soon succeeded through the interlinking relationships of high officers,
some of whom supported its activities, in putting out tentacles into
the first and third bureaus of the army as well--those concerned
respectively with direction of operations and supplies--in other words
the two departments which in June were responsible respectively for
the orders to retreat and for the failure of the front-line troops to
receive ammunition and aid from the aviation.
It may be noted also that several of these high officers who were
sympathetic to the Cagoulard movement were in particularly close
contact with Marshal Pétain who had his own devoted followers in the
army, just as all other first-rank military leaders, like Gamelin and
Weygand, had also, whether they were on the active list or retired.
All this may seem incredible. It is difficult to believe that French
officers of high rank should have acted in the interests of Germany
during the war, thus contributing to bring about their country’s
downfall. Even though the Cagoulards, an emanation of the Deuxième
Bureau, may have maintained contact with the Germans several years
before the war; even if unsuccessful newspapermen like Gaxotte may have
made up for deficits by accepting subsidies from the Nazis, it still
seems fantastic that the military leaders of France, whose patriotism
no one has ever doubted, should have acted as traitors in time of war.
It seems to be a moral impossibility.
The explanation is simple. Neither the Cagoulards, nor the editors
of _Je Suis Partout_, nor the French officers who were in relations
with them, ever believed at any moment that they were traitors. If
history sets them down as having betrayed France, the verdict will be
incomprehensible to them. They believed themselves to be patriots. It
is our privilege, if we wish, to see them rather as pitiful victims of
German Propaganda.
What happened was this: Long before the war, the Nazi secret service
realized that both the Cagoulards and the staff of _Je Suis Partout_
were worth cultivating because of their connections with members of
the French General Staff, and with officers of influence close to such
leaders as Pétain, among others.
Friendly relations were established, and the Germans hammered away with
arguments like these:
“You Frenchmen consider that we Germans are your hereditary enemies.
There’s no reason why you should think so. Our two peoples should
be able to live and work side by side without friction. It’s true
we’ve had trouble in the past, but why? Because England, who can only
maintain her influence on the continent if the continental nations are
divided, has constantly stirred us up against each other.
“Besides that, we have not fought against the real France. Our wars
were against the French Republic. For 150 years that regime has usurped
the place of the real France. In 1789 the English provoked the French
Revolution to weaken your nation, and since then your people seem to
have forgotten its great destiny.
“The Revolution of France started in the lodges of Freemasonry, which
were implanted in your country by England. The Freemasons operated
with English and Jewish help; for the last 150 years, you have been
under the control of the same powers. For the last twenty years these
powers have been cooperating with international Communism and thus have
brought another danger into your country.
“Wake up! Denounce the English alliance, expel the Jews from important
positions, suppress Freemasonry, as we have done in Germany. The danger
of Communism will be over, and there will be no obstacle to a happy and
peaceful understanding between France and Germany.”
This bait was eagerly taken. It made no difference that this account
was inaccurate, and might easily have been refuted. It was the sort of
thing that right-wing Frenchmen of anti-Republican and antidemocratic
leanings were ready to hear, and it provided a moral basis for
cooperation between them and the Germans. Supplied with a patriotic
motive for destroying their domestic political opponents, convinced
that in so doing they would not open the way to the hereditary enemy
but on the contrary make him a friend, these Frenchmen no longer had
any scruples about accepting subsidies for the arming of the Cagoulards
and the publication of _Je Suis Partout_ from an ally in the common
cause of continental peace and friendship.
The Germans had found the ideal sophism with which to gain friends
within the French Army. They realized, of course, that they could
not hope to influence a majority of General Staff officers, but they
knew also that an active minority, so convinced it is right that it
is willing to use any methods to achieve its aims, can arrive at its
objectives at decisive moments by obstructing the course of action
decided upon by the majority. And among the officers whom German
propaganda had reached were many so placed that they could easily block
the complicated intermeshing gears of the army machine at the critical
juncture.
Relationships between the Germans and their friends in France were
maintained even after the beginning of the war through various neutral
countries. Ferdonnet continued to communicate with Mouton and the staff
of _Je Suis Partout_. Michelin, the big automobile tire manufacturer
whose name was whispered all over France as that of one of the men
behind the Cagoulards, sent frequent messengers to Switzerland. Pétain
himself was French Ambassador to Spain, and several members of his
entourage maintained contact with members of the German Embassy in
Madrid. There were even rumors that Pétain had secret meetings with the
German Ambassador, though this was denied. The theme the Germans were
singing to their French friends now was a development of that which
they had dinned into them earlier. It had evolved into this:
“We did not want this war. You yourselves did your utmost to avoid it.
But now that it has come it is a fact which we cannot leave out of
account. Both of us wanted to create a better understanding between our
two countries, to be followed by an alliance. The war now prevents us
from reaching our goal by direct means.
