Already had Dion reached the Temenitid gate, where the principal

citizens, clothed in their best attire, and the multitude pouring

forth loud and joyous acclamations, were assembled to meet him.

Halting at the gate, he caused his trumpet to sound, and entreated

silence; after which he formally proclaimed, that he and his brother

Megakles were come for the purpose of putting down the Dionysian

despotism, and of giving liberty both to the Syracusans and the other

Sicilian Greeks. The acclamations redoubled as he and his soldiers

entered the city, first through Neapolis, next by the ascent up to

Achradina; the main street of which (broad, continuous, and straight,

as was rare in a Grecian city[200]) was decorated as on a day of

jubilee, with victims under sacrifice to the gods, tables, and bowls

of wine ready prepared for festival. As Dion advanced at the head of

his soldiers through a lane formed in the midst of this crowd, from

each side wreaths were cast upon him as upon an Olympic victor, and

grateful prayers addressed to him, as it were to a god.[201] Every

house was a scene of clamorous joy, in which men and women, freemen

and slaves, took part alike; the outburst of feelings long compressed

and relieved from the past despotism with its inquisitorial police

and garrison.

[200] Cicero in Verr. iv. 53. “Altera autem est urbs Syracusis,

cui nomen Acradina est: in quâ forum maximum, pulcherrimæ

porticus, ornatissimum prytaneum, amplissima est curia,

templumque egregium Jovis Olympii; cæteræque urbis partes, _unâ

totâ viâ perpetuâ_, multisque transversis, divisæ, privatis

ædificiis continentur.”

[201] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29: Diodor. xvi. 11. Compare the

manifestations of the inhabitants of Skionê towards Brasidas

(Thucyd. iv. 121).

It was not yet time for Dion to yield to these pleasing but passive

impulses. Having infused courage into his soldiers as well as into

the citizens by his triumphant procession through Achradina, he

descended to the level ground in front of Ortygia. That strong hold

was still occupied by the Dionysian garrison, whom he thus challenged

to come forth and fight. But the flight of Timokrates had left them

without orders, while the imposing demonstration and unanimous rising

of the people in Achradina—which they must partly have witnessed

from their walls, and partly learnt through fugitive spies and

partisans—struck them with discouragement and terror; so that they

were in no disposition to quit the shelter of their fortifications.

Their backwardness was hailed as a confession of inferiority by

the insurgent citizens, whom Dion now addressed as an assembly of

freemen. Hard by, in front of the acropolis with its Pentapyla or

five gates, there stood a lofty and magnificent sun-dial, erected

by the elder Dionysius. Mounting on the top of this edifice, with

the muniments of the despot on the one side and the now liberated

Achradina on the other, Dion addressed[202] an animated harangue

to the Syracusans around, exhorting them to strenuous efforts in

defence of their newly acquired rights and liberties, and inviting

them to elect generals for the command, in order to accomplish the

total expulsion of the Dionysian garrison. The Syracusans, with

unanimous acclamations, named Dion and his brother Megakles generals

with full powers. But both the brothers insisted that colleagues

should be elected along with them. Accordingly twenty other persons

were chosen besides, ten of them being from that small band of

Syracusan exiles who had joined at Zakynthus.

[202] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 10, 11. The description

which Plutarch gives of the position of this sun-dial is

distinct, and the harangue which Dion delivered, while standing

upon it, is an impressive fact:—Ἦν δ᾽ ~ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν~ καὶ τὰ

πεντάπυλα, Διονυσίου κατασκευάσαντος, ἡλιοτρόπιον καταφανὲς καὶ

ὑψηλόν. Ἐπὶ τούτῳ προσβὰς ἐδημηγόρησε, καὶ παρώρμησε τοὺς πολίτας

ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

The sun-dial was thus _under_ the acropolis, that is, in the low

ground immediately adjoining to Ortygia; near the place where the

elder Dionysius is stated to have placed his large porticos and

market-house (Diodor. xiv. 7), and where the younger Dionysius

erected the funeral monument to his father (xv. 74). In order to

arrive at the sun-dial, Dion must have descended from the height

of Achradina. Now Plutarch mentions that Dion _went up_ through

Achradina (ἀνῄει διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς). It is plain that he must

have come down again from Achradina, though Plutarch does not

specially mention it. And if he brought his men close under the

walls of the enemy’s garrison, this can hardly have been for any

other reason than that which I have assigned in the text.

Plutarch indicates the separate localities with tolerable

clearness, but he does not give a perspicuous description of

the whole march. Thus, he says that Dion, “wishing to harangue

the people himself, _went up_ through Achradina,” (Βουλόμενος

δὲ καὶ δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ προσαγορεῦσαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀνῄει διὰ τῆς

Ἀχραδινῆς), while the place from which Dion did harangue the

people, was _down under_ the acropolis of Ortygia.

Diodorus is still less clear about the localities, nor does

he say anything about the sun-dial or the exact spot from

whence Dion spoke, though he mentions the march of Dion through

Achradina.

It seems probable that what Plutarch calls τὰ πεντάπυλα are

the same as what Diodorus (xv. 74) indicates in the words ταῖς

βασιλικαῖς καλουμέναις πύλαις.

Such was the entry of Dion into Syracuse, on the third day[203]

after his landing in Sicily; and such the first public act of

renewed Syracusan freedom; the first after that fatal vote which,

forty-eight years before, had elected the elder Dionysius general

plenipotentiary, and placed in his hands the sword of state, without

foresight of the consequences. In the hands of Dion, that sword

was vigorously employed against the common enemy. He immediately

attacked Epipolæ; and such was the consternation of the garrison

left in it by the fugitive Timokrates, that they allowed him to

acquire possession of it, together with the strong fort of Euryalus,

which a little courage and devotion might long have defended. This

acquisition, made suddenly in the tide of success on one side and

discouragement on the other, was of supreme importance, and went far

to determine the ultimate contest. It not only reduced the partisans

of Dionysius within the limits of Ortygia, but also enabled Dion to

set free many state prisoners,[204] who became ardent partisans of

the revolution. Following up his success, he lost no time in taking

measures against Ortygia. To shut it up completely on the land-side,

he commenced the erection of a wall of blockade, reaching from the

Great Harbor at one extremity, to the sea on the eastern side of the

Portus Lakkius, at the other.[205] He at the same time provided arms

as well as he could for the citizens, sending for those spare arms

which he had deposited with Synalus at Minoa. It does not appear that

the garrison of Ortygia made any sally to impede him; so that in the

course of seven days, he had not only received his arms from Synalus,

but had completed, in a rough way, all or most of the blockading

cross-wall.[206]

[203] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 5.

[204] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29.

[205] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 12. Plutarch says,

τὴν δὲ ἀκρόπολιν ἀπετείχισε—Diodorus is more specific—Τῶν δὲ

Συρακοσίων κατεσκευακότων ἐκ θαλάσσης εἰς θάλασσαν διατειχίσματα,

etc. These are valuable words as indicating the line and the two

terminations of Dion’s blockading cross-wall.

[206] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29.

At the end of these seven days, but not before (having been prevented

by accident from receiving the express sent to him), Dionysius

returned with his fleet to Ortygia.[207] Fatally indeed was his

position changed. The islet was the only portion of the city which he

possessed, and that too was shut up on the land-side by a blockading

wall nearly completed. All the rest of the city was occupied by

bitter enemies instead of by subjects. Leontini also, and probably

many of his other dependencies out of Syracuse, had taken the

opportunity of revolting.[208] Even with the large fleet which he

had brought home, Dionysius did not think himself strong enough to

face his enemies in the field, but resorted to stratagem. He first

tried to open a private intrigue with Dion; who, however, refused to

receive any separate propositions, and desired him to address them

publicly to the freemen, citizens of Syracuse. Accordingly, he sent

envoys tendering to the Syracusans what in the present day would

be called a constitution. He demanded only moderate taxation, and

moderate fulfilments of military service, subject to their own vote

of consent. But the Syracusans laughed the offer to scorn, and Dion

returned in their name the peremptory reply,—that no proposition from

Dionysius could be received, short of total abdication; adding in

his own name, that he would himself, on the score of kindred, procure

for Dionysius, if he did abdicate, both security and other reasonable

concessions. These terms Dionysius affected to approve, desiring

that envoys might be sent to him in Ortygia to settle the details.

Both Dion and the Syracusans eagerly caught at his offer, without

for a moment questioning his sincerity. Some of the most eminent

Syracusans, approved by Dion, were despatched as envoys to Dionysius.

A general confidence prevailed, that the retirement of the despot was

now assured; and the soldiers and citizens employed against him, full

of joy and mutual congratulations, became negligent of their guard

on the cross-wall of blockade; many of them even retiring to their

houses in the city.

[207] This return of Dionysius, seven days after the coming of

Dion, is specified both by Plutarch and Diodorus (Plutarch, Dion,

c. 26-29; Diodor. xvi. 11).

[208] Diodor. xvi. 16.

This was what Dionysius expected. Contriving to prolong the

discussion, so as to detain the envoys in Ortygia all night, he

ordered at daybreak a sudden sally of all his soldiers, whom he had

previously stimulated both by wine and by immense promises in case

of victory.[209] The sally was well-timed and at first completely

successful. One half of Dion’s soldiers were encamped to guard the

cross-wall (the other half being quartered in Achradina), together

with a force of Syracusan citizens. But so little were they prepared

for hostilities, that the assailants, rushing out with shouts and

at a run, carried the wall at the first onset, slew the sentinels,

and proceeded to demolish the wall (which was probably a rough and

hasty structure) as well as to charge the troops on the outside of

it. The Syracusans, surprised and terrified, fled with little or no

resistance. Their flight partially disordered the stouter Dionian

soldiers, who resisted bravely, but without having had time to form

their regular array. Never was Dion more illustrious, both as an

officer and as a soldier. He exerted himself to the utmost to form

the troops, and to marshal them in ranks essential to the effective

fighting of the Grecian hoplite. But his orders were unheard in the

clamor, or disregarded in the confusion: his troops lost courage,

the assailants gained ground, and the day seemed evidently going

against him. Seeing that there was no other resource, he put himself

at the head of his best and most attached soldiers, and threw

himself, though now an elderly man, into the thickest of the fray.

The struggle was the more violent, as it took place in a narrow

space between the new blockading wall on one side, and the outer

wall of Neapolis on the other. Both the armor and the person of

Dion being conspicuous, he was known to enemies as well as friends,

and the battle around him was among the most obstinate in Grecian

history.[210] Darts rattled against both his shield and his helmet,

while his shield was also pierced through by several spears which

were kept from his body only by the breastplate. At length he was

wounded through the right arm or hand, thrown on the ground, and in

imminent danger of being made prisoner. But this forwardness on his

part so stimulated the courage of his own troops, that they both

rescued him, and made redoubled efforts against the enemy. Having

named Timonides commander in his place, Dion with his disabled hand

mounted on horseback, rode into Achradina, and led forth to the

battle that portion of his troops which were there in garrison. These

men, fresh and good soldiers, restored the battle. The Syracusans

came back to the field, all joined in strenuous conflict, and the

Dionysian assailants were at length again driven within the walls of

Ortygia. The loss on both sides was severe; that of Dionysius eight

hundred men; all of whom he caused to be picked up from the field

(under a truce granted on his request by Dion), and buried with

magnificent obsequies, as a means of popularizing himself with the

survivors.[211]

[209] Plutarch, Dion, c. 30. ἐμπλήσας ἀκράτου. It is rare that we

read of this proceeding with soldiers in antiquity. Diodor. xvi.

11, 12. τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν.

[210] Diodor. xvi. 12. Ὁ δὲ Δίων ἀνελπίστως παρεσπονδημένος, μετὰ

τῶν ἀρίστων στρατιωτῶν ἀπήντα τοῖς πολεμίοις· καὶ συνάψας μάχην,

πολὺν ἐποίει φόνον ἐν σταδίῳ. Ὀλίγῳ δὴ διαστήματι, τῆς διατειχίου

ἔσω, μάχης οὔσης, συνέδραμε πλῆθος στρατιωτῶν εἰς στένον τόπον.

The text here is not quite clear (see Wesseling’s note); but

we gather from the passage information about the topography of

Syracuse.

[211] Plutarch, Dion, c. 30; Diodor. xvi. 12, 13.

When we consider how doubtful the issue of this battle had proved,

it seems evident that had Timokrates maintained himself in Epipolæ,

so as to enable Dionysius to remain master of Epipolæ as well as of

Ortygia, the success of Dion’s whole enterprise in Syracuse would

have been seriously endangered.

