German Ships, Officers, and Men
In material, in the art of constructing and equipping ships of war,
Germany at the beginning of the war ranked far above most of the
Great Powers, and she was little, if anything, behind even Great
Britain in workmanship, rapidity and cheapness. Her personnel also
stood high, for she had succeeded in translating into naval terms
the professional and disciplinary codes which have raised the German
Army to a position of pre-eminence. Above all she had succeeded, in
a degree never before attempted by any country, in keeping ships and
men in constant association. The German naval authorities recognized
that, while a conscriptive system of manning a fleet brings into the
organization certain grave and ineradicable disadvantages, it did at
least enable large numbers of officers and men to be borne for service
at a relatively small annual cost. Realising this economic benefit
of conscription, the Marineamt had no hesitation in increasing its
personnel rapidly from year to year. The expansion of this element of
naval power kept pace with the activity of the shipyards. This policy
of simultaneous increase of ships and of men, accompanied as it was
by the expansion of her shipbuilding and allied industries and of
her dockyards, has been the secret of the rapid rise of Germany as a
maritime Power wielding world-wide influence.
Within the memory of the present generation German ships of war, if not
built in England, were constructed in Germany with materials obtained
entirely or in part from England. Her earliest armoured ships of any
account--the _Deutschland_, the _Kaiser_ and the _Konig Wilhelm_--were
all constructed on the banks of the Thames at the old Samuda Yard.
The great industry which Germany and other foreign nations helped to
support is now dead, and on the other side of the North Sea is to be
seen an activity more intense and on a far larger scale than the Thames
establishments could boast even in the day of their greatest prosperity.
Though there are many shipbuilding yards and engine-making
establishments in Germany, the naval authorities depend exclusively
upon the vast establishment of Krupp for armour and guns, and the
repute of the firm in both respects stands high. The vast establishment
which supplies the German and many other Governments was founded in
1810 by Friedrich Krupp, who bought a small forge and devoted himself,
with little commercial success, to the manufacture of cast steel. In
this he was ahead of Germany's requirements, but on the basis thus
laid by the father, the son built; and in 1851 a solid steel ingot
which he exhibited at the Great Exhibition in London completely took
the metallurgic world by surprise, and his fortune was made. He turned
his energy and knowledge to the making of guns, armour, weldless steel
rails, and other manufactures; and the modest works at Essen continued
to expand until to-day they and the associated establishments give
employment to about 70,000 men, not all of whom, of course, always are
engaged on the manipulation of armaments.
For many years the Krupp process of armour manufacture was adopted in
every country of the world, but later on the British Admiralty, it is
common knowledge, adopted a superior process which produces a plate
of greater resisting power, and the German cemented type of armour no
longer holds the premier position which it occupied when its advantages
over the Harvey plate were demonstrated. On the other hand, the Krupp
firm still claim that their ordnance is not equalled by any in the
world, and on the strength of this claim they have obtained most
valuable orders, extending over a long series of years, from foreign
Governments. British guns are made on the wire-wound system--that
is, steel ribbon is wound under great pressure round the gun, and
over this is placed an outer hoop; Krupp's, on the other hand, still
remain faithful to the solid steel tube to resist the gas pressures
exerted, arguing that their method of steel manufacture enables them
to submit it to strains which other steel might not stand. There has
been endless controversy as to the merits of the two systems; and the
subject was again discussed as recently as the end of 1912, when the
Italian Minister of Marine laid a report before the Italian Parliament
with reference to the armaments of the principal fleets. According to
this statement the British, Italian, and Japanese are the only Navies
to mount wire-wound guns; the probable life of the Italian and Japanese
12-inch guns was given at 80 rounds, whereas the English gun was good
for only 60 rounds. On the other hand, the Austrian and German guns
were given from 200 to 220 rounds, and the American 14-inch gun was
estimated to have a probable life of 150 rounds. Particulars with
reference to British and German guns were given as follows:
+---------------------+-------------+--------------------+
| | British. | German. |
+---------------------+------+------+------+------+------+
|Calibre in inches | 12| 13.5| 12| 14| 15|
|Length in calibres | 50| 45| 45| 50| 50|
|Weight in tons | 69| 80| 53| 83| 102|
|Weight of projectile | | | | | |
| in pounds | 850| 1,240| 850| 1,360| 1,650|
|Initial velocity | 2,950| 2,800| 3,000| 3,000| 3,000|
|Energy at muzzle in | | | | | |
| metric tons |16,540|22,150|17,520|27,650|33,910|
|Energy per kilogramme| | | | | |
| in kilometres | 240| 277| 330| 330| 330|
|Probable life in | | | | | |
| rounds | 60| 60| 200| 200| 200|
+---------------------+------+------+------+------+------+
The attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty was directed to these
statements in the House of Commons, and he reiterated the assurance
of former Ministers that the expert advisers were satisfied as to the
wisdom of retaining the wire-wound system. He gave no data as to the
foundation of this confidence, and in the German technical Press--no
doubt with an eye to foreign orders--the superiority of the German gun
over the British was repeated with at least equal assurance.