“If you concluded a separate peace with us, we could still become your
allies. We know, of course, that you and your friends, who have the
true interests of your country at heart, and can see into the future
more clearly than the others, would eagerly accept this solution. But
you have not the power to do it; and even if you had, the people who
have been worked up by war propaganda to hate us, would never agree to
it. There is only one case now in which the French people would accept
a separate peace; and that, unfortunately, is if France suffers a
military defeat.
“It must seem monstrous to you even to envisage a French defeat. We
understand that. We sympathize with you. But suppose you knew that
it would not be a real defeat. Suppose we could arrange a simulated
defeat, which would bring the French people to accept the idea of an
armistice whether the English are ready to fight or not?
“We can give you a binding promise that if France can be apparently
defeated in this manner, she will not be treated as a defeated nation.
On the contrary, you will immediately become Germany’s ally and we will
cooperate to build up a new order in Europe. You have only to break
definitely with England as proof of your good faith.
“Of course, a brief occupation of certain parts of France by German
troops would be necessary to make the defeat look real and to persuade
the population to accept it. One of the purposes of the occupation
would be to purge France of the elements which you dislike just as much
as we do, and which stand in your way in your task of resuscitating the
real France from her torpor of a century and a half. But when it is
all over, when our troops have been withdrawn, you will be in control
of a new and reborn France which with the new Germany will impose upon
Europe an era of strength and prosperity for both of us.”
Once again the bait was taken. Its effect was felt in extremely
influential circles. I have personally been able to verify conclusively
the fact that Marshal Pétain, having invited two highly placed
Spaniards to dine with him in Hendaye in November 1939, said to his
guests: “Do not judge France by its present appearance. Democracy
is finished everywhere. Next spring will see a movement in France
comparable to your own national uprising.”
Such a phrase in the mouth of a French Ambassador who was at the same
time a French military leader was extremely significant. What other
meaning could a revolt in wartime have except that its intent was to
end the war? What other reason could there have been for waiting until
spring except that this period was the best for a German offensive?
It was not necessary, as I have already noted above, to transform all
or even a majority of the officers of the French General Staff, into
accomplices in order to provoke a French defeat. If in a big business,
a few accountants, an assistant cashier, the head of the sales
department, and one or two keymen in the stock department took part in
a conspiracy to ruin the firm, their simultaneous coordinated sabotage
would inevitably achieve their aim--and with particular ease if the
organization of the company were faulty.
There were some faults with the French Army, certainly. Was morale
unsatisfactory? Was equipment inadequate? Undoubtedly, but the
situation in these respects was not strikingly different from that of
1914-1918. The decisive factor seems to have been faults in the high
command--important information regarding the movements of the enemy
was not relayed in time, orders to army corps suffered considerable
delays, the supply service left equipment and matériel of all sorts in
the depots instead of sending it to strategically important points.
From June 13 on, troops in good fighting shape received everywhere
mysterious orders for retreat which puzzled them most of all, at the
same time that French statesmen were hearing from French generals (most
of them may have spoken with complete good faith), that all troops were
fleeing in disorder. Confusion was so great and news of the retreat so
unexpected that nobody thought to investigate the hidden causes of the
disaster.
Shortly after the armistice, the same announcement was repeated in
French by the Stuttgart radio several evenings in succession. It was
this: “Frenchmen, in a few days we will give you the name of an
outstanding countryman of yours who was our principal agent in France,
and who helped to bring about your defeat.”
Everyone in the French unoccupied zone either heard this broadcast or
heard about it. There was naturally a good deal of guessing as to the
name that would be given by the Germans. For my part, I made a bet that
no name would ever be given by Stuttgart. My reasoning was this: That
there was such a man or men I didn’t doubt for an instant. But I didn’t
doubt also that he had not expected the terrible armistice conditions
imposed upon France. He had led his country into what he had thought
would be a fake defeat on the basis of his confidence in the honesty of
the Germans. By then he had discovered that they were not honest, and
that it was a real defeat that had been inflicted upon the country. He
saw that the Nazis intended to treat the country with all the severity
of genuine conquerors, and that he and his friends had been dupes.
I supposed then, that this man had tried to force the Germans to live
up to their promises and to treat France as an ally. He would have
pointed out that the new Pétain government had turned against England,
as had been agreed. And he would have threatened to reveal everything
if Germany did not hold to her bargain, thus ending the acceptance of
defeat on the part of the French people by letting them know that they
had not in fact been militarily defeated.
Germany’s answer was the Stuttgart broadcast. Her French agent had
tried to threaten her. She simply returned the blackmail, reminding him
forcefully that the Reich no longer cared whether the French people
knew how it had been defeated or not, since the Army was disbanded,
the strategic points occupied, and the people helpless to resume the
fight. He was reminded also what his own position would be if the story
came out. He saw that he had to keep silence to save himself, and the
Germans, perfectly willing that silence should be kept, never honored
their promise to reveal his name.
