Some enthusiasm was indeed required to determine volunteers in an

enterprise of which the formidable difficulties, and the doubtful

reward, were obvious from the beginning. But even before the

preparations were completed, news came which seemed to render it all

but hopeless. Hiketas sent a second mission, retracting all that he

said in the first, and desiring that no expedition might be sent from

Corinth. Not having received Corinthian aid in time (he said), he had

been compelled to enter into alliance with the Carthaginians, who

would not permit any Corinthian soldiers to set foot in Sicily. This

communication, greatly exasperating the Corinthians against Hiketas,

rendered them more hearty in votes to put him down. Yet their zeal

for active service, far from being increased, was probably even

abated by the aggravation of obstacles thus revealed. If Timoleon

even reached Sicily, he would find numberless enemies, without a

single friend of importance:—for without Hiketas, the Syracusan

people were almost helpless. But it now seemed impossible that

Timoleon with his small force could ever touch the Sicilian shore, in

the face of a numerous and active Carthaginian fleet.[306]

[306] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7.

While human circumstances thus seemed hostile, the gods held out to

Timoleon the most favorable signs and omens. Not only did he receive

an encouraging answer at Delphi, but while he was actually in the

temple, a fillet with intertwined wreaths and symbols of victory fell

from one of the statues upon his head. The priestesses of Persephonê

learnt from the goddess in a dream, that she was about to sail with

Timoleon for Sicily, her own favorite island. Accordingly he caused

a new special trireme to be fitted out, sacred to the Two goddesses

(Dêmêtêr and Persephonê) who were about to accompany him. And when,

after leaving Korkyra, the squadron struck across for a night voyage

to the Italian coast, this sacred trireme was seen illumined by a

blaze of light from heaven; while a burning torch on high, similar

to that which was usually carried in the Eleusinian mysteries,

ran along with the ship and guided the pilot to the proper landing

place at Metapontum. Such manifestations of divine presence and

encouragement, properly certified and commented upon by the prophets,

rendered the voyage one of universal hopefulness to the armament.[307]

[307] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 8; Diodor. xvi. 66.

These hopes, however, were sadly damped, when after disregarding

a formal notice from a Carthaginian man-of-war, they sailed down

the coast of Italy and at last reached Rhegium. This city, having

been before partially revived under the name of Phœbia, by the

younger Dionysius, appears now as reconstituted under its old name

and with its full former autonomy, since the overthrow of his rule

at Lokri and in Italy generally. Twenty Carthaginian triremes,

double the force of Timoleon, were found at Rhegium awaiting his

arrival—with envoys from Hiketas aboard. These envoys came with

what they pretended to be good news. “Hiketas had recently gained a

capital victory over Dionysius, whom he had expelled from most part

of Syracuse, and was now blocking up in Ortygia; with hopes of soon

starving him out, by the aid of a Carthaginian fleet. The common

enemy being thus at the end of his resources, the war could not be

prolonged. Hiketas therefore trusted that Timoleon would send back

to Corinth his fleet and troops, now become superfluous. If Timoleon

would do this, he (Hiketas) would be delighted to see him personally

at Syracuse, and would gladly consult him in the resettlement of that

unhappy city. But he could not admit the Corinthian armament into

the island; moreover, even had he been willing, the Carthaginians

peremptorily forbade it, and were prepared, in case of need, to repel

it with their superior naval force now in the strait.”[308]

[308] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 9; Diodor. xvi. 68.

The game which Hiketas was playing with the Carthaginians now stood

plainly revealed, to the vehement indignation of the armament.

Instead of being their friend, or even neutral, he was nothing less

than a pronounced enemy, emancipating Syracuse from Dionysius only

to divide it between himself and the Carthaginians. Yet with all

the ardor of the armament, it was impossible to cross the strait

in opposition to an enemy’s fleet of double force. Accordingly

Timoleon resorted to a stratagem, in which the leaders and people

of Rhegium, eagerly sympathizing with his projects of Sicilian

emancipation, coöperated. In an interview with the envoys of Hiketas

as well as with the Carthaginian commanders, he affected to accept

the conditions prescribed by Hiketas; admitting at once that it was

useless to stand out. But he at the same time reminded them, that

he had been intrusted with the command of the armament for Sicilian

purposes,—and that he should be a disgraced man, if he now conducted

it back without touching the island; except under the pressure of

some necessity not merely real, but demonstrable to all and attested

by unexceptionable witnesses. He therefore desired them to appear,

along with him, before the public assembly of Rhegium, a neutral

city and common friend of both parties. They would then publicly

repeat the communication which they had already made to him, and they

would enter into formal engagement for the good treatment of the

Syracusans, as soon as Dionysius should be expelled. Such proceeding

would make the people of Rhegium witnesses on both points. They would

testify on his (Timoleon’s) behalf, when he came to defend himself

at Corinth, that he had turned his back only before invincible

necessity, and that he had exacted everything in his power in the

way of guarantee for Syracuse; they would testify also on behalf of

the Syracusans, in case the guarantee now given should be hereafter

evaded.[309]

[309] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 10.

Neither the envoys of Hiketas, nor the Carthaginian commanders, had

any motive to decline what seemed to them an unmeaning ceremony. Both

of them accordingly attended, along with Timoleon, before the public

assembly of Rhegium formally convened. The gates of the city were

closed (a practice usual during the time of a public assembly): the

Carthaginian men-of-war lay as usual near at hand, but in no state

for immediate movement, and perhaps with many of the crews ashore;

since all chance of hostility seemed to be past. What had been

already communicated to Timoleon from Hiketas and the Carthaginians,

was now repeated in formal deposition before the assembly; the envoys

of Hiketas probably going into the case more at length, with certain

flourishes of speech prompted by their own vanity. Timoleon stood by

as an attentive listener; but before he could rise to reply, various

Rhegine speakers came forward with comments or questions, which

called up the envoys again. A long time was thus insensibly wasted,

Timoleon often trying to get an opportunity to speak, but being

always apparently constrained to give way to some obtrusive Rhegine.

During this long time, however, his triremes in the harbor were not

idle. One by one, with as little noise as possible, they quitted

their anchorage and rowed out to sea, directing their course towards

Sicily. The Carthaginian fleet, though seeing this proceeding,

neither knew what it meant, nor had any directions to prevent it. At

length the other Grecian triremes were all afloat and in progress;

that of Timoleon alone remaining in the harbor. Intimation being

secretly given to him as he sat in the assembly, he slipped away

from the crowd, his friends concealing his escape—and got aboard

immediately. His absence was not discovered at first, the debate

continuing as if he were still present, and intentionally prolonged

by the Rhegine speakers. At length the truth could no longer be kept

back. The envoys and the Carthaginians found out that the assembly

and the debate were mere stratagems, and that their real enemy had

disappeared. But they found it out too late. Timoleon with his

triremes was already on the voyage to Tauromenium in Sicily, where

all arrived safe and without opposition. Overreached and humiliated,

his enemies left the assembly in vehement wrath against the Rhegines,

who reminded them that Carthaginians ought to be the last to complain

of deception in others.[310]

[310] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 10, 11.

The well-managed stratagem, whereby Timoleon had overcome a

difficulty to all appearance insurmountable, exalted both his own

fame and the spirits of his soldiers. They were now safe in Sicily,

at Tauromenium, a recent settlement near the site of the ancient

Naxos: receiving hearty welcome from Andromachus, the leading citizen

of the place—whose influence was so mildly exercised, and gave such

complete satisfaction, that it continued through and after the reform

of Timoleon, when the citizens might certainly have swept it away

if they had desired. Andromachus, having been forward in inviting

Timoleon to come, now prepared to coöperate with him, and returned

a spirited reply to the menaces sent over from Rhegium by the

Carthaginians, after they had vainly pursued the Corinthian squadron

to Tauromenium.

But Andromachus and Tauromenium were but petty auxiliaries compared

with the enemies against whom Timoleon had to contend; enemies

now more formidable than ever. For Hiketas, incensed with the

stratagem practised at Rhegium, and apprehensive of interruption

to the blockade which he was carrying on against Ortygia, sent for

an additional squadron of Carthaginian men-of-war to Syracuse;

the harbor of which place was presently completely beset.[311]

A large Carthaginian land force was also acting under Hanno in

the western regions of the island, with considerable success

against the Campanians of Entella and others.[312] The Sicilian

towns had their native despots, Mamerkus at Katana—Leptines

at Apollonia[313]—Nikodemus at Kentoripa—Apolloniades at

Agyrium[314]—from whom Timoleon could expect no aid, except in so

far as they might feel predominant fear of the Carthaginians. And

the Syracusans, even when they heard of his arrival at Tauromenium,

scarcely ventured to indulge hopes of serious relief from such a

handful of men, against the formidable array of Hiketas and the

Carthaginians under their walls. Moreover, what guarantee had they

that Timoleon would turn out better than Dion, Kallippus, and others

before him? seductive promisers of emancipation, who, if they

succeeded, forgot the words by which they had won men’s hearts,

and thought only of appropriating to themselves the sceptre of the

previous despot, perhaps even aggravating all that was bad in his

rule? Such was the question asked by many a suffering citizen of

Syracuse, amidst that despair and sickness of heart which made the

name of an armed liberator sound only like a new deceiver and a new

scourge.[315]

[311] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11.

[312] Diodor. xvi. 67.

[313] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13-24; Diodor. xvi. 72.

[314] Diodor. xvi. 82.

[315] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11.

It was by acts alone that Timoleon could refute such well-grounded

suspicions. But at first, no one believed in him; nor could he

escape the baneful effects of that mistrust which his predecessors

had everywhere inspired. The messengers whom he sent round were so

coldly received, that he seemed likely to find no allies beyond the

walls of Tauromenium.

At length one invitation, of great importance, reached him—from the

town of Adranum, about forty miles inland from Tauromenium; a native

Sikel town, seemingly in part hellenized, inconsiderable in size, but

venerated as sacred to the god Adranus, whose worship was diffused

throughout all Sicily. The Adranites being politically divided, at

the same time that one party sent the invitation to Timoleon, the

other despatched a similar message to Hiketas. Either at Syracuse or

Leontini, Hiketas was nearer to Adranum than Timoleon at Tauromenium;

and lost no time in marching thither, with five thousand troops, to

occupy so important a place. He arrived there in the evening, found

no enemy, and established his camp without the walls, believing

himself already master of the place. Timoleon, with his inferior

numbers, knew that he had no chance of success except in surprise.

Accordingly, on setting out from Tauromenium, he made no great

progress the first day, in order that no report of his approach might

reach Adranum; but on the next morning he marched with the greatest

possible effort, taking the shortest, yet most rugged paths. On

arriving within about three miles of Adranum, he was informed that

the troops from Syracuse, having just finished their march, had

encamped near the town, not aware of any enemy near. His officers

were anxious that the men should be refreshed after their very

fatiguing march, before they ventured to attack an army four times

superior in number. But Timoleon earnestly protested against any

such delay, entreating them to follow him at once against the enemy,

as the only chance of finding them unprepared. To encourage them,

he at once took up his shield and marched at their head, carrying

it on his arm (the shield of the general was habitually carried for

him by an orderly), in spite of the fatiguing march, which he had

himself performed on foot as well as they. The soldiers obeyed, and

the effort was crowned by complete success. The troops of Hiketas,

unarmed and at their suppers, were taken so completely by surprise,

that in spite of their superior number, they fled with scarce any

resistance. From the rapidity of their flight, three hundred of them

only were slain, But six hundred were made prisoners, and the whole

camp, including its appurtenances, was taken, with scarcely the loss

of a man. Hiketas escaped with the rest to Syracuse.[316]

[316] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12; Diodor. xvi. 68. Diodorus and

Plutarch agree in the numbers both of killed and of prisoners on

the side of Hiketas.

This victory, so rapidly and skilfully won—and the acquisition of

Adranum which followed it—produced the strongest sensation throughout

Sicily. It counted even for more than a victory; it was a declaration

of the gods in favor of Timoleon. The inhabitants of the holy

town, opening their gates and approaching him with awe-stricken

reverence, recounted the visible manifestations of the god Adranus

in his favor. At the moment when the battle was commencing, they

had seen the portals of their temple spontaneously burst open, and

the god brandishing his spear, with profuse perspiration on his

face.[317] Such facts,—verified and attested in a place of peculiar

sanctity, and circulated from thence throughout the neighboring

communities,—contributed hardly less than the victory to exalt the

glory of Timoleon. He received offers of alliance from Tyndaris and

several other towns, as well as from Mamerkus despot of Katana,

one of the most warlike and powerful princes in the island.[318]

So numerous were the reinforcements thus acquired, and so much was

his confidence enhanced by recent success, that he now ventured to

march even under the walls of Syracuse, and defy Hiketas; who did not

think it prudent to hazard a second engagement with the victor of

Adranum.[319]

[317] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12.

[318] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 69.

[319] Diodor. xvi. 68, 69. That Timoleon marched up to Syracuse,

is stated by Diodorus, though not by Plutarch. I follow Diodorus

so far; because it makes the subsequent proceedings in regard to

Dionysius more clear and intelligible.