The great advantage of the wire-wound system, it has always been
claimed, is that after much use, when the rifling is worn, the gun can
be given a new inner tube, a comparatively simple and cheap operation
which results in practically a new gun being made available for sea
service in a short time. All that can be said as to the two systems
from practical experience is that the Japanese found the British-made
weapons give eminently satisfactory results during the war with Russia,
while the Krupp artillery guns used by the Turkish Army in the Balkan
War of 1912 did not realize expectations.
Probably in naval material--in ships, their armour, armament, and
engineering equipment--there is little difference as between the
leading navies. One may be thought to have an advantage in some
particular respect, but this may possibly be counterbalanced by the
rival's superiority in another. Generally, the British ships mount
fewer guns but of larger calibre, and to the experienced eye they
look very workman-like; while the German ships carry smaller guns in
greater number and have a crowded appearance which does not appeal to
British naval opinion in its desire for simplicity of design and plenty
of working room. Virtually, all the instruments for exerting naval
power as they exist to-day are experimental, based upon the empirical
knowledge. When the war between the United States and Spain occurred,
it was anticipated that it would throw light upon these problems, but
these anticipations were not realized, and even the struggle between
Russia and Japan failed to satisfy fully the natural curiosity of the
naval constructor and the naval officer owing to the inefficiency with
which the Russian ships were handled, and the deplorable slackness of
the administration.
It is the fashion to calculate the relative strength of fleets in tons
and guns, but the probability is that on the day of trial in a great
battle at sea these nice paper computations will be entirely upset by
the course of events. Morale, as Napoleon observed, dominates war. This
dictum is no less true to-day than it was in the past. Man is still
greater than the instruments of his creation, and the experience of war
on a grand scale will certainly confirm the teaching of history--that
the important element in naval power is men rather than ships. On the
eve of the Battle of St. Vincent, when Jervis, in command of fifteen
ships, was pacing the quarter-deck of his flag-ship and the Spanish
Fleet was entering the field of vision, the numbers of the enemy were
reported by the Captain of the Fleet to the Commander-in-Chief as they
were counted. "There are eight sail of the line, Sir John," "Very
well, sir," answered the Admiral. "There are twenty sail of the line,
Sir John." "Very well, sir," Jervis responded. "There are twenty-five
sail of the line, Sir John." "Very well, sir," the Admiral again
replied imperturbably. "There are twenty-seven sail of the line, Sir
John," the Captain of the Fleet at length reported, and when he had
the temerity to remark on the great disparity between the British and
Spanish Fleets, the Admiral, confident in the efficiency of his small
fleet, replied: "The die is cast, and if there be fifty sail, I will
go through them." We may be sure that the victor of the Battle of St.
Vincent, who by stern but wisely directed measures created the fleet
which Nelson used with such dramatic effect at Trafalgar, would have
scorned and ridiculed an entire reliance on mere paper calculations of
guns and tons, realizing that victory or defeat depends mainly upon the
personal element and morale.
It is in respect of officers and men that there is the greatest
contrast between the British Fleet and the Navies of the Continent
of Europe. The British service is organized on a voluntary system,
while the Continental fleets are manned mainly by conscripts; the
former serve for many years, while the latter for the most part submit
to only the short period of duty required by law and then pass into
the reserve. In the matter of officers, however, the German Fleet is
certainly not worse served than the British Navy; though the cadets
begin their training at a somewhat later age, a thoroughly good sea
officer is produced. The marked distinction between the two services
is that, whereas under the White Ensign special duties are assigned to
special classes of officers--gunnery, torpedo, navigation, signalling
and physical training--in the German Navy no hard-and-fast lines
are drawn. It is held that the British system would entail a larger
number of officers than are available on the other side of the North
Sea. However this may be, the German authorities can certainly pride
themselves upon a corps of executive officers which in many respects is
not excelled in any country. As in the British service, special lines
of officers are trained for engineering, medical, and accountant duties
and these have no executive standing.
