The German Navy Acts
Among the political developments of the last quarter of a century there
is none more remarkable than the evolution of German naval ambitions as
revealed in the legislation passed since 1898.
One of the first acts after the Emperor ascended the throne was the
reorganization of the central Navy administration, which had hitherto
been presided over by a general officer of the army. This fact in
itself indicates the subordinate position which the navy had hitherto
occupied in the defensive machinery of the German Empire. The fleet
itself was of extremely modest proportions. It consisted only of
a few small battleships of heavy gun-power, but limited radius of
action, whose rôle was the defence of the coasts of Germany, and more
particularly the Baltic littoral, for at this period few men-of-war
under any flag cruised in the North Sea. The spearhead of the British
Navy was exposed in the Mediterranean, where the latest and most
powerful ships were stationed, and the small Channel Fleet spent
most of its time not in the Channel, but ringing the changes on Vigo
and other Spanish ports--Lisbon, Lagos, Gibraltar, Madeira, and Port
Mahon. This squadron consisted of five obsolescent ships, and the
only British vessels permanently in home waters--so complete was the
domination of the situation in southern waters--were a number of port
and coast-guard ships, half manned and distributed round the coast, and
the unmanned vessels in reserve in the dockyards. The distribution of
the French Fleet was on much the same lines, the majority of the modern
ships being concentrated in the Mediterranean, while a small force was
based upon Brest. Russia alone was represented in northern waters, and
it was consequently in the Baltic that the German Fleet, such as it
was, was trained and drilled. Except for a few gunboats, the German
naval ensign was entirely unrepresented in distant seas, and public
opinion showed no desire to increase the naval votes in order to enable
German influence to be exercised beyond home waters.
After the Emperor's accession to the throne in June, 1888, and after
the reorganization of naval administration, an effort was made to
obtain an increased grant from the Reichstag, but only with partial
success. From 1874 to 1889-90 the naval expenditure had increased
gradually from £1,950,000 to about £2,750,000. In 1890-91 the Estimates
had advanced to nearly £3,600,000, and in the following year they rose
still further to £4,750,000, and then they began to fall once more
under the pressure of the Reichstag, which viewed with no sympathy the
new naval ambitions which were finding expression in the Press. During
these years the Reichstag repeatedly reduced the votes put forward by
Admiral von Hollmann, the Minister of Marine. Throughout his period
of office, from 1890 to 1897, he failed signally to inoculate the
Parliamentary majority with the new ideas and the new enthusiasm which
dominated the Marineamt; and at last in 1897, after being repulsed,
first by the Budget Committee and then by the Reichstag itself, the
Marine Minister, whose ambitions were really extremely modest, retired
from the scene, compelled to admit defeat. He was a sailor and neither
a statesman nor an administrator, and his blunt methods were not to the
liking of the politicians. No surprise consequently was felt when three
months after this final humiliation the Admiral resigned his office.
One of the pioneers of German sea-power, Admiral von Hollmann began,
under the inspiration of the Emperor, the naval movement which, a few
years later, under the impulse that the Boer War imparted to public
opinion, and with the help of an elaborate Press Bureau, was carried to
such lengths by his successor.
On the resignation of Admiral von Hollmann, the Emperor appointed as
Naval Secretary a comparatively unknown naval officer named Tirpitz.
Born on March 19th, 1849, at Cüstrin, and the son of a judge, Alfred
Tirpitz became a naval cadet in 1865, and was afterwards at the Naval
Academy from 1874 to 1876. He subsequently devoted much attention to
the torpedo branch of the service, and was mainly responsible for
the torpedo organization and the tactical use of torpedoes in the
German Navy--a work which British officers regard with admiration.
Subsequently he became Inspector of Torpedo Service, and was the first
Flotilla Chief of the Torpedo Flotillas. Later he was appointed Chief
of the Staff of the naval station in the Baltic and of the Supreme
Command of the German Fleet. During these earlier years of his sea
career Admiral Tirpitz made several long voyages. He is regarded as
an eminent tactician, and is the author of the rules for German naval
tactics as now in use in the Navy. In 1895 he was promoted to the rank
of Rear-Admiral, and became Vice-Admiral in 1899. During 1896 and
1897 he commanded the cruiser squadron in East Asia, and was appointed
Secretary of State of the Imperial Navy Office in January, 1897. In the
following year he was made a Minister of State, and in 1901 received
the hereditary rank of nobility, entitling him to the use of the prefix
"von" before his name.
With the advent of this officer as Marine Minister, German naval
affairs at once underwent a change. His predecessor, who entertained
very modest theories as to the size of the fleet which Germany should
possess, had attempted to browbeat the politicians, thumping the table
in irritation when he could not get his way. The new Minister from
the first adopted other methods. He devoted himself to the education
of the people by means of an elaborate Press Bureau, and was soon
the undisputed master of German naval policy. He met opposition in
the Reichstag with a smiling reasonableness, and set himself to win
the support of opponents by good-tempered argument. In fact, Admiral
von Tirpitz from the first revealed himself as a politician and
diplomatist, and from the time that he took office, though now and
again slight checks were experienced, naval policy in Germany made
rapid--indeed, astonishing--progress.
In the year after Admiral von Tirpitz went to the Marine Office, a Navy
Bill, far more ambitious in its terms than any proposal that had been
put forward by Admiral von Hollmann, was accepted by the Reichstag.
This measure was believed to embody at any rate the beginnings of a
scheme which he had submitted to the Emperor some time prior to his
appointment. At any rate, it enunciated a new and vital principle.
As has been seen, the Government, whether Prussian or German, had on
previous occasions drafted extensive naval programmes for the carrying
out of which a period of ten or twelve years was required. Not once,
however, had the establishment of ships and personnel been fixed by
law; and the Parliament in each case committed itself to the entire
scheme only to the extent of passing the first annual instalment
considered necessary by the Government as the initial step towards
the desired goal. In this way neither Diet nor Reichstag bound itself
or its successors for the future, but left both free to deal with the
annual naval estimates as they thought fit. And in practice it had been
found that very liberal use was made of the budgetary prerogatives,
that standards once approved were not considered binding, and that the
fate of the naval estimates depended to a considerable extent on the
relations which happened for the moment to exist between the Government
and the majority parties on questions totally unconnected with the
naval requirements of the Empire.
Another disadvantage of the practice of leaving the Reichstag free to
determine annually the number of vessels which should be laid down
in a given year, was, that it gave the shipbuilding, armour-plate,
and ordnance industries no sure basis for their plans for the future.
The rule that Germany must build, engine, arm, and equip her own war
vessels had been generally accepted, but the industries which should
enable her to do this were still in their infancy, and were almost
entirely dependent upon the orders of the home Government. If they
were ever to be able to supply the demands of a powerful fleet, it
was necessary that slips should be multiplied, plant increased, and
workshops extended. But so long as the naval policy of the Empire was
indefinite and subject to violent fluctuations, ship-builders and
manufacturers would not endanger their businesses by locking up large
amounts of capital in appliances which could be used for the building
and arming of warships and for no other purposes. If German industry
was ever to be in a position to satisfy the demands of a large and
efficient fleet, some guarantee of steady and remunerative orders must,
it was urged, be afforded to the trades concerned. And apart altogether
from its own needs, the Government also hoped that, some day, Germany
would be able to claim a share in those large profits which Great
Britain appropriated to herself as the world's shipbuilder.
It was by such arguments that Admiral von Tirpitz justified his demand
that the strength of the fleet, the date at which it should attain
that strength, and the age at which each ship should be automatically
replaced by a new one, should be fixed by legal enactment. No portion
of his Bill was more hotly contested than this. It was objected
that, by accepting it, the Reichstag would be depriving itself of a
considerable portion of that power of the purse which constituted the
only effective bulwark of its rights. But in the end the smiling and
imperturbable patience of Admiral von Tirpitz gained the day, and
the Reichstag satisfied itself with the formal right of drawing the
absolutely unavoidable conclusions from its own enactment and passing
every year the naval estimates, which could not be rejected without
an infraction of the law. The repeated sections in the Act of 1898
which appear to reserve the Chamber's Budget rights, are, in reality,
meaningless and valueless--except as a monument to the folly of those
who believed they had a meaning and a value. Admiral von Tirpitz
apparently drew from his first legislative experience the perfectly
correct conclusion that the Reichstag can be made to do almost anything
if one only treats it in the right way.
