον ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους, p. 182), so that each group
would contain individuals very unequal in wealth, though the
aggregate wealth of one group would be nearly equal to that of
another. These twelve persons were to defray collectively the
cost of trierarchy for one ship, two ships, or three ships,
according to the number of ships which the state might require
(p. 183). But Demosthenes nowhere points out in what proportions
they were to share the expense among them; whether the richest
citizens among the twelve were to pay only an equal sum with
the poorest, or a sum greater in proportion to their wealth.
There is nothing in his project to prevent the richer members
from insisting that all should pay equally. This is the very
abuse that he denounced afterwards (in 340 B. C.), as actually
realized—and corrected by a new law. The oration of Demosthenes
De Symmoriis, omitting as it does all positive determination as
to proportions of payment, helps us to understand how the abuse
grew up.
The same influences, which had led originally to the introduction of
such abuses, stood opposed to the orator in his attempted amendment.
The body of Three Hundred, the richest men in the state—the leader
or richest individual in each symmory, with those who stood second
or third in order of wealth—employed every effort to throw out
the proposition, and tendered large bribes to Demosthenes (if we
may credit his assertion) as inducements for dropping it. He was
impeached moreover under the Graphê Paranomon, as mover of an
unconstitutional or illegal decree. It required no small share of
firmness and public spirit, combined with approved eloquence and an
established name, to enable Demosthenes to contend against these
mighty enemies.
His new law caused the charge of trierarchy to be levied upon all
the members of the symmories, or upon all above a certain minimum of
property, in proportion to their rated property; but it seems, if we
rightly make out, to have somewhat heightened the minimum, so that
the aggregate number of persons chargeable was diminished.[1015]
Every citizen rated at ten talents was assessed singly for the
charge of trierarchy belonging to one trireme; if rated at twenty
talents, for the trierarchy of two; at thirty talents, for the
trierarchy of three; if above thirty talents, for that of three
triremes and a service boat—which was held to be the maximum
payable by any single individual. Citizens rated at less than ten
talents, were grouped together into ratings of ten talents in the
aggregate, in order to bear collectively the trierarchy of one of a
trireme; the contributions furnished by each person in the group
being proportional to the sum for which he stood rated. This new
proposition, while materially relieving the poorer citizens, made
large addition to the assessments of the rich. A man rated at twenty
talents, who had before been chargeable for only the sixteenth part
of the expense of one trierarchy, along with partners much poorer
than himself but equally assessed—now became chargeable with the
entire expense of two trierarchies. All persons liable were assessed
in fair proportion to the sum for which they stood rated in the
schedule. When the impeachment against Demosthenes came to be tried
before the Dikastery, he was acquitted by more than four-fifths
of the Dikasts; so that the accuser was compelled to pay the
established fine. And so animated was the temper of the public at
that moment, in favor of vigorous measures for prosecuting the war
just declared, that they went heartily along with him, and adopted
the main features of his trierarchic reform. The resistance from
the rich, however, though insufficient to throw out the measure,
constrained him to modify it more than once, during the progress of
the discussion;[1016] partly in consequence of the opposition of
Æschines, whom he accuses of having been hired by the rich for the
purpose.[1017] It is deeply to be regretted that the speeches of
both of them—especially those of Demosthenes, which must have been
numerous—have not been preserved.
[1015] Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 86) charges Demosthenes with
“having stolen away from the city the trierarchs of sixty-five
swift sailing vessels.” This implies, I imagine, that the new law
diminished the total number of persons chargeable with trierarchy.