The method of training executive officers for the German Fleet differs
in some important respects from that which obtains in England. In the
British service the cadets, who enter when they are, on the average,
thirteen and a half years of age, have not completed their general
education, and consequently spend four years at the Naval Colleges at
Osborne and Dartmouth respectively before they go afloat in a training
ship. The German naval officer receives much the same general education
as any other boy before he enters the navy, whereas the British cadet,
after entering, is submitted to an educational course specially devised
with a view to his future naval career; his studies embrace physical
science and practical engineering, and emphasis is laid upon athletics
and as much sea experience as can be obtained in small craft. When the
four years ashore are completed he goes afloat at about the same age as
the average German cadet and makes a six months' cruise. Which is the
better system? Who shall say? This is certain, however, that British
naval officers have always held that lads for the sea service cannot
be caught, broken in, and inoculated, so to speak, too early.
Throughout the years of naval expansion the German authorities have
been struggling to eliminate as far as possible the disadvantages
of conscription in its application to naval conditions. The War
Department is responsible for putting in force the conscription law,
and periodically the navy sends in its requisition, stating the number
of recruits who will be needed, and where and when they are to join.
The men selected are passed direct into the fleet without preliminary
training each October. Under the British system boys are entered at
about sixteen years of age, and receive a short training first in one
of the shore or stationary sea establishments, and are subsequently
drafted into one of the ships of the Training Squadron, thence joining
the sea-going fleet. A certain number of youths are also entered at an
average age of about seventeen and a half years, and these recruits
dispense with the preliminary course, but are also drafted to the
Training Squadron before joining the fleet. Nearly all the men of the
fleet sign on for twelve years' active service, and the best of these
are permitted to re-engage for another ten years in order to earn
pensions. A relatively small number of men, not boys, join the British
Navy for a term of only five years, with the obligation to remain in
the Reserve for seven years. Five years, consequently, is the minimum
in the British Navy, and applies to only a relatively small number of
men; but three years is the maximum period of German conscripts, and
during this time the officers and warrant officers have to do their
best to transform the raw material provided by the State into skilled
seamen.
It is easy to imagine the difficulties which assail the administration
in Germany in these circumstances. Every year one-third of the naval
conscripts complete their period of active service and are passed into
the Reserve, and their places are taken by an equivalent batch of raw
recruits. The result is that in the winter months the officers and
petty officers of the fleet are occupied in licking into shape these
embryo sailors, and from October until May the fighting ships of the
Empire become practically training vessels.
If this were a complete representation of the conditions in the German
Fleet its efficiency would be of a low order. The Navy is, however,
stiffened by a proportion of conscripts who re-engage voluntarily,
and by a certain number of volunteers who enter as boys. These lads
engage at ages ranging from fifteen to eighteen years. They agree to
undergo an apprenticeship of two years followed by seven years of
active fleet service. Volunteers are not trained ashore or in fixed
naval establishments as in the United Kingdom, but are drafted to
sea-going training ships, which cruise in home waters during the summer
months and pass into the Mediterranean during the winter. By these
two expedients the German naval authorities have been able to secure
about 25 per cent. of the German personnel on what passes in Germany
for a long-service system. The boy volunteers and the conscripts who
re-engage constitute the class from which petty officers are drawn, and
these men are the backbone of the naval organization ashore and afloat,
and it is to their efforts that the high standard of efficiency which
Germany's Navy has attained may in a large measure be traced.
Year by year, in order to provide crews for the larger number of
ships passed into the fleet, the Marine Office has been compelled to
increase the number of conscripts required for sea service, and thus
the task of training the Navy has been increased in advance of the
expansion of the material, because men must begin training before their
ships are ready for sea. The officers and petty officers have had not
only to train raw recruits embarked to take the place of conscripts at
the end of their three years' term, but to find means also of training
additional recruits entered as net additions to the naval strength.