In the explanatory Memorandum attached to the Bill, Admiral von
Tirpitz was able to adduce two convincing reasons why the fleet should
at once be considerably augmented. One of these was the fact that
Germany's naval strength had in recent years actually diminished. In
case of mobilization, it was pointed out, she would have had only
seven efficient battleships, whereas she had once had fourteen. Of the
armoured cruisers which had been adopted in other navies for foreign
service in times of peace, she did not possess a single example, and
their work had to be done by three antiquated battleships. Moreover,
to the tasks allotted to the fleet in the Memorandum of 1873, another
of great importance had been added--namely, the defence of Germany's
newly-acquired colonial empire. Further, it was contended that the
growth of the Empire's population, trade, and industry, the development
of her sea-fisheries, and the increasing investment of German capital
abroad, had all added to the possibilities of her becoming involved
in quarrels with other nations. The fleet which Admiral von Tirpitz
considered necessary to fulfil the old and the new sea requirements of
the Empire was as under:
The Battle Fleet.
19 battleships (2 as material reserve).
8 armoured coast-defence vessels.
6 large cruisers.
16 small cruisers.
Foreign Service Fleet.
_Large Cruisers._
For East Asia 2
For Central and South America 1
Material reserve 3
--
Total 6
_Small Cruisers._
For East Asia 3
For Central and South America 3
For East Africa 2
For the South Seas 2
Material reserve 4
--
Total 14
1 station ship.
The period proposed for the gradual attainment of this strength was
seven years, but the Reichstag shortened it by a year, and thus it
became known as the "Sexennat." It was pronounced inexpedient to
attempt to fix for some years in advance the Empire's requirements in
torpedo craft, school-ships, and training ships.
That this scheme was intended by its author to be merely a beginning
has been shown by the sequel, but Admiral von Tirpitz himself little
dreamed that he would so soon be able to take the next and decisive
step, which should bring him to within measurable distance of his goal.
Early in 1899 he said in the Budget Committee: "I declare expressly
that in no quarter has the intention to submit a new navy plan in any
way been manifested; that, on the contrary, in all quarters concerned,
the firmest intention exists to carry out the Navy Law, and to observe
the limits therein laid down." In other words, the law was to run its
six years' course.
Nevertheless, before the year was at an end, the Bill which was
to become the Navy Law of 1900 had already been announced by the
Government.
In the light of the vast development of Germany's colonial and
commercial interests the Navy Act of 1898 was of an unambitious
character. The German Fleet was at this time still the weakest
possessed by any of the Great Powers of Europe, except Austria-Hungary,
which then had no naval pretensions. If only as a matter of historical
interest it is interesting to record that, at the moment when this
effort towards expansion was made, Germany kept in commission only four
ships which could be dignified with the description of battleships,
together with four smaller armoured vessels. The only modern ships of
the line under the German ensign consisted of these four battleships
of the Worth class, vessels of 9,874 tons displacement in comparison
with ships of 15,000 tons which had already been incorporated in the
British Fleet. The German ships, though nominally battleships, were
really only coast-defence vessels, heavily gunned and thickly armoured,
but with storage for only 680 tons of coal; whereas contemporary
British ships of the Majestic class possessed a capacity of 1,850
tons.[8] The four vessels of this class, in addition to the _Worth_,
were the _Weisenburg_, _Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm_, and _Brandenburg_.
They marked a notable advance on the little armoured ships of three
to four thousand tons of the Siegfried class, which had been built
during the early 'nineties, but, owing to their limited fuel capacity,
their radius of action was extremely restricted, and they were, in
fact, only very powerful coast-defence ships, with a speed on trial of
between sixteen and seventeen knots. The design of every armoured ship
is a compromise between armament, armour, speed, and coal capacity,
and in this German design a predominance then unprecedented in any
navy in the world was given to the two first-named characteristics. On
paper these ships were vessels of great offensive power, as is revealed
by the contrast given on p. 103 between them and the contemporary
battleships of the Majestic class of the British Fleet, which displaced
about 15,000 tons and attained a speed of eighteen knots, with 1,850
tons of coal on board.
These few details reveal the fundamental differences between the
character of the British and German Navies at this time and the policy
which they represented. The British Government, in accordance with
precedent, was providing a fleet of the high-seas type, while the
German Government was content with a small force built specifically for
the purpose of coast-defence. These four large German coast-defence
ships were at this time supported by the four vessels of the Sachsen
type of 7,283 tons, already obsolescent; by six old ships--one dating
back to 1868; by eight little armoured vessels of the Beowulf class,
of about 3,500 tons, which had been constructed during the early
'nineties; and the tail of the list was brought up by eleven armoured
gunboats each of 1,000 tons displacement. This enumeration of the naval
forces of Germany indicates conclusively the modest ambitions which
hitherto had animated her naval administration.
The German Fleet, except for the purposes of coast defence, and
specifically for the protection of her Baltic shores, was a negligible
quantity, having no
+------------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
| | Majestic Class. | Worth Class. |
+------------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
|Length |Over all, 413 ft. |380 ft. 6 in. (354 ft. |
| | (390 ft. at water-line). | 3 in. at water-line.) |
| | | |
|Beam |75 ft. |65 ft. 6 in. |
|Mean draught|27 ft. 6 in. |24 ft. 4 in. |
|Armour |Partial 9-in. Harveyed |Complete belt, 11·8 to |
| | belt, 16 ft. | 15·7 in. (compound |
| | broad, and 220 ft. | in earlier, steel in |
| | long; bulkheads, | later, ships); barbettes |
| | 14 in. (max.); | and conning-tower, |
| | barbettes, 14 in.; | 11·8 in.; |
| | barbette-shields, | ammunition hoists, |
| | 10 in.; casemates | 11·8 in.; gun-hoods, |
| | (12), 6 in.; protected | 5 in.; cellulose |
| | deck 2·5 to | cofferdam belt; |
| | 4 in.; forward | casemate for 4·1-in. |
| | conning tower, 14 | guns, 3 in.; steel |
| | in.; after conning | deck, 3 in., flat on |
| | tower, 3 in. | top of belt. |
| | | |
|Armament |4 12-in. 46-ton |6 11-in. Krupp |
| | (wire-wound) | breech-loading, |
| | breech-loading; | 2 in each |
| | 12 6-in. | barbette; 8 4·1 in. |
| | quickfirers in casemates;| quickfiring of 30 |
| | 16 12-pounder | calibres in a casemate |
| | quick-firers; | forward of |
| | 2 12-pounder | the centre barbettes; |
| | boat-guns; 12 | 8 3·4-in. |
| | 3-pounder quick-firing; | quick-firers of 30 |
| | 2 Maxims; | calibres; 2·23 in. |
| | 5 torpedo-tubes | breech-loading |
| | (18-in.), 4 submerged, | boat or field guns; |
| | 1 above | 12 1-pounder quick-firers;|
| | water astern. | 8 machine; |
| | | 3 torpedo tubes, |
| | | 2 submerged. |
+------------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
influence either upon European or world policy. The truth of this
statement is conclusively proved by the following table showing the
relative strength of the only five navies of the world which were, at
that time, of appreciable importance, the fleets of Japan and of the
United States being then still in their infancy:
+---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
| |Britain.|France.|Russia.|Italy.|Germany.|
+---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
|Battleships: | | | | | |
| First-class | 29 | 14 | 6 | 8 | 4 |
| Second-class | 7 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| Third-class | 18 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 6 |
| +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
| Total battleships| 54 | 29 | 15 | 13 | 14 |
| +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
|Coast-defence ships | 14 | 16 | 13 | -- | 18 |
| +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
|Cruisers: | | | | | |
| First-class | 23 | 8 | 6 | -- | 1 |
| Second-class | 47 | 13 | 3 | 5 | 3 |
| Third-class | 34 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 9 |
| +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
| Total cruisers | 104 | 30 | 10 | 14 | 13 |
| +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
|Torpedo gunboats | 34 | 19 | 8 | 15 | 4 |
+---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+
It must be confessed that at this time the German Fleet bore no
reasonable relation to Germany's growing trade and oversea interests.