[1016] Deinarchus adv. Demosthen. p. 95. s. 43. Εἰσί τινες ἐν
τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τριακοσίοις γεγενημένων, ὅθ᾽ οὗτος
(Demosthenes) ἐτίθει τὸν περὶ τῶν τριηράρχων νόμον. Οὐ φράσετε
τοῖς πλησίον ὅτι τρία τάλαντα λαβὼν μετέγραφε καὶ μετεσκεύαζε τὸν
νόμον καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπώλει ὦν εἰλήφει τὴν
τιμὴν, τὰ δ᾽ ἀποδόμενος οὐκ ἐβεβαίου;
Without accepting this assertion of a hostile speaker, so far
as it goes to accuse Demosthenes of having accepted bribes—we
may safely accept it, so far as it affirms that he made several
changes and modifications in the law before it finally passed; a
fact not at all surprising, considering the intense opposition
which it called forth.
Some of the Dikasts, before whom Deinarchus was pleading, had
been included among the Three Hundred (that is, the richest
citizens in the State) when Demosthenes proposed his trierarchic
reform. This will show, among various other proofs which might
be produced, that the Athenian Dikasts did not always belong to
the poorest class of citizens, as the jests of Aristophanes would
lead us to believe.
[1017] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 329. Boeckh (Attisch. Seewesen,
p. 183, and Publ. Econ. Ath. iv. 14) thinks that this
passage—διτάλαντον δ᾽ εἶχες ἔρανον δωρεὰν παρὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων
τῶν συμμοριῶν, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐλυμῄνω τὸν τριηραρχικὸν νόμον—must
allude to injury done by Æschines to the law in later years,
after it became a law. But I am unable to see the reason for so
restricting its meaning. The rich men would surely bribe most
highly, and raise most opposition, against the first passing of
the law, as they were then most likely to be successful; and
Æschines, whether bribed or not bribed, would most naturally as
well as most effectively stand out against the novelty introduced
by his rival, without waiting to see it actually become a part of
the laws of the State.
Thus were the trierarchic symmories distributed and assessed anew
upon each man in the ratio of his wealth, and therefore most largely
upon the Three Hundred richest.[1018] How long the law remained
unchanged, we do not know. But it was found to work admirably well;
and Demosthenes boasts that during the entire war (that is, from
the renewal of the war about August 340 B. C., to the battle of
Chæroneia in August 338 B. C.) all the trierarchs named under the law
were ready in time without complaint or suffering; while the ships,
well-equipped and exempt from the previous causes of delay, were
found prompt and effective for all exigencies. Not one was either
left behind, or lost at sea, throughout these two years.[1019]
[1018] See the citation from Hyperides in Harpokrat. v. Συμμορία.
The Symmories are mentioned in Inscription xiv. of Boeckh’s
Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen (p. 465), which Inscription
bears the date of 325 B. C. Many of these Inscriptions name
individual citizens, in different numbers three, five, or six, as
joint trierarchs of the same vessel.
[1019] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 262.
Probably the first fruits of the Demosthenic reform in Athenian naval
administration, was, the fleet equipped under Phokion, which acted
so successfully at and near Byzantium. The operations of Athenians
at sea, though not known in detail, appear to have been better
conducted and more prosperous in their general effect than they had
ever been since the Social War. But there arose now a grave and
melancholy dispute in the interior of Greece, which threw her upon
her defence by land. This new disturbing cause was nothing less than
another Sacred War, declared by the Amphiktyonic assembly against
the Lokrians of Amphissa. Kindled chiefly by the Athenian Æschines,
it more than compensated Philip for his repulse at Byzantium and
his defeat by the Triballi; bringing, like the former Sacred War,
aggrandizement to him alone, and ruin to Grecian liberty.