Great was the joy excited at Syracuse by the victory. The Syracusan

people testified their gratitude to the Dionian soldiers by voting a

golden wreath to the value of one hundred minæ; while these soldiers,

charmed with the prowess of their general, voted a golden wreath

to him. Dion immediately began the re-establishment of the damaged

cross-wall, which he repaired, completed, and put under effective

guard for the future.[212] Dionysius no longer tried to impede it by

armed attack. But as he was still superior at sea, he transported

parties across the harbor to ravage the country for provisions, and

despatched vessels to bring in stores also by sea. His superiority

at sea was presently lessened by the arrival of Herakleides from

Peloponnesus,[213] with twenty triremes, three smaller vessels, and

fifteen hundred soldiers. The Syracusans, now beginning to show

themselves actively on shipboard, got together a tolerable naval

force. All the docks and wharfs lay concentrated in and around

Ortygia, within the grasp of Dionysius, who was master of the naval

force belonging to the city. But it would seem that the crews of

some of the ships (who were mostly native Syracusans,[214] with an

intermixture of Athenians, doubtless of democratical sentiments) must

have deserted from the despot to the people, carrying over their

ships, since we presently find the Syracusans with a fleet of sixty

triremes,[215] which they could hardly have acquired otherwise.

[212] Diodor. xvi. 13.

[213] Diodor. xvi. 16. Plutarch states that Herakleides brought

only seven triremes. But the force stated by Diodorus (given in

my text) appears more probable. It is difficult otherwise to

explain the number of ships which the Syracusans presently appear

as possessing. Moreover the great importance, which Herakleides

steps into, as opposed to Dion, is more easily accounted for.

[214] Plutarch, Dion, c. 35. About the Athenian seamen in

Ortygia, see a remarkable passage of Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350

A. When Plato was at Syracuse, in danger from the mercenaries,

the Athenian seamen, there employed, gave warning to him as their

countryman.

[215] Diodor. xvi. 16.

Dionysius was shortly afterwards reinforced by Philistus, who brought

to Ortygia, not only his fleet from the Tarentine Gulf, but also

a considerable regiment of cavalry. With these latter, and some

other troops besides, Philistus undertook an expedition against

the revolted Leontini. But though he made his way into the town

by night, he was presently expelled by the defenders, seconded by

reinforcements from Syracuse.[216]

[216] Diodor. xvi. 16.

To keep Ortygia provisioned, however, it was yet more indispensable

for Philistus to maintain his superiority at sea against the growing

naval power of the Syracusans, now commanded by Herakleides.[217]

After several partial engagements, a final battle, desperate and

decisive, at length took place between the two admirals. Both fleets

were sixty triremes strong. At first Philistus, brave and forward,

appeared likely to be victorious. But presently the fortune of

the day turned against him. His ship was run ashore, and himself

with most part of his fleet, overpowered by the enemy. To escape

captivity, he stabbed himself. The wound however was not mortal;

so that he fell alive, being now about seventy-eight years of age,

into the hands of his enemies,—who stripped him naked, insulted him

brutally, and at length cut off his head, after which they dragged

his body by the leg through the streets of Syracuse.[218] Revolting

as this treatment is, we must recollect that it was less horrible

than that which the elder Dionysius had inflicted on the Rhegine

general Phyton.

[217] See a Fragment of the fortieth Book of the Philippica of

Theopompus (Theopomp. Fragm. 212, ed. Didot), which seems to

refer to this point of time.

[218] Diodor. xvi. 16; Plutarch, Dion, c. 35.

The last hopes of the Dionysian dynasty perished with Philistus, the

ablest and most faithful of its servants. He had been an actor in its

first day of usurpation—its eighteenth Brumaire: his timely, though

miserable death, saved him from sharing in its last day of exile—its

St. Helena.

Even after the previous victory of Dion, Dionysius had lost all

chance of overcoming the Syracusans by force. But he had now farther

lost, through the victory of Herakleides, his superiority at sea,

and therefore his power even of maintaining himself permanently in

Ortygia. The triumph of Dion seemed assured, and his enemy humbled in

the dust. But though thus disarmed, Dionysius was still formidable by

his means of raising intrigue and dissension in Syracuse. His ancient

antipathy against Dion became more vehement than ever. Obliged to

forego empire himself—yet resolved at any rate that Dion should be

ruined along with him—he set on foot a tissue of base manœuvres

availing himself of the fears and jealousies of the Syracusans,

the rivalry of Herakleides, the defects of Dion, and what was more

important than all—the relationship of Dion to the Dionysian dynasty.

Dion had displayed devoted courage, and merited the signal gratitude

of the Syracusans. But he had been nursed in the despotism, of which

his father had been one of the chief founders; he was attached by

every tie of relationship to Dionysius, with whom his sister, his

former wife, and his children, were still dwelling in the acropolis.

The circumstances therefore were such as to suggest to the Syracusans

apprehensions, noway unreasonable, that some private bargain might

be made by Dion with the acropolis, and that the eminent services

which he had just rendered might only be made the stepping-stone

to a fresh despotism in his person. Such suspicions received much

countenance from the infirmities of Dion, who combined, with a

masculine and magnanimous character, manners so haughty as to be

painfully felt even by his own companions. The friendly letters from

Syracuse, written to Plato or to others at Athens (possibly those

from Timonides to Speusippus) shortly after the victory, contained

much complaint of the repulsive demeanor of Dion; which defect the

philosopher exhorted his friend to amend.[219] All those, whom Dion’s

arrogance offended, were confirmed in their suspicion of his despotic

designs, and induced to turn for protection to his rival Herakleides.

This latter—formerly general in the service of Dionysius, from whose

displeasure he had only saved his life by flight—had been unable or

unwilling to coöperate with Dion in his expedition from Zakynthus,

but had since brought to the aid of the Syracusans a considerable

force, including several armed ships. Though not present at the

first entry into Syracuse, nor arriving until Ortygia had already

been placed under blockade, Herakleides was esteemed the equal of

Dion in abilities and in military efficiency; while with regard to

ulterior designs, he had the prodigious advantage of being free from

connection with the despotism and of raising no mistrust. Moreover

his manners were not only popular, but according to Plutarch,[220]

more than popular—smooth, insidious, and dexterous in criminatory

speech, for the ruin of rivals and for his own exaltation.

[219] Plato, Epist. iv. p. 321 B. ... ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ καὶ ὅτι δοκεῖς

τισὶν ἐνδεεστέρως τοῦ προσήκοντος θεραπευτικὸς εἶναι· μὴ οὖν

λανθανέτω σε ὅτι διὰ τοῦ ἀρέσκειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὸ πράττειν

ἐστίν, ἡ δ᾽ αὐθάδεια ἐρημίᾳ ξύνοικος.

[220] Plutarch, Dion, c. 32.

As the contest presently came to be carried on rather at sea than

on land, the equipment of a fleet became indispensable; so that

Herakleides, who had brought the greatest number of triremes,

naturally rose in importance. Shortly after his arrival, the

Syracusan assembly passed a vote to appoint him admiral. But Dion,

who seems only to have heard of this vote after it had passed,

protested against it as derogating from the full powers which

the Syracusans had by their former vote conferred upon himself.

Accordingly the people, though with reluctance, cancelled their vote,

and deposed Herakleides. Having then gently rebuked Herakleides

for raising discord at a season when the common enemy was still

dangerous, Dion convened another assembly; wherein he proposed,

from himself, the appointment of Herakleides as admiral, with a

guard equal to his own.[221] The right of nomination thus assumed

displeased the Syracusans, humiliated Herakleides, and exasperated

his partisans as well as the fleet which he commanded. It gave him

power—together with provocation to employ that power for the ruin

of Dion; who thus laid himself doubly open to genuine mistrust from

some, and to intentional calumny from others.

[221] Plutarch, Dion, c. 33. It would seem that this Herakleides

is the person alluded to in the fragment from the fortieth Book

of the Philippica of Theopompus (Theop. Fr. 212, ed. Didot):—

Προστάται δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἦσαν τῶν μὲν Συρακουσίων Ἄθηνις καὶ

Ἡρακλείδης, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Δυμαῖος.

Probably also, Athênis is the same person named as _Athanis_ or

_Athanas_ by Diodorus and Plutarch, (Diodor. xv. 94; Plutarch,

Timoleon, c. 23-37). He wrote a history of Syracusan affairs

during the period of Dion and Timoleon, beginning from 362 B. C.,

and continuing the history of Philistus. See Historicorum Græc.

Fragm. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 81.

It is necessary to understand this situation, in order to appreciate

the means afforded to Dionysius for personal intrigue directed

against Dion. Though the vast majority of Syracusans were hostile

to Dionysius, yet there were among them many individuals connected

with those serving under him in Ortygia, and capable of being put

in motion to promote his views. Shortly after the complete defeat

of his sally, he renewed his solicitations for peace; to which Dion

returned the peremptory answer, that no peace could be concluded

until Dionysius abdicated and retired. Next, Dionysius sent out

heralds from Ortygia with letters addressed to Dion from his female

relatives. All these letters were full of complaints of the misery

endured by these poor women; together with prayers that he would

relax in his hostility. To avert suspicion, Dion caused the letters

to be opened and read publicly before the Syracusan assembly; but

their tenor was such, that suspicion, whether expressed or not,

unavoidably arose, as to the effect on Dion’s sympathies. One letter

there was, bearing on its superscription the words “Hipparinus (the

son of Dion) to his father.” At first many persons present refused

to take cognizance of a communication so strictly private; but Dion

insisted, and the letter was publicly read. It proved to come, not

from the youthful Hipparinus, but from Dionysius himself, and was

insidiously worded for the purpose of discrediting Dion in the minds

of the Syracusans. It began by reminding him of the long service

which he had rendered to the despotism. It implored him not to bury

that great power, as well as his own relatives, in one common ruin,

for the sake of a people who would turn round and sting him, so soon

as he had given them freedom. It offered, on the part of Dionysius

himself, immediate retirement, provided Dion would consent to take

his place. But it threatened, if Dion refused, the sharpest tortures

against his female relatives and his son.[222]

[222] Plutarch, Dion, c. 31.

This letter, well-turned as a composition for its own purpose, was

met by indignant refusal and protestation on the part of Dion.

Without doubt his refusal would be received with cheers by the

assembly; but the letter did not the less instil its intended poison

into their minds. Plutarch displays[223] (in my judgment) no great

knowledge of human nature, when he complains of the Syracusans for

suffering the letter to impress them with suspicions of Dion, instead

of admiring his magnanimous resistance to such touching appeals. It

was precisely the magnanimity required for the situation, which

made them mistrustful. Who could assure them that such a feeling,

to the requisite pitch, was to be found in the bosom of Dion? or

who could foretel which, among painfully conflicting sentiments,

would determine his conduct? The position of Dion forbade the

possibility of his obtaining full confidence. Moreover his enemies,

not content with inflaming the real causes of mistrust, fabricated

gross falsehoods against him as well as against the mercenaries

under his command. A Syracusan named Sôsis, brother to one of the

guards of Dionysius, made a violent speech in the Syracusan assembly,

warning his countrymen to beware of Dion, lest they should find

themselves saddled with a strict and sober despot in place of one

who was always intoxicated. On the next day Sôsis appeared in the

Assembly with a wound on the head, which he said that some of the

soldiers of Dion had inflicted upon him in revenge for his speech.

Many persons present, believing the story, warmly espoused his cause;

while Dion had great difficulty in repelling the allegation, and

in obtaining time for the investigation of its truth. On inquiry,

it was discovered that the wound was a superficial cut inflicted

by Sôsis himself with a razor, and that the whole tale was an

infamous calumny which he had been bribed to propagate.[224] In

this particular instance, it was found practicable to convict the

delinquent of shameless falsehood. But there were numerous other

attacks and perversions less tangible, generated by the same hostile

interests and tending towards the same end. Every day the suspicion

and unfriendly sentiment of the Syracusans, towards Dion and his

soldiers, became more imbittered.

[223] Plutarch, Dion, c. 32.

[224] Plutarch, Dion, c. 34.

The naval victory gained by Herakleides and the Syracusan fleet over

Philistus, exalting both the spirit of the Syracusans and the glory

of the admiral, still further lowered the influence of Dion. The

belief gained ground that even without him and his soldiers, the

Syracusans could defend themselves, and gain possession of Ortygia.

It was now that the defeated Dionysius sent from thence a fresh

embassy to Dion, offering to surrender to him the place with its

garrison, magazine of arms, and treasure equivalent to five months’

full pay—on condition of being allowed to retire to Italy, and enjoy

the revenues of a large and productive portion (called Gyarta) of

the Syracusan territory. Dion again refused to reply, desiring him

to address the Syracusan public yet advising them to accept the

terms.[225] Under the existing mistrust towards Dion, this advice

was interpreted as concealing an intended collusion between him and

Dionysius. Herakleides promised, that if the war were prosecuted, he

would keep Ortygia blocked up until it was surrendered at discretion

with all in it as prisoners. But in spite of his promise, Dionysius

contrived to elude his vigilance and sail off to Lokri in Italy, with

many companions and much property, leaving Ortygia in command of his

eldest son Apollokrates.