But the mass of the people of the German Empire were still unconscious
of any deficiency, and, blinded by the success of their armies during
the war with France and the small influence which naval power exerted
in that struggle, they had refused for many years to take upon
themselves the burden which the new naval ambitions represented.
But with the passage of the Navy Act of 1898, and the widespread
agitation carried on by the Navy League, under the highest patronage,
and--even more important--by the Press Bureau under Admiral von
Tirpitz, a change immediately occurred; and the success with which
the British forces were enabled to conduct their military operations
in South Africa, while Europe was forced to stand by inactive,
owing to the supreme control which the British Fleet possessed of
sea communications, produced a revulsion of feeling. The current of
European events, and the reception with which the Emperor's speeches
met, convinced the Government, within a comparatively few months of the
passage of the Act of 1898, that they might safely abandon this modest
measure and replace it by a new Bill.
What had happened in the meantime? This: the outbreak of the Boer War
had generated in Germany an absolutely unprecedented hostility to Great
Britain, which was afterwards roused to white heat by the seizure of
the mail steamer _Bundesrat_ and other German vessels on the African
coast. Admiral von Tirpitz had a unique opportunity such as was never
likely to present itself to him again. He made prompt and full use of
it, and while Great Britain was in the thick of the embarrassments of
the early stages of the South African War, the great Navy Bill of 1900
was passed into law.
The seizure of the German vessels was admitted by the British
Government to have been a blunder. An apology was tendered to Germany
on account of it, and promises made that similar incidents should
not recur. The action of the British warships did nothing but harm,
and would certainly never have been taken if the Foreign Office in
London had been properly informed on the situation in Germany by its
representatives in Berlin, and had itself kept the Admiralty fully
posted.
Consequently, in the spring of 1900, the Act of 1898 was replaced by
a new one, in face of all Admiral von Tirpitz's protestations of two
years before. _This measure set up an establishment of almost twice
the size of the former one, and embraced ships intended for battle
purposes on the high seas._ During the discussion of the measure in the
Reichstag the Centre Party compelled the Government to modify their
original scheme, and to drop five large and five small cruisers for
service on foreign stations, while the reserve of cruisers was reduced
by one large and two small vessels. In the course of the debate the
Naval Secretary announced that, while the Government were compelled to
agree to the amendment of their proposals, they still insisted upon the
necessity of providing the original number of ships for duty in foreign
seas, but would agree to postpone the final settlement of the question
until a subsequent date.
In its final form, as it received the approval of the Reichstag and of
the Emperor, and as it was published in the _Imperial German Gazette_
of June 20th, 1900, the Bill set up the following establishment for the
Fleet:
The Battle Fleet.
2 fleet flagships.
4 squadrons, each of 8 battleships.
8 large cruisers for scouting purposes.
24 small cruisers for scouting purposes.
Foreign Fleet.
3 large cruisers.
10 small cruisers.
Reserve.
4 battleships.
3 large cruisers.
4 small cruisers.
The new Act was based upon the same calculation of the effective life
of ships as the one of 1898, and provided that, except in the case of
total loss, battleships were to be replaced after twenty-five years
and cruisers after twenty years. It was provided that the age of ships
was to be reckoned from the grant of the first instalment in payment
for the ship to be replaced to the passing of the first instalment in
payment for the ship to be built as "substitute" (Ersatzschiff). It was
proposed to keep half the battle squadrons--the First and Second--fully
manned on a war footing, together with one-half of the torpedo craft
and all the school-ships and auxiliary vessels. The Third and Fourth
battle squadrons were to form the Reserve Fleet, half the ships of
which were to be kept in permanent commission. The Act also made
provision for nucleus crews for the second half of the torpedo-boats,
for the requirements of ships serving abroad, and for the needs of the
shore establishments.
More remarkable, perhaps, than the actual terms of the Navy Act was
the character of the explanatory Memorandum put forward by the Navy
Department.[9] In this notable document occurs the following statement
of the new naval policy of the German Empire:
"To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies, in the existing
circumstances, there is only one means: Germany must have a battle
fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest
sea-power, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil
his position in the world.
"For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German
battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power,
because a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to
concentrate all its striking forces against us. But even if it should
succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the
defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken the
enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own
position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet."
The Memorandum well repays study in the light of subsequent events.
Almost at the moment of its publication Admiral von der Goltz, a
former Chief of the Admiralstab, gave a less reserved exposition of
German policy, thus reflecting the opinions held by the naval officers
responsible for the character of the proposed expansion of the German
Fleet.
"Let us consider," he said, "the case of a war against England. In
spite of what many people think, there is nothing improbable in such
a war, owing to the animosity which exists in our country towards
England, and, on the other side, to the sentiments of the British
nation towards all Continental Powers, and in particular against
Germany. These are not Chauvinistic exaggerations, but the opinion
of the whole of the people of Great Britain, who are jealous of our
commercial development. If England should ever lose her mercantile
supremacy on the seas, the decline of her naval dominion would only be
a question of time, and she realizes the fact instinctively. Of course
the British Government will make every effort to prevent the violent
explosion of these sentiments, preferring peaceful competition to
war. But how long can that last? Violence becomes a right to a people
which fears for its existence.
"The opinion is generally held in this country that any resistance
against England at sea would be impossible, and that all our naval
preparations are but wasted efforts. It is time that this childish
fear, which would put a stop to all our progress, should be pulled up
by the roots and destroyed.
"At this moment (1900) we are almost defenceless against England
at sea, but already we possess the beginnings of a weapon which
statesmanship can put to a good use, and our chances of success in a
war against England grow more favourable day by day.
"The maritime superiority of Great Britain, overwhelming now, will
certainly remain considerable in the future; but she is compelled to
scatter her forces all over the world. In the event of war in home
waters, the greater part of the foreign squadrons would no doubt
be recalled; but that would be a matter of time, and then all the
stations oversea could not be abandoned. On the other hand, the German
Fleet, though much smaller, can remain concentrated in European waters.
"With the increases about to be made it will be in a position to
measure its strength with the ordinary British naval forces in home
waters (then consisting only of the small and inefficiently manned
Channel squadron); but it should not be forgotten that the question
of numbers is far less important at sea than on land. Numerical
inferiority can be compensated by efficiency, by excellence of
material, by the capacity and discipline of the men. Careful
preparation permitting rapid mobilization can ensure a momentary
superiority."
With the passage of the Navy Act of 1900, Germany proceeded to
develop a High-Sea Fleet--a naval force capable of going anywhere and
doing anything. Hitherto her ships had represented in their design
the domination of a coast-defence policy. She now entered upon the
construction of ships of the first class. Naval construction was
regularized, and forthwith proceeded with great rapidity. During the
five years--1886 to 1890--no ship even nominally of the battleship
class was launched. During 1891 to 1895 only four vessels, and between
1890 and 1900 only six vessels, and these all of relatively modest
fighting power, were put in the water, but in 1901 no fewer than five
first-class battleships were sent afloat.
At the time when the Navy Act of 1900 was passed Germany had just
completed the five ships of the old Kaiser class, with a displacement
of about 11,150 tons, and mounting four 9·4-inch guns of 40 calibre
as battle weapons in association with a large number of secondary
guns--eighteen pieces of 5·9 inches. The technical advisers of the
German Admiralty at this date pinned their faith to a storm of
projectiles from quick-firing guns, and in order that weights might be
kept down and the ships might be restricted to dimensions to enable
them to navigate the Kiel Canal, reliance was placed upon the 9·4-inch
gun at a moment when in practically all the navies of the world a
12-inch weapon was being mounted.
The type of battleship design which was introduced with the passage
of the Act of 1898, and which was yet in hand when the measure of 1900
was prepared, still combined a weak main armament of four 9·4-inch
guns with an exceedingly heavy secondary armament and a complete
armoured belt. Whereas British ships at this time, such as those of the
Duncan class, were being given only partial belts, and these only 7
inches thick amidships, tapering off fore and aft, the German vessels
received thicker belts extending over the whole length. Of this new
design--known as the Wittelsbach class--five units were building when
the 1900 Act was passed. They had a maximum coal capacity of 1,770 tons
of coal, with 200 tons of oil, and were capable of steaming at a speed
of about eighteen knots, thus reflecting the rise of German ambition
for something more than a coast-defence fleet. The belts of these ships
were 7·5 inches wide, with a thickness amidships of 8·9 inches, while
the four 9·4-inch guns were protected with armour 9·8 inches thick, and
the secondary turrets and casemates carrying the eighteen 5·9-inch guns
were protected with armour 5·9 inches thick.