I have recounted, in the fourth volume of this work,[1020] the first
Sacred War recorded in Grecian history (590-580 B. C.), about two
centuries before the birth of Æschines and Demosthenes. That war
had been undertaken by the Amphiktyonic Greeks to punish, and ended
by destroying, the flourishing seaport of Kirrha, situated near
the mouth of the river Pleistus, on the coast of the fertile plain
stretching from the southern declivity of Delphi to the sea. Kirrha
was originally the port of Delphi; and of the ancient Phokian town
of Krissa, to which Delphi was once an annexed sanctuary.[1021] But
in process of time Kirrha increased at the expense of both; through
profits accumulated from the innumerable visitors by sea who landed
there as the nearest access to the temple. The prosperous Kirrhæans,
inspiring jealousy at Delphi and Krissa, were accused of extortion
in the tolls levied from visitors, as well as of other guilty or
offensive proceedings. An Amphiktyonic war, wherein the Athenian
Solon stood prominently forward, being declared against them,
Kirrha was taken and destroyed. Its fertile plain was consecrated
to the Delphian god, under an oath taken by all the Amphiktyonic
members, with solemn pledges and formidable imprecations against
all disturbers. The entire space between the temple and the sea now
became, as the oracle had required, sacred property of the god; that
is, incapable of being tilled, planted, or occupied in any permanent
way, by man, and devoted only to spontaneous herbage with pasturing
animals.
[1020] Chap. xxviii. p. 62 _seqq._
[1021] For the topography of the country round Delphi, see
the instructive work of Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in
Griechenland (Bremen, 1840) chapters i. and ii. about Kirrha and
Krissa.
But though the Delphians thus procured the extirpation of their
troublesome neighbors at Kirrha, it was indispensable that on or
near the same spot there should exist a town and port, for the
accommodation of the guests who came from all quarters to Delphi;
the more so, as such persons, not merely visitors, but also traders
with goods to sell, now came in greater multitudes than ever, from
the increased attractions imparted out of the rich spoils of Kirrha
itself, to the Pythian festival. How this want was at first supplied,
while the remembrance of the oath was yet fresh, we are not informed.
But in process of time Kirrha became reoccupied and refortified by
the western neighbors of Delphi—the Lokrians of Amphissa—on whose
borders it stood, and for whom probably it served as a port not less
than for Delphi. These new occupants received the guests coming to
the temple, enriched themselves by the accompanying profit and took
into cultivation a certain portion of the plain around the town.[1022]
[1022] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69; compare Livy, xlii. 5;
Pausanias, x. 37, 4. The distance from Delphi to Kirrha is given
by Pausanias at sixty stadia, or about seven English miles: by
Strabo at eighty stadia.
At what period the occupation by the Lokrians had its origin, we
are unable to say. So much however we make out—not merely from
Demosthenes, but even from Æschines—that in their time it was an
ancient and established occupation—not a recent intrusion or novelty.
The town was fortified; the space immediately adjacent being tilled
and claimed by the Lokrians as their own.[1023] This indeed was
a departure from the oath, sworn by Solon with his Amphiktyonic
contemporaries, to consecrate Kirrha and its lands to the Delphian
god. But if that oath had been literally carried out, the god
himself, and the Delphians among whom he dwelt, would have been the
principal losers; because the want of a convenient port would have
been a serious discouragement, if not a positive barrier, against
the arrival of visitors, most of whom came by sea. Accordingly the
renovation of the town and port of Kirrha, doubtless on a modest
scale, together with a space of adjacent land for tillage, was at
least tolerated, if not encouraged. Much of the plain, indeed, still
remained unfilled and unplanted, as the property of Apollo; the
boundaries being perhaps not accurately drawn.
[1023] Æschines, _l. c._; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. τὴν
χώραν ἣν οἱ μὲν Ἀμφισσεῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν γεωργεῖν ἔφασαν, οὗτος δὲ
(Æschines) τῆς ἱερᾶς χώρας ᾐτιᾶτο εἶναι, etc.