[225] Plutarch, Dion, c. 37; Diodor. xvi. 17.

Though the blockade was immediately resumed and rendered stricter

than before, yet this escape of the despot brought considerable

discredit on Herakleides. Probably the Dionian partisans were not

sparing in their reproach. To create for himself fresh popularity,

Herakleides warmly espoused the proposition of a citizen named

Hippo, for a fresh division of landed property; a proposition,

which, considering the sweeping alteration of landed property

made by the Dionysian dynasty, we may well conceive to have been

recommended upon specious grounds of retributive justice, as well

as upon the necessity of providing for poor citizens. Dion opposed

the motion strenuously, but was outvoted. Other suggestions also,

yet more repugnant to him, and even pointed directly against him,

were adopted. Lastly, Herakleides, enlarging upon his insupportable

arrogance, prevailed upon the people to decree that new generals

should be appointed, and that the pay due to the Dionian soldiers,

now forming a large arrear, should not be liquidated out of the

public purse.[226]

[226] Plutarch, Dion, c. 37; Diodor. xvi. 17.

It was towards midsummer that Dion was thus divested of his command,

about nine months after his arrival at Syracuse.[227] Twenty-five new

generals were named, of whom Herakleides was one.

[227] Plutarch, Dion, c. 38. θέρους μεσοῦντος, etc.

The measure, scandalously ungrateful and unjust, whereby the soldiers

were deprived of the pay due to them, was dictated by pure antipathy

against Dion: for it does not seem to have been applied to those

soldiers who had come with Herakleides; moreover the new generals

sent private messages to the Dionian soldiers, inviting them to

desert their leader and join the Syracusans, in which case the grant

of citizenship was promised to them.[228] Had the soldiers complied,

it is obvious, that either the pay due, or some equivalent, must

have been assigned to satisfy them. But one and all of them scorned

the invitation, adhering to Dion with unshaken fidelity. The purpose

of Herakleides was, to expel him alone. This however was prevented

by the temper of the soldiers; who, indignant at the treacherous

ingratitude of the Syracusans, instigated Dion to take a legitimate

revenge upon them, and demanded only to be led to the assault.

Refusing to employ force, Dion calmed their excitement, and put

himself at their head to conduct them out of the city; not without

remonstrances addressed to the generals and the people of Syracuse

upon their proceedings, imprudent as well as wicked, while the enemy

were still masters of Ortygia. Nevertheless, the new generals, chosen

as the most violent enemies of Dion, not only turned a deaf ear to

his appeal, but inflamed the antipathies of the people, and spurred

them on to attack the soldiers on their march out of Syracuse. Their

attack, though repeated more than once, was vigorously repulsed by

the soldiers—excellent troops, three thousand in number; while Dion,

anxious to ensure their safety, and to avoid bloodshed on both sides,

confined himself strictly to the defensive. He forbade all pursuit,

giving up the prisoners without ransom as well as the bodies of the

slain for burial.[229]

[228] Plutarch, Dion, c. 38.

[229] Plutarch, Dion, c. 39; Diodor. xvi. 17.

In this guise Dion arrived at Leontini, where he found the warmest

sympathy towards himself, with indignant disgust at the behavior

of the Syracusans. Allied with the newly-enfranchised Syracuse

against the Dionysian dynasty, the Leontines not only received the

soldiers of Dion into their citizenship, and voted to them a positive

remuneration, but sent an embassy to Syracuse insisting that justice

should be done to them. The Syracusans, on their side, sent envoys to

Leontini, to accuse Dion before an assembly of all the allies there

convoked. Who these allies were, our defective information does not

enable us to say. Their sentence went in favor of Dion and against

the Syracusans; who nevertheless stood out obstinately, refusing all

justice or reparation,[230] and fancying themselves competent to

reduce Ortygia without Dion’s assistance—since the provisions therein

were exhausted, and the garrison was already suffering from famine.

Despairing of reinforcement, Apollokrates had already resolved to

send envoys and propose a capitulation, when Nypsius, a Neapolitan

officer, despatched by Dionysius from Lokri, had the good fortune to

reach Ortygia at the head of a reinforcing fleet, convoying numerous

transports with an abundant stock of provisions. There was now no

farther talk of surrender. The garrison of Ortygia was reinforced

to ten thousand mercenary troops of considerable merit, and well

provisioned for some time.[231]

[230] Plutarch, Dion, c. 40.

[231] Plutarch, Dion, c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 18, 19.

The Syracusan admirals, either from carelessness or ill-fortune,

had not been able to prevent the entry of Nypsius. But they made

a sudden attack upon him while his fleet were in the harbor, and

while the crews, thinking themselves safe from an enemy, were

interchanging salutations or aiding to disembark the stores. This

attack was well-timed and successful. Several of the triremes of

Nypsius were ruined—others were towed off as prizes, while the

victory, gained by Herakleides without Dion, provoked extravagant

joy throughout Syracuse. In the belief that Ortygia could not longer

hold out, the citizens, the soldiers, and even the generals, gave

loose to mad revelry and intoxication, continued into the ensuing

night. Nypsius, an able officer, watched his opportunity, and made

a vigorous night-sally. His troops, issuing forth in good order,

planted their scaling-ladders, mounted the blockading wall, and slew

the sleeping or drunken sentinels without any resistance. Master of

this important work, Nypsius employed a part of his men to pull it

down, while he pushed the rest forward against the city. At daybreak

the affrighted Syracusans saw themselves vigorously attacked even

in their own stronghold, when neither generals nor citizens were at

all prepared to resist. The troops of Nypsius first forced their

way into Neapolis, which lay the nearest to the wall of Ortygia;

next into Tycha, the other fortified suburb. Over these they ranged

victorious, vanquishing all the detached parties of Syracusans which

could be opposed to them. The streets became a scene of bloodshed—the

houses of plunder; for as Dionysius had now given up the idea of

again permanently ruling at Syracuse, his troops thought of little

else except satiating the revenge of their master and their own

rapacity. The soldiers of Nypsius stripped the private dwellings in

the town, taking away not only the property, but also the women and

children, as booty into Ortygia. At last (it appears) they got also

into Achradina, the largest and most populous portion of Syracuse.

Here the same scene of pillage, destruction, and bloodshed, was

continued throughout the whole day, and on a still larger scale; with

just enough resistance to pique the fury of the victors, without

restraining their progress.

It soon became evident to Herakleides and his colleagues, as well as

to the general body of citizens, that there was no hope of safety

except in invoking the aid of Dion and his soldiers from Leontini.

Yet the appeal to one whom they not only hated and feared, but had

ignominiously maltreated, was something so intolerable, that for a

long time no one would speak out to propose what every man had in his

mind. At length some of the allies present, less concerned in the

political parties of the city, ventured to broach the proposition,

which ran from man to man, and was adopted under a press of mingled

and opposite emotions. Accordingly two officers of the allies, and

five Syracusan horsemen set off at full speed to Leontini, to implore

the instant presence of Dion. Reaching the place towards evening,

they encountered Dion himself immediately on dismounting, and

described to him the miserable scenes now going on at Syracuse. Their

tears and distress brought around them a crowd of hearers, Leontines

as well as Peloponnesians; and a general assembly was speedily

convened, before which Dion exhorted them to tell their story. They

described, in the tone of men whose all was at stake, the actual

sufferings and the impending total ruin of the city; entreating

oblivion for their past misdeeds, which were already but too cruelly

expiated.

Their discourse, profoundly touching to the audience, was heard in

silence. Every one waited for Dion to begin, and to determine the

fate of Syracuse. He rose to speak; but for a time tears checked his

utterance, while his soldiers around cheered him with encouraging

sympathy. At length he found voice to say, “I have convened you,

Peloponnesians and allies, to deliberate about your own conduct.

For me, deliberation would be a disgrace, while Syracuse is in the

hands of the destroyer. If I cannot save my country, I shall go and

bury myself in its flaming ruins. For you, if, in spite of what

has happened, you still choose to assist us, misguided and unhappy

Syracusans, we shall owe it to you that we still continue a city.

But if, in disdainful sense of wrong endured, you shall leave us to

our fate, I here thank you for all your past valor and attachment

to me, praying that the gods may reward you for it. Remember Dion,

as one who neither deserted you when you were wronged, nor his own

fellow-citizens when they were in misery.”

This address, so replete with pathos and dignity, went home to the

hearts of the audience, filling them with passionate emotion and

eagerness to follow him. Universal shouts called upon him to put

himself at their head instantly and march to Syracuse; while the

envoys present fell upon his neck, invoking blessings both upon him

and upon the soldiers. As soon as the excitement had subsided, Dion

gave orders that every man should take his evening meal forthwith,

and return in arms to the spot, prepared for a night-march to

Syracuse.

By daybreak, Dion and his band were within a few miles of the

northern wall of Epipolæ. Messengers from Syracuse here met him,

inducing him to slacken his march and proceed with caution.

Herakleides and the other generals had sent a message forbidding

his nearer approach, with notice that the gates would be closed

against him; yet at the same time, counter-messages arrived from

many eminent citizens, entreating him to persevere, and promising

him both admittance and support. Nypsius, having permitted his

troops to pillage and destroy in Syracuse throughout the preceding

day, had thought it prudent to withdraw them back into Ortygia for

the night. His retreat raised the courage of Herakleides and his

colleagues; who, fancying that the attack was now over, repented

of the invitation which they had permitted to be sent to Dion.

Under this impression they despatched to him the second message of

exclusion; keeping guard at the gate in the northern wall to make

their threat good. But the events of the next morning speedily

undeceived them. Nypsius renewed his attack with greater ferocity

than before, completed the demolition of the wall of blockade before

Ortygia, and let loose his soldiers with merciless hand throughout

all the streets of Syracuse. There was on this day less of pillage,

but more of wholesale slaughter. Men, women, and children perished

indiscriminately, and nothing was thought of by these barbarians

except to make Syracuse a heap of ruins and dead bodies. To

accelerate the process, and to forestall Dion’s arrival, which they

fully expected—they set fire to the city in several places, with

torches and fire-bearing arrows. The miserable inhabitants knew not

where to flee, to escape the flames within their houses, or the sword

without. The streets were strewed with corpses, while the fire gained

ground perpetually, threatening to spread over the greater part of

the city. Under such terrible circumstances, neither Herakleides,

himself wounded, nor the other generals, could hold out any longer

against the admission of Dion; to whom even the brother and uncle of

Herakleides were sent, with pressing entreaties to accelerate his

march, since the smallest delay would occasion ruin to Syracuse.[232]

[232] Plutarch, Dion, c. 45.

Dion was about seven miles from the gates when these last cries of

distress reached him. Immediately hurrying forward his soldiers,

whose ardor was not inferior to his own, at a running pace, he

reached speedily the gates called Hexapyla, in the northern wall of

Epipolæ. When once within these gates, he halted in an interior area

called the Hekatompedon.[233] His light-armed were sent forward at

once to arrest the destroying enemy, while he kept back the hoplites

until he could form them into separate columns under proper captains,

along with the citizens who crowded round him with demonstrations

of great reverence. He distributed them so as to enter the interior

portion of Syracuse, and attack the troops of Nypsius, on several

points at once.[234] Being now within the exterior fortification

formed by the wall of Epipolæ, there lay before him the tripartite

interior city—Tycha, Neapolis, Achradina. Each of these parts had its

separate fortification; between Tycha and Neapolis lay an unfortified

space, but each of them joined on to Achradina, the western wall of

which formed their eastern wall. It is probable that these interior

fortifications had been partially neglected since the construction of

the outer walls along Epipolæ, which comprised them all within, and

formed the principal defence against a foreign enemy. Moreover the

troops of Nypsius, having been masters of the three towns, and roving

as destroyers around them, for several hours, had doubtless broken

down the gates and in other ways weakened the defences. The scene was

frightful, and the ways everywhere impeded by flame and smoke, by

falling houses and fragments, and by the numbers who lay massacred

around. It was amidst such horrors that Dion and his soldiers found

themselves—while penetrating in different divisions at once into

Neapolis, Tycha, and Achradina.

[233] Diodor. xvi. 20. διανύσας ὀξέως τὴν εἰς Συρακούσσας ὁδὸν,

ἧκε πρὸς τὰ Ἑξάπυλα, etc. Plutarch, Dion, c. 45. εἰσέβαλε διὰ τῶν

πυλῶν εἰς τὴν Ἑκατόμπεδον λεγομένην, etc.

[234] Plutarch, Dion, c. 45. ὀρθίους λόχους ποιῶν καὶ διαιρῶν τὰς

ἡγεμονίας, ὅπως πολλαχόθεν ἅμα προσφέροιτο φοβερώτερον.

His task would probably have been difficult, had Nypsius been able

to control the troops under his command, in themselves brave and

good. But these troops had been for some hours dispersed throughout

the streets, satiating their licentious and murderous passions, and

destroying a town which Dionysius now no longer expected to retain.