After the passage of the Navy Act of 1900 the 9·4-inch gun, as the
battle weapon, was abandoned in favour of an 11-inch of 40 calibre, and
the displacement of the new ships of the Deutschland class, as they are
generically termed, although there are minor differences in the ten
vessels, was nearly 13,000 tons. These ships really represented the
entrance of Germany upon the high seas as a first-class naval Power,
possessing vessels fit to lie in the line and to fight the men-of-war
under any foreign flag. The new design may be contrasted with advantage
with that of the Worth class which has already been described:
Deutschland Class.
_Armour._
Krupp, complete belt, about 7 feet wide,[10] 8·9 inches amidships,
tapering to 3·9 inches at ends; lower edge amidships, 6·7 inches;
lower deck side amidships, 5·5 inches; main turrets and barbettes,
11 inches to 9·8 inches; secondary turrets, 6·7 inches; battery, 5·9
inches; conning-tower, 11·8 inches; s.t.--aft, 5·5 inches; deck, 2·9
inches on slopes, 1·6 inches on flat.
_Armament._
Four 11 inch (40 calibre) in pairs in turrets, fore and aft; 14 6·7
inch (40 calibre), 10 in battery on main deck, 4 singly in turrets on
upper deck; 12 3·4 inch (24 pounder); 4 machine; torpedo tubes, 6 (18
inch), 4 submerged, 1 bow, and 1 stern.
Simultaneously with the construction of these ten battleships, six
armoured cruisers, ranging in displacement from 8,800 to about 11,000
tons, were laid down, and in 1906 a single clause amending the Act was
passed increasing the foreign fleet by five armoured cruisers and the
fleet reserve by one armoured cruiser, thus fulfilling in part the
original programme of the Navy Department with which the Reichstag had
interfered.
At about the same date German naval opinion made a complete _volte
face_ in regard to the fighting value of the submarine. About the time
when the Act of 1900 was passed the British Admiralty, after a careful
study of the progress of submarine navigation in France and America,
decided that it could no longer ignore this type of man-of-war. It
was forthwith decided to buy an experimental ship from the Holland
Company of the United States, which had already demonstrated the
practical value of this particular type of submersible torpedo-boat.
The original craft which was purchased under these circumstances was
a little ship with a submerged displacement of only 120 tons, and a
water-line displacement of 104 tons. She was propelled on the surface
by a four-cylinder gasoline engine giving a speed of eight to eight and
a half knots, while below the surface she was driven by an electric
motor, and was capable of only six or seven knots.
The entrance of this little ship into the British service was hailed
in Germany with something approaching derision, and in the technical
papers the futility of the submarine was urged with a wealth of
argument. The little Holland boat, however, was merely the foundation
from which the British authorities proceeded to develop a type of craft
in keeping with the offensive rôle of the British Navy, and in 1906
submarines were being built for the British Fleet mounting two torpedo
tubes on a displacement of about 300 tons, and possessing a surface
speed of fourteen knots in combination with a submerged speed of ten
knots. When it is added that these craft possessed a full speed radius
of about 3,000 miles on the surface and were estimated to be able to
travel 150 miles under water, it is not surprising that German naval
opinion as to the advantages of the submarine underwent a sudden and
dramatic change. Henceforth the submarine was to be treated by German
naval officers with respect. Without the formality of any public
announcement, either in the Reichstag or in the Press, an under-water
boat was laid down at the Germania Yard at Kiel in 1906, and
thenceforward an energetic policy of construction was pursued, although
it was not until two years later that legislative provision was made
for the building of this type of warship.
A very remarkable feature of German policy has been the persistency
with which cruisers have been built even at a time when other naval
Powers, including Great Britain, were inactive. As a matter of course,
during the period when the German Government was content to provide
a fleet mainly for the purposes of coast defence, great importance
was attached to the efficiency and adequacy of the cruiser squadrons.
At the time of the passage of the Navy Act of 1900, for instance,
there were eighteen cruisers completed and nearly a dozen others in
hand. Under the Act of that year provision was made to continue this
policy while attaining a higher standard of battle strength.[11] Even
when, in 1908, legislative effect was given to the ambition of the
Marine Office further to expedite battleship construction, in spite of
the heavy cost involved by the transition from mixed armament ships
to the all-big-gun ships of the Dreadnought era, the Reichstag was
asked to stereotype the cruiser programme. The Act made provision
for two light cruisers to be laid down annually, and in the measure
passed in 1912 an addition of two "small cruisers" was made for
the period 1912-1917. A notable contrast is provided by a study of
Germany's action and the policy of the British Admiralty charged with
the protection of a vast oversea trade and half the shipping of the
world. During the later years of the last century and the first four
years of the present century a persistent policy of construction was
pursued both in armoured and protected cruisers, and then for several
years there was a complete cessation of this form of shipbuilding
activity. Other countries, Germany only excepted, either acting on
their own initiative or accepting the lead of the British authorities
also desisted from cruiser construction. The advance in the size and
cost of large armoured ships threw heavy burdens upon the respective
Exchequers, and no doubt the saving effected was a welcome relief at
a moment when under every flag naval expenditure was advancing at an
unparalleled rate. The result of the persistent policy adopted by
Germany became apparent in 1911, when in modern swift cruisers suitable
for scouting the two fleets were practically upon an equality. It was
in these circumstances, faced by evidence of German progress in cruiser
construction, that the British authorities again decided to embark
upon the building of new squadrons of cruisers of small size and high
speed--in fact, of considerably smaller size than the ships then in
hand in Germany.
But in battleship construction German policy has necessarily been
less continuous and consistent. The war between Russia and Japan in
the Far East, and the lessons which it taught to the naval world were
destined to upset completely the theories upon which battleship and
larger cruiser design in Germany had been based in the early years of
the present century. The German naval authorities had persisted in
attaching primary importance to the secondary gun, still believing in
the moral and material effect of a storm of projectiles from numerous
quick-firing guns. They were still proceeding with the construction of
ships--battleships and large cruisers--embodying these ideas when a new
Board of Admiralty in London, with Admiral Sir John--now Lord--Fisher
as First Sea Lord, appointed a Committee to reconsider the design of
British ships in the light of the information which the gunnery tests
of the fleet and the struggle in the Far East had supplied.
Thanks to the British alliance with the Japanese, British officers,
and British officers only, had been permitted to be present with
the Japanese Fleet during the decisive battles of the war. With the
advantage of the information thus obtained the designs of British
ships were reconsidered. The report of this Committee was treated as
confidential. In presenting the Navy Estimates for 1905 to the House of
Commons, the Earl of Selborne, the First Lord, contented himself with
making the following statement as to the work of this body, and of the
new programme of construction:
"I may claim that the work of the Committee will enable the Board to
ensure to the Navy the immediate benefit of the experience which is to
be derived from the naval warfare between Russia and Japan, and of the
resultant studies of the Naval Intelligence Department. I can however
hold out no hope that it will be consistent with the interests of the
public service to publish either the reference to the Committee or its
report.
"It is proposed to begin during the financial year 1905-06: 1
battleship, 4 armoured cruisers, 5 ocean-going destroyers, 1
ocean-going destroyer of the experimental type, 12 coastal destroyers,
11 submarines.[12]
"His Majesty has approved that the battleship should be called
the _Dreadnought_, and the first of the armoured cruisers the
_Invincible_."
It was not until many months later that it gradually became known
that the British Admiralty were embarking upon the construction of an
entirely new type of battleship, and it was even later that information
was available as to the character of the "armoured cruisers" mentioned
in the First Lord's statement. In the following spring a partial
revelation of the change in British design was made in the _Naval
Annual_:
"The _Dreadnought_, officially laid down at Portsmouth on October
2nd, 1905, though some material had already been built into her, was
launched by His Majesty on February 10th, 1906. The Admiralty announce
that the period of building for armoured vessels is to be reduced to
two years, but the _Dreadnought_ is to be completed in February, 1907.