While the Lokrians had thus been serviceable to the Delphian
temple by occupying Kirrha, they had been still more valuable as
its foremost auxiliaries and protectors against the Phokians,
their enemies of long standing.[1024] One of the first objects of
Philomelus the Phokian, after defeating the Lokrian armed force, was
to fortify the sacred precinct of Delphi on its western side, against
their attacks;[1025] and we cannot doubt that their position in close
neighborhood to Delphi must have been one of positive suffering as
well as of danger, during the years when the Phokian leaders, with
their numerous mercenary bands, remained in victorious occupation of
the temple, and probably of the harbor of Kirrha also. The subsequent
turn of fortune,—when Philip crushed the Phokians and when the
Amphiktyonic assembly was reorganized, with him as its chief,—must
have found the Amphissian Lokrians among the warmest allies and
sympathizers. Resuming possession of Kirrha, they may perhaps have
been emboldened, in such a moment of triumphant reaction, to enlarge
their occupancy round the walls to a greater extent than they had
done before. Moreover they were animated with feelings attached to
Thebes; and were hostile to Athens, as the ally and upholder of their
enemies the Phokians.
[1024] Diodor. xvi. 24; Thucyd. iii. 101.
[1025] Diodor. xvi. 25.
Matters were in this condition when the spring meeting of the
Amphiktyonic assembly (February or March 339 B. C.) was held at
Delphi. Diognetus was named by the Athenians to attend it as
Hieromnemon, or chief legate; with three Pylagoræ or vice-legates,
Æschines, Meidias, and Thrasykles.[1026] We need hardly believe
Demosthenes, when he states that the name of Æschines was put up
without foreknowledge on the part of any one; and that though it
passed, yet not more than two or three hands were held up in his
favor.[1027] Soon after they reached Delphi, Diognetus was seized
with a fever, so that the task of speaking in the Amphiktyonic
assembly was confided to Æschines.
[1026] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.
[1027] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.
There stood in the Delphian temple some golden or gilt shields
dedicated as an offering out of the spoils taken at the battle of
Platæa, a century and a half before,—with an inscription to this
effect,—“Dedicated by the Athenians, out of the spoils of Persians
and Thebans engaged in joint battle against the Greeks.” It appears
that these shields had recently been set up afresh (having been
perhaps stript of their gilding by the Phokian plunderers), in a
new cell or chapel, without the full customary forms of prayer or
solemnities;[1028] which perhaps might be supposed unnecessary,
as the offering was not now dedicated for the first time. The
inscription, little noticed and perhaps obscured by the lapse of
time on the original shields, would now stand forth brightly and
conspicuously on the new gilding; reviving historical recollections
highly offensive to the Thebans,[1029] and to the Amphissian Lokrians
as friends of Thebes. These latter not only remonstrated against it
in the Amphiktyonic assembly, but were even preparing (if we are
to believe Æschines), to accuse Athens of impiety; and to invoke
against her a fine of fifty talents, for omission of the religious
solemnities.[1030] But this is denied by Demosthenes;[1031] who
states that the Lokrians could not bring any such accusation against
Athens without sending a formal summons,—which they had never sent.
Demosthenes would be doubtless right as to the regular form, probably
also as to the actual fact; though Æschines accuses him of having
received bribes[1032] to defend the iniquities of the Lokrians.
Whether the Lokrians went so far as to invoke a penalty, or not,—at
any rate they spoke in terms of complaint against the proceeding.
Such complaint was not without real foundation; since it was better
for the common safety of Hellenic liberty against the Macedonian
aggressor, that the treason of Thebes at the battle of Platæa should
stand as a matter of past antiquity, rather than be republished in a
new edition. But this was not the ground taken by the complainants,
nor could they directly impeach the right of Athens to burnish up her
old donatives. Accordingly they assailed the act on the allegation
of impiety, as not having been preceded by the proper religious
solemnities; whereby they obtained the opportunity of inveighing
against Athens, as ally of the Phokians in their recent sacrilege,
and enemy of Thebes the steadfast champion of the god.
[1028] This must have been an ἀποκατάστασις τῶν ἀναθημάτων
(compare Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 13), requiring to be preceded by
solemn ceremonies, sometimes specially directed by the oracle.
[1029] How painfully the Thebans of the Demosthenic age felt the
recollection of the alliance of their ancestors with the Persians
at Platæa, we may read in Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 187.