But Diodorus adds two further matters, which cannot be correct.

He affirms that Timoleon pursued Hiketas at a running pace

(δρομαῖος) immediately from the field of battle at Adranum to

Syracuse; and that he then got possession of the portion of

Syracuse called Epipolæ.

Now it was with some difficulty that Timoleon could get his

troops even up to the field of battle at Adranum, without some

previous repose; so long and fatiguing was the march which they

had undergone from Tauromenium. It is therefore impossible that

they can have been either inclined or competent to pursue (at

a rapid pace) Hiketas immediately from the field of battle at

Adranum to Syracuse.

Next, it will appear from subsequent operations, that Timoleon

did not, on this occasion, get possession of any other portion of

Syracuse than the Islet Ortygia, surrendered to him by Dionysius.

He did not enter Epipolæ until afterwards.

Hiketas was still master of all Syracuse—except Ortygia, against

which he had constructed lines of blockade, in conjunction with

the Carthaginian fleet occupying the harbor. Timoleon was in no

condition to attack the place, and would have been obliged speedily

to retire, as his enemies did not choose to come out. But it was soon

seen that the manifestations of the Two goddesses, and of the god

Adranus, in his favor, were neither barren nor delusive. A real boon

was now thrown into his lap, such as neither skill nor valor could

have won. Dionysius, blocked up in Ortygia with a scanty supply of

provisions, saw from his walls the approaching army of Timoleon, and

heard of the victory of Adranum. He had already begun to despair of

his own position of Ortygia;[320] where indeed he might perhaps hold

out by bold effort and steady endurance, but without any reasonable

chance of again becoming master of Syracuse; a chance which Timoleon

and the Corinthian intervention cut off more decidedly than ever.

Dionysius was a man not only without the energetic character and

personal ascendency of his father, which might have made head

against such difficulties—but indolent and drunken in his habits,

not relishing a sceptre when it could only be maintained by hard

fighting, nor stubborn enough to stand out to the last merely as a

cause of war.[321] Under these dispositions, the arrival of Timoleon

both suggested to him the idea, and furnished him with the means, of

making his resignation subservient to the purchase of a safe asylum

and comfortable future maintenance: for to a Grecian despot, with

the odium of past severities accumulated upon his head, abnegation

of power was hardly ever possible, consistent with personal

security.[322] But Dionysius felt assured that he might trust to the

guarantee of Timoleon and the Corinthians for shelter and protection

at Corinth, with as much property as he could carry away with him;

since he had the means of purchasing such guarantee by the surrender

of Ortygia—a treasure of inestimable worth. Accordingly he resolved

to propose a capitulation, and sent envoys to Timoleon for the

purpose.

[320] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13. ἀπειρηκὼς ἤδη ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ

μικρὸν ἀπολιπὼν ἐκπολιορκεῖσθαι, etc.

[321] Tacitus, Histor. iii. 70. Respecting the last days of the

Emperor Vitellius, “Ipse, neque jubendi neque vetandi potens, non

jam Imperator, sed tantum belli causa erat.”

[322] See, among other illustrations of this fact, the striking

remark of Solon (Plutarch, Solon, c. 14).

There was little difficulty in arranging terms. Dionysius stipulated

only for a safe transit with his movable property to Corinth, and

for an undisturbed residence in that city; tendering in exchange

the unconditional surrender of Ortygia with all its garrison, arms,

and magazines. The convention was concluded forthwith, and three

Corinthian officers—Telemachus, Eukleides and Neon—were sent in with

four hundred men to take charge of the place. Their entrance was

accomplished safely, though they were obliged to elude the blockade

by stealing in at several times, and in small companies. Making over

to them the possession of Ortygia with the command of its garrison,

Dionysius passed, with some money and a small number of companions,

into the camp of Timoleon; who conveyed him away, leaving at the same

time the neighborhood of Syracuse.[323]

[323] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 70. Diodorus

appears to me to misdate these facts; placing the capitulation of

Dionysius and the surrender of Ortygia to Timoleon, _after_ the

capture of the other portion of Syracuse by Timoleon. I follow

Plutarch’s chronology, which places the capitulation of Ortygia

first.

Conceive the position and feelings of Dionysius, a prisoner in the

camp of Timoleon, traversing that island over which his father as

well as himself had reigned all-powerful, and knowing himself to

be the object of either hatred or contempt to every one,—except so

far as the immense boon which he had conferred, by surrendering

Ortygia, purchased for him an indulgent forbearance! He was doubtless

eager for immediate departure to Corinth, while Timoleon was no

less anxious to send him thither, as the living evidence of triumph

accomplished. Although not fifty days[324] had yet elapsed, since

Timoleon’s landing in Sicily, he was enabled already to announce a

decisive victory, a great confederacy grouped around him, and the

possession of the inexpugnable position of Ortygia, with a garrison

equal in number to his own army; the despatches being accompanied

by the presence of that very despot, bearing the terrific name

of Dionysius, against whom the expedition had been chiefly aimed!

Timoleon sent a special trireme[325] to Corinth, carrying Dionysius,

and communicating important events, together with the convention

which guaranteed to the dethroned ruler an undisturbed residence in

that city.

[324] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.

[325] Theopompus stated that Dionysius had gone from Sicily to

Corinth in a merchant ship (νηῒ στρογγύλῃ). Timæus contradicted

this assertion seemingly with his habitual asperity, and stated

that Dionysius had been sent in a ship of war (νηῒ μακρᾷ). See

Timæus, Fragment 133; Theopompus, Fragm. 216, ed. Didot.

Diodorus (xvi. 70) copies Theopompus.

Polybius (xii. 4 _a_) censures Timæus for cavilling at such

small inaccuracies, as if the difference between the two were

not worth noticing. Probably the language of Timæus may have

deserved blame as ill-mannered; but the matter of fact appears to

me to have been perfectly worth correcting. To send Dionysius in

a trireme, was treating him as prisoner in a respectful manner,

which Timoleon was doubtless bound to do; and which he would be

inclined to do on his own account—seeing that he had a strong

interest in making the entry of Dionysius as a captive into

Corinth, an impressive sight. Moreover the trireme would reach

Corinth more speedily than the merchantman.

That Dionysius should go in a merchant-ship, was one additional

evidence of fallen fortune; and this seems to have been the

reason why it was taken up by Theopompus—from the passion,

prevalent among so many Greek authors, for exaggerating contrasts.

The impression produced at Corinth by the arrival of this trireme

and its passengers was powerful beyond all parallel. Astonishment

and admiration were universal; for the expedition of Timoleon had

started as a desperate venture, in which scarce one among the leading

Corinthians had been disposed to embark; nor had any man conceived

the possibility of success so rapid as well as so complete. But the

victorious prospect in Sicily, with service under the fortunate

general, was now the general passion of the citizens. A reinforcement

of two thousand hoplites and two hundred cavalry was immediately

voted and equipped.[326]

[326] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13, 14, 15.

If the triumph excited wonder and joy, the person of Dionysius

himself appealed no less powerfully to other feelings. A fallen

despot was a sight denied to Grecian eyes; whoever aspired to

despotism, put his all to hazard, forfeiting his chance of retiring

to a private station. By a remarkable concurrence of circumstances,

the exception to this rule was presented just where it was least

likely to take place; in the case of the most formidable and odious

despotism which had ever overridden the Grecian world. For nearly

half a century prior to the expedition of Dion against Syracuse,

every one had been accustomed to pronounce the name of Dionysius

with a mixture of fear and hatred—the sentiment of prostration

before irresistible force. How much difficulty Dion himself found,

in overcoming this impression in the minds of his own soldiers, has

been already related. Though dissipated by the success of Dion, the

antecedent alarm became again revived, when Dionysius recovered his

possession of Ortygia, and when the Syracusans made pathetic appeal

to Corinth for aid against him. Now, on a sudden, the representative

of this extinct greatness, himself bearing the awful name of

Dionysius, enters Corinth under a convention, suing only for the

humble domicile and unpretending security of a private citizen.[327]

The Greek mind was keenly sensitive to such contrasts, which entered

largely into every man’s views of human affairs, and were reproduced

in a thousand forms by writers and speakers. The affluence of

visitors—who crowded to gaze upon and speak to Dionysius, not merely

from Corinth, but from other cities of Greece—was immense; some in

simple curiosity, others with compassion, a few even with insulting

derision. The anecdotes which are recounted seem intended to convey

a degrading impression of this last period of his career. But even

the common offices of life—the purchase of unguents and condiments at

the tavern[328]—the nicety of criticism displayed respecting robes

and furniture[329]—looked degrading when performed by the ex-despot

of Syracuse. His habit of drinking largely, already contracted, was

not likely to become amended in these days of mortification; yet on

the whole his conduct seems to have had more dignity than could have

been expected. His literary tastes, manifested during the time of his

intercourse with Plato, are implied even in the anecdotes intended to

disparage him. Thus he is said to have opened a school for teaching

boys to read, and to have instructed the public singers in the art

of singing or reciting poetry.[330] His name served to subsequent

writers, both Greek and Roman,—as those of Crœsus, Polykrates, and

Xerxes, serve to Herodotus—for an instance to point a moral on the

mutability of human events. Yet the anecdotes recorded about him can

rarely be verified, nor can we distinguish real matters of fact from

those suitable and impressive myths which so pregnant a situation was

sure to bring forth.

[327] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 14; Diodor. xvi. 70. The remarks

of Tacitus upon the last hours of the Emperor Vitellius have

their application to the Greek feeling on this occasion (Histor.

iii. 68):—“Nec quisquam adeo rerum humanarum immemor, quem non

commoveret illa facies; Romanum principem, et generis humani

paulo ante dominum, relictâ fortunæ suæ sede, exire de imperio.

_Nihil tale viderant, nihil audierant_,” etc.

[328] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 14; Theopomp. Fragm. 217, ed.

Didot.; Justin xxi. 5.

[329] Timæus, ap. Polybium. xii. 24.

[330] Plutarch, Timol. c. 14; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. iii. 12, 7.

His remark, that Dionysius opened the school from anxiety still

to have the pleasure of exercising authority, can hardly be meant

as serious.

We cannot suppose that Dionysius in his exile at Corinth suffered

under any want of a comfortable income: for it is mentioned, that

all his movable furniture (ἐπισκευὴ) was bought by his namesake

Dionysius, the fortunate despot of the Pontic Herakleia; and

this furniture was so magnificent, that the acquisition of it is

counted among the peculiar marks of ornament and dignity to the

Herakleotic dynasty:—see the Fragments of the historian Memnon of

Herakleia, ch. iv. p. 10, ed. Orell. apud Photium Cod. 224.

Among those who visited him at Corinth was Aristoxenus of Tarentum:

for the Tarentine leaders, first introduced by Plato, had maintained

their correspondence with Dionysius even after his first expulsion

from Syracuse to Lokri, and had vainly endeavored to preserve his

unfortunate wife and daughters from the retributive vengeance

of the Lokrians. During the palmy days of Dionysius, his envoy

Polyarchus had been sent on a mission to Tarentum, where he came into

conversation with the chief magistrate Archytas. This conversation

Aristoxenus had recorded in writing; probably from the personal

testimony of Archytas, whose biography he composed. Polyarchus dwelt

upon wealth, power, and sensual enjoyments, as the sole objects worth

living for; pronouncing those who possessed them in large masses,

as the only beings deserving admiration. At the summit of all stood

the Persian King, whom Polyarchus extolled as the most enviable and

admirable of mortals. “Next to the Persian King (said he), though

with a very long interval, comes our despot of Syracuse.”[331] What

had become of Polyarchus, we do not know; but Aristoxenus lived to

see the envied Dionysius under the altered phase of his life at

Corinth, and probably to witness the ruin of the Persian Kings also.

On being asked, what had been the cause of his displeasure against

Plato, Dionysius replied, in language widely differing from that

of his former envoy Polyarchus, that amidst the many evils which

surrounded a despot, none was so mischievous as the unwillingness of

his so-called friends to tell him the truth. Such false friends had

poisoned the good feeling between him and Plato.[332] This anecdote

bears greater mark of being genuine, than others which we read more

witty and pungent. The Cynic philosopher Diogenes treated Dionysius

with haughty scorn for submitting to live in a private station after

having enjoyed so overruling an ascendency. Such was more or less the

sentiment of every visitor who saw him; but the matter to be lamented

is, that he had not been in a private station from the beginning.

He was by nature unfit to tread, even with profit to himself, the

perilous and thorny path of a Grecian despot.

[331] Aristoxenus, Fragm. 15, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, p. 545.

δεύτερον δὲ, φησὶ, τὸν ἡμέτερον τύραννον θείη τις ἂν, καίπερ πολὺ

λειπόμενον.

One sees that the word τύραννος was used even by those who

intended no unfriendly sense—applied by an admiring envoy to his

master.

[332] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15. Aristoxenus heard from Dionysius

at Corinth the remarkable anecdote about the faithful attachment

of the two Pythagorean friends, Damon and Phintias. Dionysius

had been strongly impressed with the incident, and was fond of

relating it (~πολλάκις~ ἡμῖν διηγεῖτο, Aristoxen. Fragm. 9, ed.