Recalling as many soldiers as he could from this brutal disorder,

Nypsius marshalled them along the interior fortification, occupying

the entrances and exposed points where Dion would seek to penetrate

into the city.[235] The battle was thus not continuous, but fought

between detached parties at separate openings, often very narrow, and

on ground sometimes difficult to surmount, amidst the conflagration

blazing everywhere around.[236] Disorganized by pillage, the troops

of Nypsius could oppose no long resistance to the forward advance

of Dion, with soldiers full of ardor and with the Syracusans around

him stimulated by despair. Nypsius was overpowered, compelled to

abandon his line of defence, and to retreat with his troops into

Ortygia, which the greater number of them reached in safety. Dion

and his victorious troops, after having forced the entrance into the

city, did not attempt to pursue them. The first and most pressing

necessity was to extinguish the flames; but no inconsiderable number

of the soldiers of Nypsius were found dispersed through the streets

and houses, and slain while actually carrying off plunder on their

shoulders. Long after the town was cleared of enemies, however,

all hands within it were employed in stopping the conflagration; a

task in which they hardly succeeded, even by unremitting efforts

throughout the day and the following night.[237]

[235] Plutarch, Dion, c. 46. παρατεταγμένων ~παρὰ τὸ τείχισμα~

χαλεπὴν ἔχον καὶ δυσεκβίαστον τὴν πρόσοδον.

To a person who, after penetrating into the interior of the

wall of Epipolæ, stood on the slope, and looked down eastward,

the outer wall of Tycha, Achradina, and Neapolis, might be said

to form one τείχισμα; not indeed in one and the same line or

direction, yet continuous from the northern to the southern brink

of Epipolæ.

[236] Plutarch, Dion, c. 46. Ὡς δὲ προσέμιξαν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐν

χερσὶ μὲν ὀλίγων πρὸς ὀλίγους ἐγένετο μάχη, διὰ τὴν στενότητα καὶ

τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τοῦ τόπου, etc.

[237] Plutarch, Dion, c. 45, 46; Diodor. xvi. 20.

On the morrow Syracuse was another city; disfigured by the desolating

trace of flame and of the hostile soldiery, yet still refreshed in

the hearts of its citizens, who felt that they had escaped much

worse; and above all, penetrated by a renewed political spirit,

and a deep sense of repentant gratitude towards Dion. All those

generals, who had been chosen at the last election from their

intense opposition to him, fled forthwith; except Herakleides and

Theodotes. These two men were his most violent and dangerous enemies;

yet it appears that they knew his character better than their

colleagues, and therefore did not hesitate to throw themselves upon

his mercy. They surrendered, confessed their guilt, and implored his

forgiveness. His magnanimity (they said) would derive a new lustre,

if he now rose superior to his just resentment over misguided rivals,

who stood before him humbled and ashamed of their former opposition,

entreating him to deal with them better than they had dealt with him.

If Dion had put their request to the vote, it would have been refused

by a large majority. His soldiers, recently defrauded of their pay,

were yet burning with indignation against the authors of such an

injustice. His friends, reminding him of the bitter and unscrupulous

attacks which he as well as they had experienced from Herakleides,

exhorted him to purge the city of one who abused the popular forms

to purposes hardly less mischievous than despotism itself. The

life of Herakleides now hung upon a thread. Without pronouncing any

decided opinion, Dion had only to maintain an equivocal silence, and

suffer the popular sentiment to manifest itself in a verdict invoked

by one party, expected even by the opposite. The more was every one

astonished when he took upon himself the responsibility of pardoning

Herakleides; adding, by way of explanation and satisfaction[238] to

his disappointed friends—

[238] Plutarch, Dion, c. 47. Ὁ δὲ Δίων παραμυθούμενος αὐτοὺς

ἔλεγεν, etc.

“Other generals have gone through most of their training with a view

to arms and war. My long training in the Academy has been devoted to

aid me in conquering anger, envy, and all malignant jealousies. To

show that I have profited by such lessons, it is not enough that I do

my duty towards my friends and towards honest men. The true test is,

if, after being wronged, I show myself placable and gentle towards

the wrong-doer. My wish is to prove myself superior to Herakleides

more in goodness and justice, than in power and intelligence.

Successes in war, even when achieved single-handed, are half owing

to fortune. If Herakleides has been treacherous and wicked through

envy, it is not for Dion to dishonor a virtuous life in obedience to

angry sentiment. Nor is human wickedness, great as it often is, ever

pushed to such an excess of stubborn brutality, as not to be amended

by gentle and gracious treatment, from steady benefactors.”[239]

[239] Plutarch, Dion, c. 47.

We may reasonably accept this as something near the genuine speech

of Dion, reported by his companion Timonides, and thus passing into

the biography of Plutarch. It lends a peculiar interest, as an

exposition of motives, to the act which it accompanies. The sincerity

of the exposition admits of no doubt, for all the ordinary motives of

the case counselled an opposite conduct; and had Dion been in like

manner at the feet of his rival, his life would assuredly not have

been spared. He took pride (with a sentiment something like that of

Kallikratidas[240] on liberating the prisoners taken at Methymna) in

realizing by conspicuous act the lofty morality which he had imbibed

from the Academy; the rather, as the case presented every temptation

to depart from it Persuading himself that he could by an illustrious

example put to shame and soften the mutual cruelties so frequent in

Grecian party-warfare, and regarding the amnesty towards Herakleides

as a proper sequel to the generous impulse which had led him to march

from Leontini to Syracuse,—he probably gloried in both, more than in

the victory itself. We shall presently have the pain of discovering

that his anticipations were totally disappointed. And we may be sure

that at the time, the judgment passed on his proceeding towards

Herakleides was very different from what it now receives. Among his

friends and soldiers, the generosity of the act would be forgotten in

its imprudence. Among his enemies, it would excite surprise, perhaps

admiration—yet few of them would be conciliated or converted into

friends. In the bosom of Herakleides himself, the mere fact of owing

his life to Dion would be a new and intolerable humiliation, which

the Erinnys within would goad him on to avenge. Dion would be warned,

by the criticism of his friends, as well as by the instinct of his

soldiers, that in yielding to a magnanimous sentiment, he overlooked

the reasonable consequences; and that Herakleides continuing at

Syracuse would only be more dangerous both to him and them, than he

had been before. Without taking his life, Dion might have required

him to depart from Syracuse; which sentence, having regard to the

practice of the time, would have been accounted generosity.

[240] See Vol. VIII. Ch. lxiv. p. 165 of this History.

It was Dion’s next business to renew the wall of blockade constructed

against Ortygia, and partially destroyed in the late sally of

Nypsius. Every Syracusan citizen was directed to cut a stake, and

deposit it near the spot; after which, during the ensuing night, the

soldiers planted a stockade so as to restore the broken parts of

the line. Protection being thus ensured to the city against Nypsius

and his garrison, Dion proceeded to bury the numerous dead who had

been slain in the sally, and to ransom the captives, no less than

two thousand in number, who had been carried off into Ortygia.[241]

A trophy, with sacrifice to the gods for the victory, was not

forgotten.[242]

[241] Plutarch, Dion, c. 48.

[242] Diodor. xvi. 20.

A public assembly was now held to elect new generals in place of

those who had fled. Here a motion was made by Herakleides himself,

that Dion should be chosen general with full powers both by land

and sea. The motion was received with great favor by the principal

citizens; but the poorer men were attached to Herakleides, especially

the seamen; who preferred serving under his command, and loudly

required that he should be named admiral, along with Dion as general

on land. Forced to acquiesce in this nomination, Dion contented

himself with insisting and obtaining, that the resolution, which had

been previously adopted for redistributing lands and houses, should

be rescinded.[243]

[243] Plutarch, Dion, c. 48.

The position of affairs at Syracuse was now pregnant with mischief

and quarrel. On land, Dion enjoyed a dictatorial authority;—at sea,

Herakleides, his enemy not less than ever, was admiral, by separate

and independent nomination. The undefined authority of Dion—exercised

by one self-willed, though magnanimous, in spirit, and extremely

repulsive in manner—was sure to become odious after the feelings

arising out of the recent rescue had worn off; and abundant opening

would thus be made for the opposition of Herakleides, often on just

grounds. That officer indeed was little disposed to wait for just

pretences. Conducting the Syracusan fleet to Messênê in order to

carry on war against Dionysius at Lokri, he not only tried to raise

the seamen in arms against Dion, by charging him with despotic

designs, but even entered into a secret treaty with the common enemy

Dionysius; through the intervention of the Spartan Pharax, who

commanded the Dionysian troops. His intrigues being discovered, a

violent opposition was raised against them by the leading Syracusan

citizens. It would seem (as far as we can make out from the

scanty information of Plutarch) that the military operations were

frustrated, and that the armament was forced to return to Syracuse.

Here again the quarrel was renewed—the seamen apparently standing

with Herakleides, the principal citizens with Dion—and carried so

far, that the city suffered not only from disturbance, but even

from irregular supply of provisions.[244] Among the mortifications

of Dion, not the least was that which he experienced from his

own friends or soldiers, who reminded him of their warnings and

predictions when he consented to spare Herakleides. Meanwhile

Dionysius had sent into Sicily a body of troops under Pharax, who

were encamped at Neapolis in the Agrigentine territory. In what

scheme of operations this movement forms a part, we cannot make

out; for Plutarch tells us nothing except what bears immediately

on the quarrel between Dion and Herakleides. To attack Pharax, the

forces of Syracuse were brought out; the fleet under Herakleides,

the soldiers on land under Dion. The latter, though he thought

it imprudent to fight, was constrained to hazard a battle by the

insinuations of Herakleides and the clamor of the seamen; who accused

him of intentionally eking out the war for the purpose of prolonging

his own dictatorship. Dion accordingly attacked Pharax, but was

repulsed. Yet the repulse was not a serious defeat, so that he was

preparing to renew the attack, when he was apprised that Herakleides

with the fleet had departed and were returning at their best speed

to Syracuse; with the intention of seizing the city, and barring

out Dion with his troops. Nothing but a rapid and decisive movement

could defeat this scheme. Leaving the camp immediately with his best

horsemen, Dion rode back to Syracuse as fast as possible; completing

a distance of seven hundred stadia (about eighty-two miles) in a very

short time, and forestalling the arrival of Herakleides.[245]

[244] Plutarch, Dion, c. 48. καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὴν ἀπορία καὶ σπάνις ἐν

ταῖς Συρακούσαις, etc.

[245] Plutarch, Dion, c. 49.

Thus disappointed and exposed, Herakleides found means to direct

another manœuvre against Dion, through the medium of a Spartan

named Gæsylus; who had been sent by the Spartans, informed of the

dissensions in Syracuse, to offer himself (like Gylippus) for the

command. Herakleides eagerly took advantage of the arrival of this

officer; pressing the Syracusans to accept a Spartan as their

commander-in-chief. But Dion replied that there were plenty of

native Syracusans qualified for command; moreover, if a Spartan was

required, he was himself a Spartan, by public grant. Gæsylus, having

ascertained the state of affairs, had the virtue and prudence not

merely to desist from his own pretensions, but also to employ his

best efforts in reconciling Dion and Herakleides. Sensible that the

wrong had been on the side of the latter, Gæsylus constrained him

to bind himself by the strongest oaths to better conduct in future.

He engaged his own guarantee for the observance of the covenant;

but the better to ensure such observance, the greater part of the

Syracusan fleet (the chief instrument of Herakleides) was disbanded,

leaving only enough to keep Ortygia under blockade.[246]

[246] Plutarch, Dion, c. 50.

The capture of that islet and fortress, now more strictly watched

than ever, was approaching. What had become of Pharax, or why

he did not advance, after the retreat of Dion, to harass the

Syracusans and succor Ortygia—we know not. But no succor arrived;

provisions grew scarce; and the garrison became so discontented,

that Apollokrates the son of Dionysius could not hold out any

longer. Accordingly, he capitulated with Dion; handing over to him

Ortygia with its fort, arms, magazines and everything contained in

it—except what he could carry away in five triremes. Aboard of these

vessels, he placed his mother, his sisters, his immediate friends,

and his chief valuables, leaving everything else behind for Dion

and the Syracusans, who crowded to the beach in multitudes to see

him depart. To them the moment was one of lively joy, and mutual

self-congratulation—promising to commence a new era of freedom.[247]

[247] Plutarch, Dion, c. 50.

On entering Ortygia, Dion saw for the first time after a separation

of about twelve years, his sister Aristomachê, his wife Aretê, and

family. The interview was one of the tenderest emotion and tears of

delight to all. Aretê, having been made against her own consent the

wife of Timokratês, was at first afraid to approach Dion. But he

received and embraced her with unabated affection.[248] He conducted

both her and his son away from the Dionysian acropolis, in which they

had been living since his absence, into his own house; having himself

resolved not to dwell in the acropolis, but to leave it as a public

fort or edifice belonging to Syracuse. However, this renewal of his

domestic happiness was shortly afterwards imbittered by the death

of his son; who having imbibed from Dionysius drunken and dissolute

habits, fell from the roof of the house, in a fit of intoxication or

frenzy, and perished.[249]

[248] Plutarch, Dion, c. 51.