The rapidity of her construction will therefore out-rival that of the
_Majestic_ and _Magnificent_, which were completed within two years
from the date of the laying of their first keel plates.
"The _Dreadnought_ represents a remarkable development in naval
construction, which has been for some time foreshadowed, notably
by Captain Cuniberti, the famous Italian naval constructor. The
Russo-Japanese War, more particularly the Battle of Tsushima,
established the fact that naval engagements can, and will, be fought
at greater distances than were formerly considered possible. Hence the
medium armament is held by many authorities to lose much of its value."
In the _Naval Annual_ of that year, it was reported that the Japanese
contemplated laying down a battleship with an armament of four 12-inch
and ten 10-inch guns. It was then announced that the _Dreadnought_ was
to carry a main armament of ten 12-inch 45 calibre guns, of 50 per
cent. greater power than those carried by the _Majestic_, while the
medium armament was to disappear entirely.
The question of protection entered also very largely into the
consideration, and _The Times_, in describing the new ship, said that
it was understood that "she was to be made as nearly unsinkable as
possible from the explosion of a torpedo or mine." It was even stated
that there would be no openings in the watertight bulkheads, and this
proved to be the fact. Moreover, this ship was the first large vessel
in the world to be fitted with turbines.
It was stated unofficially that this new ship of the all-big-gun
type rendered obsolescent practically all the battleships of the
world with mixed armaments--that is with guns of varying size. The
British naval authorities continued to maintain a discreet silence
as to the character of the new vessels, and the design, as its main
characteristics became known, was assailed with a good deal of
criticism. The controversy was at its height when President Roosevelt
called upon Commander Sims, the Inspector of Target Practice in the
United States Navy, to make a report upon the advantages possessed
by the all-big-gun ship of high speed and complete armour protection
in view of the criticism of the British design of Admiral Mahan.[13]
Commander Sims, who had made a life-study of gunnery questions,
prepared a long report describing the character of the revolution
in design, and its influence upon the navies of the world. It is
interesting to recall some passages from this report, which in its
essential portions appeared in the proceedings of the United States
Naval Institute, particularly as the British Admiralty have never
considered it wise to enter upon a detailed defence of their policy.
Commander Sims stated:
"Concerning the advisability of building all-big-gun ships, that
is, discarding all smaller guns (except torpedo-defence guns) and
designing the ships to carry the maximum number of heavy turret guns,
these alone to be used in battle against other ships, I think it
could be clearly shown that Captain Mahan is in error in concluding
that it would add more to our naval strength to expend the same
amount of money that the big ships would cost, for smaller and
slower ships, carrying the usual intermediate guns (6-inch, etc.);
and that, as in the question of speed, this error is due to the
fact that much important information concerning the new methods of
gun-fire was not considered by the author in preparing his article.
(Note.--Unfortunately these methods of gun-fire cannot at present be
specifically explained in a published article, as this would involve
a discussion of our methods of controlling our ships' batteries, and
bringing our ships into action with an enemy.)
"I may, however, assure the reader that, from the point of view of
the efficiency of gun-fire alone, it would be unwise ever to build
a man-of-war of any type whatever, having more than one calibre of
gun in her main battery. In other words, it may be stated that the
abandonment of mixed-battery ships in favour of the all-big-gun,
one-calibre ship was directly caused by the recognition of certain
fundamental principles of naval markmanship developed by gunnery
officers.
"Therefore we have but to decide what the calibre for each class
of ships should be, a decision which should present no special
difficulty, provided it be first determined how we are to defeat the
enemy--whether by the destruction of his ships (by sinking them or
disabling their guns) or by the destruction or demoralization of their
personnel.
"In this connection the following facts should first be clearly
understood--namely:
"1. Turrets are now, for the first time, being designed that are
practically invulnerable to all except heavy projectiles. Instead of
having sighting-hoods on the turret roof, where sights, pointers, and
officers are exposed to disablement (as frequently happened in the
Russian ships) there will be prismatic sights, projecting laterally
from the gun trunnions, through small holes in the side of the turret,
and the gun-ports will be protected by 8-inch armour plates, so
arranged that no fragments of shells can enter the turrets.
"2. On the proposed all-big-gun ships the heavy armour belt will be
about eight feet above the water-line, and extending from end to end.
The conning-tower, barbettes, etc., will be of heavy armour; and there
being no intermediate battery (which could not be protected by heavy
armour, on account of its extent), it follows that in battle all the
gunnery personnel, except the small, single fire-control party aloft,
will be behind heavy armour, and that, therefore, neither the ship or
her personnel can be materially injured by small calibre guns.
"Considering, therefore, that our object in designing a battleship
is that she may be able to meet those of our possible enemies upon
at least equal terms, it seems evident that it would be extremely
unwise to equip our new ships with a large number of small guns that
are incapable of inflicting material damage upon the all-big-gun
one-calibre ships of our enemies, or upon the personnel manning their
guns."
In the same paper Commander Sims explained the principal tactical
qualities that are desirable in a fleet--namely, compactness of the
battle formation and the flexibility of the fleet as a unit--that is,
its ability to change its formation in the least possible time and
space with safety to its units. Proceeding to elaborate his views,
Commander Sims stated:
"For example, suppose two fleets of eight vessels each, composed of
ships that are alike in all respects, and suppose their personnel to
be equally skilful, with the exception of the Commanders-in-Chief,
whose difference in energy and ability is such that one fleet has been
so drilled as to be able to manoeuvre with precision and safety while
maintaining one-half the distance between its units that the other
fleet requires.
"This is putting an extreme case, but it shows:
"1. That the short fleet, being about half the length of the other
one, can complete certain important manoeuvres in about one-half the
time and one half the space required for similar manoeuvres of the
long fleet.
"2. That, when ranged alongside each other, the defeat of the long
fleet is inevitable, since the rapidity of hitting of the individual
units is assumed to be equal, and each of the four leading ships of
the long fleet receives about twice as many hits as she can return,
though the eighth ship of the short fleet would suffer a preponderance
of gun-fire from the fifth or sixth vessel of the long fleet, the
seventh and eighth being too far astern to do much damage, as would
also be the case if the long fleet had several vessels astern of these.
"It is because of the principle here illustrated that the constant
effort of competent flag-officers is to reduce the distance between
the units of their fleets to the minimum that can be maintained with
safety under battle conditions--that is, while steaming at full speed,
without the aid of stadimeters, sextants, and other appliances that
should be used only for preliminary drills.
"Doubtless some flag-officers, by constant competitive exercises
in manoeuvring, may succeed in attaining an interval between ships
that is less by 15 or 20 per cent. than that attained by others; but
manifestly there is hardly any possibility of much greater improvement
in this respect, because the minimum practical interval between ships
depends upon their lengths and manoeuvring qualities. For example,
the German interval is 300 metres from centre to centre, while larger
ships, say 400 feet long, require about 400 yards, and those between
450 and 500 feet in length require about 450 yards.
"If we accept Captain Mahan's advice and build comparatively small,
low-speed battleships, while our possible enemies build large, swift,
all-big-gun ships, it seems clear that we will sacrifice the enormous
advantages of fleet compactness and flexibility, the superior effect
of heavy-gun fire and the ability to concentrate our fire--the loss of
these advantages to be fully realised twenty-five years hence, when
our enemies have fleets of big ships while we still have those of our
present size."
* * * * *
Finally, this officer added:
"If it be claimed that it would be better to reduce the speed of the
large vessel to sixteen knots and put the weight saved into guns,
it may be replied that the heavy turret guns cannot be mounted to
advantage (so as to increase the hitting capacity of the vessel)
without very considerably increasing the size of the ship, because the
number of heavy turrets that can be placed to advantage is governed
largely by the length of the ship--which increases slowly with the
displacement. This point is fully discussed in a recent article in a
German publication. I do not remember the displacement used by the
author to illustrate the principle, but, supposing the ones quoted
below to be correct, he shows that if it requires a displacement of
20,000 tons to obtain a broadside fire of, say, eight 12-inch turret
guns, you could not advantageously mount any additional turrets on
21,000 or 22,000 tons, but would have to go to 25,000 or 26,000
tons to obtain the necessary space. And, conversely, if you design a
20,000-ton battleship for sixteen instead of twenty knots, you cannot
utilise the weight saved to increase the gun-power by adding 12-inch
turrets, as you could by adding a number of intermediate guns.