It appears that the Thebans also had erected a new chapel at
Delphi (after 346 B. C.) out of the spoils acquired from the
conquered Phokians—ὁ ἀπὸ Φωκέων ναὸς, ὃν ἱδρύσαντο Θηβαῖοι
(Diodor. xvii. 10).
[1030] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. The words of his speech
do not however give either a full or a clear account of the
transaction; which I have endeavored, as well as I can, to supply
in the text.
[1031] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.
[1032] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.
“The Amphiktyons being assembled (I here give the main recital,
though not the exact words, of Æschines), a friendly person came to
acquaint us that the Amphissians were bringing on their accusation
against Athens. My sick colleagues requested me immediately to enter
the assembly and undertake her defence. I made haste to comply, and
was just beginning to speak, when an Amphissian,—of extreme rudeness
and brutality,—perhaps even under the influence of some misguiding
divine impulse,—interrupted me and exclaimed,—‘Do not hear him,
men of Hellas! Do not permit the name of the Athenian people to be
pronounced among you at this holy season! Turn them out of the sacred
ground, like men under a curse.’ With that he denounced us for our
alliance with the Phokians, and poured out many other outrageous
invectives against the city.
“To me (continues Æschines) all this was intolerable to hear; I
cannot even now think on it with calmness—and at the moment, I was
provoked to anger such as I had never felt in my life before. The
thought crossed me that I would retort upon the Amphissians for their
impious invasion of the Kirrhæan land. That plain, lying immediately
below the sacred precinct in which we were assembled, was visible
throughout. ‘You see, Amphiktyons (said I), that plain cultivated
by the Amphissians, with buildings erected in it for farming and
pottery! You have before your eyes the harbor, consecrated by the
oath of your forefathers, now occupied and fortified. You know
of yourselves, without needing witnesses to tell you, that these
Amphissians have levied tolls and are taking profit out of the
sacred harbor!’ I then caused to be read publicly the ancient
oracle, the oath, and the imprecations (pronounced after the first
Sacred War, wherein Kirrha was destroyed). Then continuing, I
said—‘Here am I, ready to defend the god and the sacred property,
according to the oath of our forefathers, with hand, foot, voice,
and all the powers that I possess. I stand prepared to clear my own
city of her obligations to the gods do you take counsel forthwith
for yourselves. You are here about to offer sacrifice and pray
to the gods for good things, publicly and individually. Look well
then,—where will you find voice, or soul, or eyes, or courage,
to pronounce such supplications, if you permit these accursed
Amphissians to remain unpunished, when they have come under the
imprecations of the recorded oath? Recollect that the oath distinctly
proclaims the sufferings awaiting all impious transgressors, and even
menaces those who tolerate their proceedings, by declaring,—They who
do not stand forward to vindicate Apollo, Artemis, Latona, and Athênê
Pronæa, may not sacrifice undefiled or with favorable acceptance.’”
Such is the graphic and impressive description,[1033] given by
Æschines himself some years afterwards to the Athenian assembly,
of his own address to the Amphiktyonic meeting in spring 339 B.
C.; on the lofty sight of the Delphian Pylæa, with Kirrha and its
plain spread out before his eyes, and with the ancient oath and
all its fearful imprecations recorded on the brass plate hard by,
readable by every one. His speech, received with loud shouts, roused
violent passion in the bosoms of the Amphiktyons, as well as of the
hearers assembled round. The audience at Delphi was not like that
of Athens. Athenian citizens were accustomed to excellent oratory,
and to the task of balancing opposite arguments: though susceptible
of high-wrought intellectual excitement—admiration or repugnance
as the case might be—they discharged it all in the final vote, and
then went home to their private affairs. But to the comparatively
rude men at Delphi, the speech of a first-rate Athenian orator was
a rarity. When Æschines, with great rhetorical force, unexpectedly
revived in their imaginations the ancient and terrific history of the
curse of Kirrha[1034]—assisted by all the force of visible and local
association—they were worked up to madness; while in such minds as
theirs, the emotion raised would not pass off by simple voting, but
required to be discharged by instant action.