Didot; apud Jamblichum Vit. Pythag. s. 233).

The reinforcements decreed by the Corinthians, though equipped

without delay and forwarded to Thurii in Italy, were prevented

from proceeding farther on shipboard by the Carthaginian squadron

at the strait, and were condemned to wait for a favorable

opportunity.[333] But the greatest of all reinforcements to Timoleon

was, the acquisition of Ortygia. It contained not merely a garrison

of two thousand soldiers—who passed (probably much to their own

satisfaction) from the declining cause of Dionysius to the victorious

banner of Timoleon—but also every species of military stores. There

were horses, engines for siege and battery, missiles of every sort,

and above all, shields and spears to the amazing number of seventy

thousand—if Plutarch’s statement is exact.[334] Having dismissed

Dionysius, Timoleon organized a service of small craft from Katana to

convey provisions by sea to Ortygia, eluding the Carthaginian guard

squadron. He found means to do this with tolerable success,[335]

availing himself of winds or bad weather, when the ships of war could

not obstruct the entrance of the lesser harbor. Meanwhile he himself

returned to Adranum, a post convenient for watching both Leontini and

Syracuse. Here two assassins, bribed by Hiketas, were on the point

of taking his life, while sacrificing at a festival; and were only

prevented by an accident so remarkable, that every one recognized the

visible intervention of the gods to protect him.[336]

[333] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.

[334] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.

[335] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 18.

[336] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.

Meanwhile Hiketas, being resolved to acquire possession of Ortygia,

invoked the aid of the full Carthaginian force under Magon. The

great harbor of Syracuse was presently occupied by an overwhelming

fleet of one hundred and fifty Carthaginian ships of war, while a

land force, said to consist of sixty thousand men, came also to join

Hiketas, and were quartered by him within the walls of Syracuse.

Never before had any Carthaginian troops got footing within those

walls. Syracusan liberty, perhaps Syracusan Hellenism, now appeared

extinct. Even Ortygia, in spite of the bravery of its garrison under

the Corinthian Neon, seemed not long tenable, against repeated attack

and battery of the walls, combined with strict blockade to keep out

supplies by sea. Still, however, though the garrison was distressed,

some small craft with provisions from Katana contrived to slip in; a

fact, which induced Hiketas and Magon to form the plan of attacking

that town, thinking themselves strong enough to accomplish this by

a part of their force, without discontinuing the siege of Ortygia.

Accordingly they sailed forth from the harbor, and marched from the

city of Syracuse, with the best part of their armament, to attack

Katana, leaving Ortygia still under blockade. But the commanders

left behind were so negligent in their watch, that Neon soon saw

from the walls of Ortygia the opportunity of attacking them with

advantage. Making a sudden and vigorous sally, he fell upon the

blockading army unawares, routed them at all points with serious

loss, and pressed his pursuit so warmly, that he got possession of

Achradina, expelling them from that important section of the city.

The provisions and money, acquired herein at a critical moment,

rendered this victory important. But what gave it the chief value

was, the possession of Achradina which Neon immediately caused to

be joined on to Ortygia by a new line of fortifications, and thus

held the two in combination.[337] Ortygia had been before (as I have

already remarked) completely distinct from Achradina. It is probable

that the population of Achradina, delighted to be liberated from

the Carthaginians, lent zealous aid to Neon both in the defence of

their own walls, and in the construction of the new connecting lines

towards Ortygia; for which the numerous intervening tombs would

supply materials.

[337] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 18. ... Ὁ δὲ Κορίνθιος Νέων,

κατιδὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄκρας τοὺς ὑπολελειμμένους τῶν πολεμίων ἀργῶς

καὶ ἀμελῶς φυλάττοντας, ἐξαίφνης ἐνέπεσε διεσπαρμένοις αὐτοῖς·

καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνελὼν, τοὺς δὲ τρεψάμενος, ἐκράτησε καὶ κατέσχε

τὴν λεγομένην Ἀχραδινὴν, ὃ κράτιστον ἐδόκει καὶ ἀθραυστότατον

ὑπάρχειν τῆς Συρακουσίων μέρος πόλεως, τρόπον τινα συγκειμένης

καὶ συνηρμοσμένης ἐκ πλειόνων πόλεων. Εὐπορήσας δὲ καὶ σίτου καὶ

χρημάτων οὐκ ἀφῆκε τὸν τόπον, οὐδ᾽ ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν,

ἀλλὰ φραξάμενος τὸν περίβολον τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς ~καὶ συνάψας τοῖς

ἐρύμασι πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν~, διεφύλαττε.

This gallant exploit of Neon permanently changed the position of the

combatants at Syracuse. A horseman started instantly to convey the

bad news to Hiketas and Magon near Katana. Both of them returned

forthwith; but they returned only to occupy half of the city—Tycha,

Neapolis, and Epipolæ. It became extremely difficult to prosecute a

successful siege or blockade of Ortygia and Achradina united: besides

that Neon had now obtained abundant supplies for the moment.

Meanwhile Timoleon too was approaching, reinforced by the new

Corinthian division; who, having been at first detained at Thurii,

and becoming sick of delay, had made their way inland, across the

Bruttian territory, to Rhegium. They were fortunate enough to find

the strait unguarded; for the Carthaginian admiral Hanno—having seen

their ships laid up at Thurii, and not anticipating their advance

by land—had first returned with his squadron to the Strait of

Messina, and next, hoping by a stratagem to frighten the garrison of

Ortygia into surrender, had sailed to the harbor of Syracuse with his

triremes decorated as if after a victory. His seamen with wreaths

round their heads, shouted as they passed into the harbor under

the walls of Ortygia, that the Corinthian squadron approaching the

strait had been all captured, and exhibited as proofs of the victory

certain Grecian shields hung up aboard. By this silly fabrication,

Hanno probably produced a serious dismay among the garrison of

Ortygia. But he purchased such temporary satisfaction at the cost of

leaving the strait unguarded, and allowing the Corinthian division

to cross unopposed from Italy into Sicily. On reaching Rhegium,

they not only found the strait free, but also a complete and sudden

calm, succeeding upon several days of stormy weather. Embarking

immediately on such ferry boats and fishing craft as they could find,

and swimming their horses alongside by the bridle, they reached the

Sicilian coast without loss or difficulty.[338]

[338] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 19.

Thus did the gods again show their favor towards Timoleon by an

unusual combination of circumstances, and by smiting the enemy with

blindness. So much did the tide of success run along with him, that

the important town of Messênê declared itself among his allies,

admitting the new Corinthian soldiers immediately on their landing.

With little delay, they proceeded forward to join Timoleon; who

thought himself strong enough, notwithstanding that even with this

reinforcement he could only command four thousand men, to march up

to the vicinity of Syracuse, and there to confront the immeasurably

superior force of his enemies.[339] He appears to have encamped near

the Olympieion, and the bridge over the river Anapus.

[339] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20.

Though Timoleon was sure of the coöperation of Neon and the

Corinthian garrison in Ortygia and Achradina, yet he was separated

from them by the numerous force of Hiketas and Magon, who occupied

Epipolæ, Neapolis, and Tycha, together with the low ground between

Epipolæ and the Great Harbor; while the large Carthaginian fleet

filled the Harbor itself. On a reasonable calculation, Timoleon

seemed to have little chance of success. But suspicion had already

begun in the mind of Magon, sowing the seeds of disunion between

him and Hiketas. The alliance between Carthaginians and Greeks

was one unnatural to both parties, and liable to be crossed, at

every mischance, by mutual distrust, growing out of antipathy

which each party felt in itself and knew to subsist in the other.

The unfortunate scheme of marching to Katana, with the capital

victory gained by Neon in consequence of that absence, made Magon

believe that Hiketas was betraying him. Such apprehensions were

strengthened, when he saw in his front the army of Timoleon, posted

on the river Anapus—and when he felt that he was in a Greek city

generally disaffected to him, while Neon was at his rear in Ortygia

and Achradina. Under such circumstances, Magon conceived the whole

safety of his Carthaginians as depending on the zealous and faithful

coöperation of Hiketas, in whom he had now ceased to confide.

And his mistrust, once suggested, was aggravated by the friendly

communication which he saw going on between the soldiers of Timoleon

and those of Hiketas. These soldiers, all Greeks and mercenaries

fighting for a country not their own, encountered each other, on

the field of battle, like enemies,—but conversed in a pacific and

amicable way, during intervals, in their respective camps. Both

were now engaged, without disturbing each other, in catching eels

amidst the marshy and watery ground between Epipolæ and the Anapus.

Interchanging remarks freely, they were admiring the splendor and

magnitude of Syracuse with its great maritime convenience,—when one

of Timoleon’s soldiers observed to the opposite party—“And this

magnificent city, you, Greeks as you are, are striving to barbarise,

planting these Carthaginian cut-throats nearer to us than they now

are; though our first anxiety ought to be, to keep them as far off as

possible from Greece. Do you really suppose that they have brought

up this host from the Atlantic and the pillars of Herakles, all for

the sake of Hiketas and his rule? Why, if Hiketas took measure of

affairs like a true ruler, he would not thus turn out his brethren,

and bring in an enemy to his country; he would ensure to himself an

honorable sway, by coming to an understanding with the Corinthians

and Timoleon.” Such was the colloquy passing between the soldiers

of Timoleon and those of Hiketas, and speedily made known to the

Carthaginians. Having made apparently strong impression on those to

whom it was addressed, it justified alarm in Magon; who was led to

believe that he could no longer trust his Sicilian allies. Without

any delay, he put all his troops aboard the fleet, and in spite

of the most strenuous remonstrances from Hiketas sailed away to

Africa.[340]

[340] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20.

On the next day, when Timoleon approached to the attack, he was

amazed to find the Carthaginian army and fleet withdrawn. His

soldiers, scarcely believing their eyes, laughed to scorn the

cowardice of Magon. Still however Hiketas determined to defend

Syracuse with his own troops, in spite of the severe blow inflicted

by Magon’s desertion. That desertion had laid open both the Harbor,

and the lower ground near the Harbor; so that Timoleon was enabled

to come into direct communication with his garrison in Ortygia and

Achradina, and to lay plans for a triple simultaneous onset. He

himself undertook to attack the southern front of Epipolæ towards the

river Anapus, where the city was strongest; the Corinthian Isias was

instructed to make a vigorous assault from Achradina, or the eastern

side; while Deinarchus and Demaretus, the generals who had conducted

the recent reinforcement from Corinth, were ordered to attack the

northern wall of Epipolæ, or the Hexapylon;[341] they were probably

sent round from Ortygia, by sea, to land at Trogilus. Hiketas,

holding as he did the aggregate consisting of Epipolæ, Tycha,

and Neapolis, was assailed on three sides at once. He had a most

defensible position, which a good commander, with brave and faithful

troops, might have maintained against forces more numerous than those

of Timoleon. Yet in spite of such advantages, no effective resistance

was made, nor even attempted. Timoleon not only took the place, but

took it without the loss of a single man, killed or wounded. Hiketas

and his followers fled to Leontini.[342]

[341] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21. The account given by Plutarch of

Timoleon’s attack is very intelligible. He states that the side

of Epipolæ fronting southwards or towards the river Anapus was

the strongest.

Saverio Cavallari (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 22) confirms

this, by remarking that the northern side of Epipolæ, towards

Trogilus, is the weakest, and easiest for access or attack.

We thus see that Epipolæ was the _last_ portion of Syracuse which

Timoleon mastered—not the _first_ portion, as Diodorus states

(xvi. 69).

[342] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21.

The desertion of Magon explains of course a great deal of

discouragement among the soldiers of Hiketas. But when we read the

astonishing facility of the capture, it is evident that there must

have been something more than discouragement. The soldiers on defence

were really unwilling to use their arms for the purpose of repelling

Timoleon, and keeping up the dominion of Hiketas in Syracuse. When we

find this sentiment so powerfully manifested, we cannot but discern

that the aversion of these men to serve, in what they looked upon

as a Carthaginian cause, threw into the hands of Timoleon an easy

victory, and that the mistrustful retreat of Magon was not so absurd

and cowardly as Plutarch represents.[343]

[343] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20, 21. Diodorus also implies the

same verdict (xvi. 69), though his account is brief as well as

obscure.

The Grecian public, however, not minutely scrutinizing preliminary

events, heard the easy capture as a fact, and heard it with unbounded

enthusiasm. From Sicily and Italy the news rapidly spread to Corinth

and other parts of Greece. Everywhere the sentiment was the same;

astonishment and admiration, not merely at the magnitude of the

conquest, but also at the ease and rapidity with which it had been

achieved. The arrival of the captive Dionysius at Corinth had been in

itself a most impressive event. But now the Corinthians learnt the

disappearance of the large Carthaginian host and the total capture of

Syracuse, without the loss of a man; and that too before they were

even assured that their second reinforcement, which they knew to have

been blocked up at Thurii, had been able to touch the Sicilian shore.