"It is now hardly necessary to state that adding superimposed turrets
(by which the number of guns could be doubled, if the weights
permitted) does not materially increase the hitting capacity of the
ship as a whole, because of the 'interference' caused by having four
guns in one two-story turret, while it decreases her defensive power
by adding to the vertical height of her vital targets.
"Captain Mahan characterizes the sudden inclination in all navies to
increase the size of the new battleships (from about 15,000 to about
20,000 tons) as a 'wilful premature antiquating of good vessels' ...
'a growing and wanton evil.' If these words are intended in their true
meaning, the statement is to me incomprehensible. I can understand
an individual being wilful and wanton, but I cannot believe that the
naval officers of the world could, without good cause, be suddenly
and uniformly inspired in this manner. On the contrary, it seems to
me that the mere fact of there being a common demand for such large
vessels is conclusive evidence that there must be a common cause that
is believed to justify the demand.
"This common cause is undoubtedly a common belief that the same amount
of money expended for large war vessels will add more to a nation's
naval power than the same amount expended for small vessels, for it
cannot reasonably be assumed that the tax-ridden nations of Europe
expend their great naval budgets wilfully and wantonly. Undoubtedly
each nation earnestly strives to expend these sums as to derive the
greatest increase of naval power. The same is true in reference to
their armies. As the mechanical arts improve each nation endeavours to
improve its war material. When a nation adopts new rifles, it is not
a wilful premature antiquating of several million excellent ones, it
is a case of _force majeure_--it must adopt them or suffer a relative
loss of military efficiency, and it must make no mistake as to the
relative efficiency of its weapons. In 1870 the French suffered a
humiliating defeat as a direct result of the colossal conceit which
rendered them incapable of accepting conclusive evidence that the
German field artillery was greatly superior to theirs.
"The same law--that of necessity--governs the evolution of
battleships. As might have been expected, this evolution has, as a
rule, been gradual as regards increased displacement. The exception
is the sudden recent increase (4,000 to 5,000 tons) in displacement.
This exception therefore needs explanation.... It was due to a
complete change of opinion as to the _hitting capacity_ of guns of
various calibres. This is now well understood by all officers who
have recently been intimately associated with the new methods of
gunnery training. These methods have demonstrated this point in such
a manner as to leave no doubt in our minds as to the correctness of
our conclusions. The rapidity of hitting of the heaviest guns has been
increased several thousand per cent., and that of smaller guns about
in proportion to their calibre.
" ... The inception of the epoch-making principles of the new methods
of training belongs exclusively to Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Percy
Scott, Director of Naval Practice of the British Navy, who has, I
believe, done more in this respect to improve naval marksmanship
than all of the naval officers who have given their attention to
this matter since the first introduction of the rifled cannon on
men-of-war; nor should we forget that this degree of improvement
was rendered possible by the introduction of telescope sights, the
successful application of which to naval guns was made by Commander
B.A. Fiske, U.S. Navy, as early as 1892. As soon as the above facts
gained general acceptance in Great Britain and the United States, the
evolution of the all-big-gun one-calibre battleship became a foregone
conclusion; and the reason for the great increase in displacement, as
I understand it, is simply that you cannot build an efficient ship of
this class on less than about 20,000 tons, because you cannot mount
more than two 12-inch turrets to advantage upon a battleship of much
less displacement, because the length and breadth are not sufficient."
The Dreadnought design and all that it meant threw the German
Admiralty into confusion. At the moment they were still engaged in
the construction of the vessels of the Deutschland class, of about
13,000 tons, in which primary importance was given to the secondary
gun--fourteen 6·7-inch weapons--to the sacrifice of the big gun--four
11-inch pieces--and speed; whereas the new British design ignored the
secondary gun in order to mount no fewer than ten big guns, and develop
the speed to the extent of three or four knots above battleships then
building. Before the _Dreadnought_ of the British programme of 1905 had
been laid down at Portsmouth, two German battleships of the familiar
design with mixed armament had been begun--the _Schleswig Holstein_ in
the Germania Yard and the _Schlesien_ at Dantzic. So completely were
the German authorities unprepared for the revolution initiated by the
British Admiralty, that from the summer of 1905 until July, 1907, the
keel of not a single further battleship was laid in Germany. In the
meantime, while British yards were busy with vessels of the new type,
the design of the German ships was reconsidered. After an interval of
two years the keels of two vessels of the _Dreadnought_ type were laid
down, and two more keels were placed in position a month later--that
is, in August, 1907. These four ships--the Nassau class--inaugurated
the Dreadnought policy in Germany. Two were completed in May, 1910, and
two in September following.
These ships embody the all-big-gun principle in association with a
powerful secondary armament, consisting of a dozen 5·9-inch guns and
sixteen 24-pounders. Moreover, whereas the British Dreadnought had been
provided with only ten big guns, which was held by the British gunnery
experts to be the maximum number which could be carried with advantage
on the displacement then considered advisable, the German vessels were
given twelve guns, not of the 12-inch but of the 11-inch type. Each of
these ships displaces 18,600 tons, and has a nominal speed of twenty
knots. Their normal coal capacity is 885 tons, with a maximum storage
of 2,655 tons. On the other hand, the early British _Dreadnought_, with
about the same displacement and coal-carrying capacity, attained a
speed of one or two knots more, owing to the use of turbines in place
of reciprocating engines. The contrast between the armour and armament
of the British and German ships, comparing the four Nassaus of the
German Fleet[14] with the Superb class of the British Navy, is given in
the table on p. 129.
By energetic action the British Admiralty had obtained a lead in the
new type of battleship.[15] Moreover, even after the character of the
Dreadnought became known, the German authorities remained ignorant of
the fact that the "armoured cruisers" of the Invincible class were
really swift battleships carrying the same type of battle gun as the
_Dreadnought_, in association with a speed exceeding twenty-five
knots, and an armour belt not inferior to that placed on the latest
pre-Dreadnought German battleships. By this decisive move, the British
authorities had depressed the value of all mixed armament battleships,
in which the British Fleet was becoming weak in face of foreign--and
particularly German--rivalry, and had started the competition of
armaments on an entirely new basis upon terms of advantage.
No sooner was the true inwardness of the Dreadnought policy realized
than the German authorities began the preparation of a new German Navy
Act. It was eventually decided that the best
+--------+---------------------------+---------------------------+
| | Superb Class. | Nassau Class. |
+--------+---------------------------+---------------------------+
|Armour |Krupp: Complete |Krupp: Complete |
| | belt, about 16 ft. | belt, 12 in. amidships, |
| | wide (narrower | tapering |
| | aft), 11 in. amidships, | to 3·9 in. forward, |
| | tapering to | and 3·9 in. aft; |
| | 6 in. forward and | lower deck side, |
| | 4 in. aft; turrets, | 7·9 in. amidships, |
| | 8 in.; barbettes, | 3·9 in. narrow |
| | 12 in.; forward | belt at ends; turrets |
| | conning-tower, 12 | and barbettes, |
| | in.; after conning-tower,| 11 in.; battery, |
| | 8 in.; deck, | 6·1 in.; conning-tower, |
| | sloping, 2·7 in. | 11·8 in.; |
| | | deck, sloping, 2·9 in. |
|Armament|10 12-in. (45 calibres) |12 11-in. (45 calibres) |
| | in pairs in turrets, | in pairs in turrets, |
| | 1 forward, 1 on | 1 forward, 1 aft, |
| | each beam, 2 aft | and 2 on each |
| | on centre line; | beam; 12 5·9 in. |
| | 16 4-in. (50 calibres), | (45 calibres) in battery;|
| | 2 on each | 16 3·4 in. |
| | turret (except No. | (24-pounder); torpedo |
| | 4), 8 in superstructure; | tubes, 6 18-in., |
| | 5 machine; | submerged, bow, |
| | torpedo tubes, 5 | stern, and broadside. |
| | 18-in., submerged, | |
| | broadside, and | |
| | stern. | |
+--------+---------------------------+---------------------------+
means of accomplishing the end in view--namely, the construction of
a larger number of ships of the armoured classes in the next few
years than was provided in the Act of 1900, was to reduce the nominal
effective age, and legislate for the replacement of all battleships
and large cruisers within twenty years. Accordingly, attached to the
new Act passed early in 1908, which was over two years after the laying
down of the Dreadnought, was a schedule setting forth that four large
armoured ships should be laid down annually between 1908 and 1911,
both inclusive, and that in 1911 onwards to 1917, two keels annually
should be placed in position. By means of this single clause measure,
which became law on April 6th, 1908, the construction of ships of the
Dreadnought type was accelerated, and whereas the British Admiralty had
definitely abandoned the construction of large cruisers of the armoured
class--as the German authorities knew by this time--the Marine Office
decided that each of the "large cruisers" specified in the Act of 1900
should be swift Dreadnoughts.