[249] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 5.

Dion was now at the pinnacle of power as well as of glory. With

means altogether disproportionate, he had achieved the expulsion of

the greatest despot in Greece, even from an impregnable stronghold.

He had combated danger and difficulty with conspicuous resolution,

and had displayed almost chivalrous magnanimity. Had he “breathed

out his soul”[250] at the instant of triumphant entry in Ortygia,

the Academy would have been glorified by a pupil of first-rate and

unsullied merit. But that cup of prosperity, which poisoned so many

other eminent Greeks, had now the fatal effect of exaggerating all

the worst of Dion’s qualities, and damping all the best.

[250] Juvenal, Satir. x. 381.

“Quid illo cive (Marius) tulisset

Imperium in terris, quid Roma beatius unquam,

Si circumducto captivorum agmine, et omni

Bellorum pompâ, animam exhalasset opimam,

Cum de Teutonico vellet descendere curru?”

Plutarch indeed boasts, and we may perfectly believe, that he

maintained the simplicity of his table, his raiment, and his habits

of life, completely unchanged—now that he had become master of

Syracuse, and an object of admiration to all Greece. In this respect,

Plato and the Academy had reason to be proud of their pupil.[251]

But the public mistakes, now to be recounted, were not the less

mischievous to his countrymen as well as to himself.

[251] Plutarch, Dion, c. 52.

From the first moment of his entry into Syracuse from Peloponnesus,

Dion had been suspected and accused of aiming at the expulsion of

Dionysius, only in order to transfer the despotism to himself.

His haughty and repulsive manners, raising against him personal

antipathies everywhere, were cited as confirming the charge. Even

at moments when Dion was laboring for the genuine good of the

Syracusans, this suspicion had always more or less crossed his

path; robbing him of well-merited gratitude—and at the same time

discrediting his opponents, and the people of Syracuse, as guilty of

mean jealousy towards a benefactor.

The time had now come when Dion was obliged to act in such a manner

as either to confirm, or to belie, such unfavorable auguries.

Unfortunately both his words and his deeds confirmed them in the

strongest manner. The proud and repulsive external demeanor, for

which he had always been notorious, was rather aggravated than

softened. He took pride in showing, more plainly than ever, that he

despised everything which looked like courting popularity.[252]

[252] Plutarch, Dion, c. 52. Τοῦ μέντοι περὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας ὄγκου

καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀτενοῦς ~ἐφιλονείκει μηδὲν ὑφελεῖν μηδὲ

χαλάσαι~, καίτοι τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῷ χάριτος ἐνδεῶν ὄντων, καὶ

Πλάτωνος ἐπιτιμῶντος, etc.

If the words and manner of Dion were thus significant, both what

he did, and what he left undone, was more significant still. Of

that great boon of freedom, which he had so loudly promised to the

Syracusans, and which he had directed his herald to proclaim on first

entering their walls, he conferred absolutely nothing. He retained

his dictatorial power unabated, and his military force certainly

without reduction, if not actually reinforced; for as Apollokrates

did not convey away with him the soldiers in Ortygia, we may

reasonably presume that a part of them at least remained to embrace

the service of Dion. He preserved the acropolis and fortifications

of Ortygia just as they were, only garrisoned by troops obeying his

command instead of that of Dionysius. His victory made itself felt

in abundant presents to his own friends and soldiers;[253] but to

the people of Syracuse, it produced nothing better than a change of

masters.

[253] Plutarch, Dion, c. 52.

It was not indeed the plan of Dion to constitute a permanent

despotism. He intended to establish himself king, but to grant to

the Syracusans what in modern times would be called a constitution.

Having imbibed from Plato and the Academy as well as from his

own convictions and tastes, aversion to a pure democracy, he had

resolved to introduce a Lacedæmonian scheme of mixed government,

combining king, aristocracy, and people, under certain provisions

and limitations. Of this general tenor are the recommendations

addressed both to him, and to the Syracusans after his death, by

Plato; who however seems to contemplate, along with the political

scheme, a Lykurgean reform of manners and practice. To aid in

framing and realizing his scheme, Dion sent to Corinth to invite

counsellors and auxiliaries; for Corinth was suitable to his views,

not simply as mother city of Syracuse, but also as a city thoroughly

oligarchical.[254]

[254] Plutarch, Dion, c. 53; Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 334, 336;

viii. p. 356.

That these intentions on the part of Dion were sincere, we need not

question. They had been originally conceived without any views of

acquiring the first place for himself, during the life of the elder

Dionysius, and were substantially the same as those which he had

exhorted the younger Dionysius to realize, immediately after the

death of the father. They are the same as he had intended to further

by calling in Plato,—with what success, has been already recounted.

But Dion made the fatal mistake of not remarking, that the state of

things, both as to himself and as to Syracuse, was totally altered

during the interval between 367 B. C. and 354 B. C. If at the former

period, when the Dionysian dynasty was at the zenith of power, and

Syracuse completely prostrated, the younger Dionysius could have

been persuaded spontaneously and without contest or constraint to

merge his own despotism in a more liberal system, even dictated by

himself—it is certain that such a free, though moderate concession,

would at first have provoked unbounded gratitude, and would have had

a chance (though that is more doubtful) of giving long-continued

satisfaction. But the situation was totally different in 354 B. C.,

when Dion, after the expulsion of Apollokrates, had become master in

Ortygia; and it was his mistake that he still insisted on applying

the old plans when they had become not merely unsuitable, but

mischievous. Dion was not in the position of an established despot,

who consents to renounce, for the public good, powers which every

one knows he can retain, if he chooses; nor were the Syracusans any

longer passive, prostrate, and hopeless. They had received a solemn

promise of liberty, and had been thereby inflamed into vehement

action, by Dion himself; who had been armed by them with delegated

powers, for the special purpose of putting down Dionysius. That

under these circumstances Dion, instead of laying down his trust,

should constitute himself king—even limited king—and determine how

much liberty he would consent to allot to the Syracusans who had

appointed him—this was a proceeding which they could not but resent

as a flagrant usurpation, and which he could only hope to maintain by

force.

The real conduct of Dion, however, was worse even than this. He

manifested no visible evidence of realizing even that fraction

of popular liberty which had entered into his original scheme.

What exact promises he made, we do not know. But he maintained his

own power, the military force, and the despotic fortifications,

provisionally undiminished. And who could tell how long he intended

to maintain them? That he really had in his mind purposes such as

Plato[255] gives him credit for, I believe to be true. But he took no

practical step towards them. He had resolved to accomplish them, not

through persuasion of the Syracusans, but through his own power. This

was the excuse which he probably made to himself, and which pushed

him down that inclined plane from whence there was afterwards no

escape.

[255] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 335 F. p. 351 A.; Epistol. viii. p.

357 A.

It was not likely that Dion’s conduct would pass without a protest.

That protest came loudest from Herakleides; who, so long as Dion had

been acting in the real service of Syracuse, had opposed him in a

culpable and traitorous manner—and who now again found himself in

opposition to Dion, when opposition had become the side of patriotism

as well as of danger. Invited by Dion to attend the council, he

declined, saying that he was now nothing more than a private citizen,

and would attend the public assembly along with the rest; a hint

which implied, plainly as well as reasonably, that Dion also ought

to lay down his power, now that the common enemy was put down.[256]

The surrender of Ortygia had produced strong excitement among the

Syracusans. They were impatient to demolish the dangerous stronghold

erected in that islet by the elder Dionysius; they both hoped and

expected, moreover, to see the destruction of that splendid funeral

monument which his son had built in his honor, and the urn with

its ashes cast out. Now of these two measures, the first was one

of pressing and undeniable necessity, which Dion ought to have

consummated without a moment’s delay; the second was compliance

with a popular antipathy at that time natural, which would have

served as an evidence that the old despotism stood condemned. Yet

Dion did neither. It was Herakleides who censured him, and moved

for the demolition of the Dionysian Bastile; thus having the glory

of attaching his name to the measure eagerly performed by Timoleon

eleven years afterwards, the moment that he found himself master of

Syracuse. Not only Dion did not originate the overthrow of this

dangerous stronghold, but when Herakleides proposed it, he resisted

him and prevented it from being done.[257] We shall find the same den

serving for successive despots—preserved by Dion for them as well as

for himself, and only removed by the real liberator Timoleon.

[256] Plutarch, Dion, c. 53.

[257] Plutarch, Dion. c. 53. Ἔπειτα κατηγόρει τοῦ Δίωνος ὅτι τὴν

ἄκραν οὐ κατέσκαψε, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν Διονυσίου τάφον ὡρμημένῳ

λῦσαι καὶ τὸν νεκρὸν ἐκβαλεῖν οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε, etc.

Compare Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 22.

Herakleides gained extraordinary popularity among the Syracusans

by his courageous and patriotic conduct. But Dion saw plainly

that he could not, consistently with his own designs, permit such

free opposition any longer. Many of his adherents, looking upon

Herakleides as one who ought not to have been spared on the previous

occasion, were ready to put him to death at any moment; being

restrained only by a special prohibition which Dion now thought it

time to remove. Accordingly, with his privity, they made their way

into the house of Herakleides, and slew him.[258]

[258] Plutarch, Dion, c. 53; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 6.

This dark deed abolished all remaining hope of obtaining Syracusan

freedom from the hands of Dion, and stamped him as the mere successor

of the Dionysian despotism. It was in vain that he attended the

obsequies of Herakleides with his full military force, excusing

his well-known crime to the people, on the plea, that Syracuse

could never be at peace while two such rivals were both in active

political life. Under the circumstances of the case, the remark

was an insulting derision; though it might have been advanced with

pertinence as a reason for sending Herakleides away, at the moment

when he before spared him. Dion had now conferred upon his rival the

melancholy honor of dying as a martyr to Syracusan freedom; and in

that light he was bitterly mourned by the people. No man after this

murder could think himself secure. Having once employed the soldiers

as executioners of his own political antipathies, Dion proceeded

to lend himself more and more to their exigencies. He provided for

them pay and largesses, great in amount, first at the cost of his

opponents in the city, next at that of his friends, until at length

discontent became universal. Among the general body of the citizens,

Dion became detested as a tyrant, and the more detested because he

had presented himself as a liberator; while the soldiers also were in

great part disaffected to him.[259]

[259] Cornel. Nepos, Dion, c. 7.

The spies and police of the Dionysian dynasty not having been yet

reëstablished, there was ample liberty at least of speech and

censure; so that Dion was soon furnished with full indications of the

sentiment entertained towards him. He became disquieted and irritable

at this change of public feeling;[260] angry with the people, yet

at the same time ashamed of himself. The murder of Herakleides sat

heavy on his soul. The same man whom he had spared before when in

the wrong, he had now slain when in the right. The maxims of the

Academy which had imparted to him so much self-satisfaction in the

former act, could hardly fail to occasion a proportionate sickness of

self-reproach in the latter. Dion was not a mere power-seeker, nor

prepared for all that endless apparatus of mistrustful precaution,

indispensable to a Grecian despot. When told that his life was in

danger, he replied that he would rather perish at once by the hands

of the first assassin, than live in perpetual diffidence, towards

friends as well as enemies.[261]

[260] Cornelius Nepos, Dion. c. 7. “Insuetus male audiendi,” etc.

[261] Plutarch, Dion, c. 56. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν Δίων, ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν

Ἡρακλείδην ἀχθόμενος, καὶ τὸν φόνον ἐκεῖνον, ὥς τινα τοῦ βίου

καὶ τῶν πράξεων αὐτῷ κηλῖδα προκειμένην, δυσχεραίνων ἀεὶ καὶ

βαρυνόμενος εἶπεν, ὅτι πολλάκις ἤδη θνήσκειν ἕτοιμός ἐστι καὶ

παρέχειν τῷ βουλομένῳ σφάττειν αὐτὸν, εἰ ζῇν δεήσει μὴ μόνον τοὺς

ἐχθροὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους φυλαττόμενον.

Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 176 F.

One thus too good for a despot, and yet unfit for a popular leader,

could not remain long in the precarious position occupied by Dion.