Such transcendent novelties excited even in Greece, and much more

in Sicily itself, a sentiment towards Timoleon such as hardly any

Greek had ever yet drawn to himself. His bravery, his skilful plans,

his quickness of movement, were indeed deservedly admired. But in

this respect, others had equalled him before; and we may remark that

even the Corinthian Neon, in his capture of Achradina, had rivalled

anything performed by his superior officer. But that which stood

without like or second in Timoleon—that which set a peculiar stamp

upon all his meritorious qualities—was, his superhuman good fortune;

or—what in the eyes of most Greeks was the same thing in other

words—the unbounded favor with which the gods had cherished both his

person and his enterprise. Though greatly praised as a brave and able

man, Timoleon was still more affectionately hailed as an enviable

man.[344] “Never had the gods been so manifest in their dispensations

of kindness towards any mortal.[345]” The issue, which Telekleides

had announced as being upon trial when Timoleon was named, now stood

triumphantly determined. After the capture of Syracuse, we may be

sure that no one ever denounced Timoleon as a fratricide;—every one

extolled him as a tyrannicide. The great exploits of other eminent

men, such as Agesilaus and Epaminondas, had been achieved at the cost

of hardship, severe fighting, wounds and death to those concerned,

etc., all of which counted as so many deductions from the perfect

mental satisfaction of the spectator. Like an oration or poem

smelling of the lamp, they bore too clearly the marks of preliminary

toil and fatigue. But Timoleon, as the immortal gods descending to

combat on the plain of Troy, accomplished splendid feats,—overthrew

what seemed insuperable obstacles—by a mere first appearance, and

without an effort. He exhibited to view a magnificent result,

executed with all that apparent facility belonging as a privilege

to the inspirations of first-rate genius.[346] Such a spectacle of

virtue and good fortune combined—glorious consummation with graceful

facility—was new to the Grecian world.

[344] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21. Τὸ μὲν ἁλῶναι τὴν πόλιν

(Syracuse) κατ᾽ ἄκρας καὶ γενέσθαι ταχέως ὑποχείριον ἐκπεσόντων

τῶν πολεμίων, δίκαιον ἀναθεῖναι τῇ τῶν μαχομένων ἀνδραγαθίᾳ καὶ

τῇ δεινότητι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν τινα μηδὲ τρωθῆναι

τῶν Κορινθίων, ἴδιον ἔργον αὑτῆς ἡ Τιμολέοντος ἐπεδείξατο

τύχη, καθάπερ διαμιλλωμένη πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς, ~ἵνα

τῶν ἐπαινουμένων αὐτοῦ τὰ μακαριζόμενα μᾶλλον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι

θαυμάζωσιν~.

[345] Homer, Odyss. iii. 219 (Nestor addressing Telemachus).

Εἰ γάρ σ᾽ ὣς ἔθελοι φιλέειν γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,

Ὡς τότ᾽ Ὀδυσσῆος περικήδετο κυδαλίμοιο

Δήμῳ ἔνι Τρώων, ὅθι πάσχομεν ἄλγε᾽ Ἀχαῖοι—

Οὐ γάρ πω ἴδον ὧδε θεοὺς ἀναφανδὰ φιλεῦντας,

Ὡς κείνῳ ἀναφανδὰ παρίστατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

[346] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36. μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ πολὺ τὸ ῥᾳδίως

ἔχουσα (ἡ Τιμολέοντος στρατηγία) φαίνεται, τοῖς εὖ καὶ δικαίως

λογιζομένοις, οὐ τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀρετῆς εὐτυχούσης.

For all that he had done, Timoleon took little credit to himself.

In the despatch which announced to the Corinthians his _Veni, Vidi,

Vici_, as well as in his discourses at Syracuse, he ascribed the

whole achievement to fortune or to the gods, whom he thanked for

having inscribed his name as nominal mover of their decree for

liberating Sicily.[347] We need not doubt that he firmly believed

himself to be a favored instrument of the divine will, and that he

was even more astonished than others at the way in which locked gates

flew open before him. But even if he had not believed it himself,

there was great prudence in putting this coloring on the facts; not

simply because he thereby deadened the attacks of envy, but because,

under the pretence of modesty, he really exalted himself much higher.

He purchased for himself a greater hold on men’s minds towards his

future achievements, as the beloved of the gods, than he would ever

have possessed as only a highly endowed mortal. And though what he

had already done was prodigious, there still remained much undone;

new difficulties, not the same in kind, yet hardly less in magnitude,

to be combated.

[347] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36; Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4;

Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.

It was not only new difficulties, but also new temptations, which

Timoleon had to combat. Now began for him that moment of trial,

fatal to so many Greeks before him. Proof was to be shown, whether

he could swallow, without intoxication or perversion, the cup

of success administered to him in such overflowing fulness. He

was now complete master of Syracuse; master of it too with the

fortifications of Ortygia yet standing,—with all the gloomy means

of despotic compression, material and moral, yet remaining in his

hand. In respect of personal admiration and prestige of success, he

stood greatly above Dion, and yet more above the elder Dionysius

in the early part of his career. To set up for himself as despot

at Syracuse, burying in oblivion all that he had said or promised

before, was a step natural and feasible; not indeed without peril or

difficulty, but carrying with it chances of success equal to those of

other nascent despotisms, and more than sufficient to tempt a leading

Greek politician of average morality. Probably most people in Sicily

actually expected that he would avail himself of his unparalleled

position to stand forth as a new Dionysius. Many friends and

partisans would strenuously recommend it. They would even deride

him as an idiot (as Solon had been called in his time[348]) for not

taking the boon which the gods set before him, and for not hauling up

the net when the fish were already caught in it. There would not be

wanting other advisers to insinuate the like recommendation under the

pretence of patriotic disinterestedness, and regard for the people

whom he had come to liberate. The Syracusans (it would be contended),

unfit for a free constitution, must be supplied with liberty in small

doses, of which Timoleon was the best judge: their best interests

require that Timoleon should keep in his hands the anti-popular power

with little present diminution, in order to restrain their follies,

and ensure to them benefits which they would miss if left to their

own free determination.

[348] Solon, Fragm. 26, ed. Schneid.; Plutarch, Solon, c. 14.

Οὐκ ἔφυ Σόλων βαθύφρων, οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνήρ·

Ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐδέξατο.

Περιβαλὼν δ᾽ ἄγραν, ἀγασθεὶς οὐκ ἀνέσπασεν μέγα

Δίκτυον, θυμοῦ θ᾽ ἁμαρτῇ καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλείς.

Considerations of this latter character had doubtless greatly

weighed with Dion in the hour of his victory, over and above mere

naked ambition, so as to plunge him into that fatal misjudgment and

misconduct out of which he never recovered. But the lesson deducible

from the last sad months of Dion’s career was not lost upon Timoleon.

He was found proof, not merely against seductions within his own

bosom, but against provocations or plausibilities from without.

Neither for self-regarding purposes, nor for beneficent purposes,

would he be persuaded to grasp and perpetuate the anti-popular

power. The moment of trial was that in which the genuine heroism and

rectitude of judgment united in his character, first shone forth with

its full brightness.

Master as he now was of all Syracuse, with its fivefold aggregate,

Ortygia, Achradina, Tycha, Neapolis, and Epipolæ—he determined to

strike down at once that great monument of servitude which the elder

Dionysius had imposed upon his fellow citizens. Without a moment’s

delay, he laid his hand to the work. He invited by proclamation every

Syracusan who chose, to come with iron instruments, and coöperate

with him in demolishing the separate stronghold, fortification, and

residence, constructed by the elder Dionysius in Ortygia; as well as

the splendid funeral monument erected to the memory of that despot by

his son and successor.[349] This was the first public act executed

in Syracuse by his order; the first manifestation of the restored

sovereignty of the people; the first outpouring of sentiment, at

once free, hearty, and unanimous, among men trodden down by half

a century of servitude; the first fraternizing coöperation of

Timoleon and his soldiers with them, for the purpose of converting

the promise of liberation into an assured fact. That the actual

work of demolition was executed by the hands and crowbars of the

Syracusans themselves, rendered the whole proceeding an impressive

compact between them and Timoleon. It cleared away all mistake, all

possibility of suspicion, as to his future designs. It showed that

he had not merely forsworn despotism for himself, but that he was

bent on rendering it impossible for any one else, when he began by

overthrowing what was not only the conspicuous memento, but also

the most potent instrument, of the past despots. It achieved the

inestimable good of inspiring at once confidence in his future

proceedings, and disposing the Syracusans to listen voluntarily to

his advice. And it was beneficial, not merely in smoothing the way to

farther measures of pacific reconstruction, but also in discharging

the reactionary antipathies of the Syracusans, inevitable after so

long an oppression, upon unconscious stones; and thus leaving less of

it to be wreaked on the heads of political rivals, compromised in the

former proceedings.

[349] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 22. Γενόμενος δὲ τῆς ἀκρᾶς κύριος,

οὐκ ἔπαθε Δίωνι ταὐτὸ πάθος, οὐδ᾽ ἐφείσατο τοῦ τόπου διὰ τὸ

κάλλος καὶ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τῆς κατασκευῆς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκεῖνον

διαβαλοῦσαν, εἶτ᾽ ἀπολέσασαν ὑποψίαν φυλαξάμενος, ἐκήρυξε τῶν

Συρακοσίων τὸν βουλόμενον παρεῖναι μετὰ σιδήρου καὶ συνεφάπτεσθαι

τῶν τυραννικῶν ἐρυμάτων. Ὡς δὲ πάντες ἀνέβησαν, ἀρχὴν ἐλευθερίας

ποιησάμενοι βεβαιοτάτην τὸ κήρυγμα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην, οὐ

μόνον τὴν ἄκραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰ μνήματα τῶν τυράννων

ἀνέτρεψαν καὶ κατέσκαψαν. Εὐθὺς δὲ τὸν τόπον συνομαλύνας,

ἐνῳκοδόμησε τὰ δικαστήρια, χαριζόμενος τοῖς πολίταις, καὶ τῆς

τυραννίδος ὑπερτέραν ποιῶν τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 3.

This important act of demolition was farther made subservient to

a work of new construction, not less significant of the spirit in

which Timoleon had determined to proceed. Having cleared away the

obnoxious fortress, he erected upon the same site, and probably with

the same materials, courts for future judicature. The most striking

symbol and instrument of popular government thus met the eye as a

local substitute for that of the past despotism.

Deep was the gratitude of the Syracusans for these proceedings—the

first fruits of Timoleon’s established ascendency. And if we regard

the intrinsic importance of the act itself—the manner in which an

emphatic meaning was made to tell as well upon the Syracusan eye as

upon the Syracusan mind—the proof evinced not merely of disinterested

patriotism, but also of prudence in estimating the necessities of the

actual situation—lastly, the foundation thus laid for accomplishing

farther good—if we take all these matters together, we shall feel

that Timoleon’s demolition of the Dionysian Bastile, and erection in

its place of a building for the administration of justice, was among

the most impressive phenomena in Grecian history.

The work which remained to be done was indeed such as to require the

best spirit, energy and discretion, both on his part and on that of

the Syracusans. Through long oppression and suffering, the city was

so impoverished and desolate, that the market-place (if we were to

believe what must be an exaggeration of Plutarch) served as pasture

for horses, and as a place of soft repose for the grooms who attended

them. Other cities of Sicily exhibited the like evidence of decay,

desertion, and poverty. The manifestations of city life had almost

ceased in Sicily. Men were afraid to come into the city, which

they left to the despot and his mercenaries, retiring themselves

to live on their fields and farms, and shrinking from all acts of

citizenship. Even the fields were but half cultivated, so as to

produce nothing beyond bare subsistence. It was the first anxiety

of Timoleon to revive the once haughty spirit of Syracuse out of

this depth of insecurity and abasement; to which revival no act

could be more conducive than his first proceedings in Ortygia. His

next step was to bring together, by invitations and proclamations

everywhere circulated, those exiles who had been expelled, or forced

to seek refuge elsewhere, during the recent oppression. Many of

these, who had found shelter in various parts of Sicily and Italy,

obeyed his summons with glad readiness.[350] But there were others,

who had fled to Greece or the Ægean islands, and were out of the

hearing of any proclamations from Timoleon. To reach persons thus

remote, recourse was had, by him and by the Syracusans conjointly,

to Corinthian intervention. The Syracusans felt so keenly how much

was required to be done for the secure reorganization of their city

as a free community, that they eagerly concurred with Timoleon in

entreating the Corinthians to undertake, a second time, the honorable

task of founders of Syracuse.[351]

[350] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23; Diodor. xvi. 83.

[351] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23.

Two esteemed citizens, Kephalus and Dionysius, were sent from Corinth

to coöperate with Timoleon and the Syracusans, in constituting the

community anew, on a free and popular basis, and in preparing an

amended legislation.[352] These commissioners adopted, for their main

text and theme, the democratical constitution and laws as established

by Dioklês about seventy years before, which the usurpation of

Dionysius had subverted when they were not more than seven years

old. Kephalus professed to do nothing more than revive the laws of

Dioklês, with such comments, modifications, and adaptations, as the

change of times and circumstances had rendered necessary.[353] In the

laws respecting inheritance and property, he is said to have made no

change at all; but unfortunately we are left without any information

what were the laws of Dioklês, or how they were now modified. It

is certain, however, that the political constitution of Dioklês

was a democracy, and that the constitution as now reëstablished

was democratical also.[354] Beyond this general fact we can assert

nothing.