This point is an important one. Between 1897 and 1904, Great Britain
laid down 27 battleships and 35 armoured cruisers--a total of 62
armoured ships in eight years, or an average of 7·75 ships a year. In
this period Germany built 16 battleships and 5 armoured cruisers, or
21 armoured ships--equal to an average of 2·62 ships a year. In 1905
the Admiralty determined to cease building armoured cruisers. In that
year they laid down 4 "capital ships"--all of them Dreadnoughts; in the
next two years 3 annually, and in 1908, 2 ships only. While the British
authorities abandoned the building of armoured cruisers, Germany
decided to accelerate her battleship construction, and she also decided
that all the "large cruisers" specified in her Law should be swift
Dreadnoughts, and thus from 38 battleships and 20 armoured cruisers,
she rose to an establishment of 58 battleships.
At the end of 1911, when it was imagined that the German programme
would fall from 4 large ships annually to 2 ships, a new Navy Bill was
produced.[16] Incidentally this measure added to the establishment
3 battleships and 2 unarmoured cruisers, and made provision for the
construction of a maximum of 72 submarines.
The significance of the successive changes in shipbuilding policy in
Germany, reflecting in an ascending scale the naval ambitions of the
Marineamt, may be realised from the following summary, showing the
establishment of large armoured ships fixed under successive measures:
+-----+----------------------------+
| Act.| Establishment of Ships |
| | Adopted. |
| +------------+---------------+
| |Battleships.|Large Cruisers.|
+-----+------------+---------------+
|1898 | 17 | 8 |
|1900 | 38 | 14 |
|1906 | 38 | 20 |
| | | |
| +----------------------------+
| | Dreadnoughts. |
|1908 | 58 |
|1912 | 61 |
+-----+----------------------------+
Under the operation of German naval legislation, it was determined to
provide sixty-one large armoured ships of maximum power, all of them
less than twenty years old. The Act did not specify the character of
the vessels of the various classes to be laid down. It was elastic in
this respect. It left to the Marine Office complete freedom in the
matter of design; but, on the other hand, it tied effectually the
hands of the Reichstag, and it could not, except it repealed the Navy
Law, reduce in any year the number of keels to be laid down. There
could be no reduction in the output of naval material until a new Navy
Law had been passed. This is a point which was frequently forgotten in
England.
But the notable feature of the Navy Act passed by the Reichstag in 1912
was not the additions to the shipbuilding programme, though these were
notable, but the steps taken to increase the instant readiness of the
fleet for war. Prior to the passage of this measure it had been the
practice in the British Navy to maintain only about half the men-of-war
of various classes on a war footing, relegating the remainder to
reserves representing various stages of preparedness for action. The
German Navy Act of 1912 set up an entirely new standard with a view to
obtaining the maximum advantage from a conscript service, where the pay
is low, in competition with a voluntary service, such as obtains in the
British Fleet, with very much higher rates of pay. In the speech which
he delivered in Committee in the House of Commons on July 22nd, 1912,
Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, gave a lucid
explanation of the essential features of this German Navy Act. He said:
"The main feature of that Law is not the increase in the new
construction of capital ships, though that is an important feature.
The main feature is the increase in the striking force of ships of all
classes which will be available, immediately available, at all seasons
of the year. A third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and
maintained in full commission as part of the active battle-fleet.
Whereas, according to the unamended Law, the active battle-fleet
consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle or large armoured cruisers, and
12 small cruisers; in the near future that active fleet will consist
of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small
cruisers; and, whereas at present owing to the system of recruitment
which prevails in Germany, the German Fleet is less fully mobile
during the winter than during the summer months, it will, through the
operation of this Law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered
much more readily available.
"Ninety-nine torpedo-boat destroyers--or torpedo-boats, as they
are called in Germany--instead of 66, will be maintained in full
commission out of a total of 144. Three-quarters of a million pounds
had already been taken in the general estimate for the year for the
building of submarines. The new Law adds a quarter of a million to
this, and that is a provision which, so far as we can judge from a
study of the finances, would appear to be repeated in subsequent
years. Seventy-two new submarines will be built within the currency of
the Law, and of those it is apparently proposed to maintain fifty-four
with full permanent crews.
"Taking a general view, the effect of this Law will be that nearly
four-fifths of the entire German Navy will be maintained in full
permanent commission--that is to say, instantly and constantly ready
for war. Such a proportion is remarkable, and so far as I am aware,
finds no example in the previous practice of modern naval Powers.
So great a change and development in the German Fleet involves, of
course, important additions to their personnel. In 1898 the officers
and men of the German Navy amounted to 25,000. To-day that figure has
reached 66,000.
"Under the previous Laws and various amendments which have preceded
this one, the Germans have been working up to a total in 1920,
according to our calculations, of 86,500 officers and men, and they
have been approaching that total by increments of, approximately, an
addition of 3,500 a year. The new law adds a total of 15,000 officers
and men, and makes the total in 1920 of 101,500.[17] The new average
annual addition is calculated to be 1,680 of all ranks, but for the
next three years by special provision 500 extra are to be added. From
1912 to 1914 500 are to be added, and in the last three years of the
currency of the Law 500 less will be taken. This makes a total rate of
increase of the German Navy personnel of about 5,700 men a year.
"The new construction under the Law prescribes for the building of
three additional battleships--one to be begun next year (1913), one in
1916, and two small cruisers of which the date has not yet been fixed.
The date of the third battleship has not been fixed. It has been
presumed to be later than the six years which we have in view.
"The cost of these increases in men and in material during the next
six years is estimated as £10,500,000 above the previous estimates
spread over that period. I should like to point out to the Committee
that this is a cumulative increase which follows upon other increases
of a very important character. The Law of 1898 was practically doubled
by the Law of 1900, and if the expenditure contemplated by the Law of
1900 had been followed the German estimates of to-day would be about
£11,000,000. But owing to the amendments of 1906 and 1908, and now of
1912, that expenditure is very nearly £23,000,000. But the fact that
the personnel plays such a large part in this new amendment, and that
personnel is more cheaply obtained in Germany than in this country,
makes the money go farther there than it would do over here.
"The ultimate scale of the new German Fleet, as contemplated by the
latest Navy Law, will be 41 battleships, 20 battle or large armoured
cruisers, and 40 small cruisers, besides a proper proportion--an ample
proportion--of flotillas of torpedo-boat destroyers and submarines, by
1920. This is not on paper a great advance on the figures prescribed
by the previous Law, which gave 38 battleships, 20 battle or large
armoured cruisers, and 38 small cruisers. That is not a great
advance on the total scale. In fact, however, there is a remarkable
expansion of strength and efficiency, and particularly of strength
and efficiency as they contribute to striking power. The number of
battleships and large armoured cruisers alone which will be kept
constantly ready and in full commission will be raised by the Law
from twenty-one, the present figure, to thirty-three--that is to say,
an addition of twelve, or an increase of about 57 per cent. The new
fleet will in the beginning include about twenty battleships and large
cruisers of the older types, but gradually, as new vessels are built,
the fighting power of the fleet will rise until in the end it will
consist completely of modern vessels.