It was on the basis of this theory that I expected in advance that the
Stuttgart radio would not follow up its announcement. Since it did not,
I feel justified in assuming that the reasoning which enabled me to
arrive at a correct prediction was probably correct itself.
As if to confirm all this, Pétain himself later made a very mild speech
in which he timidly asked the Germans whether they intended to accept
the new France as a full-fledged partner in the reconstruction of
Europe. France’s new rulers have kept all the promises they had given
the Germans. They have cut off relationships with England, dissolved
the Freemasons, attacked the Jews, delivered up anti-Hitler German
refugees, fought the British at Oran, Dakar, and in Syria. They have
slavishly obeyed Hitler’s commands and now they are naively surprised
because Hitler has not kept his promise to free France and make her
independent again. With the true psychology of a dupe they had believed
that Hitler might fool others, but never themselves.
_That ends the statement of my French friend._
* * * * *
Q. _How would you sum up Pétain? Is he a patriot or a traitor, or
misguided, or what?_
A. He is first of all a very old, too-old man. Only a man who had
lost his judgment could surrender his country to Hitler as Hindenburg
did and as Pétain did, both under a profound misconception of
Hitler. Pétain is intensely religious and identifies Communism with
anti-Christ, the only enemy, failing to perceive that the most powerful
foe of Christianity to appear on earth since Christ lived is Hitler.
It is a mistake to call Pétain a Fascist; he is a medievalist. He
believes the principal goal of life is to prepare for the other
world, and the man who can do that best is the man whose activity is
closest to nature, the peasant, and the man whose mind is not confused
by learning, the illiterate peasant. Therefore he wants a France of
uneducated, devout peasants; he does not mind at all the plan of Hitler
to abolish French industry.
He is a defeatist at heart; the affairs of this earth are not worth
fighting for. It is on record that at Verdun he several times wished
to surrender. As a defeatist he believes in superior force and can be
as ruthless when he is in possession of it as he can be submissive
when he has lost it. His suppression of the mutinies in the French
Army was notoriously harsh; the statistics of the killed have yet to
be published. He accepts the French birth rate as a fact of superior
force to which France must bow and his experience of the bloodletting
at Verdun reinforced his conviction that France ought not to try to
maintain a predominant place in Europe.
As an old man his vivid memories are of the past, and Germany, though
marching under the pirate swastika, remained for him in 1940 the
Germany which let France off lightly in 1871. He once told a friend
how impressed he was with the behavior of the German commander at
Verdun who allowed French officers to retain their swords after one of
the surrenders of Douaumont. In this venerable confidence that he was
dealing with gentlemen, he gave up. The most pathetic words uttered in
this war were those of Pétain when he addressed his petition for an
armistice to Hitler with the words, “I speak as soldier to soldier.”
Q. _Why was that pathetic; isn’t Hitler a soldier?_
A. Yes, indeed, but the meaning of the old marshal’s words was,
“I speak to you as gentleman to gentleman,” and that is the most
pathetic sentence of the war, because it contains the utter failure
of the French to understand that not only is Hitler not a gentleman,
but Hitler would be the first indignantly to repudiate a title he
despises. The code of a gentleman is derived from the Christian code,
which Hitler and his Nazi-Nietzchean followers despise. They curse
Christ as a Jewish weakling whose religion is for slaves. They spit
upon the elementary idea of fair play. A group of devoted young Nazis,
a dozen strong, who have just beaten to death a crippled Jew, will be
clear of conscience, joyful as though they had done a good deed, and
utterly unable to understand the American or British notion that it is
not even enjoyable sport to attack with odds of twelve to one. It is
sport to them. Pétain had not the faintest notion that the sons of the
Germans he had known had come to this. So with his eyes closed, and
dreaming of the past, he accepted the promise of a position for France
of junior partner to Germany.
Q. _Is Pétain moved by personal ambition?_
A. He is consumed by it. He did not accept with reluctance the post
of “Chief of the Government” after Reynaud fell, but gladly, feeling
that he had finally received the recognition denied him when Foch was
made Commander in Chief. He does not consider himself a Fuehrer or a
Duce. He is much nearer the position of his fellow clericalist, the
_caudillo_, Franco, who never clearly understood the meaning of Nazism
and was repelled by what he did understand.
Pétain does not understand Fascism or Nazism but only sees that they
control the mob, and he wishes above all to see the mob controlled as
an army, to be drilled and disciplined into hardworking, God-fearing
Frenchmen, obedient in civil as in religious life. His religious
feeling dominates all his actions. In Bordeaux, the day Reynaud
resigned, I was told Pétain’s words as he heard the debacle was
reaching its end: “France must suffer for her sins!” Mystically he
surrendered, and mystically he still exclaimed a year later to a nation
which had endured twelve months of injury and abasement with no
prospect of relief, “You are suffering and must suffer for a long time
still because we have not yet paid for all our mistakes.”