[352] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24.

[353] Diodor. xiii. 35; xvi. 81.

[354] Diodor. xvi. 70.

Though a free popular constitution, however, was absolutely

indispensable, and a good constitution a great boon—it was not the

only pressing necessity for Syracuse. There was required, no less an

importation of new citizens; and not merely of poor men bringing with

them their arms and their industry, but also of persons in affluent

or easy circumstances, competent to purchase lands and houses.

Besides much land ruined or gone out of cultivation, the general

poverty of the residents was extreme; while at the same time the

public exigencies were considerable, since it was essential, among

other things, to provide pay for those very soldiers of Timoleon to

whom they owed their liberation. The extent of poverty was painfully

attested by the fact that they were constrained to sell those public

statues which formed the ornaments of Syracuse and its temples; a

cruel wound to the sentiments of every Grecian community. From this

compulsory auction, however, they excepted by special vote the statue

of Gelon, in testimony of gratitude for his capital victory at Himera

over the Carthaginians.[355]

[355] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23; Dion Chrysostom, Orat. xxxvii.

p. 460.

For the renovation of a community thus destitute, new funds as well

as new men were wanted; and the Corinthians exerted themselves

actively to procure both. Their first proclamation was indeed

addressed specially to Syracusan exiles, whom they invited to resume

their residence at Syracuse as free and autonomous citizens under a

just allotment of lands. They caused such proclamation to be publicly

made at all the Pan-hellenic and local festivals; prefaced by a

certified assurance that the Corinthians had already overthrown both

the despotism and the despot—a fact which the notorious presence

of Dionysius himself at Corinth contributed to spread more widely

than any formal announcement. They farther engaged, if the exiles

would muster at Corinth, to provide transports, convoy, and leaders,

to Syracuse, free of all cost. The number of exiles, who profited

by the invitation and came to Corinth, though not inconsiderable,

was still hardly strong enough to enter upon the proposed Sicilian

renovation. They themselves therefore entreated the Corinthians to

invite additional colonists from other Grecian cities. It was usually

not difficult to find persons disposed to embark in a new settlement,

if founded under promising circumstances, and effected under the

positive management of a powerful presiding city.[356] There were

many opulent persons anxious to exchange the condition of metics

in an old city for that of full citizens in a new one. Hence the

more general proclamation now issued by the Corinthians attracted

numerous applicants, and a large force of colonists was presently

assembled at Corinth; an aggregate of ten thousand persons, including

the Syracusan exiles.[357]

[356] Compare the case of the Corinthian proclamation respecting

Epidamnus, Thucyd. i. 27; the Lacedæmonian foundation of

Herakleia, Thucyd. iii. 93; the proclamation of the Battiad

Arkesilaus at Samos, for a new body of settlers to Kyrênê

(Herodot. iv. 163).

[357] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. Diodorus states only five

thousand (xvi. 82) as coming from Corinth.

When conveyed to Syracuse, by the fleet and under the formal sanction

of the Corinthian government, these colonists found a still larger

number there assembled, partly Syracusan exiles, yet principally

emigrants from the different cities of Sicily and Italy. The Italian

Greeks, at this time hard pressed by the constantly augmenting force

of the Lucanians and Bruttians, were becoming so unable to defend

themselves without foreign aid, that several were probably disposed

to seek other homes. The invitation of Timoleon counted even more

than that of the Corinthians as an allurement to new comers—from

the unbounded admiration and confidence which he now inspired; more

especially as he was actually present at Syracuse. Accordingly, the

total of immigrants from all quarters (restored exiles as well as

others) to Syracuse in its renovated freedom was not less than sixty

thousand.[358]

[358] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. To justify his statement of this

large total, Plutarch here mentions (I wish he did so oftener)

the author from whom he copied it—Athanis, or Athanas. That

author was a native Syracusan, who wrote a history of Syracusan

affairs from the termination of the history of Philistus in 363

or 362 B. C., down to the death of Timoleon in 337 B. C.; thus

including all the proceedings of Dion and Timoleon. It is deeply

to be lamented that nothing remains of his work (Diodor. xv. 94;

Fragment. Historic. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 81). His name

seems to be mentioned in Theopompus (Fr. 212, ed. Didot) as joint

commander of the Syracusan troops, along with Herakleides.

Nothing can be more mortifying than to find ourselves without

information as to the manner in which Timoleon and Kephalus dealt

with this large influx. Such a state of things, as it produces many

new embarrassments and conflicting interests, so it calls for a

degree of resource and original judgment which furnishes good measure

of the capacity of all persons concerned, rendering the juncture

particularly interesting and instructive. Unfortunately we are not

permitted to know the details. The land of Syracuse is said to have

been distributed, and the houses to have been sold for one thousand

talents—the large sum of 230,000_l_. A right of preëmption was

allowed to the Syracusan exiles for repurchasing the houses formerly

their own. As the houses were sold, and that too for a considerable

price—so we may presume that the lands were sold also, and that

the incoming settlers did not receive their lots gratuitously. But

how they were sold, or how much of the territory was sold, we are

left in ignorance. It is certain, however, that the effect of the

new immigration was not only to renew the force and population of

Syracuse, but also to furnish relief to the extreme poverty of the

antecedent residents. A great deal of new money must thus have been

brought in.[359]

[359] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. καὶ γενομένοις αὐτοῖς

ἑξακισμυρίοις τὸ πλῆθος, ὡς Ἄθανις εἴρηκε, τὴν μὲν χώραν

διένειμε, τὰς δὲ οἰκίας ἀπέδοτο χιλίων ταλάντων, ἅμα μὲν

ὑπολειπόμενος τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Συρακουσίοις ἐξωνεῖσθαι τὰς αὑτῶν,

ἅμα δὲ χρημάτων εὐπορίαν τῷ δήμῳ μηχανώμενος οὕτως πενομένῳ καὶ

πρὸς τἄλλα καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ὥστε, etc.

Diodorus (xvi. 82) affirms that forty thousand new settlers

were admitted εἰς τὴν Συρακουσίαν τὴν ἀδιαίρετον, and that ten

thousand were settled in the fine and fertile territory of

Agyrium. This latter measure was taken certainly, after the

despot of Agyrium had been put down by Timoleon. We should

have been glad to have an explanation of τὴν Συρακουσίαν τὴν

ἀδιαίρετον: in the absence of information, conjecture as to the

meaning is vain.

Such important changes doubtless occupied a considerable time,

though we are not enabled to arrange them in months or years. In the

meantime Timoleon continued to act in such a manner as to retain, and

even to strengthen, the confidence and attachment of the Syracusans.

He employed his forces actively in putting down and expelling the

remaining despots throughout the island. He first attacked Hiketas,

his old enemy, at Leontini; and compelled him to capitulate, on

condition of demolishing the fortified citadel, abdicating his

rule, and living as a private citizen in the town. Leptines, despot

of Apollonia and of several other neighboring townships, was also

constrained to submit, and to embrace the offer of a transport to

Corinth.[360]

[360] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24.

It appears that the submission of Hiketas was merely a feint, to

obtain time for strengthening himself by urging the Carthaginians to

try another invasion of Sicily.[361] They were the more disposed to

this step as Timoleon, anxious to relieve the Syracusans, sent his

soldiers under the Corinthian Deinarchus to find pay and plunder for

themselves in the Carthaginian possessions near the western corner

of Sicily. This invasion, while it abundantly supplied the wants of

the soldiers, encouraged Entella and several other towns to revolt

from Carthage. The indignation among the Carthaginians had been

violent, when Magon returned after suddenly abandoning the harbor of

Syracuse to Timoleon. Unable to make his defence satisfactory, Magon

only escaped a worse death by suicide, after which his dead body

was crucified by public order. And the Carthaginians now resolved

on a fresh effort, to repair their honor as well as to defend their

territory.[362]

[361] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30. Diodor. (xvi. 72) does not

mention that Hiketas submitted at all. He states that Timoleon

was repulsed in attacking Leontini; and that Hiketas afterwards

attacked Syracuse, but was repulsed with loss, during the absence

of Timoleon in his expedition against Leptines.

[362] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24; Diodor. xvi. 73.

The effort was made on a vast scale, and with long previous

preparations. An army said to consist of seventy thousand men, under

Hasdrubal and Hamilkar, was disembarked at Lilybæum, on the western

corner of the island; besides which there was a fleet of two hundred

triremes, and one thousand attendant vessels carrying provisions,

warlike stores, engines for sieges, war-chariots with four horses,

etc.[363] But the most conspicuous proof of earnest effort, over and

above numbers and expense, was furnished by the presence of no less

than ten thousand native infantry from Carthage; men clothed with

panoplies costly, complete, and far heavier than ordinary—carrying

white shields and wearing elaborate breastplates besides. These men

brought to the campaign ample private baggage; splendid goblets and

other articles of gold and silver, such as beseemed the rich families

of that rich city. The _élite_ of the division—twenty-five hundred

in number, or one-fourth part—formed what was called the Sacred Band

of Carthage.[364] It has been already stated, that in general, the

Carthaginians caused their military service to be performed by hired

foreigners, with few of their own citizens. Hence this army stood

particularly distinguished, and appeared the more formidable on

their landing; carrying panic, by the mere report, all over Sicily

not excepting even Syracuse. The Corinthian troops ravaging the

Carthaginian province were obliged to retreat in haste, and sent to

Timoleon for reinforcement.

[363] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25; Diodor. xvi. 77. They agree in

the main about the numerical items, and seem to have copied from

the same authority.

[364] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27; Diodor. xvi. 80.

The miscellaneous body of immigrants recently domiciliated at

Syracuse, employed in the cares inseparable from new settlement, had

not come prepared to face so terrible a foe. Though Timoleon used

every effort to stimulate their courage, and though his exhortations

met with full apparent response, yet such was the panic prevailing,

that comparatively few would follow him to the field. He could

assemble no greater total than twelve thousand men; including about

three thousand Syracusan citizens—the paid force which he had round

him at Syracuse—that other paid force under Deinarchus, who had

been just compelled by the invaders to evacuate the Carthaginian

province—and finally such allies as would join.[365] His cavalry

was about one thousand in number. Nevertheless, in spite of so

great an inferiority, Timoleon determined to advance and meet

the enemy in their own province, before they should have carried

ravage over the territory of Syracuse and her allies. But when he

approached near to the border, within the territory of Agrigentum,

the alarm and mistrust of his army threatened to arrest his farther

progress. An officer among his mercenaries, named Thrasius, took

advantage of the prevailing feeling to raise a mutiny against him,

persuading the soldiers that Timoleon was madly hurrying them on

to certain ruin, against an enemy six times superior in number,

and in a hostile country eight days’ march from Syracuse; so that

there would be neither salvation for them in case of reverse, nor

interment if they were slain. Their pay being considerably in

arrear Thrasius urged them to return to Syracuse for the purpose of

extorting the money, instead of following a commander, who could not

or would not requite them, upon such desperate service. Such was the

success and plausibility of these recommendations, under the actual

discouragement, that they could hardly be counterworked by all the

efforts of Timoleon. Nor was there ever any conjuncture in which his

influence, derived as well from unbounded personal esteem as from

belief in his favor with the gods, was so near failing. As it was,

though he succeeded in heartening up and retaining the large body

of his army, yet Thrasius, with one thousand of the mercenaries,

insisted upon returning, and actually did return, to Syracuse.

Moreover Timoleon was obliged to send an order along with them to

the authorities at home, that these men must immediately, and at all

cost, receive their arrears of pay. The wonder is, that he succeeded

in his efforts to retain the rest, after insuring to the mutineers a

lot which seemed so much safer and more enviable. Thrasius, a brave

man, having engaged in the service of the Phokians Philomêlus and

Onomarchus, had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple,

which drew upon him the aversion of the Grecian world.[366] How

many of the one thousand seceding soldiers, who now followed him to

Syracuse, had been partners in the same sacrilegious act, we cannot

tell. But it is certain that they were men who had taken service

with Timoleon in hopes of a period, not merely of fighting, but also

of lucrative license, such as his generous regard for the settled

inhabitants would not permit.

[365] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25; Diodor. xvi. 78. Diodorus gives

the total of Timoleon’s force at twelve thousand men; Plutarch at

only six thousand. The larger total appears to me most probable,

under the circumstances. Plutarch seems to have taken account

only of the paid force who were with Timoleon at Syracuse, and

not to have enumerated that other division, which, having been

sent to ravage the Carthaginian province, had been compelled

to retire and rejoin Timoleon when the great Carthaginian host

landed.

Diodorus and Plutarch follow in the main the same authorities

respecting this campaign.

[366] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30.