[1033] Æschines adv. Ktesiph, p. 70.
[1034] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. ὡς δὲ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα
λαβὼν (Æschines) ἀφίκετο εἰς τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας, πάντα τἄλλ᾽ ἀφεὶς
καὶ παριδὼν ἐπέραινεν ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐμισθώθη, καὶ λόγους εὐπροσώπους
καὶ μύθους, ὅθεν ἡ Κιῤῥαία χώρα καθιερώθη, συνθεὶς καὶ διεξελθὼν,
~ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων~ καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προορωμένους, τοὺς
Ἀμφικτύονας, πείθει ψηφίσασθαι, etc.
How intense and ungovernable that emotion became, is shown by
the monstrous proceedings which followed. The original charge of
impiety brought against Athens, set forth by the Amphissian speaker
coarsely and ineffectively, and indeed noway lending itself to
exaggeration—was now altogether forgotten in the more heinous impiety
of which Æschines had accused the Amphissians themselves. About
the necessity of punishing them, there was but one language. The
Amphissian speakers appear to have fled—since even their persons
would hardly have been safe amidst such an excitement. And if the day
had not been already far advanced, the multitude would have rushed
at once down from the scene of debate to Kirrha.[1035] On account of
the lateness of the hour, a resolution was passed which the herald
formally proclaimed,—That on the morrow at daybreak, the whole
Delphian population, of sixteen years and upwards, freemen as well as
slaves, should muster at the sacrificing place, provided with spades
and pickaxes: That the assembly of Amphiktyonic legates would there
meet them, to act in defence of the god and the sacred property: That
if there were any city whose deputies did not appear, it should be
excluded from the temple, and proclaimed unholy and accursed.[1036]
[1035] Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. κραυγὴ πολλὴ καὶ θόρυβος ἦν
τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων, καὶ λόγος ἦν οὐκέτι περὶ τῶν ἀσπίδων ἃς ἡμεῖς
ἀνέθεμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων τιμωρίας. Ἤδη δὲ πόῤῥω
τῆς ἡμέρας οὔσης, προελθὼν ὁ κῆρυξ, etc.
[1036] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.
At daybreak, accordingly, the muster took place. The Delphian
multitude came with their implements for demolition:—the Amphiktyons
with Æschines placed themselves at the head:—and all marched down
to the port of Kirrha. Those there resident—probably astounded and
terrified at so furious an inroad from an entire population with
whom, a few hours before, they had been on friendly terms—abandoned
the place without resistance, and ran to acquaint their
fellow-citizens at Amphissa. The Amphiktyons with their followers
then entered Kirrha, demolished all the harbor-conveniences, and
even set fire to the houses in the town. This Æschines himself tells
us; and we may be very sure (though he does not tell us) that the
multitude thus set on were not contented with simply demolishing,
but plundered and carried away whatever they could lay hands on.
Presently, however, the Amphissians, whose town was on the high
ground about seven or eight miles west of Delphi, apprised of the
destruction of their property and seeing their houses in flames,
arrived in haste to the rescue, with their full-armed force. The
Amphiktyons and the Delphian multitude were obliged in their turn to
evacuate Kirrha, and hurry back to Delphi at their best speed. They
were in the greatest personal danger. According to Demosthenes, some
were actually seized; but they must have been set at liberty almost
immediately.[1037] None were put to death; an escape which they
probably owed to the respect borne by the Amphissians, even under
such exasperating circumstances, to the Amphiktyonic function.
[1037] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277. According to the second
decree of the Amphiktyons cited in this oration (p. 278), some of
the Amphiktyons were wounded. But I concur with Droysen, Franke,
and others, in disputing the genuineness of these decrees; and
the assertion, that some of the Amphiktyons were wounded, is one
among the grounds for disputing it: for if such had been the
fact, Æschines could hardly have failed to mention it; since it
would have suited exactly the drift and purpose of his speech.