To the old Marshal, France’s troubles began with the Revolution of
1789, and to cure them he wants to take France back to the Ancien
Regime. He wants to do away with liberty, because liberty is synonymous
with license and license with sin. Theoretically he is a monarchist,
but now that he has become Regent, like Horthy of Hungary, he does not
want a king. This period Pétain regards as France’s purgatory, which he
gladly endures, confident of a better world. Many Frenchmen recognize
Pétain’s good intentions but do not believe they will save him from
Hell.
Q. _Why, if the Germans have such a hold over Pétain, have they not
forced him to surrender the French fleet and to give them the use of
the North African naval and air bases? If Pétain is in fear of being
revealed by the Germans as one who helped bring about the French
defeat, why can’t the Germans get anything they want from him?_
A. First, because Pétain is more useful to the Germans than the French
fleet and the North African bases. Who else could lead so many of the
French people to submit and collaborate as they are doing today under
Pétain? Pétain does Hitler’s work for him. Pétain coaxes the plunder
from the French people in the form of taxes and hands it to Hitler in
the form of payment for maintenance of the army of occupation. If the
Germans ever exposed him, he would lose his position and they would
lose their most useful servant.
Second, the more time that elapses since the armistice, the less
effective is the German blackmail threat on Pétain, because as time
passes people become less interested in what happened, and as
experience with the Germans deepens, fewer people can be found to
believe any German explanation.
Third, Pétain, with all his senility, must have realized that it is
not nearly as certain now that Germany will win, as it was when he
surrendered. The Russian resistance, much as Pétain hates and despises
Bolshevism, must have made him think; and the growing belligerence of
America must have had some effect upon him. As he becomes less and less
convinced that Germany is certain to win he should logically become
less submissive to the Germans. On the other hand, he is not likely to
revolt openly until he is convinced Germany will lose; and the only way
to give him such conviction is for the United States to enter the war.
Q. _What would Hitler do if he finally tired of fooling with Vichy?_
A. He would simply march in and occupy all of France. He could do
it with a handful of divisions, since the French have been totally
disarmed or at least as fully disarmed as it was possible for
the Germans to do. But from then on he would have the trouble of
administering the whole country and collecting the taxes which Pétain
collects for him now. I do not think he is anxious to increase his
responsibilities that way now. Pétain knows this too, and that stiffens
the old man’s backbone a little. Essentially though the Vichy attitude
will always depend on the question who is going to win the war. I
should think that when the defeat of Hitler is assured, the Vichy
government may be overthrown and another or Free French, de Gaulle
government may re-enter the war on our side. Pétain and Darlan it seems
to me are too compromised ever to do that.
Q. _What about Darlan?_
A. Darlan undoubtedly sees more clearly than Pétain, but he is less
honorable; indeed I have heard highly placed Englishmen who knew
him intimately curse him with concentrated bitterness as the vilest
traitor of the lot. Few people would describe Pétain as consciously
dishonorable. Few of the men around Pétain are spared the charge by
Frenchmen who know them best.
Darlan has no respect from anybody. He has been all his life a
political sailor, having had his start from his father, one-time
Minister of Justice. His politics were consistently opportunistic.
Today he helps head a government that has suppressed Freemasonry; yet
he was a Freemason when to be a Freemason was an asset. He helps keep
Leon Blum in confinement; yet he supported Blum when Blum was in power.
He is now the fiercest advocate of fighting England; yet until Reynaud
fell he supported the policy of moving the government to North Africa
and carrying on.
He switched when he perceived the chance of becoming head man in the
appeasement government. His change of heart was literally overnight.
In London immediately after the fall of France, an old friend of mine,
an officer of the French Navy whose ship had broken away and come to
England, told me Darlan had issued an order to all vessels of the Navy
that with the signing of the Armistice they should make for French
African or other friendly ports and prepare to go on with the war;
twenty-four hours later another code message from Darlan countermanded
the order and directed all ships to make for French ports. In the
interval Darlan had been promised a seat next to the Chief of the Vichy
State.
Nothing in Darlan’s record indicates that he has ever acted except
for the purpose of furthering his career; he is characterized by the
French as the perfect careerist, and the word has even less flattering
connotations in French than in English. The one instinct in him
which seems to have persisted without variance is his hatred of the
British, based upon the centuries-old rivalry of the French and British
navies. While the French were in the war we Americans forgot that the
memory of Trafalgar is for the French Navy, or for its older officers
anyway, stronger than the memory of the four years of Franco-British
comradeship on the battlefields of 1914-1918.