Having succeeded in keeping up the spirits of his remaining army, and

affecting to treat the departure of so many cowards as a positive

advantage, Timoleon marched on westward into the Carthaginian

province, until he approached within a short distance of the river

Krimêsus, a stream which rises in the mountainous region south of

Panormus (Palermo), runs nearly southward, and falls into the sea

near Selinus. Some mules, carrying loads of parsley, met him on the

road; a fact which called forth again the half-suppressed alarm of

the soldiers, since parsley was habitually employed for the wreaths

deposited on tombstones. But Timoleon, taking a handful of it and

weaving a wreath for his own head, exclaimed, “This is our Corinthian

symbol of victory: it is the sacred herb with which we decorate our

victors at the Isthmian festival. It comes to us here spontaneously,

as an earnest of our approaching success.” Insisting emphatically on

this theme, and crowning himself as well as his officers with the

parsley, he rekindled the spirits of the army, and conducted them

forward to the top of the eminence, immediately above the course of

the Krimêsus.[367]

[367] The anecdote about the parsley is given both in Plutarch

(Timol. c. 26) and Diodorus (xvi. 79).

The upper portion of the river Krimêsus, near which this battle

was fought, was in the mountainous region called by Diodorus ἡ

Σελινουντία δυσχωρία: through which lay the road between Selinus

and Panormus (Diodor. xxiii. Frag. p. 333, ed. Wess.).

It was just at that moment that the Carthaginian army were passing

the river, on their march to meet him. The confused noise and

clatter of their approach were plainly heard; though the mist of

a May morning,[368] overhanging the valley, still concealed from

the eye the army crossing. Presently the mist ascended from the

lower ground to the hill tops around, leaving the river and the

Carthaginians beneath in conspicuous view. Formidable was the aspect

which they presented. The war-chariots-and-four,[369] which formed

their front, had already crossed the river, and appear to have been

halting a little way in advance. Next to them followed the native

Carthaginians, ten thousand chosen hoplites with white shields, who

had also in part crossed and were still crossing; while the main

body of the host, the foreign mercenaries, were pressing behind in

a disorderly mass to get to the bank, which appears to have been in

part rugged. Seeing how favorable was the moment for attacking them,

while thus disarrayed and bisected by the river, Timoleon, after

a short exhortation, gave orders immediately to charge down the

hill.[370] His Sicilian allies, with some mercenaries intermingled,

were on the two wings; while he himself, with the Syracusans and the

best of the mercenaries, occupied the centre. Demaretus with his

cavalry was ordered to assail the Carthaginians first, before they

could form regularly. But the chariots in their front, protecting the

greater part of the line, left him only the power of getting at them

partially through the vacant intervals. Timoleon, soon perceiving

that his cavalry accomplished little, recalled them and ordered them

to charge on the flanks, while he himself, with all the force of his

infantry, undertook to attack in front. Accordingly, seizing his

shield from the attendant, he marched forward in advance, calling

aloud to the infantry around to be of good cheer and follow. Never

had his voice been heard so predominant and heart-stirring; the

effect of it was powerfully felt on the spirits of all around, who

even believed that they heard a god speaking along with him.[371]

Reëchoing his shout emphatically, they marched forward to the charge

with the utmost alacrity—in compact order, and under the sound of

trumpets.

[368] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27. ἱσταμένου θέρους ὥραν—λήγοντι

μηνὶ Θαργηλίωνι, etc.

[369] Of these war-chariots they are said to have had not less

than two thousand, in the unsuccessful battle which they fought

against Agathokles in Africa, near Carthage (Diodor. xx. 10).

After the time of Pyrrhus, they came to employ tame elephants

trained for war.

[370] It appears from Polybius that Timæus ascribed to Timoleon,

immediately before this battle, an harangue which Polybius

pronounces to be absurd and unsuitable (Timæus, Fr. 134, ed.

Didot; Polyb. xii. 26 _a_).

[371] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27. Ἀναλαβὼν τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ βοήσας

ἕπεσθαι καὶ θαῤῥεῖν τοῖς πέζοις ἔδοξεν ὑπερφυεῖ φωνῇ καὶ μείζονι

κεχρῆσθαι τοῦ συνήθους, εἴτε τῷ πάθει παρὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὸν

ἐνθουσιασμὸν οὕτω διατεινάμενος, εἴτε ~δαιμονίου τινὸς, ὡς τοῖς

πολλοῖς τότε παρέστη, συνεπιφθεγξαμένου~.

The infantry were probably able to evade or break through the

bulwark of interposed chariots with greater ease than the cavalry,

though Plutarch does not tell us how this was done. Timoleon and his

soldiers then came into close and furious contest with the chosen

Carthaginian infantry, who resisted with a courage worthy of their

reputation. Their vast shields, iron breastplates, and brazen helmets

(forming altogether armor heavier than was worn usually even by

Grecian hoplites), enabled them to repel the spear-thrusts of the

Grecian assailants, who were compelled to take to their swords, and

thus to procure themselves admission within the line of Carthaginian

spears, so as to break their ranks. Such use of swords is what we

rarely read of in a Grecian battle. Though the contest was bravely

maintained by the Carthaginians, yet they were too much loaded with

armor to admit of anything but fighting in a dense mass. They were

already losing their front rank warriors, the picked men of the

whole, and beginning to fight at a disadvantage—when the gods, yet

farther befriending Timoleon, set the seal to their discomfiture

by an intervention manifest and terrific.[372] A storm of the most

violent character began. The hill-tops were shrouded in complete

darkness; the wind blew a hurricane; rain and hail poured abundantly,

with all the awful accompaniments of thunder and lightning. To the

Greeks, this storm was of little inconvenience, because it came in

their backs. But to the Carthaginians, pelting as it did directly in

their faces, it occasioned both great suffering, and soul-subduing

alarm. The rain and hail beat, and the lightning flashed, in their

faces, so that they could not see to deal with hostile combatants:

the noise of the wind, and of hail rattling against their armor,

prevented the orders of their officers from being heard: the folds

of their voluminous military tunics were surcharged with rain-water,

so as to embarrass their movements: the ground presently became so

muddy that they could not keep their footing; and when they once

slipped, the weight of their equipment forbade all recovery. The

Greeks, comparatively free from inconvenience, and encouraged by the

evident disablement of their enemies, pressed them with redoubled

energy. At length, when the four hundred front rank men of the

Carthaginians had perished by a brave death in their places, the

rest of the White-shields turned their backs and sought relief in

flight. But flight, too, was all but impossible. They encountered

their own troops in the rear advancing up, and trying to cross the

Krimêsus; which river itself was becoming every minute fuller and

more turbid, through the violent rain. The attempt to recross was one

of such unspeakable confusion, that numbers perished in the torrent.

Dispersing in total rout, the whole Carthaginian army thought only

of escape, leaving their camp and baggage a prey to the victors, who

pursued them across the river and over the hills on the other side,

inflicting prodigious slaughter. In this pursuit the cavalry of

Timoleon, not very effective during the battle, rendered excellent

service; pressing the fugitive Carthaginians one over another in

mass, and driving them, overloaded with their armor, into mud and

water, from whence they could not get clear.[373]

[372] Diodor. xvi. 79. Περιεγένοντο γὰρ ἀνελπίστως τῶν πολεμίων,

οὐ μόνον διὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἀνδραγαθίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν

συνεργίαν.

[373] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27, 28; Diodor. xvi. 79, 80.

No victory in Grecian history was ever more complete than that of

Timoleon at the Krimêsus. Ten thousand Carthaginians are said to have

been slain, and fifteen thousand made prisoners. Upon these numbers

no stress is to be laid; but it is certain that the total of both

must have been very great. Of the war-chariots, many were broken

during the action, and all that remained, two hundred in number,

fell into the hands of the victors. But that which rendered the loss

most serious, and most painfully felt at Carthage, was, that it fell

chiefly upon the native Carthaginian troops, and much less upon the

foreign mercenaries. It is even said that the Sacred Battalion of

Carthage, comprising twenty-five hundred soldiers belonging to the

most considerable families in Carthage, were all slain to a man;

a statement, doubtless, exaggerated, yet implying a fearful real

destruction. Many of these soldiers purchased safe escape by throwing

away their ornamented shields and costly breastplates, which the

victors picked up in great numbers—one thousand breastplates, and

not less than ten thousand shields. Altogether, the spoil collected

was immense—in arms, in baggage, and in gold and silver from the

plundered camp; occupying the Greeks so long in the work of pursuit

and capture, that they did not find time to erect their trophy until

the third day after the battle. Timoleon left the chief part of the

plunder,[374] as well as most part of the prisoners, in the hands of

the individual captors, who enriched themselves amply by the day’s

work. Yet there still remained a large total for the public Syracusan

chest; five thousand prisoners, and a miscellaneous spoil of armor

and precious articles, piled up in imposing magnificence around the

general’s tent.

[374] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 80, 81.

The Carthaginian fugitives did not rest until they reached Lilybæum.

And even there, such was their discouragement—so profound their

conviction that the wrath of the gods was upon them—that they could

scarcely be induced to go on shipboard for the purpose of returning

to Carthage; persuaded as they were that if once caught out at sea,

the gods in their present displeasure would never let them reach

land.[375] At Carthage itself also, the sorrow and depression was

unparalleled: sorrow private as well as public, from the loss of so

great a number of principal citizens. It was even feared that the

victorious Timoleon would instantly cross the sea and attack Carthage

on her own soil. Immediate efforts were however made to furnish a

fresh army for Sicily, composed of foreign mercenaries with few or

no native citizens. Giskon, the son of Hanno, who passed for their

most energetic citizen, was recalled from exile, and directed to get

together this new armament.

[375] Diodor. xvi. 81. Τοσαύτη δ᾽ αὐτοὺς κατάπληξις καὶ δέος

κατεῖχεν, ὥστε μὴ τολμᾷν εἰς τὰς ναῦς ἐμβαίνειν, μηδ᾽ ἀποπλεῖν

εἰς τὴν Λιβύην, ὡς ~διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀλλοτριότητα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ

τοῦ Λιβυκοῦ πελάγους καταποθησομένους~. Compare the account of

the religious terror of the Carthaginians, after their defeat by

Agathokles (Diodor. xx. 14).

So, in the argument between Andokides and his accusers, before

the Dikastery at Athens—the accusers contend that Andokides

clearly does not believe in the gods, because, after the great

impiety which he has committed, he has still not been afraid

afterwards to make sea voyages (Lysias, cont. Andokid. s. 19).

On the other hand, Andokides himself argues triumphantly, from

the fact of his having passed safely through sea voyages in the

winter, that he is _not_ an object of displeasure to the gods.

“If the gods thought that I had wronged them, they would not

have omitted to punish me, when they caught me in the greatest

danger. For what danger can be greater than a sea voyage in

winter-time? The gods had then both my life and my property in

their power; and yet they preserved me. Was it not then open to

them so to manage, as that I should not even obtain interment

for my body?....Have the gods then preserved me from the dangers

of sea and pirates, merely to let me perish at Athens by the act

of my villanous accuser Kephisius? No, Dikasts; the dangers of

_accusation and trial are human_; but _the dangers encountered

at sea are divine_. If, therefore, we are to surmise about

the sentiments of the gods, I think they will be extremely

displeased and angry, if they see a man, whom they themselves

have preserved, destroyed by others.” (Andokides, De Mysteriis,

s. 137-139). ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἡγοῦμαι χρῆναι νομίζειν τοὺς τοιούτους

κινδύνους ἀνθρωπίνους, ~τοὺς δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν θείους~. Εἴπερ οὖν

δεῖ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὑπονοεῖν, πολὺ ἂν αὐτοὺς οἶμαι ἐγὼ ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ

ἀγανακτεῖν, εἰ τοὺς ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν σωζομένους, ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων ἀπολλυμένους

ὁρῷεν.

Compare Plutarch, Paul. Emil. c. 36. ~μάλιστα κατὰ πλοῦν~

ἐδεδίειν τὴν μεταβολὴν τοῦ δαίμονος, etc.

The subduing impression of the wrath of the gods, under which the

Carthaginians labored, arose from the fact that their defeat had

been owing not less to the terrific storm, than to the arms of

Timoleon. Conversely, in regard to Timoleon himself, the very same

fact produced an impression of awe-striking wonder and envy. If

there were any sceptics who doubted before either the reality of

special interventions by the gods, or the marked kindness which

determined the gods to send such interventions to the service of

Timoleon—the victory of the Krimêsus must have convinced them.

The storm alike violent and opportune, coming at the back of the

Greeks and in the faces of the Carthaginians, was a manifestation

of divine favor scarcely less conspicuous than those vouchsafed to

Diomedes or Æneas in the Iliad.[376] And the sentiment thus raised

towards Timoleon—or, rather previously raised, and now yet farther

confirmed—became blended with that genuine admiration which he had

richly earned by his rapid and well-conducted movements, as well as

by a force of character striking enough to uphold, under the most

critical circumstances, the courage of a desponding army. His victory

at the Krimêsus, like his victory at Adranum, was gained mainly by

that extreme speed in advance, which brought him upon an unprepared

enemy at a vulnerable moment. And the news of it which he despatched

at once to Corinth,—accompanied with a cargo of showy Carthaginian

shields to decorate the Corinthian temples,—diffused throughout

Central Greece both joy for the event and increased honor to his

name, commemorated by the inscription attached—“The Corinthians and

the general Timoleon, after liberating the Sicilian Greeks from the

Carthaginians, have dedicated these shields as offerings of gratitude

to the gods.”[377]

[376] Claudian, De Tertio Consulatu Honorii, v. 93.