His intimate friend, the Athenian Kallippus, seeing that the man

who could destroy him would become popular with the Syracusans as

well as with a large portion of the soldiery, formed a conspiracy

accordingly. He stood high in the confidence of Dion, had been his

companion during his exile at Athens, had accompanied him to Sicily,

and entered Syracuse by his side. But Plato, anxious for the credit

of the Academy, is careful to inform us, that this inauspicious

friendship arose, not out of fellowship in philosophy, but out

of common hospitalities, and especially common initiation in the

Eleusinian mysteries.[262] Brave and forward in battle, Kallippus

enjoyed much credit with the soldiery. He was conveniently placed

for tampering with them, and by a crafty stratagem, he even insured

the unconscious connivance of Dion himself. Having learnt that plots

were formed against his life, Dion talked about them to Kallippus,

who offered himself to undertake the part of spy, and by simulated

partnership to detect as well as to betray the conspirators. Under

this confidence, Kallippus had full licence for carrying on his

intrigues unimpeded, since Dion disregarded the many warnings which

reached him.[263] Among the rumors raised out of Dion’s new position,

and industriously circulated by Kallippus—one was, that he was about

to call back Apollokrates, son of Dionysius, as his partner and

successor to the despotism—as a substitute for the youthful son who

had recently perished. By these and other reports, Dion became more

and more discredited, while Kallippus secretly organized a wider

circle of adherents. His plot however did not escape the penetration

of Aristomachê and Aretê; who having, first addressed unavailing

hints to Dion, at last took upon them to question Kallippus himself.

The latter not only denied the charge, but even confirmed his

denial, at their instance, by one of the most solemn and terrific

oaths recognized in Grecian religion; going into the sacred grove of

Demeter and Persephonê, touching the purple robe of the goddess, and

taking in his hand a lighted torch.[264]

[262] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 F.: compare Plutarch. Dion. c.

17, 28, 54.

Athenæus, on the contrary, states that Kallippus was a pupil of

Plato, and fellow pupil with Dion in the school (Athenæus, xi. p.

508).

The statement of Plato hardly goes so far as to negative the

supposition that Kallippus may have frequented his school and

received instruction there, for a time greater or less. But it

refutes the idea, that the friendship of Dion and Kallippus arose

out of these philosophical tastes common to both; which Athenæus

seems to have intended to convey.

[263] Plutarch, Dion, c. 54; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 8.

[264] Plutarch, Dion. c. 56.

Inquiry being thus eluded, there came on presently the day of the

Koreia:—the festival of these very Two goddesses in whose name and

presence Kallippus had forsworn. This was the day which he had

fixed for execution. The strong points of defence in Syracuse were

confided beforehand to his principal adherents while his brother

Philostrates[265] kept a trireme manned in the harbor ready for

flight in case the scheme should miscarry. While Dion, taking no part

in the festival, remained at home, Kallippus caused his house to be

surrounded by confidential soldiers, and then sent into it a select

company of Zakynthians, unarmed, as if for the purpose of addressing

Dion on business. These men, young and of distinguished muscular

strength, being admitted into the house, put aside or intimidated

the slaves, none of whom manifested any zeal or attachment. They

then made their way up to Dion’s apartment, and attempted to throw

him down and strangle him. So strenuously did he resist, however,

that they found it impossible to kill him without arms; which they

were perplexed how to procure, being afraid to open the doors, lest

aid might be introduced against them. At length one of their number

descended to a back-door, and procured from a Syracusan without,

named Lykon, a short sword; of the Laconian sort, and of peculiar

workmanship. With this weapon they put Dion to death.[266] They

then seized Aristomachê and Aretê, the sister and wife of Dion.

These unfortunate women were cast into prison, where they were long

detained, and where the latter was delivered of a posthumous son.

[265] Plato alludes to the two brothers whom Dion made his

friends at Athens, and who ultimately slew him; but without

mentioning the name of either (Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 F.).

The third Athenian—whose fidelity he emphatically contrasts

with the falsehood of these two—appears to mean, himself—Plato.

Compare pp. 333 and 334.

[266] Plutarch, Dion, c. 57; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 9; Diodor.

xvi. 31.

Thus perished Dion, having lived only about a year after his

expulsion of the Dionysian dynasty from Syracuse—but a year too

long for his own fame. Notwithstanding the events of those last

months, there is no doubt that he was a man essentially differing

from the class of Grecian despots: a man, not of aspirations

purely personal, nor thirsting merely for multitudes of submissive

subjects and a victorious army—but with large public-minded purposes

attached as coördinate to his own ambitious views. He wished to

perpetuate his name as the founder of a polity, cast in something

of the general features of Sparta; which, while it did not shock

Hellenic instincts, should reach farther than political institutions

generally aim to do, so as to remodel the sentiments and habits

of the citizens, on principles suited to philosophers like Plato.

Brought up as Dion was from childhood at the court of the elder

Dionysius, unused to that established legality, free speech,

and habit of active citizenship, from whence a large portion of

Hellenic virtue flowed—the wonder is how he acquired so much public

conviction and true magnanimity of soul—not how he missed acquiring

more. The influence of Plato during his youth stamped his mature

character; but that influence (as Plato himself tells us) found a

rare predisposition in the pupil. Still, Dion had no experience of

the working of a free and popular government. The atmosphere in

which his youth was passed was that of an energetic despotism; while

the aspiration which he imbibed from Plato was, to restrain and

regularize that despotism, and to administer to the people a certain

dose of political liberty, yet reserving to himself the task of

settling how much was good for them, and the power of preventing them

from acquiring more.

How this project—the natural growth of Dion’s mind, for which his

tastes and capacities were suited—was violently thrust aside through

the alienated feelings of the younger Dionysius—has been already

recounted. The position of Dion was now completely altered. He became

a banished, ill-used man, stung with contemptuous antipathy against

Dionysius, and eager to put down his despotism over Syracuse. Here

were new motives apparently falling in with the old project. But

the conditions of the problem had altogether changed. Dion could

not overthrow Dionysius without “taking the Syracusan people into

partnership” (to use the phrase of Herodotus[267] respecting the

Athenian Kleisthenes)—without promising them full freedom, as an

inducement for their hearty coöperation—without giving them arms, and

awakening in them the stirring impulses of Grecian citizenship, all

the more violent because they had been so long trodden down.[268]

With these new allies he knew not how to deal. He had no experience

of a free and jealous popular mind in persuasion, he was utterly

unpractised: his manners were haughty and displeasing. Moreover, his

kindred with the Dionysian family exposed him to antipathy from two

different quarters. Like the Duke of Orleans (Égalité) at the end

of 1792, in the first French Revolution—he was hated both by the

royalists, because, though related to the reigning dynasty, he had

taken an active part against it—and by sincere democrats, because

they suspected him of a design to put himself in its place. To Dion,

such coalition of antipathies was a serious hindrance; presenting

a strong basis of support for all his rivals, especially for the

unscrupulous Herakleides. The bad treatment which he underwent both

from the Syracusans and from Herakleides, during the time when

the officers of Dionysius still remained masters in Ortygia, has

been already related. Dion however behaved, though not always with

prudence, yet with so much generous energy against the common enemy,

that he put down his rival, and maintained his ascendency unshaken,

until the surrender of Ortygia.

[267] Herodotus, v. 66. ἑσσούμενος δ᾽ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον

προσεταιρίζεται.

[268] Cicero de Officiis, ii. 7. “Acriores morsus intermissæ

libertatis quam retentæ.”

That surrender brought his power to a maximum. It was the

turning-point and crisis of his life. A splendid opportunity was

now opened, of earning for himself fame and gratitude. He might

have attached his name to an act as sublime and impressive as any

in Grecian history, which, in an evil hour, he left to be performed

in after days by Timoleon—the razing of the Dionysian stronghold,

and the erection of courts of justice on its site. He might have

taken the lead in organizing, under the discussion and consent of

the people, a good and free government, which, more or less exempt

from defect as it might have been, would at least have satisfied

them, and would have spared Syracuse those ten years of suffering

which intervened until Timoleon came to make the possibility a fact.

Dion might have done all that Timoleon did—and might have done it

more easily, since he was less embarrassed both by the other towns

in Sicily and by the Carthaginians. Unfortunately he still thought

himself strong enough to resume his original project. In spite of

the spirit, kindled partly by himself, among the Syracusans—in spite

of the repugnance, already unequivocally manifested, on the mere

suspicion of his despotic designs—he fancied himself competent to

treat the Syracusans as a tame and passive herd; to carve out for

them just as much liberty as he thought right, and to require them

to be satisfied with it; nay, even worse, to defer giving them any

liberty at all, on the plea, or pretence, of full consultation with

advisers of his own choice.

Through this deplorable mistake, alike mischievous to Syracuse and

to himself, Dion made his government one of pure force. He placed

himself in a groove wherein he was fatally condemned to move on from

bad to worse, without possibility of amendment. He had already made

a martyr of Herakleides, and he would have been compelled to make

other martyrs besides, had his life continued. It is fortunate for

his reputation that his career was arrested so early, before he had

become bad enough to forfeit that sympathy and esteem with which

the philosopher Plato still mourns his death, appeasing his own

disappointment by throwing the blame of Dion’s failure on every one

but Dion himself.

CHAPTER LXXXV.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS DOWN TO THE CLOSE OF THE EXPEDITION OF TIMOLEON. B.

C. 353-336.

The assassination of Dion, as recounted in my last chapter, appears

to have been skilfully planned and executed for the purpose of its

contriver, the Athenian Kallippus. Succeeding at once to the command

of the soldiers, among whom he had before been very popular,—and to

the mastery of Ortygia,—he was practically supreme at Syracuse. We

read in Cornelius Nepos, that after the assassination of Dion there

was deep public sorrow, and a strong reaction in his favor, testified

by splendid obsequies attended by the mass of the population.[269]

But this statement is difficult to believe; not merely because

Kallippus long remained undisturbed master, but because he also threw

into prison the female relatives of Dion—his sister Aristomachê

and his pregnant wife Aretê, avenging by such act of malignity the

false oath which he had so lately been compelled to take, in order

to satisfy their suspicions.[270] Aretê was delivered of a son in

the prison. It would seem that these unhappy women were kept in

confinement during all the time, more than a year, that Kallippus

remained master. On his being deposed, they were released; when a

Syracusan named Hiketas, a friend of the deceased Dion, affected

to take them under his protection. After a short period of kind

treatment, he put them on board a vessel to be sent to Peloponnesus,

but caused them to be slain on the voyage, and their bodies to

be sunk in the sea. To this cruel deed he is said to have been

instigated by the enemies of Dion; and the act shows but too plainly

how implacable those enemies were.[271]

[269] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 10.

[270] Plutarch, Dion, c. 56, 57.

[271] Plutarch, Dion, c. 58.

How Kallippus maintained himself in Syracuse—by what support, or

violences, or promises—and against what difficulties he had to

contend—we are not permitted to know. He seems at first to have

made promises of restoring liberty; and we are even told, that he

addressed a public letter to his country, the city of Athens;[272]

wherein he doubtless laid claim to the honors of tyrannicide;

representing himself as the liberator of Syracuse. How this was

received by the Athenian assembly, we are not informed. But to

Plato and the frequenters of the Academy, the news of Dion’s death

occasioned the most profound sorrow, as may still be read in the

philosopher’s letters.

[272] Plutarch, Dion, c. 58.

Kallippus maintained himself for a year in full splendor and

dominion. Discontents had then grown up; and the friends of Dion—or

perhaps the enemies of Kallippus assuming that name—showed themselves

with force in Syracuse. However, Kallippus defeated them, and forced

them to take refuge in Leontini;[273] of which town we presently

find Hiketas despot. Encouraged probably by this success, Kallippus

committed many enormities, and made himself so odious,[274] that the

expelled Dionysian family began to conceive hopes of recovering

their dominion. He had gone forth from Syracuse on an expedition

against Katana; of which absence Hipparinus took advantage to effect

his entry into Syracuse, at the head of a force sufficient, combined

with popular discontent, to shut him out of the city. Kallippus

speedily returned, but was defeated by Hipparinus, and compelled to

content himself with the unprofitable exchange of Katana in place of

Syracuse.[275]

[273] Plutarch, Dion, c. 58; Diodor. xvi. 31-36.

[274] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11; Plutarch, compar. Timoleon and

Paul Emil, c. 2.

[275] This seems to result from Plutarch, Dion, c. 58, compared

with Diodor. xvi. 36.