"This new scale of the German Fleet--organized in five battle
squadrons, each attended by a battle or armoured cruiser squadron,
complete with small cruisers and auxiliaries of all kinds, and
accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and submarines, more
than three-fourths--nearly four-fifths, maintained in full permanent
commission--the aspect and scale of this fleet is, I say, extremely
formidable. Such a fleet will be about as numerous to look at as the
fleet which was gathered at Spithead for the recent Parliamentary
visit, but, of course, when completed it will be far superior in
actual strength. This full development will only be realized step
by step. But already in 1914 two squadrons will, so far as we can
ascertain, be entirely composed of Dreadnoughts, or what are called
Dreadnoughts, and the third will be made up of good ships like the
Deutschlands and the Braunschweigs,[18] together with five Dreadnought
battle-cruisers. It remains to be noted that this new Law is the fifth
in fourteen years of the large successive increases made in German
naval strength, that it encountered no effective opposition in its
passage through the Reichstag, and that, though it has been severely
criticized in Germany since its passage, the criticisms have been
directed towards its inadequacy."
Such is the evolution which German naval ambitions have undergone since
the Reichstag in the early years of the Emperor's reign refused to
believe that four relatively small battleships in full commission, with
the same number of ineffective coast-defence ships of small size, did
not represent the maximum naval power which Germany need provide, and
that an expenditure of two and three-quarter millions sterling was not
sufficient burden to impose annually upon the Teutonic peoples over and
above the cost in money and service of the predominant army.
Nothing reveals the statesmanship of Admiral von Tirpitz so strikingly
as the character of the naval legislation for which he has been
responsible, and the manner in which he has bent every influence
in Germany and every occurrence abroad to promote his ends. Prior
to the introduction of the Navy Act of 1898, the only example of a
continuous naval policy was the Naval Defence Act of 1889, under
which seventy ships of various types were added to the British Navy
during a period of four years. Of these vessels only ten were of the
armoured classes. This measure was confined to shipbuilding, and it
made no provision for increasing the personnel or for setting up a
fixed standard of commissioning. It merely provided a certain number
of ships and left it to Parliament to provide or not to provide crews
with which to man them, and, as a matter of fact, Parliament did not
provide the necessary officers and men until long after the ships were
at sea. Admiral von Tirpitz was not satisfied with so unmethodical and
unstatesman-like a measure of procedure when he went to the Marineamt
in 1897. He presented to the Reichstag a complete scheme of naval
expansion, making provision not only for the construction of ships in
specified numbers over a period of six years, but providing also for
the due expansion of the personnel and for the attainment of a fixed
establishment of ships first in full commission, secondly with nucleus
crews, and thirdly in reserve. In obtaining the assent of the Reichstag
to this measure, which to a great extent removed the naval expansion
movement from the control which it had hitherto exercised annually on
the presentation of the Estimates, the Minister of Marine achieved his
first great triumph.
This Act was to have remained in operation for a period of six years,
and was represented as an embodiment of German needs, quite independent
of the naval preparations then being made by other Powers. During the
next two years no development occurred in the naval programmes either
of Great Britain or other foreign countries, but an Anglophobe wave
passed over the Continent as a result of the South African War. German
sympathies in particular were aroused, and Admiral von Tirpitz at once
seized the opportunity to repeal the fixed and immutable Fleet Law of
1898, and to replace it by a new enactment providing a Battle Fleet of
roughly twice the strength of that legalized in the establishment of
the former measure. This measure was to have remained in force until
1917. Six years later--a Liberal Government, intent on disarmament,
having assumed office in the United Kingdom--an amendment representing
another expansion was passed; two years after that the fourth Fleet
Law became operative, and in 1912 another measure was adopted by the
Reichstag under the influence of a renewed Anglophobe movement in
Germany. Experience has shown that German Fleet Laws are regarded as
immutable and fixed when proposals in the direction of a limitation
of armaments are made, but as flexible as though no Fleet Law existed
when political circumstances are favourable for making a further effort
towards a higher standard of naval power.
Nor does this study exhaust the remarkable features of this naval
legislation. An ordinary statesman, ignorant of naval matters, might
have so framed the successive Naval Laws as seriously to tie the hands
of the naval authorities in the development of the fleet, whereas
Admiral von Tirpitz, with great skill, restricted the powers of
interference on the part of the Reichstag, while leaving the Marine
Office with almost complete freedom in shaping the naval machine in
the process of expansion. This double end was achieved by the use of
generic naval terms in the loose manner adopted by those unfamiliar
with their significance. Admiral von Tirpitz made up his "paper"
establishment in the Fleet Laws by styling every ship of slow speed
but carrying an armoured belt "a battleship," and then, under the
terms of the Law, he made provision for these dummy vessels to be
replaced by veritable battleships of maximum power. Thus ships of
4,000 tons displacement have been replaced by Dreadnoughts of 25,000
tons, carrying the heaviest guns, and protected by thick armour. The
establishment fixed by the Reichstag has not been exceeded, but by
a simple process of conjuring, small coast-defence ships have been
quietly converted into first class sea-going battleships, ranking in
strategical and tactical qualities with the most formidable ships in
the British Fleet. The naval authorities have by this means been
able to prove to the uninitiated when challenged that they have kept
within the four corners of the Law, that the number of battleships has
remained fixed according to the establishment between the periods of
each enactment, and at the same time they have been in a position to
follow an active shipbuilding policy, while raising from year to year
the necessary personnel for manning the new vessels. This in another
notable feature of Admiral von Tirpitz's policy. The legislation
has been so elastic as to enable him to raise the necessary number
of officers and men to suit the requirements of the Fleet. When a
Dreadnought, requiring 1,106 officers and men, has been completed for
sea to take the place of a ship of the Hagen class, with a crew of only
306, the additional personnel has been instantly ready.
The same process has been adopted in increasing the cruiser squadrons
of the German Navy. The Law has specified that a certain number of
"large cruisers" shall be built, and it has been left to the discretion
of the naval authorities to interpret this elastic term in tons,
guns, armour, knots of speed, and personnel. In accordance with the
Law, Admiral von Tirpitz has thus been able to replace cruisers of
negligible fighting value and of small size by Dreadnought battle
cruisers mounting guns of immense power and attaining speeds hitherto
without precedent. Similarly, small torpedo-boats have given way in the
establishment of the Navy to torpedo-boat destroyers of large size,
and step by step the naval strength of Germany has been increased by a
process, the cleverness and ingenuity of which even the German people
themselves have not realized.
Germany has immensely increased her resources of ships and men, but
she has done more than that: she has forced other Powers to organize
and train their squadrons on a standard of efficiency never attempted
in the past. She has increased the strain and stress of peace until it
resembles closely the actual conditions of war, and having determined
year in and year out to keep nearly four-fifths of her fleet always on
a war footing, always instantly ready for action, she has compelled
other countries, in accordance with the dictates of ordinary foresight,
to take similar action, however onerous the financial burden. It is on
Great Britain and the United States that the weight of this burden has
borne most heavily, for in those States alone is reliance placed on a
voluntary system of manning, which is necessarily very costly.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 8: It is interesting to note, however, that even at this
early date the German Admiralty made provision for the storage of oil
in order to supplement the coal supply.]
[Footnote 9: _Cf._ Appendix I.]
[Footnote 10: The five later ships were given a belt with a thickness
of 9·4 inches amidships, but otherwise their protection and armament
closely resembled those laid down at an earlier date.]
[Footnote 11: See Appendix II.]
[Footnote 12: One of these "armoured cruisers" was not built.]
[Footnote 13: It has since become known that the Americans had designed
an all-big-gun ship before the British Dreadnought was laid down.]
[Footnote 14: British naval opinion held from the first that these
ships of the Nassau type vitiated the Dreadnought principle of
simplicity of armament, and were so over-gunned as to be ineffective
units. Sea-service has tended to confirm this view.]
[Footnote 15: In the three succeeding years, in accordance with the
British Government's policy of a limitation of naval armaments, and
as an example to other Powers, this advantage was partially lost, and
hence the large programme of 1909-10.]
[Footnote 16: _Cf._ Appendix II.]
[Footnote 17: In his speech in the House of Commons on March 26th,
1913, the First Lord corrected this figure. He stated that the maximum
to be attained under the new Fleet Law in 1920 was 107,000, apart from
reserves.]
[Footnote 18: These two groups of ships are of practically the same
design.]