“Te propter, gelidis Aquilo de monte procellis

Obruit adversas acies, revolutaque tela

Vertit in auctores, et turbine reppulit hastas.

O nimium dilecte Deo, cui fundit ab antris

Æolus armatas hyemes; cui militat æther,

Et conjurati veniunt ad classica venti.”

Compare a passage in the speech of Thrasybulus, Xenoph. Hellen.

ii. 4, 14.

[377] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 80.

Leaving most of his paid troops to carry on war in the Carthaginian

province, Timoleon conducted his Syracusans home. His first

proceeding was, at once to dismiss Thrasius with the one thousand

paid soldiers who had deserted him before the battle. He commanded

them to quit Sicily, allowing them only twenty-four hours to depart

from Syracuse itself. Probably under the circumstances, they were not

less anxious to go away than he was to dismiss them. But they went

away only to destruction; for having crossed the Strait of Messina

and taken possession of a maritime site in Italy on the Southern

sea, the Bruttians of the inland entrapped them by professions of

simulated friendship, and slew them all.[378]

[378] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30; Diodor. xvi. 82.

Timoleon had now to deal with two Grecian enemies—Hiketas and

Mamerkus—the despots of Leontini and Katana. By the extraordinary

rapidity of his movements, he had crushed the great invading host

of Carthage, before it came into coöperation with these two allies.

Both now wrote in terror to Carthage, soliciting a new armament, as

indispensable for their security not less than for the Carthaginian

interest in the island; Timoleon being the common enemy of both.

Presently Giskon son of Hanno, having been recalled on purpose out of

banishment, arrived from Carthage with a considerable force—seventy

triremes, and a body of Grecian mercenaries. It was rare for the

Carthaginians to employ Grecian mercenaries; but the battle of

Krimêsus is said to have persuaded them that there were no soldiers

to be compared to Greeks. The force of Giskon was apparently

distributed partly in the Carthaginian province at the western angle

of the island—partly in the neighborhood of Mylæ and Messênê on the

north-east, where Mamerkus joined him with the troops of Katana.

Messênê appears to have recently fallen under the power of a despot

named Hippon, who acted as their ally. To both points Timoleon

despatched a portion of his mercenary force, without going himself in

command; on both, his troops at first experienced partial defeats;

two divisions of them, one comprising four hundred men, being cut to

pieces. But such partial reverses were, in the religious appreciation

of the time, proofs more conspicuous than ever of the peculiar favor

shown by the gods towards Timoleon. For the soldiers thus slain

had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple, and were

therefore marked out for the divine wrath; but the gods suspended

the sentence during the time when the soldiers were serving under

Timoleon in person, in order that he might not be the sufferer; and

executed it now in his absence, when execution would occasion the

least possible inconvenience to him.[379]

[379] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30. Ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα τὴν

Τιμολέοντος εὐτυχίαν συνέβη γενέσθαι διώνυμον.... Τὴν μὲν οὖν

πρὸς Τιμολέοντα τῶν θεῶν εὐμένειαν, οὐχ ἧττον ἐν αἷς προσέκρουσε

πράξεσιν ἢ περὶ ἃς κατώρθου, θαυμάζεσθαι συνέβαινεν.

Compare Plutarch, De Serâ Num. Vind. p. 552 F.

Mamerkus and Hiketas, however, not adopting this interpretation

of their recent successes against Timoleon, were full of hope

and confidence. The former dedicated the shields of the slain

mercenaries to the gods, with an inscription of insolent triumph:

the latter—taking advantage of the absence of Timoleon, who had made

an expedition against a place not far off called Kalauria—undertook

an inroad into the Syracusan territory. Not content with inflicting

great damage and carrying off an ample booty, Hiketas, in returning

home, insulted Timoleon and the small force along with him by passing

immediately under the walls of Kalauria. Suffering him to pass by,

Timoleon pursued, though his force consisted only of cavalry and

light troops, with few or no hoplites. He found Hiketas posted

on the farther side of the Damurias; a river with rugged banks

and a ford of considerable difficulty. Yet notwithstanding this

good defensive position, the troops of Timoleon were so impatient

to attack, and each of his cavalry officers was so anxious to be

first in the charge, that he was obliged to decide the priority by

lot. The attack was then valiantly made, and the troops of Hiketas

completely defeated. One thousand of them were slain in the action,

while the remainder only escaped by flight and throwing away of their

shields.[380]

[380] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 31.

It was now the turn of Timoleon to attack Hiketas in his own domain

of Leontini. Here his usual good fortune followed him. The soldiers

in garrison—either discontented with the behavior of Hiketas at the

battle of the Damurias, or awe-struck with that divine favor which

waited on Timoleon—mutinied and surrendered the place into his

hands; and not merely the place, but also Hiketas himself in chains,

with his son Eupolemus, and his general Euthymus, a man of singular

bravery as well as a victorious athlete at the games. All three

were put to death; Hiketas and his son as despots and traitors; and

Euthymus, chiefly in consequence of insulting sarcasms against the

Corinthians, publicly uttered at Leontini. The wife and daughters

of Hiketas were conveyed as prisoners to Syracuse, where they were

condemned to death by public vote of the Syracusan assembly. This

vote was passed in express revenge for the previous crime of Hiketas,

in putting to death the widow, sister, and son, of Dion. Though

Timoleon might probably have saved the unfortunate women by a strong

exertion of influence, he did not interfere. The general feeling

of the people accounted this cruel, but special, retaliation right

under the circumstances; and Timoleon, as he could not have convinced

them of the contrary, so he did not think it right to urge them to

put their feeling aside as a simple satisfaction to him. Yet the act

leaves a deserved stain upon a reputation such as his.[381] The women

were treated on both sides as adjective beings, through whose lives

revenge was to be taken against a political enemy.

[381] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 33.

Next came the turn of Mamerkus, who had assembled near Katana a

considerable force, strengthened by a body of Carthaginian allies

under Giskon. He was attacked and defeated by Timoleon near the

river Abolus, with a loss of two thousand men, many of them

belonging to the Carthaginian division. We know nothing but the

simple fact of this battle; which probably made serious impression

upon the Carthaginians, since they speedily afterwards sent earnest

propositions for peace, deserting their Sicilian allies. Peace was

accordingly concluded; on terms however which left the Carthaginian

dominion in Sicily much the same as it had been at the end of the

reign of the elder Dionysius, as well as at the landing of Dion in

Sicily.[382] The line of separation was fixed at the river Halykus,

or Lykus, which flows into the southern sea near Herakleia Minoa,

and formed the western boundary of the territory of Agrigentum.

All westward of the Halykus was recognized as Carthaginian: but it

was stipulated that if any Greeks within that territory desired to

emigrate and become inmates of Syracuse, they should be allowed

freely to come with their families and their property. It was farther

covenanted that all the territory eastward of the Halykus should be

considered not only as Greek, but as free Greek, distributed among

so many free cities, and exempt from despots. And the Carthaginians

formally covenanted that they would neither aid, nor adopt as ally,

any Grecian despot in Sicily.[383] In the first treaty concluded by

the elder Dionysius with the Carthaginians, it had been stipulated by

an express article that the Syracusans should be subject to him.[384]

Here is one of the many contrasts between Dionysius and Timoleon.

[382] Diodor. xv. 17. Minoa (Herakleia) was a Carthaginian

possession when Dion landed (Plutarch, Dion, c. 25).

Cornelius Nepos (Timoleon, c. 2) states erroneously, that the

Carthaginians were completely expelled from Sicily by Timoleon.

[383] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 34; Diodor. xvi. 82.

[384] Diodor. xiii. 114.

Having thus relieved himself from his most formidable enemy, Timoleon

put a speedy end to the war in other parts of the island. Mamerkus

in fact despaired of farther defence without foreign aid. He crossed

over with a squadron into Italy to ask for the introduction of a

Lucanian army into Sicily;[385] which he might perhaps have obtained,

since that warlike nation were now very powerful—had not his own

seamen abandoned him, and carried back their vessels to Katana,

surrendering both the city and themselves to Timoleon. The same

thing, and even more, had been done a little before by the troops of

Hiketas at Leontini, who had even delivered up Hiketas himself as

prisoner; so powerful, seemingly, was the ascendency exercised by

the name of Timoleon, with the prestige of his perpetual success.

Mamerkus could now find no refuge except at Messênê, where he was

welcomed by the despot Hippon. But Timoleon speedily came thither

with a force ample enough to besiege Messênê by land and by sea.

After a certain length of resistance,[386] the town was surrendered

to him, while Hippon tried to make his escape secretly on shipboard.

But he was captured and brought back into the midst of the Messenian

population, who, under a sentiment of bitter hatred and vengeance,

planted him in the midst of the crowded theatre and there put him

to death with insult, summoning all the boys from school into the

theatre to witness what was considered an elevating scene. Mamerkus,

without attempting to escape, surrendered himself prisoner to

Timoleon; only stipulating that his fate should be determined by the

Syracusan assembly after a fair hearing, but that Timoleon himself

should say nothing to his disfavor. He was accordingly brought to

Syracuse, and placed on his trial before the assembled people,

whom he addressed in an elaborate discourse; probably skilfully

composed, since he is said to have possessed considerable talent as

a poet.[387] But no eloquence could surmount the rooted aversion

entertained by the Syracusans for his person and character. Being

heard with murmurs, and seeing that he had no chance of obtaining a

favorable verdict, he suddenly threw aside his garment and rushed

with violent despair against one of the stone seats, head foremost,

in hopes of giving himself a fatal blow. But not succeeding in this

attempted suicide, he was led out of the theatre and executed like a

robber.[388]

[385] Cornelius Nepos (Timoleon, c. 2) calls Mamerkus an Italian

general who had come into Sicily to aid the despots. It is

possible enough that he may have been an Italiot Greek; for he

must have been a Greek, from the manner in which Plutarch speaks

of his poetical compositions.

[386] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37.

[387] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 31.

[388] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 34.

Timoleon had now nearly accomplished his confirmed purpose of

extirpating every despotism in Sicily. There remained yet Nikodemus

as despot at Kentoripa, and Apolloniades at Agyrium. Both of these

he speedily dethroned or expelled, restoring the two cities to the

condition of free communities. He also expelled from the town of Ætna

those Campanian mercenaries who had been planted there by the elder

Dionysius.[389] In this way did he proceed until there remained only

free communities, without a single despot, in the Grecian portion of

Sicily.

[389] Diodor. xvi. 82.

Of the details of his proceedings our scanty information permits

us to say but little. But the great purpose with which he had

started from Corinth was now achieved. After having put down all the

other despotisms in Sicily, there remained for him but one farther

triumph—the noblest and rarest of all—to lay down his own. This he

performed without any delay, immediately on returning to Syracuse

from his military proceedings. Congratulating the Syracusans on

the triumphant consummation already attained, he entreated them to

dispense with his farther services as sole commander; the rather

as his eyesight was now failing.[390] It is probable enough that

this demand was at first refused, and that he was warmly requested

to retain his functions; but if such was the fact, he did not the

less persist, and the people, willing or not, acceded. We ought

farther to note, that not only did he resign his generalship, but he

resigned it at once and immediately, after the complete execution

of his proclaimed purpose, to emancipate the Sicilian Greeks from

foreign enemies as well as from despot-enemies; just as, on first

acquiring possession of Syracuse, he had begun his authoritative

career, without a moment’s delay, by ordering the demolition of the

Dionysian stronghold, and the construction of a court of justice in

its place.[391] By this instantaneous proceeding he forestalled the

growth of that suspicion which delay would assuredly have raised,

and for which the free communities of Greece had in general such

ample reason. And it is not the least of his many merits, that while

conscious of good intentions himself, he had also the good sense

to see that others could not look into his bosom; that all their

presumptions, except what were created by his own conduct, would be

derived from men worse than him—and therefore unfavorable. Hence it

was necessary for him to be prompt and forward, even to a sort of

ostentation, in exhibiting the amplest positive proof of his real

purposes, so as to stifle beforehand the growth of suspicion.

[390] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37. Ὡς δὲ ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς Συρακούσας,

εὐθὺς ἀποθέσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν καὶ παραιτεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας, τῶν

πραγμάτων εἰς τὸ κάλλιστον ἡκόντων τέλος.

[391] Plutarch, _l. c._ ~εὐθὺς~ ἀποθέσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν: compare

c. 22.

He was now a private citizen of Syracuse, having neither paid

soldiers under his command nor any other public function. As a

reward for his splendid services, the Syracusans voted to him a

house in the city, and a landed property among the best in the

neighborhood. Here he fixed his residence, sending for his wife and

family to Corinth.[392]

[392] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.