Hipparinus and Nysæus were the two sons of Dionysius the elder, by

Aristomachê, and were therefore nephews of Dion. Though Hipparinus

probably became master of Ortygia, the strongest portion of Syracuse,

yet it would appear that in the other portions of Syracuse there were

opposing parties who contested his rule; first, the partisans of

Dionysius the younger, and of his family—next, the mass who desired

to get rid of both the families, and to establish a free popular

constitution. Such is the state of facts which we gather from the

letters of Plato.[276] But we are too destitute of memorials to

make out anything distinct respecting the condition of Syracuse

or of Sicily between 353 B. C. and 344 B. C.—from the death of

Dion to the invitation sent to Corinth, which brought about the

mission of Timoleon. We are assured generally that it was a period

of intolerable conflicts, disorders, and suffering; that even

the temples and tombs were neglected;[277] that the people were

everywhere trampled down by despots and foreign mercenaries; that the

despots were frequently overthrown by violence or treachery, yet only

to be succeeded by others as bad or worse; that the multiplication of

foreign soldiers, seldom regularly paid, spread pillage and violence

everywhere.[278] The philosopher Plato—in a letter written about a

year or more after the death of Dion (seemingly after the expulsion

of Kallippus) and addressed to the surviving relatives and friends of

the latter—draws a lamentable picture of the state both of Syracuse

and Sicily. He goes so far as to say, that under the distraction

and desolation which prevailed, the Hellenic race and language were

likely to perish in the island, and give place to the Punic or

Oscan.[279] He adjures the contending parties at Syracuse to avert

this miserable issue by coming to a compromise, and by constituting a

moderate and popular government,—yet with some rights reserved to the

ruling families, among whom he desires to see a fraternal partnership

established, tripartite in its character; including Dionysius the

younger (now at Lokri)—Hipparinus son of the elder Dionysius—and

the son of Dion. On the absolute necessity of such compromise

and concord, to preserve both people and despots from one common

ruin, Plato delivers the most pathetic admonitions. He recommends

a triple coördinate kingship, passing by hereditary transmission

in the families of the three persons just named; and including the

presidency of religious ceremonies with an ample measure of dignity

and veneration, but very little active political power. Advising

that impartial arbitrators, respected by all, should be invoked to

settle terms for the compromise, he earnestly implores each of the

combatants to acquiesce peaceably in their adjudication.[280]

[276] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353, 355, 356.

[277] Plato, Epist. viii. 356 B. ἐλεῶν δὲ πατρίδα καὶ ἱερῶν

ἀθεραπευσίαν καὶ τάφους, etc.

[278] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 1.

[279] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 F. ... διολέσθαι δ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ

κύκλου τούτου καὶ τὸ τυραννικὸν ἅπαν καὶ τὸ δημοτικὸν γένος,

~ἥξει δὲ~, ἐάν περ τῶν εἰκότων γίγνηταί τι καὶ ἀπευκτῶν, ~σχεδὸν

εἰς ἐρημίαν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φωνῆς Σικελία πᾶσα, Φοινίκων ἢ Ὀπικῶν

μεταβαλοῦσα εἴς τινα δυναστεῖαν καὶ κράτος~. Τούτων δὴ χρὴ πάσῃ

προθυμίᾳ πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας τέμνειν φάρμακον.

[280] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 356.

To Plato,—who saw before him the line double of Spartan kings, the

only hereditary kings in Greece,—the proposition of three coördinate

kingly families did not appear at all impracticable; nor indeed was

it so, considering the small extent of political power allotted

to them. But amidst the angry passions which then raged, and the

mass of evil which had been done and suffered on all sides, it was

not likely that any pacific arbitrator, of whatever position or

character, would find a hearing, or would be enabled to effect any

such salutary adjustment as had emanated from the Mantinean Dêmônax

at Kyrênê—between the discontented Kyreneans and the dynasty of the

Battiad princes.[281] Plato’s recommendation passed unheeded. He died

in 348-347 B. C., without seeing any mitigation of those Sicilian

calamities which saddened the last years of his long life. On the

contrary, the condition of Syracuse grew worse instead of better.

The younger Dionysius contrived to effect his return, expelling

Hipparinus and Nysæus from Ortygia, and establishing himself there

again as master. As he had a long train of past humiliation to

avenge, his rule was of that oppressive character which the ancient

proverb recognized as belonging to kings restored from exile.[282]

[281] Herodot. iv. 161.

[282] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 1.

... Regnabis sanguine multo

Ad regnum quisquis venit ab exilio.

Of all these princes descended from the elder Dionysius, not one

inherited the sobriety and temperance which had contributed so

much to his success. All of them are said to have been of drunken

and dissolute habits[283]—Dionysius the younger, and his son

Apollokrates, as well as Hipparinus and Nysæus. Hipparinus was

assassinated while in a fit of intoxication; so that Nysæus became

the representative of this family, until he was expelled from Ortygia

by the return of the younger Dionysius.

[283] Aristotle and Theopompus, ap. Athenæum, x. p. 435, 436;

Theopomp. Fragm. 146, 204, 213, ed. Didot.

That prince, since his first expulsion from Syracuse, had chiefly

resided at Lokri in Italy, of which city his mother Doris was a

native. It has already been stated that the elder Dionysius had

augmented and nursed up Lokri by every means in his power, as an

appurtenance of his own dominion at Syracuse. He had added to its

territory all the southernmost peninsula of Italy (comprehended

within a line drawn from the Gulf of Terina to that of Skylletium),

once belonging to Rhegium, Kaulonia, and Hipponium. But though the

power of Lokri was thus increased, it had ceased to be a free city,

being converted into a dependency of the Dionysian family.[284] As

such, it became the residence of the second Dionysius, when he could

no longer maintain himself in Syracuse. We know little of what he

did; though we are told that he revived a portion of the dismantled

city of Rhegium under the name of Phœbia.[285] Rhegium itself

reappears shortly afterwards as a community under its own name, and

was probably reconstituted at the complete downfall of the second

Dionysius.

[284] Aristotel. Politic. v. 6, 7.

[285] Strabo, vi. p. 258.

The season between 356-346 B. C., was one of great pressure and

suffering for all the Italiot Greeks, arising from the increased

power of the inland Lucanians and Bruttians. These Bruttians, who

occupied the southernmost Calabria, were a fraction detached from

the general body of Lucanians and self-emancipated; having consisted

chiefly of indigenous rural serfs in the mountain communities,

who threw off the sway of their Lucanian masters, and formed an

independent aggregate for themselves. These men, especially in

the energetic effort which marked their early independence, were

formidable enemies of the Greeks on the coast, from Tarentum to the

Sicilian strait; and more than a match even for the Spartans and

Epirots invited over by the Greeks as auxiliaries.

It appears that the second Dionysius, when he retired to Lokri

after the first loss of his power at Syracuse, soon found his rule

unacceptable and his person unpopular. He maintained himself,

seemingly from the beginning, by means of two distinct citadels in

the town, with a standing army under the command of the Spartan

Pharax, a man of profligacy and violence.[286] The conduct of

Dionysius became at last so odious, that nothing short of extreme

force could keep down the resentment of the citizens. We read that he

was in the habit of practising the most licentious outrage towards

the marriageable maidens of good family in Lokri. The detestation

thus raised against him was repressed by his superior force—not,

we may be sure, without numerous cruelties perpetrated against

individual persons who stood on their defence—until the moment

arrived when he and his son Apollokrates effected their second

return to Ortygia. To ensure so important an acquisition, Dionysius

diminished his military force at Lokri, where he at the same time

left his wife, his two daughters, and his youthful son. But after his

departure, the Lokrians rose in insurrection, overpowered the reduced

garrison, and took captive these unfortunate members of his family.

Upon their guiltless heads fell all the terrors of retaliation for

the enormities of the despot. It was in vain that both Dionysius

himself, and the Tarentines[287] supplicated permission to redeem

the captives at the highest ransom. In vain was Lokri besieged, and

its territory desolated. The Lokrians could neither be seduced by

bribes, nor deterred by threats, from satiating the full extremity

of vindictive fury. After multiplied cruelties and brutalities, the

wife and family of Dionysius were at length relieved from farther

suffering by being strangled.[288] With this revolting tragedy

terminated the inauspicious marital connection begun between the

elder Dionysius and the oligarchy of Lokri.

[286] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11; Compar. Timoleon and Paul. Emil.

c. 2; Theopompus ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 536; Plutarch, Reipub.

Gerend. Præcept. p. 821 D. About the two citadels in Lokri, see

Livy, xxix. 6.

It may have been probably a predatory fleet in the service of

the younger Dionysius, which Livy mentions to have been ravaging

about this time the coast of Latium, coöperating with the Gauls

against portions of the Roman territory (Livy, vii. 25, 26).

[287] It would appear that relations of amity, or amicable

dependence, still subsisted between Dionysius the younger and the

Tarentines. There was seen, in the prytaneum or government-house

of Tarentum, a splendid chandelier with three hundred and

sixty-five burners, a present from Dionysius (Euphorion, ap.

Athenæum, xv. p. 700).

[288] Strabo, vi. p. 259, 260; Athenæus, xii. p. 541.

By the manner in which Dionysius exercised his power at Lokri, we

may judge how he would behave at Syracuse. The Syracusans endured

more evil than ever, without knowing where to look for help. Hiketas

the Syracusan (once the friend of Dion, ultimately the murderer of

the slain Dion’s widow and sister), had now established himself as

despot at Leontini. To him they turned as an auxiliary, hoping thus

to obtain force sufficient for the expulsion of Dionysius. Hiketas

gladly accepted the proposition, with full purpose of reaping the

reward of such expulsion, when achieved, for himself. Moreover,

a formidable cloud was now gathering from the side of Carthage.

What causes had rendered Carthage inactive for the last few years,

while Sicily was so weak and disunited—we do not know; but she had

now become once more aggressive, extending her alliances among the

despots of the island, and pouring in a large force and fleet, so as

to menace the independence both of Sicily and of Southern Italy.[289]

The appearance of this new enemy drove the Syracusans to despair,

and left them no hope of safety except in assistance from Corinth.

To that city they sent a pathetic and urgent appeal, setting forth

both the actual suffering and the approaching peril from without.

And such indeed was the peril, that even to a calm observer, it might

well seem as if the mournful prophecy of Plato was on the point of

receiving fulfilment—Hellenism as well as freedom becoming extinct on

the island.

[289] Diodor. xvi. 67.

To the invocation of Corinthian aid, Hiketas was a party; yet an

unwilling party. He had made up his mind that for his purpose, it

was better to join the Carthaginians, with whom he had already

opened negotiations—and to employ their forces, first in expelling

Dionysius, next in ruling Syracuse for himself. But these were

schemes not to be yet divulged: accordingly, Hiketas affected to

concur in the pressing entreaty sent by the Syracusans to Corinth,

intending from the beginning to frustrate its success.[290] He

expected indeed that the Corinthians would themselves decline

compliance: for the enterprise proposed to them was full of

difficulty; they had neither injury to avenge, nor profit to expect;

while the force of sympathy, doubtless not inconsiderable, with a

suffering colony, would probably be neutralized by the unsettled and

degraded condition into which all Central Greece was now rapidly

sinking, under the ambitious strides of Philip of Macedon.

[290] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2.

The Syracusan envoys reached Corinth at a favorable moment. But

it is melancholy to advert to the aggregate diminution of Grecian

power, as compared with the time when (seventy years before) their

forefathers had sent thither to solicit aid against the besieging

armament of Athens; a time when Athens, Sparta, and Syracuse herself,

were all in exuberant vigor as well as unimpaired freedom. However,

the Corinthians happened at this juncture to have their hands as

well as their minds tolerably free, so that the voice of genuine

affliction, transmitted from the most esteemed of all their colonies,

was heard with favor and sympathy. A decree was passed, heartily and

unanimously, to grant the aid solicited.[291]

[291] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3.

The next step was to choose a leader. But a leader was not easily

found. The enterprise presented little temptation, with danger and

difficulty abundant as well as certain. The hopeless discord of

Syracuse for years past, was well known to all the leading Corinthian

politicians or generals. Of all or most of these, the names were

successively put up by the archons; but all with one accord

declined. At length, while the archons hesitated whom to fix upon,

an unknown voice in the crowd pronounced the name of Timoleon, son

of Timodemus. The mover seemed prompted by divine inspiration;[292]

so little obvious was the choice, and so preëminently excellent did

it prove. Timoleon was named—without difficulty, and without much

intention of doing him honor—to a post which all the other leading

men declined.

[292] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3. ἀλλὰ θεοῦ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰς

νοῦν ἐμβαλόντος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, etc.

Some points must be here noticed in the previous history of this

remarkable man. He belonged to an illustrious family in Corinth,

and was now of mature age—perhaps about fifty. He was distinguished

no less for his courage than for the gentleness of his disposition.

Little moved either by personal vanity or by ambition, he was

devoted in his patriotism, and unreserved in his hatred of despots

as well as of traitors.[293] The government of Corinth was, and

always had been, oligarchical; but it was a regular, constitutional,

oligarchy; while the Corinthian antipathy against despots was of old

standing[294]—hardly less strong than that of democratical Athens.

As a soldier in the ranks of Corinthian hoplites, the bravery of

Timoleon, and his submission to discipline, were alike remarkable.

[293] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3 ... φιλόπατρις δὲ καὶ πρᾶος

διαφερόντως, ὅσα μὴ σφόδρα μισοτύραννος εἶναι καὶ μισοπόνηρος.

[294] Herodot. v. 92.