When it is added that in 1894 the number of officers and men in the
Navy was less than 21,000, whereas it is now nearly 80,000, and under
the Navy Act of 1912 is to be raised to 107,000, some conception may be
formed of the character of the problem which has presented itself, not
only to the central administration ashore, but to the officers afloat,
intent upon attaining the highest standard of efficiency at sea.
Admission of these difficulties was made by Admiral von Tirpitz in the
explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the last Navy Bill presented
to the Reichstag and which directed attention to "two serious defects"
in the organization of the fleet:
"The one defect consists in the fact that in the
autumn of every year the time-expired men--_i.e._
almost one-third of the crew in all ships of the
battle fleet, are discharged and replaced mainly
by recruits from the _inland population_. Owing
to this, the readiness of the battle fleet for war
is considerably impaired for a prolonged period."
When it is recalled that the maritime population of Germany amounts
only to 80,000, and that compulsory service in the active fleet lasts
for only three years, it will be realized that most of the recruits
taken for the German Navy must necessarily be landsmen. The personnel
in 1914 numbered roughly over 70,000, after deducting from the total
the executive officers, engineers, cadets, and accountants. If
approximately 17,000 of these are regarded as long-service men there
remain roughly 54,000 conscripts, one-third of whom pass annually into
the Reserve, and are replaced by raw hands. Under the new Navy Law it
was intended to strengthen the personnel in the next few years by 6,400
annually. While the average period of service in the British Navy,
including the relatively small number of five years' men entered for
short service, is about ten years, the average in the German Fleet does
not amount to as much as half this period.
It is possible to attach too much importance to the fact that
the German Navy is recruited "mainly by recruits from the inland
population." The inherited sea habit counts for less to-day than at
any time since men attempted to navigate the seas. Ships of war have
become vast complicated boxes of machinery, and naval life requires
the exercise of qualities different from those it demanded in the sail
era. Then brute courage, endurance, and familiarity with the moods
of the sea were the main attributes of sailors, but to-day a large
proportion of the crews must be experts in the handling of complicated
mechanical appliances. In these changed conditions the compulsory
system of education in Germany has proved of the greatest advantage in
providing recruits of a high standard of intelligence, who probably
acquire in six months as complete a familiarity with their work as it
would have taken a seaman of the old school as many years to attain.
At the same time, while resisting the temptation to place too great
importance upon the inherited sea habit, it would be no less a mistake
to ignore entirely its influence upon naval efficiency. Familiarity
breeds contempt for the terrors of the sea and for the horrors of a
naval action, and it is reasonable to expect that in the hour of trial
the long-service men of the British Navy will exhibit a moral standard
when projectiles are falling fast and thick far higher than that of
the conscript. A modern Dreadnought is intended to fire its guns in
broadsides and not in succession, and when it is borne in mind that
at one discharge these guns will deliver on an enemy's ship, if they
are fired accurately, between five and six tons of metal, it will be
realized that at such a moment the calibre of men will count more than
the calibre of guns.
When the Act of 1900 was introduced the Reichstag was informed
by Admiral von Tirpitz in a Memorandum that "as, even after the
projected increase has been carried out, the number of vessels in
the German Navy will still be more or less inferior to that of other
individual Great Powers, our endeavours must be directed towards
compensating this superiority by the individual training of the crews
and by tactical training by practice in larger bodies.... Economy as
regards commissioning of vessels in peace time means jeopardizing the
efficiency of the fleet in case of war." Never since navies existed
have a body of officers and men been worked at higher pressure than
those of Germany; drill has never ceased; no effort has been spared to
obtain the last ounce of value out of every one on board the ships.
The promotion of officers rests with the Emperor, and he is unsparing
in his punishment of anything like slackness; an officer who is not
enthusiastic, alert, and competent, stands no chance of rising in
rank. The German Navy has no use for anything but the best which the
Empire can provide, and in order that the highest expression of the
_esprit de corps_ which has contributed to German influence on shore
may be instilled into the Navy, no officer, however influential or
brilliant, can enter either the executive or engineering branch unless
his claims are endorsed by all his contemporaries; one black ball--if
the term may be used--is sufficient to disqualify an aspirant, though
he may have passed all the prescribed examinations brilliantly.
The German Fleet has its limitations, but within those limitations it
probably has no superior in the world: the ships are well built, the
officers are capable sailors, and the men are raised to the highest
pitch of efficiency possible under a short-service system.