Yet though Timoleon had renounced every species of official

authority, and all means of constraint, his influence as an adviser

over the judgment, feelings and actions, not only of Syracusans, but

of Sicilians generally, was as great as ever; perhaps greater—because

the fact of his spontaneous resignation gave him one title more

to confidence. Rarely is it allowed to mortal man, to establish

so transcendent a claim to confidence and esteem as Timoleon now

presented; upon so many different grounds, and with so little

of alloy or abatement. To possess a counsellor whom every one

reverenced, without suspicions or fears of any kind—who had not only

given conspicuous proofs of uncommon energy combined with skilful

management, but enjoyed besides, in a peculiar degree, the favor of

the gods—was a benefit unspeakably precious to the Sicilians at this

juncture. For it was now the time when not merely Syracuse, but other

cities of Sicily also, were aiming to strengthen their reconstituted

free communities by a fresh supply of citizens from abroad. During

the sixty years which had elapsed since the first formidable invasion

wherein the Carthaginian Hannibal had conquered Selinus, there had

been a series of causes all tending to cripple and diminish, and

none to renovate, the Grecian population of Sicily. The Carthaginian

attacks, the successful despotism of the first Dionysius, and the

disturbed reign of the second,—all contributed to the same result.

About the year 352-351 B. C., Plato (as has been already mentioned)

expresses his fear of an extinction of Hellenism in Sicily giving

place before Phenician or Campanian force.[393] And what was a sad

possibility, even in 352-351 B. C.—had become nearer to a probability

in 344 B. C., before Timoleon landed, in the then miserable condition

of the island.

[393] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 F.

His unparalleled success and matchless personal behavior combined

with the active countenance of Corinth without—had completely

turned the tide. In the belief of all Greeks, Sicily was now a

land restored to Hellenism and freedom, but requiring new colonists

as well to partake, as to guard, these capital privileges. The

example of colonization, under the auspices of Corinth, had been

set at Syracuse, and was speedily followed elsewhere, especially

at Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. All these three cities had

suffered cruelly during those formidable Carthaginian invasions

which immediately preceded the despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse.

They had had no opportunity, during the continuance of the Dionysian

dynasty, even to make up what they had then lost; far less to acquire

accessions from without. At the same time, all three (especially

Agrigentum) recollected their former scale of opulence and power,

as it had stood prior to 407 B. C. It was with eagerness therefore

that they availed themselves of the new life and security imparted

to Sicily by the career of Timoleon to replenish their exhausted

numbers; by recalling those whom former suffering had driven away,

and by inviting fresh colonists besides. Megellus and Pheristus,

citizens of Elea on the southern coast of Italy (which was probably

at this time distressed by the pressure of Lucanians from the

interior), conducted a colony to Agrigentum: Gorgus, from Keos, went

with another band to Gela: in both cases, a proportion of expatriated

citizens returned among them. Kamarina, too, and Agyrium received

large accessions of inhabitants. The inhabitants of Leontini are said

to have removed their habitations to Syracuse; a statement difficult

to understand, and probably only partially true, as the city and its

name still continued to exist.[394]

[394] Diodor. xvi. 65, 82; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 35.

Unfortunately the proceedings of Timoleon come before us (through

Diodorus and Plutarch) in a manner so vague and confused, that we

can rarely trace the sequence or assign the date of particular

facts.[395] But about the general circumstances, with their character

and bearing, there is no room either for mistake or doubt. That

which rhetors and sophists like Lysias had preached in their

panegyrical harangues[396]—that for which Plato sighed, in the

epistles of his old age—commending it, after Dion’s death, to the

surviving partisans of Dion, as having been the unexecuted purpose of

their departed leader—the renewal of freedom and Hellenism throughout

the island—was now made a reality under the auspices of Timoleon.

The houses, the temples, the walls, were rescued from decay; the

lands from comparative barrenness. For it was not merely his personal

reputation and achievements which constituted the main allurement to

new colonists, but also his superintending advice which regulated

their destination when they arrived. Without the least power of

constraint, or even official dignity, he was consulted as a sort

of general Œkist or Patron-Founder, by the affectionate regard of

the settlers in every part of Sicily. The distribution or sale of

lands, the modification required in existing laws and customs, the

new political constitutions, etc., were all submitted to his review.

No settlement gave satisfaction, except such as he had pronounced or

approved; none which he had approved was contested.[397]

[395] Eight years elapsed from the time when Timoleon departed

with his expedition from Corinth to the time of his death; from

345-344 B. C. to 337-336 B. C. (Diodorus, xvi. 90; Plutarch,

Timoleon, c. 37).

The battle of the Krimêsus is assigned by Diodorus to 340 B. C.

But as to the other military achievements of Timoleon in Sicily,

Diodorus and Plutarch are neither precise, nor in accordance with

each other.

[396] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37. μόνος, ἐφ᾽ ἃς οἱ σοφισταὶ διὰ

τῶν λόγων τῶν πανηγυρικῶν ἀεὶ παρεκάλουν πράξεις τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐν

αὐταῖς ἀριστεύσας, etc.

[397] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 35. Οἷς οὐ μόνον ἀσφάλειαν ἐκ

πολέμου τοσούτου καὶ γαλήνην ἱδρυομένοις παρεῖχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἄλλα

παρασκευάσας καὶ συμπροθυμηθεὶς ὥσπερ οἰκιστὴς ἠγαπᾶτο. Καὶ τῶν

ἄλλων δὲ διακειμένων ὁμοίως πρὸς αὐτὸν, οὐ πολέμου τις λύσις, οὐ

νόμων θέσις, οὐ χώρας κατοικισμὸς, οὐ πολιτείας διάταξις, ἐδόκει

καλῶς ἔχειν, ἧς ἐκεῖνος μὴ προσάψαιτο μηδὲ κατακοσμήσειεν, ὥσπερ

ἔργῳ συντελουμένῳ δημιουργὸς ἐπιθείς τινα χάριν θεοφιλῆ καὶ

πρέπουσαν.

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 3.

In the situation in which Sicily was now placed, it is clear that

numberless matters of doubt and difficulty would inevitably arise;

that the claims and interests of pre-existing residents, returning

exiles and new immigrants, would often be conflicting; that the

rites and customs of different fractions composing the new whole,

might have to be modified for the sake of mutual harmony; that the

settlers, coming from oligarchies as well as democracies might bring

with them different ideas as to the proper features of a political

constitution; that the apportionment or sale of lands, and the

adjustment of old debts, presented but too many chances of angry

dispute; that there were, in fact, a thousand novelties in the

situation, which could not be determined either by precedent, or by

any peremptory rule, but must be left to the equity of a supreme

arbitrator. Here then the advantages were unspeakable of having a man

like Timoleon to appeal to; a man not only really without sinister

bias, but recognized by every one as being so; a man whom every one

loved, trusted, and was grieved to offend; a man who sought not

to impose his own will upon free communities, but addressed them

as freemen, building only upon their reason and sentiments, and

carrying out in all his recommendations of detail those instincts of

free speech, universal vote, and equal laws, which formed the germ

of political obligation in the minds of Greeks generally. It would

have been gratifying to know how Timoleon settled the many new and

difficult questions which must have been submitted to him as referee.

There is no situation in human society so valuable to study, as that

in which routine is of necessity broken through, and the constructive

faculties called into active exertion. Nor was there ever perhaps

throughout Grecian history, a simultaneous colonization, and

simultaneous recasting of political institutions, more extensive than

that which now took place in Sicily. Unfortunately we are permitted

to know only the general fact, without either the charm or the

instruction which would have been presented by the details. Timoleon

was, in Sicily, that which Epaminondas had been at the foundation of

Messênê and Megalopolis, though with far greater power: and we have

to deplore the like ignorance respecting the detail proceedings of

both these great men.

But though the sphere of Timoleon’s activity was coextensive with

Sicily, his residence, his citizenship, and his peculiar interests

and duties were at Syracuse. That city, like most of the other

Sicilian towns, had been born anew, with a numerous body of settlers

and altered political institutions. I have already mentioned that

Kephalus and others, invited from Corinth by express vote of

the Syracusans, had reëstablished the democratical institution

of Dioklês, with suitable modifications. The new era of liberty

was marked by the establishment of a new sacred office, that of

Amphipolus or Attendant Priest of Zeus Olympius; an office changed

annually, appointed by lot (doubtless under some conditions of

qualification which are not made known to us,[398]) and intended,

like the Archon Eponymus at Athens, as the recognized name to

distinguish each Syracusan year. In this work of constitutional

reform, as well as in all the labors and adjustments connected with

the new settlers, Timoleon took a prominent part. But so soon as

the new constitution was consummated and set at work, he declined

undertaking any specific duties or exercising any powers under it.

Enjoying the highest measure of public esteem, and loaded with

honorary and grateful votes from the people, he had the wisdom

as well as the virtue to prefer living as a private citizen; a

resolution doubtless promoted by his increasing failure of eyesight,

which presently became total blindness.[399] He dwelt in the

house assigned to him by public vote of the people, which he had

consecrated to the Holy God, and within which he had set apart a

chapel to the goddess Automatia,—the goddess under whose auspices

blessings and glory came as it were of themselves.[400] To this

goddess he offered sacrifice, as the great and constant patroness

who had accompanied him from Corinth through all his proceedings in

Sicily.

[398] Diodor. xvi. 70; Cicero in Verrem, ii. 51.

[399] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38.

[400] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς οἰκίας ἱερὸν

ἱδρυσάμενος Αὐτοματίας ἔθυσεν, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν Ἱερῷ Δαίμονι

καθιέρωσεν.

Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4; Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Præcept.

p. 816 D.

The idea of Αὐτοματία is not the same as that of Τύχη, though the

word is sometimes translated as if it were. It is more nearly the

same as Ἀγαθὴ Τύχη—though still, as it seems to me, not exactly

the same.

By refusing the official prominence tendered to him, and by keeping

away from the details of public life, Timoleon escaped the jealousy

sure to attend upon influence so prodigious as his. But in truth, for

all great and important matters, this very modesty increased instead

of diminishing his real ascendency. Here as elsewhere, the goddess

Automatia worked for him, and brought to him docile listeners without

his own seeking. Though the Syracusans transacted their ordinary

business through others, yet when any matter of serious difficulty

occurred, the presence of Timoleon was specially invoked in the

discussion. During the later months of his life, when he had become

blind, his arrival in the assembly was a solemn scene. Having been

brought in his car drawn by mules across the market-place to the door

of the theatre wherein the assembly was held, attendants then led

or drew the car into the theatre amidst the assembled people, who

testified their affection by the warmest shouts and congratulations.

As soon as he had returned their welcome, and silence was restored,

the discussion to which he had been invited took place, Timoleon

sitting on his car and listening. Having heard the matter thus

debated, he delivered his own opinion, which was usually ratified

at once by the show of hands of the assembly. He then took leave of

the people and retired, the attendants again leading the car out

of the theatre, and the same cheers of attachment accompanying his

departure; while the assembly proceeded with its other and more

ordinary business.[401]

[401] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38; Cornel. Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4.

Such is the impressive and picturesque description given (doubtless

by Athanis or some other eye-witness[402]) of the relations

between the Syracusan people and the blind Timoleon, after his

power had been abdicated, and when there remained to him nothing

except his character and moral ascendency. It is easy to see that

the solemnities of interposition, here recounted, must have been

reserved for those cases in which the assembly had been disturbed

by some unusual violence or collision of parties. For such critical

junctures, where numbers were perhaps nearly balanced, and where

the disappointment of an angry minority threatened to beget some

permanent feud, the benefit was inestimable, of an umpire whom both

parties revered, and before whom neither thought it a dishonor to

yield. Keeping aloof from the details and embarrassments of daily

political life, and preserving himself (like the Salaminian trireme,

to use a phrase which Plutarch applies to Perikles at Athens) for

occasions at once momentous and difficult, Timoleon filled up a gap

occasionally dangerous to all free societies; but which even at

Athens had always remained a gap, because there was no Athenian at

once actually worthy, and known to be worthy, to fill it. We may even

wonder how he continued worthy, when the intense popular sentiment

in his favor tended so strongly to turn his head, and when no

contradiction or censure against him was tolerated.

[402] It occurs in Cornelius Nepos prior to Plutarch, and was

probably copied by both from the same authority.

Two persons, Laphystius and Demænetus, called by the obnoxious names

of sycophants and demagogues, were bold enough to try the experiment.

The former required him to give bail in a lawsuit; the latter, in a

public discourse, censured various parts of his military campaigns.

The public indignation against both these men was vehement; yet there

can be little doubt that Laphystius applied to Timoleon a legal

process applicable universally to every citizen: what may have been

the pertinence of the censures of Demænetus, we are unable to say.

However, Timoleon availed himself of the well-meant impatience of

the people to protect him either from legal process or from censure,

only to administer to them a serious and valuable lesson. Protesting

against all interruption to the legal process of Laphystius, he

proclaimed emphatically that this was the precise purpose for which

he had so long labored, and combated—in order that every Syracusan

citizen might be enabled to appeal to the laws and exercise freely

his legal rights. And while he thought it unnecessary to rebut in

detail the objections taken against his previous generalship, he

publicly declared his gratitude to the gods, for having granted his

prayer that he might witness all Syracusans in possession of full

liberty of speech.[403]

[403] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37; Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 5.