These points of his character stood out the more forcibly from

contrast with his elder brother Timophanes; who possessed the

soldierlike merits of bravery and energetic enterprise, but combined

with them an unprincipled ambition, and an unscrupulous prosecution

of selfish advancement at all cost to others. The military qualities

of Timophanes, however, gained for him so much popularity, that he

was placed high as an officer in the Corinthian service. Timoleon,

animated with a full measure of brotherly attachment, not only tried

to screen his defects as well as to set off his merits, but also

incurred the greatest perils for the purpose of saving his life. In a

battle against the Argeians and Kleonæans, Timophanes was commanding

the cavalry, when his horse, being wounded, threw him on the ground,

very near to the enemy. The remaining horsemen fled, leaving their

commander to what seemed certain destruction; but Timoleon, who was

serving among the hoplites, rushed singly forth from the ranks with

his utmost speed, and covered Timophanes with his shield, when the

enemy were just about to pierce him. He made head single-handed

against them, warding off numerous spears and darts, and successfully

protected his fallen brother until succor arrived; though at the cost

of several wounds to himself.[295]

[295] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. At what time this battle took

place cannot be made out.

This act of generous devotion raised great admiration towards

Timoleon. But it also procured sympathy for Timophanes, who less

deserved it. The Corinthians had recently incurred great risk of

seeing their city fall into the hands of their Athenian allies, who

had laid a plan to seize it, but were disappointed through timely

notice given at Corinth.[296] To arm the people being regarded as

dangerous to the existing oligarchy,[297] it was judged expedient

to equip a standing force of four hundred paid foreign soldiers,

and establish them as a permanent garrison in the strong and lofty

citadel. The command of this garrison, with the mastery of the fort,

was intrusted to Timophanes. A worse choice could not have been

made. The new commander—seconded not only by his regiment and his

strong position, but also by some violent partisans whom he took

into his pay and armed, among the poorer citizens—speedily stood

forth as despot, taking the whole government into his own hands. He

seized numbers of the chief citizens, probably all the members of

the oligarchical councils who resisted his orders, and put them to

death without even form of trial.[298] Now, when it was too late,

the Corinthians repented of the mistaken vote which had raised up a

new Periander among them. But to Timoleon, the crimes of his brother

occasioned an agony of shame and sorrow. He first went up to the

acropolis[299] to remonstrate with him; conjuring him emphatically,

by the most sacred motives public as well as private, to renounce

his disastrous projects. Timophanes repudiated the appeal with

contempt. Timoleon had now to choose between his brother and his

country. Again he went to the acropolis, accompanied by Æschylus,

brother of the wife of Timophanes—by the prophet Orthagoras, his

intimate friend—perhaps also by another friend named Telekleides.

Admitted into the presence of Timophanes, they renewed their prayers

and supplications; urging him even yet to recede from his tyrannical

courses. But all their pleading was without effect. Timophanes first

laughed them to scorn; presently, he became exasperated, and would

hear no more. Finding words unavailing, they now drew their swords

and put him to death. Timoleon lent no hand in the deed, but stood a

little way off, with his face hidden, and in a flood of tears.[300]

[296] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οἱ Κορίνθιοι, δεδιότες μὴ

πάθοιεν οἷα καὶ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἀποβαλόντες τὴν πόλιν,

etc.

The Corinthians were carrying on war, in conjunction with Athens

and Sparta, against Thebes, when (in 366 B. C.) the Athenians

laid their plan for seizing the city. The Corinthians, having

heard of it in time, took measures to frustrate it. See Xenophon,

Hellen. vii. 4, 4-5.

[297] Aristotel. Politic, v. 5, 9.

[298] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. συχνοὺς ἀνελὼν ἀκρίτους τῶν

πρώτων πολιτῶν, ἀνέδειξεν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.

Diodorus (xvi. 65) coincides in the main fact—but differs in

several details.

[299] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. αὖθις ~ἀνέβη~ πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν,

etc.

[300] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4; Cornelius Nepos, Timol. c. 1;

Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 808 A. That Telekleides was

present and took part in the deed—though Plutarch directly names

only Æschylus and Orthagoras—seems to be implied in an indirect

allusion afterwards (c. 7), where Telekleides says to Timoleon

after his nomination to the Sicilian command, Ἂν νῦν καλῶς

ἀγωνίσῃς τύραννον ἀνῃρηκέναι ~δόξομεν~· ἂν δὲ φαυλῶς, ἀδελφόν.

The presence of the prophet seems to show, that they had just

been offering sacrifice, to ascertain the will of the gods

respecting what they were about to do.

Nepos says that Timoleon was not actually present at the moment

of his brother’s death, but stood out of the room to prevent

assistance from arriving.

Diodorus (xvi. 65) states that Timoleon slew his brother in the

market place. But the account of Plutarch appears preferable.

With the life of Timophanes passed away the despotism which had

already begun its crushing influence upon the Corinthians. The

mercenary force was either dismissed, or placed in safe hands;

the acropolis became again part of a free city; the Corinthian

constitution was revived as before. In what manner this change was

accomplished, or with what measure of violence it was accompanied,

we are left in ignorance; for Plutarch tells us hardly anything

except what personally concerns Timoleon. We learn however that the

expressions of joy among the citizens, at the death of Timophanes and

the restoration of the constitution, were vehement and universal.

So strongly did this tide of sentiment run, as to carry along with

it, in appearance, even those who really regretted the departed

despotism. Afraid to say what they really felt about the deed,

these men gave only the more abundant utterance to their hatred

of the doer. Though it was good that Timophanes should be killed

(they said), yet that he should be killed by his brother, and his

brother-in-law, was a deed which tainted both the actors with

inexpiable guilt and abomination. The majority of the Corinthian

public, however, as well as the most distinguished citizens, took a

view completely opposite. They expressed the warmest admiration as

well for the doer as for the deed. They extolled the combination of

warm family affection with devoted magnanimity and patriotism, each

in its right place and properly balanced, which marked the conduct of

Timoleon. He had displayed his fraternal affection by encountering

the greatest perils in the battle, in order to preserve the life of

Timophanes. But when that brother, instead of an innocent citizen,

became the worst enemy of Corinth, Timoleon had then obeyed the

imperative call of patriotism, to the disregard not less of his own

comfort and interest than of fraternal affection.[301]

[301] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 5.

Such was the decided verdict pronounced by the majority—a majority as

well in value as in number—respecting the behavior of Timoleon. In

his mind, however, the general strain of encomium was not sufficient

to drown, or even to compensate, the language of reproach, in itself

so much more pungent, which emanated from the minority. Among that

minority too was found one person whose single voice told with

profound impression—his mother Demaristê, mother also of the slain

Timophanes. Demaristê not only thought of her murdered son with the

keenest maternal sorrow, but felt intense horror and execration

for the authors of the deed. She imprecated curses on the head of

Timoleon, refused even to see him again, and shut her doors against

his visits, in spite of earnest supplications.

There wanted nothing more to render Timoleon thoroughly miserable,

amidst the almost universal gratitude of Corinth. Of his strong

fraternal affection for Timophanes, his previous conduct leaves no

doubt. Such affection had to be overcome before he accompanied his

tyrannicidal friends to the acropolis, and doubtless flowed back

with extreme bitterness upon his soul, after the deed was done. But

when to this internal source of distress, was added the sight of

persons who shrank from contact with him as a fratricide, together

with the sting of the maternal Erinnys—he became agonized even to

distraction. Life was odious to him; he refused for some time all

food, and determined to starve himself to death. Nothing but the

pressing solicitude of friends prevented him from executing the

resolve. But no consoling voice could impart to him spirit for the

duties of public life. He fled the city and the haunts of men,

buried himself in solitude amidst his fields in the country, and

refrained from seeing or speaking to any one. For several years

he thus hid himself like a self-condemned criminal; and even when

time had somewhat mitigated the intensity of his anguish, he still

shunned every prominent position, performing nothing more than his

indispensable duties as a citizen. An interval of twenty years[302]

had now elapsed from the death of Timophanes, to the arrival of the

Syracusan application for aid. During all this time, Timoleon, in

spite of the sympathy and willingness of admiring fellow-citizens,

had never once chosen to undertake any important command or office.

At length the _vox Dei_ is heard, unexpectedly, amidst the crowd;

dispelling the tormenting nightmare which had so long oppressed his

soul, and restoring him to healthy and honorable action.

[302] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7.

There is no doubt that the conduct of Timoleon and Æschylus in

killing Timophanes was in the highest degree tutelary to Corinth. The

despot had already imbrued his hands in the blood of his countrymen,

and would have been condemned, by fatal necessity, to go on from

bad to worse, multiplying the number of victims, as a condition of

preserving his own power. To say that the deed ought not to have

been done by near relatives, was tantamount to saying, that it ought

not to have been done at all; for none but near relatives could

have obtained that easy access which enabled them to effect it. And

even Timoleon and Æschylus could not make the attempt without the

greatest hazard to themselves. Nothing was more likely than that

the death of Timophanes would be avenged on the spot; nor are we

told how they escaped such vengeance from the soldiers at hand. It

has been already stated that the contemporary sentiment towards

Timoleon was divided between admiration of the heroic patriot, and

abhorrence of the fratricide; yet with a large preponderance on the

side of admiration, especially in the highest and best minds. In

modern times the preponderance would be in the opposite scale. The

sentiment of duty towards family covers a larger proportion of the

field of morality, as compared with obligations towards country,

than it did in ancient times; while that intense antipathy against

a despot who overtops and overrides the laws, regarding him as the

worst of criminals—which stood in the foreground of the ancient

virtuous feeling—has now disappeared. Usurpation of the supreme

authority is regarded generally among the European public as a crime,

only where it displaces an established king already in possession;

where there is no king, the successful usurper finds sympathy rather

than censure: and few readers would have been displeased with

Timoleon, had he even seconded his brother’s attempt. But in the

view of Timoleon and of his age generally, even neutrality appeared

in the light of treason to his country, when no other man but him

could rescue her from the despot. This sentiment is strikingly

embodied in the comments of Plutarch; who admires the fraternal

tyrannicide, as an act of sublime patriotism, and only complains

that the internal emotions of Timoleon were not on a level with

the sublimity of the act; that the great mental suffering which

he endured afterwards, argued an unworthy weakness of character;

that the conviction of imperative patriotic duty, having been once

deliberately adopted, ought to have steeled him against scruples,

and preserved him from that after-shame and repentance which spoiled

half the glory of an heroic act. The antithesis, between Plutarch

and the modern European point of view, is here pointed; though I

think his criticism unwarranted. There is no reason to presume

that Timoleon ever felt ashamed and repentant for having killed

his brother. Placed in the mournful condition of a man agitated by

conflicting sentiments, and obeying that which he deemed to carry the

most sacred obligation, he of necessity suffered from the violation

of the other. Probably the reflection that he had himself saved the

life of Timophanes, only that the latter might destroy the liberties

of his country—contributed materially to his ultimate resolution; a

resolution, in which Æschylus, another near relative, took even a

larger share than he.

It was in this state of mind that Timoleon was called upon to take

the command of the auxiliaries for Syracuse. As soon as the vote

had passed, Telekleides addressed to him a few words, emphatically

exhorting him to strain every nerve, and to show what he was

worth—with this remarkable point in conclusion—“If you now come off

with success and glory, we shall pass for having slain a despot; if

you fail, we shall be held as fratricides.”[303]

[303] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7. Diodorus (xvi. 65) states this

striking antithesis as if it was put by the senate to Timoleon,

on conferring upon him the new command. He represents the

application from Syracuse as having come to Corinth shortly after

the death of Timophanes, and while the trial of Timoleon was

yet pending. He says that the senate nominated Timoleon to the

command, in order to escape the necessity of pronouncing sentence

one way or the other.

I follow the account of Plutarch, as preferable, in recognizing a

long interval between the death of Timophanes and the application

from Syracuse an interval of much mental suffering to Timoleon.

He immediately commenced his preparation of ships and soldiers. But

the Corinthians, though they had resolved on the expedition, were

not prepared either to vote any considerable subsidy, or to serve in

large numbers as volunteers. The means of Timoleon were so extremely

limited, that he was unable to equip more than seven triremes, to

which the Korkyræans (animated by common sympathy for Syracuse, as

of old in the time of the despot Hippokrates[304]) added two more,

and the Leukadians one. Nor could he muster more than one thousand

soldiers, reinforced afterwards on the voyage to twelve hundred. A

few of the principal Corinthians—Eukleides, Telemachus and Neon,

among them—accompanied him. But the soldiers seem to have been

chiefly miscellaneous mercenaries,—some of whom had served under the

Phokians in the Sacred war (recently brought to a close), and had

incurred so much odium as partners in the spoliation of the Delphian

temple, that they were glad to take foreign service anywhere.[305]

[304] Herodot. vii. 155.

[305] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 8, 11, 12, 30; Diodor, xvi. 66;

Plutarch, Ser. Num. Vind. p. 552. In the Aristotelian treatise,

Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, s. 9, Timoleon is said to have had

_nine_ ships.